

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

States of Terror: Statehood as a new Feature of Terrorist Organizations

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that the bachelor thesis was entirely my own work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature sources are attributed and cited in references.

Bratislava, February 22, 2016

Lukáš Školek

Signature: _____

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Abstract

The subject of this thesis is the statehood and statehood-like actions of the Islamic State and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The research question that will be answered is: Is our understanding of international terrorist organizations still adequate, given the many elements of statehood that can be observed with the Islamic State and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam?

The existing research focuses on the IS' propaganda and foreign recruitment, which are crucial topics, but this thesis will look at something different. These two terrorist organizations have not been put in a detailed comparison. Out of the three main chapters the first one will lay theoretical basis for the argument, while the latter two will be the case studies. The hypothesis will argue that the Islamic state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam established a quasi-statehood by using state-like-infrastructure, controlling their territory and providing for their citizens, and on this scale, it is a new trend amongst terrorist groups, hence we should update our understanding of them.

The other questions this thesis is going to encounter will be: What, other than foreign recognition, makes statehood legitimate? Is Islamic State primarily a state or a terrorist group? What is international-terrorism? The questions are answered using analysis of relevant sources such as books, articles and primary sources published by the terrorist organizations.

Názor: Štáty terroru: Štátnosť ako nová črta teroristických organizácií

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Abstrakt

Predmetom tejto práce je štátnosť a štátotvorné konanie organizácií Islamský štát a Tigre Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu. Výskumná otázka, ktorá bude zodpovedaná, znie: Je naše chápanie teroristických organizácií stále adekvátne, keďže v skupinách Islamský štát a Tigre Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu nachádzame mnohé prvky štátnosti?

Existujúci výskum sa zaoberal propagandou Islamského štátu a zahraničným náborom, čo sú dôležité témy, ale táto práca sa orientuje na niečo iné. Tieto dve teroristické organizácie zatiaľ neboli detailne porovnávané. Z troch hlavných kapitol práce, prvá načrtne teóriu a ďalšie dve budú prípadové štúdie. Hypotézou práce je tvrdenie, že Islamský štát a Tigre Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu utvorili štátnosť pomocou štátnej infraštruktúry, kontrolou teritória a poskytovaním služieb pre svojich občanov a na takejto škále, je to nový trend medzi teroristickými skupinami, preto by sme mali aktualizovať naše chápanie medzinárodných teroristických organizácií.

Ostatné otázky, ktoré táto práca zodpovie sú: Čo, okrem medzinárodného uznania, dáva štátnosti legitimitu? Je Islamský štát primárne štátom alebo teroristickou organizáciou? Čo je medzinárodný terorizmus? Otázky budú zodpovedané pomocou analýz relevantných zdrojov, ako kníh, článkov, a prvotných zdrojov publikovaných teroristickými skupinami.

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Introduction

There is no terror in the bang, only in the anticipation of it.

- Alfred Hitchcock

In the current age, everything gets abbreviated. What once used to be a privilege is now a wide spread trend. At first, it probably belonged to currencies, but with the emergence of radio stations then television networks, the means of communications revealed new unparalleled possibilities for information delivery. The era of abbreviations has begun. Objective of every media was to pass the information fast. But the competition to be the fastest continued on the wireless field, where the speeds are equal. The only way to be faster here is to make the data simpler. This however, complicates an awful lot, especially in a context where the public opinion plays a major role. It makes the people think they are getting the full story, that what is said is everything there is to be said. It is not only the names that get abbreviated, the content also suffers. The big fonts shout that the ancient site of Palmyra is being destroyed, yet only a few struggle to explain why. The not-knowing then breeds generalizations, misconceptions, hatred. The point is, no single source can deliver the whole story, and no matter how hard I worked on this thesis, it will not do so either.

Terrorism is a theme that everyone knows of, yet they know so little about it. It has a long history and for the most part its figures are not lunatics. Terrorist plots are not random occurrences; it is often quite the opposite. The place, the time, the method, the victims, the executors of it are carefully thought through. With a process this complex, an internal structure is bound to be far from random as well. In fact on the international level, a terrorist network sounds more accurate, than an organization or a group. Research in this discipline might come out as a fascination, but it is only done to better understand the threat terrorism poses and the ways to get rid of it. Political ambitions of terrorism are threatening the state and society, therefore it is the political scientists who are well suited to study this field.

International terrorism as an academic discipline became truly popular only after the September 11 attacks. A lot more was being published and the topic gets more attention from the Western society. There is at least a couple of significant issues in the field, that every writer has to face. First, it is the multiplicity of definitions of terrorism. There is no single widely accepted definition of the key term, so usually a writer uses one that best fits to the focus of his work. Some definitions would include even Greenpeace as a terrorist organization (Long, 2004, pp. 4-6). The variety of terrorist groups is not the only problem that arises when defining terrorism; it is also its evolution that comes into play. Bruce Hoffman's *Inside Terrorism* illustrates both of these important factors that make it hard to define terrorism (Hoffman, 2006).

The second complication that arises is a lack of academic sources concerning the newest developments in the field. The scholars are hesitant of writing anything that might be proven wrong in near future. The Islamic state for example, is approached carefully and the academic texts stick to the descriptive and informative parts, rather than drawing conclusions about its existence or future actions.

Literature Review

The lag in publishing major texts about new topics indicates that there is some common knowledge of terrorism; it is just not bound in a single definition. Rather than a definition, the history and interpretation of terrorism in various eras are set as a common basis for any future research. In the theoretical part of this thesis, together with Hoffman's *Inside Terrorism*, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy*, *Containing the Threat* will be used to submerge into the topic of terrorism and outline its development over the course of history (Richardson, 2007). A document titled *International Terrorism* by Brian M. Jenkins was produced to educate United States Air Force officers about terrorism and it will supplement the examination of theory of terrorism (Jenkins, 1985).

It is important to begin with this theme, not only because bigger texts on terrorism do, but because this thesis is directly linked to it. The present day outburst of terrorism in the Middle East is not to be considered the same as the one that has occurred a decade ago. It could be a critical generalization to view the Islamic State as a similar organization to the Al Qaeda, because countermeasures are produced based on one's perception of the situation. So what organization is then comparable to the Islamic State?

The Islamic State's uniqueness lies in its large area control and state-like actions and when these are taken as the criteria, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are very similar to the Islamic State. The Cage, whose author was a UN spokesman in Sri Lanka, is an essential source of information about the circumstances in the northern Sri Lanka in-between the late nineteen-eighties and the 2000s (Weiss G. , 2012). Written by professor Paul Moorcraft, who had access to interview key figures of this conflict, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers* is another key text that will help in elaborating the similarity between the Islamic State and The Tamil Tigers (Moorcraft, 2014). In this conflict a narrative and naming plays a big role and *Liberation Struggle or Terrorism?* points out to that (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005).

