

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

**THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE ARAB SPRING**

BACHELOR THESIS

Marián Reháč

BRATISLAVA 2013

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BACHELOR THESIS

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Declaration of Originality

I declare that this Thesis is my own work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and properly cited in references.

Bratislava, 30 April 2013

Signature: _____

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I'd like to thank my family, friends and fellow students for their constant support, and who helped me grow personally and professionally. Special thanks needs to be paid to my professors at the Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts, and especially to Samuel Abrahám, my Advisor for this Thesis, for his patience, and without whose guidance this work would not have happened. However, all the mistakes herein are my own and in no way reflect the thought of the aforementioned individuals.

Abstract

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The topic of this Bachelor's Thesis is to examine the education sector in Egypt and Tunisia and its effect on the development after the Arab Spring as one of the many different causes, which led to the Arab Spring and to different development in the two countries afterwards. It aims to look at the Arab Spring from a different side, as most of the scientific works and articles have focused on the publically presented causes such as corruption and high levels of unemployment.

To achieve its goal, this Thesis examines the colonial and the modern history of Egypt and Tunisia, the political culture in these countries, two theories by Samuel P. Huntington and Fareed Zakaria that explain the problems of the Middle East and give solutions to the issues in the region and its transition to more liberal systems. This paper then interprets the role of education in Egypt and Tunisia from political, economical, and demographical perspective. Finally, the effects of education on the political development after the Arab Spring are discussed.

The thesis specifically focuses on the statistical data concerning the education sector in Egypt and Tunisia, which are analyzed to clearly draw the distinctions between the two countries, to better understand where these differences originate, and why similar policies had different outcomes not only in the past, but also on the development after the Arab Spring.

Abstrakt

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Témou tejto bakalárske práce je preskúmanie odvetvia vzdelávania v Egypte a v Tunisku, a vplyv vzdelávania na vývoj po Arabskej jari ako jeden z mnohých dôvod, ktoré viedli k Arabskej jari, ale aj k následnému rozdielnemu vývoju v týchto dvoch krajinách. Snaží sa o iný pohľad na problematiku Arabskej jari, keďže väčšina vedeckých prác a článkov sa zameriavala na verejne a mediálne prezentované dôvody ako korupcia alebo vysoká nezamestnanosť.

Na dosiahnutie svojho cieľa vychádza táto práca z koloniálnej a modernej histórie Egyptu a Tuniska, politickej kultúry v týchto krajinách, z dvoch teórií Samuela P. Huntingtona a Fareeda Zakariu, ktoré objasňujú problematiku Blízkeho východu a podávajú možné riešenia na prechod k liberálnejším systémom. Táto bakalárska práca potom interpretuje úlohu vzdelávania v Egypte a v Tunisku z politickej, ekonomickej, a demografickej perspektívy. Nakoniec sa bakalárska práca venuje vplyvu vzdelania na politický vývoj po Arabskej Jari.

Táto téza sa špecificky zameriava na štatistické údaje z sektore vzdelávania v Egypte a v Tunisku, ktoré sú analyzované s cieľom jasne určiť rozdieli medzi týmito dvoma krajinami; na lepšie pochopenie toho, kde tieto rozdieli vznikli; a prečo mala podobná politika rozličné dôsledky nielen v minulosti, ale aj na vývoj po Arabskej jari.

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1. General Introduction

In December 2010, a wave of protests called the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, soon expanding to numerous other countries of the Middle East. Governments and rulers were ousted from power in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and protests have occurred in Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, and Western Sahara. The Arab Spring, with its unexpected and innovative approach, attracted concern of many scholars and media. The reasons behind the Arab Spring varied, but what they all have in common is the dissatisfaction with the rule of local governments, most frequently characterized by high unemployment, human and civil rights violations, high level of political corruption, poverty, economic decline, or large percentage of educated and dissatisfied youth. There are many works thoroughly discussing the events before and after the Arab Spring, but most of these have considered the same reasons and causes.

This thesis is going to focus on the role of education in Egypt and Tunisia as one of the many different factors that led to the Arab Spring and the development afterwards. To examine the conditions in educational sector in the two countries, and find significant differences that affected political development, my thesis is firstly going to define the Arab Spring, then discuss the colonial and the modern history of the two countries, their political culture, and also two theories by Samuel P. Huntington and Fareed Zakaria, which focus on the problems of the Middle East and its transition to more liberal systems. After examining these factors that affect political culture in societies, this paper will discuss education in Egypt and Tunisia from political, economical, and demographical perspectives. Special attention will be paid to the statistical data concerning the education sector in Egypt and Tunisia. These will be analyzed to clearly draw the distinctions, and to better understand where these differences originate, and why similar policies had different outcomes on the development before and after the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring

A lot of media have falsely called the Arab Spring a revolution. While this term could be only applied to the four countries, where the system was overthrown, even in this case this word is not the most precise. If we consider different revolutions around the world, what they all have in common is a complete change in ideology of system. For example, the revolutions of 1989 in the Central Europe overthrew communism mostly in favor of liberal democracy. Similarly the French revolution, the October Socialist revolution in Russia, the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, and others, represent a throughout regime transformation. Revolution, therefore, describes a change that is fundamentally different from the previous establishment. Most of the Arab Spring countries experienced major uprisings without any change whatsoever. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, even though the previous rulers were forced from power, these countries went through partial ideological and structural reformation, and nowadays even seem to be returning to the previous system. As the Arab Spring did not concern just the four North African countries, the right words for these events are demonstrations, uprisings and protests. However, taking into account the countries, in which the rulers were forced from power, the Arab Spring should be termed as a fall of authoritarian regimes caused by protests and demonstrations. A fall of authoritarian regime is not a unique situation of the Arab Spring, and it has occurred numerous times in the history, for example in Spain or in Latin America.

2. History and Political Culture of Egypt and Tunisia

Colonial History of Egypt and Tunisia

As most of the countries in Africa, the Middle East was also from large part occupied by the colonial powers. Egypt was under British occupation; Tunisia was under a French protectorate.