The main source that will be used when writing the case study on the Islamic State is *Rise of Islamic State*, which is written by a respected journalist (Cockburn, 2015) (Weiss & Hassan,

2015) As for the primary sources statements published by the Islamic State and its propaganda videos will also be mentioned. The State of Things to Come by Safia Aoude will serve the purpose of researching state-like actions done by the Islamic State (Aoude, 2014).

From what is mentioned thus far, it is obvious that this thesis will concentrate around the questionable statehood in both of these cases. Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents is much needed literature about the concept of modern statehood and will certainly help in doing the comparison (Grant, 1999). Statehood without external recognition is discussed in Robert H. Jackson's Quasi-states: international relations and the Third World (Jackson, 1993). Charles Tilly, in his Bringing the State Back In, talks about war-making as state-making which can be implied on the case studies as well (Tilly, 1985). These themes put together lead to a central question, which this thesis should answer. The research question then is: Is our understanding of international terrorist organizations still adequate, given the many elements of statehood that can be observed with the Islamic State and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam?

Hypothesis


The Islamic state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam established a quasi-statehood by using state-like-infrastructure, controlling their territory and providing for their citizens and on this scale, it is a new trend amongst terrorist groups, hence we should update our understanding of them.

Preliminary results and discussion of methodology

In this thesis a strictly pragmatic, organization/ group based approach will be followed. Amoral discussion of terrorist organizations adds objectivity to the work, and leaves out, from this international relations theory's point of view, distracting facts. The moral impact of terror on the society is acknowledged, but it is the virtue of ignorance that helps counter it and possibly prevent it from happening.

As for the structural methodology, theoretical part will not only define key terms and narrow down the field of analysis, but it will also outline the current status of terrorism. The main features of present day terrorism will be noted, so they can be later compared with the findings of the paper. The case studies will be examined in each of these three areas considered essential in state building process: sovereignty, economy and culture. If both cases come out strong in these indicators, it shows that there is indeed this new trend in international terrorist organizations. The indicators will be looked for in the main sources mentioned in the literature review, but also in other sources of data concerning these terrorist groups. The two case studies will be compared with each other; if they are relatively in an agreement they can be then compared to the latest trends amongst terrorist organizations. If these are proved to vary significantly, the argument, that the latest feature of international terrorist organizations is a successful quasi-state formation, should be complete.

Mind-map



Implications

If there will be enough factual evidence to support the hypothesis, peer review should determine whether or not to draw practical conclusions, such as teaching this in courses, from it. Perhaps more evidence for the claim can be found in counter-terrorism measures, which were not analyzed. A proven hypothesis would also mean updating the current counter-terrorism strategies. With the advance of time, the statement will be put to a test. The Islamic State can be defeated at any moment by the allied forces. There is a chance however, that other terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, will successfully form another quasi-state, supporting the argument. If anything like this happens in future, this text can be a helpful source for any writer.

CHAPTER 1: Theory

The strength of the hypothesis is what will be important throughout this text. It will not be supported by false evidence, nor will the supporting claims be cherry picked. The evidence which was looked at and did not fit in the line of the argument will be given proper space. The thesis shall not rely on anecdotes, as thousands of those do not make a single argument; they are however good for illustration. Its basic support should lie enrooted in the theory of both state and terrorism. For that purpose, this chapter will seek to examine first terrorism as a phenomenon and then the state as a concept and an organization.

1.1 Struggle for a definition

In the current Western society, terrorism is not considered hard to define; you know it when you see it, right? Well, no, not really. Although there are some different conceptions of terrorism that various interpreters use, our media still tends to mislabel perpetrators of outright terrorist attacks. The Swedish national, Mr. Breivik, who shot dead sixty-nine people and his bomb killed another eight, is labeled mass murderer rather than a terrorist (Nyberg & Smith-Spark, 2013) (BBC-Europe, 2015) (TASR, 2015) (kla/Spiegel, 2012). Whatever the reasons for this are, it illustrates that the public sphere does not have a clear idea of what gets to be called terrorism, or rather who gets to be called a terrorist.

There also is not a universally accepted definition of terrorism on an academic level. In governmental sphere, the United States of America, which is arguably involved in fighting terrorism the most, does not even have its own general definition of terrorism; its agencies and departments use different definitions (18 U.S. Code § 2331) (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). There were attempts to define terrorism on the international level in the United Nations' General Assembly. However it resulted only in the non-binding *Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, where terrorism is described, however, not defined (A/RES/51/210). The most successful attempt was made by the European Union. On June 13, 2002 its Council adopted the decision on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA) which incorporates this rather lengthy definition of terrorist acts:

"defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population, or*
 - unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or*
 - seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation,*
- shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:*
- (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;*
 - (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;*
 - (c) kidnapping or hostage taking;*
 - (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;*
 - (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;*
 - (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;*
 - (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;*
 - (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;*
 - (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h)."*

It outlines, both the means and the ends. It offers much more detail than a dictionary kind of definition, specifies the subject and is not expressed only in vague terms. For this same purpose, to examine existing definitions of terrorism, Albert J. Jongman collected 109 definitions in 1988 and put the most used words in a table that neatly illustrates their frequency of use (Jongman, 1988, pp. 5-6).

Element		Frequency (%)
1	Violence, force	83.5

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2	Political	65
3	Fear, terror emphasized	51
4	Threat	47
5	(Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
6	Victim-target differentiation	37.5
7	Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
8	Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
9	Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
10	Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11	Publicity aspect	21.5
12	Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21
13	Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
14	Intimidation	17
15	Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
16	Group movement or organization as perpetrator	14
17	Symbolic aspect demonstration to others	13.5
18	Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19	Clandestine, covert nature	9
20	Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of the violence	7
21	Criminal	6
22	Demands made on third parties	4

This outlines many typical characteristics of terrorism. The definitions are also crafted in a way, so they can differentiate between terrorist groups and guerilla fighters. Bruce Hoffman describes guerillas as *"an irregular army fighting the regular forces of the state. They conduct themselves along military lines and generally have large numbers of adherents, which permit them to launch quasi-military operations. Their goal is the military*

defeat of the enemy" (Richardson, 2007, p. 313 Kindle location). But what happens, when both definitions can be applied to the same group? They orchestrated terrorist attacks, but it is not their primary strategy. If we look at the crimes committed by the Islamic State or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, most of them would not be classified as terrorist attacks, but armed-insurgency-related actions of guerilla warfare, conventional warfare, and war crimes such as ethnic cleansing. The number of casualties (although terrorism is committed not only on people) resulting from terrorist attacks would also in both cases be only a fraction of the total number (Sri Lankan military and army losses equal to 23,327; Indian peace keeping force lost 1200 soldiers; precise numbers for the Islamic State are not yet available) of casualties in the conflicts (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 2997 Kindle location).

However, that does not mean that if an organization, besides other actions, commits terrorist attacks, it will get labeled a terrorist organization. The African National Congress in the 1980s, lead in part by Nelson Mandela, committed a number of bombings and sabotage attacks which were considered terrorism by most definitions and certainly by most people in and outside South Africa. This example, as well as both of the case studies, go directly against the predominant thesis that terrorism is the tactic of the weak (Richardson, 2007, p. 4300 Kindle location). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the African National Congress and the Islamic State were all powerful organizations.

1.2 History of terrorism

Terrorism was a tactic of many different organizations over the course of history. It was never only the tactic of the weak. That is said mostly because of the anarchist terrorism and variety of smaller groups and branches, which arise around bigger groups. There is also the lone-wolf terrorism; a single actor, or a cell, that supports the cause of a bigger group. These one-hit-wonders give terrorism the reputation of being the weapon of the weak.

But even if the whole history of terrorism is considered, there are always examples of it not being the weapon of the weak. The history of terrorism is also important for this thesis, which argues that statehood is a new feature of some terrorist organizations. There have been connections between the state and terrorism, but those differed from the more

present cases. But at first, terrorism was primarily connected to religion. David C. Rapoport in his *Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions* argues that religion provided the only legitimacy for terrorist acts until the nineteenth century.

First traces of terrorism are often attributed to Zealots, a religious sect which operated two thousand years ago in the area of today's state of Israel (Hoffman B. , 2006, p. 83; Richardson, 2007, p. 599 Kindle location). Bands of killers who were called Thuggee murdered masses of people in India, as a sacrifice to goddess Kali (Hoffman B. , 2006, p. 83). Hassasins were an Islamic group, which during the era of the Crusades took possession of multiple castles in Syria, Iraq and Iran. Their operations were often public and the perpetrator considered it honorable to get caught and recognized for his action (Hoffman B. , 2006, p. 83). Being the etymological root of the word 'assassin' they made a significant impact even on the western society.

The word terrorism did not yet exist in this period, it appeared for the first time during the French Revolution. Between the Hassasins and Robespierre's Reign of Terror, academics tread carefully in pointing out instances of terrorism. Randall Law mentions the crimes done by the Roman Catholic Church, political murders (mostly cases of tyrannicide) and other instances of political violence. He does not label any actor terrorist, he merely indicates that it has built a perfect starting ground for the emergence of revolutionary terrorism (Law, 2009, pp. 47-56). One clear definition of terrorism therefore cannot be applicable; the term had a different meaning in each of its eras.

The infamous Reign of Terror lasted from the September 1793 to July 1794 and the estimates of deaths by executions range from 30,000 to 45,000 (Law, 2009, p. 62; McPhee, 2013, p. 359). In this instance the state itself was the agent of terrorism. There was a connection between state and what is now believed to be terrorism before, for example Zealots were killing Romans in order to establish their own governance. The Reign of Terror is so significant in study of terrorism precisely for the shift from religious terrorism to terrorism primarily connected to the state.

The events in France at the end of the eighteenth century sparked a massive revolutionary terrorism throughout Europe. This is where academics generally agree on the four waves of modern terrorism, first proposed by Rapoport. According to Rapoport, the first wave of modern terrorism originated from Russia and it was the anarchist wave (late 19th century), second came the anti-colonial wave (1920s-1960s), third was the new leftist terrorism (1960s-1990s) and from 1990s on there is the religious wave marked by the rise of Islamist terrorism (Rapoport, *The Four Waves of Terrorism*, 2004). There have been no major shifts disproving or updating this theory. There have been monitored developments in this field and terrorism has been connected to multiple different areas. Globalization of terrorism is one of the most recent trends. Terrorism is being outsourced to different countries in order to have bigger effect. Cyber-terrorism is an issue of rising importance as the Western societies are submerging into the age of digitalization. The states are relying on the information technologies with their management, finances, and also weaponry, all of which could be targeted. As new discoveries are made frequently, the security of digital space becomes ever more questionable.

1.3 Key differentiation and the exact definitions

As could be seen from the history of terrorism and from the present status quo, the connections are not only to a religion or a state. Terrorism gets used in more and more different ways, being a tool for advocacy of different agendas. And this is how terrorism should be viewed, as a pure tactic. The definition posed by the European Union is quite sufficient in framing this.

What is important to distinguish is that even though a group or an organization commits acts of terrorism, it does not necessarily get labeled a terrorist organization. Mr. Breivik is an example of the same thing on a personal level. Hence, it is important to define a terrorist organization. An organization becomes terrorist organization, only when the prevailing society recognizes it primarily for their terrorist actions. It may appear that the power of labeling is solely in the hands of the prevailing society, however the organization's action determine the judgment passed by the society.

As it happened with the ANC, even though the tactic of terrorism is relied upon, the organization does not get labeled terrorist. It is partly in the hands of the organization, what level of focus gets assigned to terrorism. If it becomes primary weapon of choice, then it is very likely to get it labeled as terrorist organization. If it uses terrorism only sporadically, and its primary focus lies elsewhere, it will get labeled separatist group, resistance movement, freedom fighters etc.

The victors get to write not only history, but also the future. It will always be up to key world's superpowers to distinguish what will get labeled a terrorist organization and what will not. If the superpowers are in a deadlock, it is only up to time to determine which side's view will get to be written in the history, as it was done after the French revolution.

1.4 Statehood

As this thesis argues that the Islamic state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam had established a quasi-statehood, it is imperative to take a look at the meaning of statehood. As it is not argued that this is a breakthrough in evolution of statehood, the history of the term is going to be neglected. What has to be clarified is how statehood is looked at in present (modern) times. The main question here is: What are the essential components of statehood?

The Weberian definition of state puts all the emphasis on the legitimate monopoly of physical violence. It is correct from sociological perspective, however it is not sufficient in the field of international relations. This field demands more such factors. Sovereignty, internal or external, does not by itself make the case for a state. It can be (with questionable legitimacy) also possessed by an organized crime network. Organized crime is in fact a direct competition of a state (Tilly, 1985, p. 169). Also, sovereignty is not just about having a monopoly of physical violence over certain territory.

Sovereignty

One understanding of sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty (a.k.a. negative sovereignty), means that there is no external power controlling the state (Krasner, 1999, p. 4). Simply

said, the state is its own master in decision making. This attribute of state comes often to question with the European Union which is a supranational organization. When Greece held a referendum on its financial bailout, and its people voted against it, the authority of the European Union overrode this decision (Mason, 2015). Regardless of the rightness of the decision, it meant a major breach of Greece's sovereignty. Yet, Greece is still regarded as a sovereign state, which proves that Westphalian sovereignty is not a strict criterion for a state.

Sovereignty then, has to be understood differently. In the present age, a state can exist without a total control over its decision making. There are however other aspects of sovereignty that it has to follow. There has to be some aspect of territorial sovereignty, although Ukraine and the Russian Federation have recently shown the world that loss or gain of territory does not change the status of their statehood. State should have defined borders, yet if we follow the examples of other states, they do not have to have them guarded. The state should have control over a significantly large area, as it is one way to gain importance/power in the international sphere. The state should also be able to have a long term presence on its territory. As for the internal sovereignty (or positive sovereignty) state should have a capacity to exercise its monopoly over its region. This happens via administration, police power and judiciary.