The history of British colonial occupation of Egypt starts in 1882, when the British succeeded in defeating the Egyptian Army. As the main purpose, Great Britain claimed the need to restore political stability in Egypt under a government of the Khedive and international controls. The occupational politics included financial reforms as a mean to achieve political reformation and stability, with focus on long-term investment in Egypt's productive resources in cotton and support of country's export earnings. Even though the British declaration officially made Egypt sovereign in 1922, the British military presence in in the country still lasted, and they controlled most of the economic life and the Suez Canal. The British occupation lasted until 1952, and after this year, Great Britain still wanted to militarily reclaim its power over Egypt and the canal, which was resolved in the 1956 Second Arab-Israeli war, as a result of an agreement that stated the British troops would leave Egypt within twenty months of the signing in exchange for the end of the attacks on British troops.

Similarly in Tunisia, France wanted to reform the financial system along with infrastructure, industry, transport, public health, administration, and education. Essentially, the goal was to achieve higher economic growth and development to solve Tunis' international debt obligations. However, the independence movement against the French opposition grew in power, because the French bureaucracy favored French businesses and citizens over Tunisians.

In 1956, the Suez crisis, or the second Arab-Israeli war, ended the British and French colonial period in the region. Middle East teaching specialist Ted Thornton suggest that even though Egypt's leader Nasser lost militarily, he was the big winner

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politically, because Suez was returned to Egypt, and Nasser's stature in the Arab world rose sharply. (Thornton, 2009) However, it cannot be certainly said that the French and British were not successful in achieving their objective in most of these countries. Fareed Zakaria notices that few would have predicted these outcomes in 1945, and that in fact many observers at the time noted that, compared with other decolonizing countries, the Arabs were doing well. (Zakaria, 2007, p. 130)

In 1956, the Middle East was still moving towards the separation of church and state. These countries wanted to become more western-like, and they saw the solution in Arab unity, self-determination and socialism. According to Fareed Zakaria, these Arab regimes chose bad ideas and implemented them in worse ways, and instead of adjusting the economy, the countries never moved on, authoritarian regimes started to gain more power, and socialism only produced bureaucracy, and stagnation. (Zakaria, 2007, p. 134)

Tunisia and Egypt after the occupation

The Kingdom of Tunisia changed to the Republic of Tunisia one year after the French left the country. Habib Bourguiba, the first president of the Republic of Tunisia, had ruled the country for more than 30 years, until 1987. Bourguiba, based on the French ideas left behind from the colonial period, governed the country with programs that supported stability, economic progress, but most importantly secularization, which was achieved by repressing Islamic fundamentalism and establishing rights for women, creating secular and populist political culture without the western political democracy, but with human and civil rights violations. In November 1987, when president Habib Bourguiba was declared unable to fulfill the duties of the presidency, as a result of medical incapacity, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali had taken the presidential office for the next 23 years. He continued to develop the country in a similar manner as the previous ruler, stably increasing economy growth, foreign investments, quality of education, and also supported liberalization. He also continued repressing and censor the Islamist opposition.

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President Ben Ali was forced from power in January 2011 during the Arab Spring protests.

In the year 1952, the Kingdom of Egypt was ousted in the Egyptian revolution and the Republic of Egypt emerged with Gamal Abdel Nasser as the president of this country. Nasser was publicly understood as a charismatic leader admired for his ability to step down against world powers such as the US. With strong power and leadership he had a clear objective to achieve the so-called Arab socialism – elements of socialism combined with a close cooperation between the Arab states against their perceived enemies. In 1958, the Republic of Egypt, after joining with the Republic of Syria, changed its name to the United Arab Republic. Syria left the republic in 1961, but Egypt under Nasser continued to use this name until 1971, when Egypt, under the president Anwar el-Sadat, changed its official name to the Arab Republic of Egypt. Egypt, under Sadat's leadership, experienced reversal to some of the previous economic and political principles that Nasser, in the name of socialism, implemented. The most important was the so-called Infitah policy, which encouraged private investments in the country. The new president, on one hand, also supported emergence of Islamist movements, but on the other hand, started to cooperate with the United States instead of the Soviet Union, initiating the peace process with Israel.

Hosni Mubarak became the president of Egypt in 1981, when Anwar Sadat was assassinated by the members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a Islamist militant group active since the late 1970s. From the beginning of his leadership, he undertook economic reformation to reduce governmental expenditures by expanding the private sector. However, Egypt has been from a large part dependent on the natural resources income, and Mubarak's economic and political reforms have been criticized for his autocratic rule, which violated basic human and civil rights. In Egypt, the secularization attempts also made the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood party illegal, and opposition was again censored. Mubarak's presidency ended in February 2011, when he resigned from office as a result of the Arab Spring demonstrations.

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Both presidents of Egypt and Tunisia, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, focused on secularization, economic reformation and also educational reformation, combined with strong violation of human and civil right, suppression of opposition, and censorship. However, even though the political focus and objective of these presidents might had been similar, there are obvious differences between the two leaderships, their policies, and most importantly, and the outcomes of these policies for economic and education spheres, which I will discuss later in this thesis.

Political culture

One of the several factors which has to be taken account of, when discussing why some of the Arab states returned to illiberal systems after the Arab Spring democratic elections, is the political culture in the Middle East region. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences describes political culture as “the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in political system.” (Sills & Merton, 1968, p. 218) Political culture is specific to every country, however, when talking about Egypt and Tunisia as countries in the Middle East region, there are certain similarities that need to be covered.

Firstly, over the past few decades, the secularization tendencies, both in Egypt and Tunisia, have oppressed the political opposition represented by the religious Islamic fundamentalists. However, the well-funded fundamentalists still existed as an unofficial, but highly organized network that connected religious people all over the country. The fundamentalists helped the people in social situations where the state was missing, and with the strong position of Islam in this region, the fundamentalists were able to sustain a strong base of supporters until the elections after the Arab Spring protests. The Arab Spring protests started in Tunisia very unexpectedly, and quickly spread to other countries. Even though it could be argued that the relationship between the people and the governments in these states has always been tense, the extensiveness and sudden fall of multiple authoritarian regimes was something nobody had foreseen, because Islamic societies did not really experience any similarly

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large-scale protests before, and after decades of oppression, these elections showed that the power of the Islamists was growing during that time in both countries.

Secondly, Islam, as the main religion in the region, has always played major role in the culture of the Middle Eastern societies and it affects almost all spheres of life including politics. Concerning the Arab Spring and its outcomes, Islamic fundamentalists are the most important religious group. The fundamentalists claim that Islam needs to be reformed, because only the return to the true fundamentals of Islam can help to solve the current problems. For them, as political analyst Graham Fuller says (Fuller, 2003, p. 48), “the [Sharia] law is the most essential component of Islam, leading to an overwhelming emphasis upon jurisprudence, usually narrowly conceived.”