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is likely to be the most cited work on problematic statehoods. Outdated as it is, it provides four criteria for the creation of a state: population, territory, capacity to exercise power and capability to engage in international relations (165 LNTS 19; 49 Stat 3097). Neither UN membership nor recognition by other states are criteria for a state (although they do help quite a lot) (Grant, 1999 , p. 451).

The denominators of sovereignty in this thesis will be the following: claim of the statehood, independence (external sovereignty), capability to rule (internal sovereignty), defined territory and population including control over both, capability to engage in international relationships.

Economy

Besides sovereignty, which is by far the biggest prerequisite for a state, a discussion of the economy in the case studies is needed. Every state needs an income to successfully operate. A majority of the state's income tends to come from the taxes. State's exports are important source of revenue as well. The state has to have the means of trade as well as an established trade partners to perform this activity. The goods to be traded are of course necessary as well. The other aspect of an economy is the infrastructure of the state. Two vital parts of infrastructure should be present in the state; communication infrastructure and energy infrastructure. In communication infrastructure media and broadcasting services will be examined together with transportation. For these case studies, funding from diaspora around the world is very important and will be considered. Providing for citizens in terms of social welfare will also be included in this chapter.

All together, very pragmatic reasons put modern state in a demand for a sufficient economy. A modern state cannot be run, unless it has enough funds. Various ways of accumulating and also spending funds in the case studies will be examined. Also a state can support its own claim by establishing international trade and finding partners on the market, which can later on become its partners in politics as well.

Culture

Culture provides the essential basis for a state to form. There has to be a certain demand for a change prior to the foundation of a new state. If it is a popular demand it gains legitimacy from its supporters. Minority struggle often helps this to escalate into a revolutionary conflict. The struggle is usually a mix of national, ethnic and religious nature.

These will serve as the examined criteria in the culture of the state. How states contribute to the culture is also important. Promoting changes from the problematic status quo will be analyzed. Education and ideology put forward by the state are critical tools for shaping the culture. Adapting a certain narrative of history and establishment of a 'golden age' in history are typical ways of trying to gain more legitimacy for the regime. A state can interact

with culture in many other different ways, which will be discussed individually based on the case study.

It is important because this is the primary way how the state gets in touch with the everyday lives of its subjects. Ultimately, by paying attention to the culture, the state can secure the right to rule from its citizens.

1.5 Conclusion of the chapter

This chapter provided theoretical background in two areas: terrorism and statehood. In the first area, definition of terrorism was picked up and definition of terrorist group formulated. This was an important distinction for the argument. Also history of the phenomenon (together with the status quo) was outlined in order to suggest the next possible trend. In the second dichotomy, there was a search for the most probable requirements of statehood. Three main factors (sovereignty, economy, culture) were picked and described. The thesis will proceed into an analysis of the case studies in the scope of the three main factors of a statehood.

CHAPTER 2: Tamil Tigers

In this chapter, the Sri Lankan group called Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam will be examined as a case study. In order to do this, it will first need to be identified as a terrorist organization based on the definition set in the first chapter. Together with this, some brief history and overview of the organization's actions will be mentioned. Afterwards, the three aspects outlined in the second part of the first chapter, will be looked at, in the setting of this case study. This analysis of sovereignty, economy and culture should constitute the major part of the chapter.

2.1 Who were the Tamil Tigers?

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was an organization fighting for a sovereign state of Tamils on the island of Sri Lanka. Tamil Eelam in this sense means Tamil homeland. Tamil people are an ethno-linguistic group. A majority of them lives in Tamil Nadu- which is a south-eastern state of India. There is a Tamil Diaspora around the world, but the most numerous Tamil populations (besides India) are in Malaysia and Sri-Lanka. There are only estimates on the size of Tamil diaspora, pointing to around three million people, a fourth of whom are estimated to be Sri Lankan Tamils.

Tamils do have a history of independence on Sri Lanka, as there were ancient Tamil kingdoms on the island. Also Tamil language is one of the very few classical languages which are not dead (linguistically- when a language has no native speakers). The earliest known Tamil grammar comes from the second century BC (Southworth, 2005, pp. 253,284). Another important factor is the religion of Tamils, which is Hinduism. A majority of Sri Lanka's population are Sinhalese people, speaking Sinhala and their primary religion is Buddhism.

The group itself was founded in 1976 by Velupillai Prabhakaran. In the 1970s and early 1980s there were multiple different Tamil separatist groups in Sri Lanka. Their emergence was a result of the government's harsh treatment of the Tamil population. The socialist government tried to prove its independence by a series of new laws. Outcomes for Tamils

where not positive. Tamil language material from Tamil Nadu was banned and in order to promote Sri Lankan education, education options in Tamil Nadu became more strict. Tamil students had to achieve higher grades in order to get to state universities. Buddhism became state religion in 1972. As many as 600 000 Tamils lacked citizenship, hence were unable to vote. In 1956 Sinhala became the official language of Sri Lanka, and even though Tamil was accepted on some level, it (was not parallel) did not enjoy the same rights. The result of this, as Sinhala and Tamil have different alphabets and are unintelligible to each other, Tamils were slowly deprived of governmental jobs (Weiss G. , 2012, pp. 656,1686 Kindle location; Moorcraft, 2014, p. 406 Kindle location).

The civil war in Sri Lanka broke out in 1983 when there was a major attack on a military patrol of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA). On July 23, thirteen servicemen lost their lives in the attack, which has sparked the Black July- anti-Tamil riots. The actual war took place mostly on Jaffna peninsula, which the Tigers captured in 1985. The Tigers' tactics were effective, and the SLA was unprepared. However, the rebellion was a small one, so in 1987 the Eelam War I was over. The Tigers were not far from being annihilated, only the intervention of the Indian government saved them. The Indian government stood up for the Tamil people, even during the conflict, when it provided aid via air drops (also viewed as territorial violation of Sri Lankan sovereignty). However, when the ceasefire was declared and an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) came to police the northern region of the island, Tamil Tigers were not present at the top level talks (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 525 Kindle location). Not even a month later came the Tigers' first suicide attack; a vehicle packed by explosives killed eighteen SLA soldiers.

Even though a sole act of suicide attack is not enough to judge anything, this is the point at which the Tigers shifted from being separatist rebels to a terrorist organization. *"The LTTE publicly admitted that 274 male suicide bombers and 104 female suicide bombers had died in action between 5 July 1987 and 20 November 2008"* (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 1989 Kindle location). There were horrible Tiger attacks on military and civilian targets before 1987, but they were reactionary slaughters by armed militias, rather than carefully planned attacks or

assassinations, with the intention of creating terror at a supposedly safe place. The first official classification of Tamil Tigers as being a terrorist organization, came in 1992 from the country that was aiding them just a few years earlier. After a suicide attack killed the former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (who sent in the IPKF) and fourteen others in 1991, the Indian government banned the LTTE (Suryanarayanan, 2014). The United States managed to do the same quite early (1997) but the United Kingdom (2001), the European Union (2006) and Canada (2006) have failed to react as quickly (BBC, 2001; Senanayake, 2006; CBC, 2006).