The fundamentalists gained most of the power in the Iranian revolution of 1979, when the religion provided an anti-governmental and non-western solution to the current problems of social injustice and secularization efforts. After all, fundamentalists provided a new way, and also in many cases supported the citizens where the state was lacking, gaining popularity with religious and nationalist appeal. After the Arab Spring, the fundamentalists won 69% of the seats in Egypt and took 41% of the seats in Tunisia. (Zaman, 2011) Similarly as before, Islamic fundamentalists represented a different path, and when compared to the ruling totalitarian governments, they seemed as a better and more prosperous solution. Essentially, the great success of the Islamic fundamentalists after the Arab Spring protests emphasizes the role of religion in the region even more.

Thirdly, Egypt and Tunisia experienced higher economic growth before the democratization in 2011, but it seemed to have an opposite effect than a lot of scholars expected. Defining political culture as a subjective set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process, we can see that the outcomes of economic and educational policies, similarly as religion or history, play a role in affecting political culture. John Meyer and Richard Rubinson claim (Meyer & Rubinson, 1975, p. 136), that “research on education and political

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development has been dominated by a single general finding: The amount of education an individual has is a powerful background variable affecting his political sentiments, competence, and behavior,” and continue, that “the educated know more about politics, participate more, perceive themselves as more effective, and are better able to interpret and tolerate the political behavior of others.” Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali were both trying the education to be mirrored on the western-type of schooling. The outcomes of the new policies in economy and education, were rather different in each country, affecting the youth in Tunisia much broadly than in Egypt. These differences will be shown in the next chapters.

The Arab Spring combined the unexpected fall of authoritarian regimes with sudden democratization, which led to even stronger position of Islam that turned out to move these countries towards even more illiberality. The political culture in these countries, therefore, has been strongly affected by religion, but the economic and educational reforms have also played an important role shaping it.

3. Economic growth and Islamic Reformation as solutions to the Middle East problem

There have been many authors writing about the future development, problems and solutions for the Middle East region. I will discuss the most important ideas in the works of Fareed Zakaria and Samuel P. Huntington – *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* – as two theories, that were, on one hand, largely criticized by the media, but on the other hand, partially describe the reality in the region correctly.

Fareed Zakaria is a journalist, an author, and host of the CNN's show Global Public Square. In his book *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, he discusses the variables required for growth of liberal-democratic systems, and whether these tendencies might eventually reach the Middle East region. According to him, these countries should reform their systems to support their economic growth and development, which will lead to liberalization and democratization. As one of the solutions to Arab illiberal democracies, Zakaria proposes economic growth, which will cause an Islamic Reformation, a division between church and state similar to the protestant reformation in Europe - economic growth would necessarily lead to secularization.

Zakaria implies that the key to making Christianity compatible was to modernize society until the church had to adapt to the world around it. The problem with Islam is that it does not provide official statements and opinions; therefore the people cannot disagree or rebel against one legitimate leader of Islam. This, for Fareed Zakaria, is the source of difficulties, and while it might seem as an unrelated fact, Christianity was much more than a religious authority in Europe for hundreds of years, and it was, in many cases, stronger than most of the rulers. This had led to religious wars and eventually even to the reformation. Zakaria claims (Zakaria, 2007, p. 147) that since “in Islam, temporal authority, was always dominant over spiritual authority, the issue of separating the two never came up.” As there is no official authority that is superior to all Islamic priests, the

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government, as well as the opposition, could manipulate religion to attain their own ends. People might, therefore, either blame or praise the religion, which is supposedly truly represented by ruler, for causing poor or wealthy life conditions. As the case of the 16th century reformation implies, for Zakaria, the key to a successful reformation lies in economic and political development, which will force Islam to modernize and adapt - a division between Islam and state. For Zakaria Christian societies no longer see their religion as an authority on political matters; the religion has rather become a source of spiritual aspiration. (Zakaria, 2007, p. 150) This distinction depicts the much stronger role of religion in the Middle Eastern religion than in Europe.

Samuel P. Huntington, a political scientist and author of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, advocates a different opinion. He believes the Middle East is moving towards an Islamic resurgence, because religion is the major element that connects the Middle Eastern societies. Arab countries within one civilization will tend to cooperate with each other more often, and against other civilizations, most importantly against the West. This so-called “kin-country effect” assumes that peace can be achieved only through the leadership of core, leading state, which the Middle East is currently missing.

Zakaria thinks the real problem of the Middle East’s unsuccessful revolution and democratization lies not in the Muslim society but in the Middle East, and Huntington seems to advocate similar opinion. Zakaria argues naming Islamic societies successfully integrated outside the Middle East region, and Huntington draws a clear geographical line between Christianity and Islam, with similar problems occurring only in the Middle Eastern Islamic region, proposing the Middle East to be an exception. While most underdeveloped countries want to follow the West, at least its successful economic model, Islam is completely against it politically, economically, and most importantly culturally. Huntington does not expect any change in the near future, and for him religion and culture are the most important sources of this hatred.

Considering the West as a certain political and cultural opposition to the Arab world, and comparing European revolutions with the Arab spring, we can see that

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there are several differences. The major one is religion, which necessary connects private and public life, therefore is a fuel for the revolutionary groups in Muslim countries.

Firstly, Zakaria thinks the people of the Middle East are not ready for democracy: “In Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco, on virtually every political issue, the monarchs are more liberal than the societies over which they reign,” and he continues: “The Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than what would likely replace them.” (Zakaria, *Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism*, 2004, p. 2) The solution lies in liberalization and economic reformation, which will raise the levels of education, but can be also supported by higher quality of education. But what has been happening in the Middle East Zakaria describes as the reverse of the historical process that happened in the Western World. Instead of producing liberalism, which would lead to democracy, Arab countries have produced dictatorships, which have bred terrorism. Trying to achieve democracy led only to illiberality, and the same situation occurred in Egypt and Tunisia after the elections after the Arab Spring.

Secondly, while Christianity is a source of spiritual inspiration, Islam is still an authority on moral, political and other questions: “For the fundamentalist Muslims, Islam is considered a template for all life, including politics,” says Zakaria. (Zakaria, 2004, p. 3) This also seems to indicate that the Arab world stayed stuck in primate political and social arrangements, which are not culturally unique, but historically old. The Middle East is stuck in a religious control similarly as was Europe stuck with Christianity in the 16th century.