The LTTE began to focus much more on using the tactic of terrorism after its first major military defeat in 1987. It even revolutionized the tactic of terrorism in at least two ways: using female suicide bombers, naval and airborne terror attacks. It gained money from racketeering via a transnational network of organized crime. It collaborated with another terrorist organization - the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 467 Kindle location). It also carried out terrorist attacks on foreign soil. For these methods of advocacy, the LTTE is labeled a terrorist organization. Now the examination of the aforementioned statebuilding aspects will begin.

2.2 Sovereignty

It was between 2002 and 2006 when the LTTE looked perhaps the most like a state. First, in 1990, when the IPKF was on its way back home and the civil war was about to resume, the chief minister of the North-East Provincial Council, Varatharaja Perumal (an official legislative/executive governmental body of Sri Lanka) declared the Free and Sovereign Democratic Republic of Eelam (Ferdinando, 2000). The Tigers themselves, did not put forward any formal claim of statehood. The government reacted quickly, dissolving the body and imposing a direct rule, although the minister was not connected to the Tigers. Eleven years later, a significant ceasefire process began, mediated by Norway. The Tigers were willing to negotiate, as it was the time when the United States were mounting their offensive against terror. Rebels were in control of four northern provinces, excluding Jaffna (the city of Jaffna together with the peninsula was controlled by the Tigers from 1990-1995,

after the government recaptured the city it understood its strategic importance and would not let it fall anymore). There was also a substantial, but still minor, presence of LTTE in the coastal eastern and western provinces. These too, were supposed to be parts of the much wanted sovereign state of Tamil Eelam. When the war resumed in 2006 it was mainly because the Tigers mounted an offensive to gain control of the East and Jaffna. They held roughly 15000 square kilometers - a quarter of the island, but their ambitions for Tamil Eelam were set on 20000 square kilometers. *"The verdict of international experts that Colombo's war was unwinnable seemed justified. Up to this time [July 21, 2006], if Prabhakaran had decided to accept a loose federal or devolved deal he would probably have achieved his independent Tamil Eelam in the end"* (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 3155 Kindle location).

A formal declaration of state is missing, because the Tigers' leadership was not fully satisfied with the situation. There was a daring proposal which, if accepted, could serve as a constitution of the Tamil Eelam (The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 2003). It demanded control of eight districts - the whole Tamil Eelam, not just the parts the LTTE held. It was turned down by the government, however *"[i]t is important to note that, after the 2002 ceasefire until the resumption of conflict in 2006, the [government of Sri Lanka] permitted the existence of the LTTE's civilian administrative apparatus, which, in its entirety, formed the LTTE's de facto state"* (Richards, 2014, p. 44).

The LTTE had a precise idea about the area it controlled and about that which it wanted to take possession of. Territory control took the form of security checkpoints (essentially borders as well), police force and fully functional judiciary. *"Women were encouraged to join the Tamil Eelam police. Crime rates dropped dramatically, especially in the Jaffna area"* (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 2057 Kindle location). Much of the administrative infrastructure was taken over from what has used to be the North-East Provincial Council. The LTTE was strongly nationalist, and it had a defined population. It displayed a control over the population via using ID cards to monitor its citizens (Ferdinando, Tigers used different ID cards to restrict movements, check infiltrators, 2011). Effective control over population

could also be seen in ethnic cleansing of Muslims during the second Eelam War (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 638 Kindle location). The capability to engage in international relationships was displayed in multiple occasions. It does happen quite a lot that terrorists interact internationally, but the LTTE displayed its capability to interact not just with various foreign actors, but with foreign governments and on different fields. First of all, there were the negotiated ceasefires which involved interactions with representatives of multiple different foreign governments. The LTTE has purchased military supplies from North Korea - which is a form of contact with another state (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 2112 Kindle location). Indian military provided valuable training for the Tigers, which is another successful interaction with a foreign country (Weiss, 2012, p. 1507 Kindle location).

2.3 Economy

During the discussed period between 2002 and 2006, the Tigers did have an impressive income of USD 200-300 million per year (Sánchez-Cacicedo, 2014, p. 63). The financial support came from the voluntary contributions of the Tamil diaspora, an organized crime network, international trade and domestic taxation. *"LTTE in many ways built a state of the art procurement network and since late 1997 North Korea became the principal country to provide arms, ammunition and explosives to the LTTE"* (LLRC, 2010). But LTTE did not shop only for war-time items. When the tsunami struck Sri Lanka in 2004, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization claims to have raised USD 500 million in a single month; the Tigers cooperated with the government in vital crisis management operations (Moorcraft, 2014, p. 950 Kindle location). Their trade was mostly done using over twenty large cargo ships, registered in different states. The international network that the Tigers managed to develop was spectacular for a terrorist organization. Another achievement was the Tigers' radio and television broadcast, which are both vital parts of a modern state's infrastructure.

Despite all of this, the LTTE did not manage to ultimately fund its own state. For the most part, it funded its own terror/military/political affairs. *"Bizarrely, everything from the supply of electricity to health and education services continued to be funded and run by the Sri Lankan government"* (Anderson, 2011). After the end of the war, according to the Sri

Lankan government, the LTTE had between one and five billion US dollars in accounts all over the world. Even if the higher numbers were correct, this money was not enough to properly run a state. This dependence on the government of Sri Lanka, and on a variety of NGOs especially in the field of healthcare, undermines the supposed sovereignty of the Tamil Eelam. To rebuff this counterargument, it is important to note that this was negotiated as a part of the ceasefire agreements (Nalapat, 2011). The Tigers knew they are not done with fighting and that there is another war coming, where they will try to take the rest of the Tamil Eelam. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that they would want to save as much money for the war as they could, particularly when the Sri Lankan government was preparing for the war as well. It simply was not in the interest of the Tigers to do this just yet. Their focus was on arming for the next conflict and setting up all the basic administration and infrastructure they could. Running the Bank of Tamil Eelam, with eleven branches, is another example of the Tigers caring about the infrastructure and economy of their territory (Times of India, 2010).

2.4 Culture

The LTTE correctly recognized cultural needs of the Tamil Nation. During the rule of the Tigers, Tamils would enjoy the right to use their own language as well as hearing it in radio and television broadcasts for the first time. They were not discriminated against by the Sinhalese and they did not suffer the hardship of living under an official state religion-which was Buddhism, while a vast majority of Tamils are Hindus. The Tigers also smuggled their ideology into schools and orphanages, where every morning a prayer for the martyrs was sung (Weiss, 2012, p. 1737 Kindle location). The unprecedented mass involvement of women in the whole LTTE operation could be seen as a progressive step for a terrorist organization. Another way of interaction with the culture, was to use history and old tales to support propaganda against the Sri Lankan government (Weiss, 2012, p. 1748 Kindle location). The LTTE used songs, poems and plays to spread out their ideas. Inevitably, this had an impact on the Tamil culture. They established a national holiday called 'Great Heroes Day' on 27th of November; it was known for Prabakharan's yearly speech (Weiss, 2012, p. 2068 Kindle location).

A strong personality cult was created around the leader and also around the top suicide echelon called 'The Black Tigers'. The LTTE even 'shopped' for culture, when they openly asked their supporters for a new anthem (BBC, 2005). They also managed to form a certain death culture, which was rooted in the militarism. The flag bore their main symbol- a Tiger, but also AK47 rifles and bullets. The national flower of Tamil Eelam was a poisonous type of lily used for suicides. Most LTTE soldiers were given a cyanide pellet as a way of achieving an honorable death.

2.5 Conclusion of the chapter

The LTTE were perhaps the closest to establishing the state in the areas of sovereignty and culture. They had effective administration of their territory and population, were partly involved in international relations, and it was very probable for them to achieve a two state solution on the island. They addressed the population through the culture, which rewarded them with massive support. There was not a huge wave of migration from Sri Lanka, which would be a clear indicator that people were not comfortable with the Tigers' regime. The Tigers were not strong enough economically to operate as a developed state. They were awaiting one more crucial step, overtaking of the whole Tamil Eelam, which would solidify their claims and make them shift from war making to state making process. That step never came and the Tigers were crushed by the government in 2009.

CHAPTER 3: Islamic State

The history of the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East region is centuries old. For the basic understanding of the conflict it is important to begin in the Saddam Era. Saddam was a Sunni, as were most of his government and army officials. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam was ousted and a Shia government was formed. Meanwhile the United States presence made a major mistake by disbanding the Iraqi Army. Al-Maliki (currently the vice-president of Iraq) took office as the prime minister of post-Saddam Iraq in 2006 and remained in office for the next eight years. His administration was very anti-Sunni and got a lot of Sunni Muslims out their governmental jobs. Sunnis were pushed to the bottom of the society and Sunni jihadist groups (mostly al-Qaeda affiliates) were gaining more supporters. The Shia tribes (and militant groups) were cooperating with the government and the US to get rid of al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. This was initially successful and a lot of al-Qaeda terrorists ended up in prison. The Islamic State is an offspring of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In 2006 the leader of AQI, Al- al-Zarqawi, was killed in a coalition airstrike. Later on in 2006, smaller groups were merged into one called the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Their leader was Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, while the new leader of AQI was Abbu Ayyub al-Masri. *"[About al-Masri:] He came from outside, he was the guy sent by al-Zawahiri [later the leader of al-Qaeda] and bin Laden to be their man in Iraq"* (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 63). Baghdadi was an Iraqi and he had a much bigger influence among the Sunnis, so it happened that ISI outpaced its parent, the AQI. Both, al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed in 2010. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has emerged as a new leader, who forged his plans of creating the caliphate years ago, while in American-run prison. The new al-Baghdadi is a very spiritual man and that is a big part of the success of his operation. In 2013 ISI grows into Syria and renames itself to Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). A year later, it boasted with the self-given title of the world-wide Caliphate and changed its official name to the Islamic State (IS). The three aspects of the IS case study laid down in this work are going to be examined mainly throughout the period after this event.

3.1 Sovereignty

It is very hard to get an accurate number on how much territory is controlled by the IS. Vast areas of northern Iraq are uninhabited desert, so numbers would skew the truth. What also damages the accuracy is the fact that the Islamic State is now fighting the Iraqi Army, Syrian Army, NATO, Iran, China, Russia, Turkey, Hezbollah, Free Syrian Army, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Peshmerga, PKK, Al-Nusra and various other smaller groups and tribal militias. Expansion as well as loss of territory happens on a daily basis. Besides these minor changes of territory, there were big ones too. In 2013 when a part of Syria was annexed by the ISIS, al-Nusra (ISI created this organization as its wing in Syria) refused to pledge alliance to it and this inner conflict has slowed down the progress of ISIS into Syria (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 183). Next was the Sinjar offensive in November 2015, in which the Kurdish Peshmerga took back some of the northern Iraq controlled by the IS. Just before the end of the year 2015 the Iraqi Army managed to retake IS's southernmost major city - Ramadi.

These victories against the IS may be significant, but considering how much pressure the IS is facing, it is more of a display of its capabilities to control its territory. Its violent expansion tactics made it possible for the IS to now hold territories in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Libya and the Philippines. It is believed to be inhabited by six million people (some estimates are even higher- 8-10 million) (Cockburn, 2015, p. 366 Kindle location). The claim of statehood is present in the form of declaration of a world-wide Caliphate. Long-term sustainability might be questionable, but the group has been able to protect a vast majority of its ground from foreign and domestic enemies for two years.

A possible counterargument to the sovereignty of the Islamic State could be the large outflow of population from its territories. The migrants are mostly Shia Muslims, Christians, or Sunnis who dislike the Islamic State. The Islamic State however is not very concerned with this. The organization is not trying to hold people in the cities, quite the opposite, it is dissolving the conquered borders. Although the regime that is being established is definitely a totalitarian one, the IS is not trying to create an ethnically homogeneous state.

The IS views Shia Islam as a heresy and it strives to battle it by either killing or converting Shia Muslims. When it gets to Christianity, the IS has negotiated a pact with Christians living in the caliphate in early 2014, which mirrors the seventh-century Pact of Umar (Hoffman & Hoffman, 2014). It gives the Christians who want to stay in the IS three choices: live according to rules that restrain the spread of their religion (yet it is not forbidden to practice it), convert to Islam or face death. Anyone who chooses to live as a Christian must pay a tax called *jizya*. This is an interesting concept taken from Qur'an. *"[If a] Muslim army was victorious over the enemy, any of the defeated people who wished to remain in the land could do so under a guarantee of protection for their life, religion and freedom, and if they wished to leave they could do so with safe conduct [...]Jizya was not a poll-tax, and it was not charged on the old or poor people, women or children"* (Haleem, 2011).

A member of the IS mentions this in an interview and it even got into the group's own propaganda material (Al-Hayat Media Center , 2015, p. 30; Dairieh, 2014). The treatment of Christians might be considered ethnic cleansing, and what the IS is doing to the Shia Muslims certainly is ethnic cleansing, but taken from an organization-centered approach, the *jizya* is an IS' attempt to incorporate other ethnic groups while following its own doctrine. Although the numbers of people in the Islamic State might be shrinking, it is so in part because the Islamic State wants to have this religiously-limited citizenship.