Fundamentalist Islamists penetrated non-authoritarian political groups in and outside of the Middle East as well: “In most societies, dissidents force their country to take a hard look at its own failings. In the Middle East, those who advocate democracy are the first to seek refuge in fantasy, denial, and delusion. The region is awash in conspiracy theories [against the West].“ (Zakaria, 2004, p. 2) Foud Ajami explains that the fundamentalists are even more successful gaining trust of people, because

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their call has resonance by inviting men to participate, in contrast to a political culture that reduces citizens to spectators and asks them to leave things to their rulers. (Ajami, 1995) However, in the post Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia, the people, who criticize the fundamentalists in government and their politics, are being suppressed and censored.

The premature introduction of democratic elections in the Middle East has usually different outcomes than in non-Islamic countries. The reason to it is mainly the strong position of religion. Its manipulating power over people, who want change, gives fundamentalist parties opportunity to easily influence voters, therefore the results of elections. The rise of illiberal democracy is not only a case of Egypt. Other countries, which successfully went through democratic elections after the Arab Spring, might be still heading towards illiberal democracies. When illiberality comes from unsuccessful economic and political development; revolutions and religious hatred of the West are necessary results of bad political and economic decisions of Arab countries. Therefore, the solution is economic reformation necessarily connected to liberalization, and political reformation in the sense of democratization afterwards. The people would start being aware of religious domination, and of their rights and freedoms, which would make the religion reform and adapt to new liberal tendencies in society, and eventually loosen its political power.

For practical purposes, Fareed Zakaria comes up with the so-called transition zone - a zone set at the level of GDP per capita between \$3000 and \$6000, in which the countries should successfully achieve liberalism, and democracy afterwards. This way, Zakaria implies the importance of the middle class, which grows with GDP, and which is the core of intellectual, cultural and revolutionary aspirations. However, Zakaria argues that wealth of a country has to be earned in order to produce liberty. Wealth of oil rich countries does not produce positive political change, because their economic development is different, and the people who live in these countries still remain uneducated and unskilled, as is the case of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, or even Latin American countries with high levels of natural

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resources. But, Tunisia is not a high natural-resources country, and Egypt has one of the highest non-oil GDPs among the Middle East countries.

GDP per capita of Tunisia, a country with no natural resources, was \$9,600 in 2011, well beyond the transition zone. Islamists movement also gained more power than expected – the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia took around 41% of the seats. (Zaman, 2011) Egypt is different than most of the Arab oil-rich countries. With the largest non-oil GDP in the Arab World, Egypt's GDP comes from agriculture (13.5%), industry (37.9%) and services (48.6%), and more than 5% comes from 2.7 million Egyptians abroad contributing remittances to the development of their country, and in 2009 Egypt was the biggest recipient of remittances in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, non-oil manufacturing only contributed 10% to its GDP and less than 6% of total employment in 2007. (AME Info, 2007)

Tunisia is also rather different than most of the Arab countries. Zakaria thinks of Tunisia as one of the countries to be in “the next wave” to move towards liberal democracy: “Both have taken steps towards loosening up the system, particularly economically . . . [Tunisia's] president runs the country tightly, allowing little political openness nor even much movement toward legal reform. But Tunisia's economic growth has been impressive and widespread.” (Zakaria, 2007, p. 80) Zakaria seems to imply, that by getting rid of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the Tunisian president at that time, Tunisia would definitely reform successfully, because the middle class Tunisia has grown almost tenfold, to include more than half of the population.

When the president, who was in office for more than twenty years, was ousted one month after the beginning of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, followed by dissolution of the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally party, and resignation of the Prime Minister Ghannouchi; Tunisia went through democratic elections, and chose to vote for the Islamist party. However, nowadays, the country is again experiencing anti-governmental riots with recent assassination of the leftist opposition politician. The prime minister said that the country's main political parties had failed to form a

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cabinet of independent technocrats. (FRANCE 24, 2013) In Egypt, the Islamists have been, on one hand, governing politically more successfully, but on the other hand, their firm rule has been aggressively repressing and censoring any opposition.

The premature introduction of democratic elections in the Middle East has usually different outcomes than in non-Islamic countries. The reason to it is mainly the strong position of religion. Its manipulative power over people, who want change, gives fundamentalist parties opportunity to easily influence voters, therefore the results of elections. However, even though the Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt and Tunisia won elections after the Arab Spring, their oppressive rule has been questioned since then. The theories of Fareed Zakaria and Samuel Huntington both describe the situations in these countries. Today we can see that there is a clear distinction between two groups in this region - the citizens, who would prefer economic growth and development, and the ruling class of Islamic fundamentalists. However, as the results of the previous elections showed, the citizens want to be governed by the Islamists. The fundamentalists, however, do not want to follow the route of democratic and capitalist success; they depict and criticize the differences between Islam and the West, and use the distorted image of the West for their own political purposes. These two groups also seem to, in a way, represent the two theories of Fareed Zakaria and Samuel Huntington. Zakaria would represent regular people, who might want to live in a religious liberal democratic society with higher economic growth and development. Huntington, on the other hand, describes the Islamic fundamentalists in the two countries, who fundamentally refuse the western liberal ideas. It is now obvious that the rule of the new governments is actually slowing down previously achieved economic growth, and that these governments are similarly violating basic human and civil rights.

The Arab Spring seemed to indicate that Zakaria's economic transition zone might be set incorrectly, and that it could be significantly different around the world. The previous presidents of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, and Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, focused on economic reformation to achieve high rates of growth. This

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reformation not only consisted of new economic policies, but also of massive secularization of all public spheres, and throughout educational reformation. These are other factors that need to be taken account of along with the economic progress. However, both countries implemented different these new policies and in different ways, causing economic and political differences between the two countries, which I will discuss later.

The previously achieved GDPs had an impact on the quality of education, because the Tunisian ex-president Ben Ali, in spite of the human and civil rights violations, tried to follow the path of western education, focusing on secularization and pro-western thinking at schools. Egypt had similar goals, but, as the next chapter will show us, its economic, political and educational reforms did not work in the same manner as in Tunisia.

4. Education in Egypt and Tunisia and the effects on the Arab Spring

Trying to find the sources of differences between Egypt and Tunisia, I have already discussed political culture in these two countries, and I will move to the role of education, which can have strong influence on political culture.

Educational and economical sectors show us that, while both countries were authoritarian, the rulers tried to lead them towards pro-western political development, secular values and, especially in education, towards critical thinking. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak were often called by media as pro-western presidents, who tried to implement liberalization and secularization in education as well. Education played a major role in the politics of Tunisia, and was definitely of great concern in Egypt too.

A lot of journalists and authors have praised the Tunisia president for the reforms that were often politically a lot further ahead when compared to other countries in the Middle East, or the rest of the Northern Africa. Andrew Borowiec from the from The Washington Times explained that under Ben Ali's leadership, "this North African country of nearly 10 million people has reached unprecedented prosperity and has become known as "the only Arab country that works" - without oil or other resources except its population, on whose education 20 percent of Tunisia's gross domestic product is spent." (Borowiec, 2003) During Ben Ali's governance, education was a crucial element for higher growth and development in the country. His policies and politics, according to James Morrison from the same newspaper, were even praised by the US State Department for enshrining legal rights for women and providing compulsory education for children through age 15, while women comprised more than 50 percent of students in Tunisian universities in the year 2005. (Morrison, 2005) Ben Ali's pro-western politics also bring more light to the close relations between Tunisia and many western countries.

Hosni Mubarak also maintained good relations with the United States, because of Egypt's tactical position in the Middle East and its close relationship with Israel. However, Mubarak was often criticized for his undemocratic and repressive rule, and

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for less successful reformation of economy that still dependent on Egypt's natural resources. Even though, politically speaking, there were small differences between the two establishments, Tunisia was far more successful in economic terms, and the situation in education in Egypt evolved similarly. Sarah A. Topol from Newsweek International talked to 39-year-old father of two, Hassan, who is convinced that Egypt's "woeful public-education system is good for nothing but turning children into undereducated hooligans" (Topol, 2012), and that only private education is meaningful.

When comparing the situation in education in the two countries, there are several factors and differences that need to be discussed. It is important to analyze the policies these leaders followed, and the political direction behind them, and the differences in governmental spending on education compared to the differences in student's demographics between Egypt and Tunisia. This comparison will clearly describe the major outcomes and the results of educational systems in Egypt and Tunisia, which are, according to my hypothesis, among the major causes of differences between these countries today.

Educational politics and reforms of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak

Ben Ali's successful attempt to economically reform Tunisia by reflexing western ideals had large impact on the policies in the educational sector. At the beginning of his rule, Ben Ali appointed Mohamed Charfi the new education minister. Charfi was known for his strong opposition to Ben Ali, and he was also a long-time leader of the League of Human Rights in Tunisia. In 1989, when he took the office, Mohamed Charfi started secularizing schools. Charfi, in his book *Islam and Freedom: The Historic Misunderstanding*, accused the previous educational system of supporting violence and preventing modernization and democratization, which was a result of the absence of criticism of Islamic law and history.

One pretext of the idea of secularizing the country was to make Tunisia look more like a modern western country, but the other, more hidden pretext were Charfi's

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own believes to get rid of the Islamist opposition. A Tunisian Journalist Kamel Labidi summarized that Mohamed Charfi, as education minister, “undertook to expunge from school curricula religious texts, which permitted violence or discrimination against women and to brought these texts into conformity with the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” (Labidi, 2000) Such educational reform, on one hand, enormously decreased the influence of the Tunisian Islamist movement, but, on the other hand, made the fundamentalists one of the top enemies of the government.

The second target of the reformation was to expand critical thinking in Tunisian schools, and critical approach towards religion, which can be achieved by educating for peace, embracing globalism, and above all, a profound understanding of equality and democracy. These are the defining characteristics that IMPACT-SE found in its comprehensive study of the curricula and educational system of Tunisia.

A comparative report conducted by the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-SE) and published in February 2011 shows that the results of the reformation came several years later, with the people, who fully experienced secularized schooling. The report says Tunisia has instituted educational reforms and is no less tolerant than Israel. The school system in Egypt, where no such similar reforms were implemented is still in grip of the religious clerics, and does not teach democratic values, which lowers the chances for the emergence of a liberal democratic government in Egypt. (IMPACT-SE, 2011)

In Egypt, there is another major problem in access to education. The results of the HIECS (Health Innovation and Education Clusters) of 1990/91 and 1995/96 and the Social Spending Survey of 1997/98 showed that there is sufficient evidence of increasing inequality of access to education by income class and between urban and rural location, while the poor and lower-income people spend larger amounts of money on education than the rest. El-Ghonemy (2003) concluded that this resulted in persistently high rate of pupil dropout from public schools, who are rather illegally working; or in recursion to private schooling.

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Y. Lulat (2005) points out that numerous countries in the Africa and the Middle East were trying to achieve economic growth and reduce inequality by supporting education, but the major problem was the unequal opportunity to higher educational, as is also the case of Egypt. Even though the secularization of the society was to be achieved in Egypt as well, the lacking modernization and reformation caused constantly outdated educational system and its syllabus. Adel Guindy, supported by his study, thinks that Egyptian government, instead of secularization, has rather Islamized its curriculum, which has hitherto provided some support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Which seems to be unsuccessful reformation and secularization, mostly only suppression of the Islamist by the law, actually resulted in higher support of the fundamentalists, who helped people in places, where the state was lacking. Guindy (Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2009) provides examples of lessons encouraging students to limit friendship to co-religionists and assigning students to search for hadith (the sayings of and anecdotes about the Prophet Muhammad) and Qur'anic verses.

The IMPACT-SE research also implies that the Egyptian people have not been taught the importance of democracy and accepting others, in contrast to Tunisia, which has introduced educational reforms. There the education cultivates equality and respect for others, avoids demonizing others, and portrays the “Other” as vital for defining and enhancing one’s own identity – the attitudes toward the religion are much more progressive than in most Arab countries. Basically, a certain openness of the Tunisian school system not only develops critical thinking, but also deprives the Islamist of the image as being in a position of good and oppressed opposition, as it is in Egypt. The study summarized that since the mid-1990s, Islamist power has declines in shaping the country’s educational curricula and the mindset of its young people. Lulat says that “in fact the rise of Islamism has had little to do with higher education per se, rather, its source lies elsewhere: alienation among the masses from the status quo engendered by such factors as economic and political chaos.” (Lulat, 2005, p. 172)

Corruption in the public sector

One of the factors that lead Tunisia to Arab Spring was public dissatisfaction with the growing corruption during the later years of Ben Ali's leadership. The country was moving towards the right direction a few years after the reformation of the whole system was implemented, but more than a decade after the president took power in 1987, the situation started to change. Higher levels of corruption in this region are very common, and in spite of the rise, Tunisia has been doing exceptionally well compared to other countries, and most importantly Egypt. The rising trend can be seen on the annual Corruption Perceptions Index conducted by Transparency International. The index measures the perceived levels of corruption in public sector in 176 countries and territories. Lower position in the index represents lower perceived levels of corruption.