Being able to cooperate on an intra-state level is essential to successfully running a state apparatus. The IS has also proved to be capable of doing this via its negotiations and manipulations with the Iraqi and Syrian tribes. *"ISIS is the first and only jihadist franchise in history to successfully pit members of the same tribe against one another [...] ISIS has also shown itself to be a remarkably adept at arbitrating disputes in tribal areas"* (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, pp. 205,207). During their presence in Iraq, the United States Armed Forces understood the importance of tribes and they too, tried to cooperate with them. A clear evidence that the IS assigns a high value to the management of the tribes is the establishment of *Diwan al-Asha'ir* which is a ministry for tribal outreach (Al-Tamimi, 2015).

The Islamic State also had strong supporters from outside its borders, namely Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies, and Turkey (Cockburn, 2015, p. Kindle location 451). A precise communication link is missing, or is yet to be drawn, but actions (be it ignorance towards the IS, or bombardment of its enemies) done by these states have shown that there are legitimate governments, which wish for the IS to exist.

When it comes to the IS' capacity to rule, there is little doubt about it. It successfully implements Sharia law on the territories it conquers. It has an army and it is policing its claimed territory. *"They fixed damaged roads, planted flowers in the street, cultivated gardens and cleaned the local schools"* (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 223). There are numerous reports of the IS members doing all kinds of seemingly unterrorist actions. But the organization earns its legitimacy for a different reason. *"Ayman al-Mit'ib, a Minbij resident [...] said, 'The reason why people support the Islamic State is its honesty and practices compared to the corruption of most of the FSA groups'"* (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 224). The Islamic State has gained legitimacy from the people by following its own rules. *"'You can drive from Aleppo to Raqqa to Deir Ezzor and into Iraq, and nobody will bother you,' a resident of Deir Ezzor said, 'Before, you'd have to be stopped at ad hoc checkpoints and you would have to bribe this and tolerate that'"* (Weiss & Hassan, 2015, p. 226).

Although it lacks foreign recognition and involvement in foreign relations, the IS continues to display its developed sovereignty.

3.2 Economy

The terrorist organization is mostly known for its world-wide recruitment, but it might as well be recognized for its revolutionary economy. The Islamic State has gained money like a regular terrorist organization - donors, ransoms and robbing banks. It just does so on a massive scale. It has robbed 62 banks by the beginning of 2015 (The New Arab, 2015). In 2014, it made \$35-45 million by ransoming hostages (Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 2014, p. 19). The most stunning numbers however come from another sources of income, which are more similar to those of states. Its agriculture could earn \$200 million per year, selling at a half of the regular price (Brisard & Martinez, 2014, p. 9). The estimates on earnings from oil industry vary, depending which period is mentioned, but at the end of 2015 the highest estimates were at a billion US dollars per year, and approximately the same amount of money from taxes (Rosenberg, Kulish, & Myers, 2015).

With this amount of money, the Islamic State is able to satisfy some basic needs of its fighters and its citizens. It is trying to create a sort of a welfare state. Theoretically the Sharia law should create a system, where the Sunni Muslims are entitled to live without having to work, unless they want to (Wood, 2015). The reality does portray a system like this, however without a job, and often with it too, the Sunni Muslims live in poverty (Stanton, 2015). From the propaganda material and even from a little more independently done interviews, it seems like some of the people actually enjoy this system of governance. Currently it is very hard to put an estimate on how many people support the regime and how many do it only to save their lives.

More important numbers for this whole thesis came up in a month long survey of the IS's propaganda. The civilian-life-related topics outweighed the military and terrorist ones on a ratio 542:350 (Winter, 2015). This shows that the organization focuses dominantly, and by no small margin, on civilian material in its propaganda, which costs money as well.

The Islamic State's capacity to maintain levels of infrastructure is limited in certain aspects. Supply of electricity is very limited, but then again so it is in the surrounding states due to the conflict. Interesting enough, it is possible to connect to the internet via satellite dishes,

which again shows that the Islamic State has powerful allies, who in this case are providing the signal. Mobile network is not present, but more basic provisions, such as drinking water and roads are provided and cared for. Overall, the economy of the Islamic State is not doing too bad for a wartime and it would be interesting to see how it would behave in peaceful conditions.

3.3 Culture

Like everything else, the IS organizes the culture in its claimed Caliphate according to Sunni Islam and Sharia law. The whole idea of the creation of the Caliphate arises from the religious conflict between the Shia and the Sunni. The Sunni Muslims were undisputedly oppressed during the al-Maliki regime in Iraq. Like many other terrorist organizations, the IS feeds of this history of hardship. It looks back to the 'golden age' of the original Caliphate. It truly lets people know it is there.

The presence of the state is non-stop and obvious; be it the five mandatory prayers per day, the Sharia-enforcing police, the weak-yet-present Islamic socialism or the bloody punishments (Dairieh, 2014). What differentiates the culture-related actions of the IS from other terrorist organizations is the scope of the organization in the area of culture. The Islamic State does not choose to do only what is completely necessary. It is very hard-line in the implementation of its image of culture. It disposes of an awful lot of assets to create a powerful propaganda for domestic purposes, besides the recruitment. In contrast to other terrorist groups, the IS addresses a lot of the needs of its subjects, even though it is in unfavorable position. While other groups would choose to devote more personnel to fighting enemies and leaving 'the state to run itself' for a while or with minimal supervision, the IS chooses a more tactical, slow approach. The IS heavily mans its cities and does not just oversee general human affairs from afar, it runs them directly even on the smallest levels. This harsh grip then allows it to be more successful in its military campaign, the citizens often rise up with the IS against the present soldiers who then retreat (Cockburn, 2015, p. 278 Kindle location).

The world-wide Caliphate claim brings a new spin towards the cultural aspect of the group as well. Its online methods of recruitment are revolutionary, but it is the establishment of colonies which gives more potential for its state-building capabilities. Besides the main territorial body of the Islamic State, the Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to the IS, and there are chunks of territories in Libya and a small island in the Pacific Ocean which have done the same (Alkhshali & Almasy, 2015; Glum, 2016; Bennett & Hennigan, 2016). If these campaigns prove successful in a longer term, it could mean that the IS would aim for getting its recognition quasi-externally, from these smaller states. The Peoples Republic of China has used this tactic and gained recognition from third world countries, when the most influential countries were recognizing its enemy - Taiwan. The IS could be heading for the same plan, and its use of religion as culture has accomplished a lot already, it is to be expected of this organization to build on this tactic.

3.4 Conclusion of the chapter

It is hard to find weaknesses in the Islamic State's state-building campaign. As horrible as it sounds, it appears as if the Islamic State has taken all the right steps. It has the claim, capacity and resources, even a significant backing of its citizens. It has its foreign supporters and a propaganda machine able to turn many more to its vile path. But perhaps a bigger test than the coalition airstrikes is coming. What happens if the fast growth hits a plateau? Is the IS ever going to accept some ceasefire, and will the rest of the World? Would the blood-soaked economy survive it? And even if so, how could the pre-destined faith (which in the narration of the IS assumes it will conquer gigantic territories) deal with it?