Table 1: Position in the Corruption Perceptions Index

| Year | Egypt | Tunisia |
|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1998 | 66 | 33 |
| 2003 | 70 | 39 |
| 2007 | 105 | 61 |
| 2010 | 98 | 59 |
| 2011 | 112 | 73 |

Source: (Transparency International, 2013)

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index shows that the corruption in public sector in Tunisia has been significantly lower than in Egypt. In the Table 1, we can see that Tunisia's position in the index moved down from number 33 to number 73 in 13 years, and Egypt moved down 46 places to number 112. In the year 1998, Tunisia was amongst countries like Hungary and Tunisia, and four positions before Czech Republic, while Egypt was very similar to India or Bulgaria. In 2010, Tunisia was amongst Slovakia and Latvia, while Egypt was with Mexico on the 98th position.

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The annual index started measuring corruption perceptions in the year 1995, hence we are not able to say whether the reformation of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia have had major impact on the situation. However, we can see that his later policies might have affected the overall situation in public sector. Nonetheless, the corruption in public sector in Egypt is much higher, and Hosni Mubarak's leadership has not helped here as well. Anver Versi (2003) from the Middle East magazine cites an American entrepreneur, who said he didn't have to pay anybody to do business in Tunisia in 2003, which is not very common in many developing countries, and certainly not in Africa or the Middle East. Versi continues that the basis of Tunisia's success had been at that time political stability, a well-educated and motivated work force (education is universal and 75% of the population is middle class), a pragmatic attitude towards business, and a modern and efficient infrastructure. (Versi, 2003)

Considering corruption as one of the causes of the Arab Spring, an interesting question we could ask is why did the Arab Spring break out in Tunisia, when Egypt has much higher levels of corruption perceptions in the public sector? One of the reasons might be the western-like education that supported critical thinking. Tunisians might had been used to lower corruption, but with the growing tendencies throughout the first decade of the 21st century and towards Ben All's extended family and other public figures, they became more critical of the regime. And even though Egyptians probably experienced corruption in daily lives a lot more often, it was the Tunisians that began the wave of demonstrations that essentially changed the situation in both countries.

The last point I want to cover concerning reforms and policies in education is also one of the factors that helped the spread of the Arab Spring protests. People of both Egypt and Tunisia used the internet, most importantly social networks, to efficiently organize. It is questionable whether the results of the protests would have the same results e the same without it. According to a survey conducted in Tunis in March 2011, 64 percent of students used Facebook as their primary source of information about protests and demonstrations during the 4-week period between December 17 and January 14. (Schraeder, Winter 2012) However, long before the

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Arab Spring, but definitely with impact, Internet had another role in the development of education in the two countries.

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali believed in strong position of new information technologies in the development of country. He believed Internet would bring benefits not only from economic perspective, but also educationally. In the year 1999, he planned to connect to the internet all schools and public libraries in the country. However, as Delinda Hanley from the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs points out (1998), the most important increases in Tunisian Internet use, already in 1998, originated within educational institutions.

Table 2 manifests this increase. Early after connecting Tunisia to the internet, the number of internet users was several times higher than in Egypt. This figure has been constant higher in Tunisia, but only as of 2011, the gap between the two countries is moving closer, with only about 3% difference for Tunisia.

Table 2: Internet users as percentage of population

| Year | Egypt | Tunisia |
|-------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1998 | 0.15 | 0.11 |
| 2000 | 0.64 | 2.72 |
| 2002 | 2.72 | 5.17 |
| 2004 | 5.15 | 8.43 |
| 2006 | 12.55 | 12.85 |
| 2008 | 18.01 | 27.31 |
| 2010 | 30.2 | 36.56 |

Source: (The World Bank Group, 2013)

Dr. Daniel Calingaert, executive vice president at the Freedom House organization, says that, on one hand, “Tunisia actively promotes Internet usage as a way to stimulate innovation and economic growth,” but, on the other hand, “these countries place wide-ranging controls over digital media to prevent them from being used for political opposition.” (Calingaert, 2010) Citizens who criticize the

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government online are subject to harassment, imprisonment, and torture. According to him, Egypt has less restrictive settings than Tunisia, but the country seemed to be heading towards greater control over the Internet, and similar prosecutions occurred both in Egypt and Tunisia. (Calingaert, 2010) However, the most important are the early years of Internet usage in these countries, because, as Delinda Hanley (1998) pointed out, the most important increases in Tunisian Internet usage originated with educational institutions, where the reform promoted western education. Hence, the ones most affected were teachers and students - these are also the people who were the most active during the Arab Spring. The national and regional research and emergence of education data communication networks in parts of the developing world have shown large benefits arising from collaboration amongst tertiary education institutes. Anna Bon explains that these benefits are not only economic sustainable development, but also “a tool for education and scientific collaboration, a platform for technological innovation, for communication and access to information.” (Bon, 2007)

The point I want to make, by describing the differences in the implementation of internet, is that it did cause not only the obvious results during the Arab Spring protests - efficient organization and spread of news - but it also had another effect in Tunisia a decade earlier – higher spread of western ideas in education, and expansion of critical thinking. Internet usage in Tunisia was significantly higher than in Egypt at the turn of the 20th century, and even though the censorship in Tunisia was higher, the role of the Internet was to support development in educational and economical sectors, while mostly only anti-governmental content was restricted.

Governmental spending on education

A necessary connection that comes hand in hand with public education is the governmental spending in this sector. The amount of allocated money schools get can not only cause large differences between the outcomes, but it can also have impact on the operation of other sectors and economic development and growth of a country as well.

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Problems with education in Egypt, economically speaking, originate from several different reasons. First of all, sudden high growth of the higher education student population compared to unproportionally low funding.

Table 3: PUBLIC SPENDING ON EDUCATION; TOTAL (% OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE)

| Year | Egypt | Tunisia |
|------|-------|---------|
| 1988 | - | 13.46 |
| 1992 | 9.65 | - |
| 1995 | 13.79 | 17.35 |
| 2000 | - | 17.37 |
| 2003 | 16.2 | 21.1 |
| 2005 | 16.0 | 20.8 |
| 2007 | 12.6 | 22.4 |
| 2008 | 11.9 | 22.7 |

Source: Trading Economics, 2012; World Bank Group, 2013

As shown in Table 3, public spending on education in Tunisia has been constantly higher for twenty years. Moreover, the government expenditure in Egypt was decreasing, while in Tunisia it was increasing, and in the year 2008, the public spending on education in Tunisia was almost twice as large than in Egypt. In the year 1995, Egypt spent 13.79% of government expenditure on education, while Tunisia spent 17.35. In 2003, it was 16.2% to 21.1%, and in 2008, Egypt's 11.9% compared to 22.7% in Tunisia. Enrollments increased by 42 percent between 1997/98 and 1998/99 leading to an 8 percent decline in per -student spending that exacerbated disparities in resource allocation between faculties.

Secondly, as a result of the low government funding, quality-decline and outdated curriculum of university education. According to World Bank's Higher Education Enhancement Project, in 2002 Egypt faced a number of challenges including antiquated system, low quality and relevance at the university level, low quality and relevance at the middle technical level, limited fiscal sustainability of

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publicly financed enrollments. With the high growth of tertiary education student enrollments and decline in government funding, the government had no capacity to sustain the quality of education in Egypt.

Thirdly, as a result, higher education institutions trying to generate revenue to restrain from decline in quality. In the years 1994-1995, the government of Egypt introduced a new law reducing the state expenditure on higher education to 85%, leaving the universities to generate the remaining 15 percent. The universities, besides charging different fees for non-educational services, created special paid programs that are meant to be of a higher quality. However, in 1995-1996 the government introduced the so-called 'Dual Track policies', which allows less qualified students to obtain places by paying 360£E in addition to the nominal fees paid by regularly admitted students. (ICHEFAP, 2009) Result of this certain kind of 'official corruption', on one hand, is even higher inequality of opportunity to education, and on the other hand, generates even more corruption directly between the teachers and students.

These three points lead Egypt to growing corruption in education, inequality of opportunity caused by large differences between social classes and between rural and urban locations.

The problem in Tunisia is of a partially different matter. While Egyptians education has major deficiencies in both quality and exceeding quantities of higher education students, in Tunisia, the quality of education has not declined due to the quantity of students as much as it has been declining in Egypt. Therefore, problem is rather about the latter mentioned. The large governmental expenditure did not only cause higher quality of education, but also growing number of enrollments. Tertiary education in the country is available for anyone, who passes the state exams at the end of secondary level education, creating a large class of college-educated workers. Hence, overeducation causes higher unemployment in the country.

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On one hand, According to John Carney from CNBC, “Tunisia has clearly over-invested in higher education - it is spending 7.2 percent of its GDP on education, more than any European or North American country that except Denmark or Iceland.” (Carney, 2013) On the other hand, universities in the country are well financially supported, so they are not forced to find other financial sources as universities in Egypt, also decreasing chances of corruption in this sector.

Tunisian government has not led its universities to focus on producing students skilled in technology that it needs to allure more investments essential for more work opportunities in the region. However, the unemployment problem as a result of overeducation does not have an affect on the results of the sphere I focus on. The differences in quality of education between the two countries are may cause unemployment, but are not caused by it.

The inequality of opportunity to higher education is much smaller than in Egypt. Tunisia kept the public spending on education slowly growing, reaching almost 23% of government expenditure in 2008, while in Egypt it has been slowly decreasing. Although the enrollments in both countries are around the same percentage level compared to the population, there has been an increase in female participation in Tunisia. In the year 2008, the number of females studying at universities compared to males was one and a half times higher, and already from the year 2002, there have been less male graduates. (Abdessalem, 2009) This growing number of female students indicates no gender bias in Tunisian education sector as a result of Ben Ali’s secularizing reformation.

To sum up, the two countries have shown obvious and large-scale differences in government funding compared to the number of students. In Egypt, the constant decline in government expenditure on government resulted in quality decline, corruption, and, in many cases, high prices of public education. In Tunisia, exceeding quantities of higher education students, sustained governmental funding, and wrong study-focus of the public schools have created high unemployment.

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Demographics of the Arab Spring protests and its correlation to education in Tunisia and Egypt

Many scholars, sociologists, political scientists, and others are convinced certain demographic settings can have large impact on the future development of a country. To be accurate, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, it was the so-called youth bulge of people who were born in the second half of the 1980's. As Kate Nevens points out (Fall 2012), "the whole Middle East region is actually experiencing an enormous youth bulge, as around 60 percent of the region's population is under the age of 30," and in some countries, these figures are even higher. Especially a 'Baby Boom' can say a lot. Richard Seymour (2010) reminds us that "the 'Baby Boom' in the US that followed the end of World War II, gave rise to the 'Flower Power Generation' of socially and politically aware activists."

The Arab Spring protests majorly consisted of this Middle Eastern youth bulge. The youth bulge that, from the very beginning, experienced the reformed, secularized, western-like and well governmentally funded education in Tunisia. The youth bulge that caused the ever-growing enrollments in higher education. According to the statistics created by the U.S. Census Bureau, the youth bulge has its origins between the years 1985 and 1990, and since then the growth in Tunisia rate has been on decrease. However, in 2010, the youth bulge of late 1980's was around 20 to 25 years old. According to the age distribution statistics, both, the 20-24 age group and the 25-29 age group, were the most populated age groups in Tunisia, with decreasing birth tendency for the younger age groups. In Egypt, there was also a 'Baby Boom' between the same years, but the increasing birth rate had continued until the year 2005, creating a burden on public education and other state-funded sectors. In the year 2010, each of the age group between 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14, had population way over 8 million people, while the age groups of 20-24 and 25-29 each consisted of less than 8 million citizens, implying increasing birth rate that only started in the 1980's, but has not stopped. Therefore, in Egypt, we cannot particularly talk about youth bulge, but rather a large increase of births.