Conclusion

To understand the different levels of success in various state-building activities, the differences between the two case studies will be pointed out. The approach to the claim of sovereignty is totally different. It seems that the LTTE wanted to win all its battles first, and then claim its own state. The Islamic State claims the statehood wherever it controls the territory. The approach of the Islamic State is more successful in this aspect. In the aspect of territorial integrity, the Tigers displayed a bigger control because they were able to negotiate a ceasefire. Internal sovereignty was present at an equal level in both case studies. External sovereignty is superior in the IS case study. This is closely connected to the fact that the IS' economy was also superior compared to the economy of the LTTE. Finally, the LTTE had its ideology centered around the nation, whereas the IS has an ideology based on a religion. The IS is open for more supporters, compared to the limited number of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Sharia law and the idea of caliphate appears to be closer to the Sunni people, than the socialist dictatorship of the LTTE was to the Tamils.

Both case studies have shown that there was statehood present in a certain time period. Currently, the Islamic State has a stronger statehood, mostly because of its economy and different approach to claiming statehood. However, the Tigers were very close to washing of the terrorist organization label and joining the modern nation states, because they were willing to negotiate. Will to negotiate is a key for a long term survival of a state. The Tigers have realized this partly, but the IS has shown no intention to negotiate so far.

The answer to the research question is that the understanding of terrorist organizations should be updated because these two case studies have shown that terrorist organizations are now able to take matters into their own hands, instead of just advocating certain ideas. The establishment of statehood by the IS and the LTTE also shows that the people are not as opposed to the usage of this tactic, as they were before. It shows that terrorist organizations are able perform all the actions a state can, and ultimately are able to make a

transformation into a state. Even though it did not happen in the examined case studies, the chances were and are higher than ever.

Terrorist organizations can now see the possibility of being the change, rather than trying to force something to change. Based on this, it is reasonable to assume that the tactic of terrorism will become a part of more conflicts. Rebels/ freedom fighter/ militias will not be as afraid to use it, if they will see a successful implementation of it in history, especially in their area.

The case study of the Islamic State is an open one. It is hard to tell at what stage is the conflict and what will come out of it. For the research in this field, it is essential to do comparisons of the groups, just like it is done in comparative politics. The Islamic State has been compared with many other Islamic groups, but not with the LTTE. Also the scope is quite different, as this text did not focus on the terrorist/military actions. In future, perhaps Boko Haram could be added to this comparison. Of course the whole work could be updated after the current conflict in the Middle East has been resolved or at least stabilized.

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Resumé

Táto bakalárska práca sa zaoberá najmä štátnosťou, medzinárodným terorizmom a medzinárodnými teroristickými organizáciami. Názov tejto práce je Štáty teroru: Štátnosť ako nová črta teroristických organizácií. V práci sú rozoberané teroristické organizácie Islamský Štát a Tigre Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu. Výskumnou otázkou tejto práce je: Je naše chápanie teroristických organizácií stále adekvátne, keďže v skupinách Islamský Štát a Tigre Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu nachádzame mnohé prvky štátnosti? Hypotézou je, že týmto teroristickým organizáciám sa štátotvorba podarila na takej bezprecedentnej mierke, že to musíme zohľadniť i na našom chápaní teroristických organizácií ako takých. Práca sa skladá z troch hlavných kapitol, záveru, a dôležité je spomenúť i úvod, prehľad literatúry a rozbor metodológie. Týmto častiam bol venovaný dostatok priestoru, nakoľko sú potrebné na jasné ohraničenie témy a prehľadnosť argumentačnej línie.

Argumentácia vychádza predovšetkým z teórie, a aj zo základného oddelenia a definície výrazov terorizmus a teroristická skupina (organizácia). Teória je predmetom prvej kapitoly. V tej sa rozoberá štátnosť a terorizmus. V tejto kapitole sa vytýčia tri elementárne prvky štátnosti, na základe relevantných zdrojov. Suverenita, ekonómia a kultúra budú v ďalších dvoch kapitolách prvky štátnosti a objekty štátotvorných akcií teroristických skupín. Teoretická časť práce sa venuje aj histórii terorizmu, nakoľko je argumentované že konanie a úspech dvoch spomínaných teroristických organizácií sa v histórii terorizmu zatiaľ neudialo. Tu sa spomínajú nielen dávne udalosti, ale aj aktuálny stav najmä na základe práce Davida C. Rapoporta *Four Waves of Modern Terror*. Najdominantnejšie dielo v sekcii o štátnosti je Konvencia o právach a povinnostiach štátov z Montevidea.

Druhá kapitola je prípadovou štúdiou zaoberajúcou sa Tigrami Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu. V porovnaní so štúdiou o Islamskom Štáte bola ľahšie spracovateľná, keďže sa jedná o ukončený konflikt. Tigre Oslobodenia Tamilského Ílamu bojovali s vládou Srí Lanky dlhých dvadsaťpäť rokov o samostatnosť pobrežných a najmä severných častí Srí Lanky, takzvaného Tamilského Ílamu. Dva najväčšie národy žijúce na Srí Lanke sa dostali do konfliktu keď sinhálska väčšina začala utláčať Tamilov. Odlišnosti v tomto konflikte neboli iba na

národnom, resp. etnickom leveli, ale i v náboženstve, keďže Tamili sú prevažne hinduisti a Sinhálci sú budhisti. Hlavné diela pre túto kapitolu boli Total Destruction of Tamil Tigers a The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka & the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Kapitola ponúka najskôr krátke zhrnutie pôsobenia Tamilských Tigrov a potom sa dostáva do popisu elementov štátnosti a štátotvorných prvkov.

Tretia kapitola sa zaoberá druhou prípadovou štúdiou a tou je Islamský Štát. Výber hlavných diel na zdokumentovanie pôsobenia Islamského Štátu bol náročný, keďže sa jedná o stále prebiehajúci konflikt a množstvo zdrojov je nedôveryhodných. Napokon boli vybraté diela Rise of the Islamic State od autora Patricka Cockburna a ISIS: Inside an Army of Terror od autorov Hassana Hassana a Michaela Weissa. V tejto kapitole bolo použitých i viacero odborných článkov, ale i primárnych zdrojov pochádzajúcich priamo od Islamského Štátu. Kapitola má rovnakú štruktúru ako prvá prípadová štúdia.

Na záver je uvedené zhrnutie, ktoré poukazuje na hlavné zistenia bakalárskej práce. Uvádza sa tu, že dominantou Tamilských Tigrov, bola schopnosť a záujem rokovať s inými štátmi, avšak u Islamského Štátu to je najmä ekonómia. Elementy štátnosti boli v prípadových štúdiách preukázané, a hypotéza sa potvrdila. Záujem o diplomáciu sa u Islamského Štátu ešte môže vyskytnúť, preto by bola zaujímavá i revízia tejto práce v priebehu nasledujúcich rokov.