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This has significant effect on the educational sector. High birth rates might not necessarily be a problem, but with decreasing governmental spending, the constant growth of birth rates has, after several years, essentially led to problems with quantity of students and continuous decrease of quality at all levels of education in Egypt. Eric Rozenman points out that all the anti-regime upheavals during the Arab Spring were driven by local conditions that failed to create enough jobs to satisfy a demographic bulge of better-educated youth. (Rozenman, Spring 2011)

The substantial decline in the quality of education in Egypt was caused by rapid increase in school enrollments, as a result of consecutive high birth rate and decrease in public spending in the sector. Tunisia, differently, experienced single and much shorter way of higher birth rate, and with continuous, even increased governmental spending, the quality of education has been sustained even with the growing number of student during the recent years. The quality in Tunisia should even rise in the following years, provided the government expenditure will stay on the same level, because the birth rate declined to its usual values after the youth bulge, and so should the quantity of students decline during the next years.

The effects of education on the development after the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring was a fall of several authoritarian rulers caused by numerous factors. Most of the papers focused on the widely discussed causes of the Arab Spring - the dissatisfaction with the rule of local governments, unemployment, human and civil rights violations, high levels of political corruption, poverty, or economic decline. However, to my knowledge, there are only a few works discussing education in these countries, but even these do not discuss the connection with the Arab Spring.

As I have shown, the differences in economical and political policies and reforms between Egypt and Tunisia have also caused large differences in their educational systems. Even though both countries aimed to achieve western-like education systems, the two countries implemented new policies in different matters, Egypt being less successful. The secularization process in Egypt only caused

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suppression and growing preferences for the Islamic Fundamentalists. In Tunisia, these symptoms were also present, but secularization in Tunisia did not only concern abandonment of the religious political opposition, but also implementation of critical thinking at schools, or high integration of females in public life. However, more obvious differences can be seen when looking at the statistics connected with education in these countries. In Egypt, rapidly growing quantities of students along with decreasing public expenditure on education have caused quick decline in overall quality of education. Even though Tunisia has also experienced higher rates of student enrollments, the government, instead of decreasing, continuously increased public spending on education.

In the mid-term and long-term effect, Tunisia, due to its history, political culture, and educational system, has sustained liberal values, which could move it towards more stable liberal systems, that will be keep the system in check. Egypt, on the contrary, again due to colonial past, political ambition, and education, immersed in Islamic religion, shaping the society under the influence of religious parties. Education, among others, played major role in shaping societies in both countries, but with long-term, more throughout, efficient, and effective secularization, Tunisia was, in this sense, able to reshape its political culture more broadly than Egypt. Considering the fact, that the Arab Spring started to spread from Tunisia, and that the people of Tunisia were able to oust the newly elected repressive government again, while Egyptians, on the contrary, are not, we can see these differences between the two countries have impact on the development after the Arab Spring.

Nowadays, in Tunisia, the government was again ousted in anti-governmental protest, and the country is preparing for new elections. Recent survey said the majority of Tunisians are concerned and don't think the situation will improve with the current premier Ali Laarayedh. (ANSAMED, 2013) In Egypt, during the recent protests, the people still seemed to believe in the power of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic fundamentalist party. For now, it looks like the preferences of Islamic fundamentalists are decreasing in Tunisia, but this is debatable in the case of Egypt. The question is whether the preferences will decline to the level the Islamic party will

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no longer be able to run Tunisia alone, and if a similar scenario could occur in Egypt as well. This necessary evokes another question, and that whether the situation in Tunisia and Egypt will essentially turn on the path to more liberalism, or will the people prefer Islamic fundamentalists in the next elections as well?

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RESUMÉ

Cieľom tejto bakalárske práce je zohľadniť úlohu vzdelávania v Egypte a v Tunisku, a vplyv vzdelávania v týchto krajinách na vývoj po Arabskej jari. Vychádza z historického pozadia a politickej kultúry v Egypte a v Tunisku, a z dvoch teórií Samuela P. Huntingtona a Fareeda Zakariu. Následne, v kombinácii so štatistickými dátami o štátnom vzdelávaní v Egypte a Tunisku, práca fakticky ilustruje rozdiely, ktoré mali vplyv na politickú kultúru a spoločnosť v týchto krajinách. Posledná časť pozostáva z konkrétneho definovania tohto vplyvu na vývoj po Arabskej Jari.

Prvá časť práce sa zameriava na presné definovanie Arabskej jari ako fenoménu, ktorý bol, napriek veľkému záujmu zo strany médií aj vzdelancov, často nepresne opísaný. Pojem Arabskej jari je často chápaný ako vlna protestov, ktorých výsledkom bola revolúcia. Avšak, po hlbšom preskúmaní tohto fenoménu, je presnejšie nazvať Arabskú jar ako pád viacerých autoritatívnych režimov. Preto, na presnejšiu definíciu pojmu, práca prirovnáva Arabskú jar k iným podobným udalostiam.

Nasledujúca kapitola sa sústreďuje na koloniálnu históriu a politickú kultúru v Egypte a v Tunisku, ktorá bola ovplyvnená francúzskou a britskou okupáciou, a silným postavením islamského náboženstva v týchto krajinách. Dlhoročným potláčaním si islamské skupiny v týchto krajinách úspešne vybudovali pevnú sieť podporovateľov, čo sa prejavilo aj v prvých demokratických voľbách po Arabskej jari, kedy fundamentalistickí islamisti vyhrali vo oboch krajinách s veľkým náskokom.

Tretia kapitola sa venuje teóriam Fareeda Zakariu, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, a Samuela P. Huntingtona, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Obe teórie sa snažia definovať a riešiť aktuálne problémy Blízkeho východu, a predvídať smerovanie politiky v tomto regióne. I keď tieto teórie predstavujú rozdielne názory, Zakaria a Huntington sa zhodujú v názore, že samotný problém pramení v oblasti Blízkeho východu a jej

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politiky, a nie z islamskej spoločnosti ako takej. Zakaria vidí riešenie v ekonomickom raste a rozvoji, ktorý by nevyhnutne viedol k liberalizácii, a neskôr aj k úspešnej demokratizácii.

Jadro bakalárskej práca tvorí záverečná štvrtá kapitola, ktorá je interpretačná: venuje sa analýze politiky v sektore štátneho školstva v Egypte a v Tunisku. Špecificky zameriava na štatistické údaje z sektore vzdelávania v Egypte a v Tunisku, ktoré sú ďalej analyzované, a pomocou ktorých je možné jasne určiť rozdieli medzi týmito dvoma krajinami, či už zo strany ekonomickej, politickej, alebo sociálnej.

Záverečná časť aplikuje tieto rozdieli v sektore vzdelávania na dnešnú situáciu, a definuje dôsledky nielen v minulosti, na vývoj po Arabskej jari, ale aj na ďalšie nasledovanie týchto krajín.