

**BRATISLAVSKÁ MEDZINÁRODNÁ ŠKOLA LIBERÁLNYCH
ŠTÚDIÍ**

**END OF HISTORY OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?
BAKALÁRSKA PRÁCA**

BRATISLAVA, 2010

Roman Kalina

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BAKALÁRSKA PRÁCA

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BRATISLAVA, 2010

Roman Kalina

Declaration of Originality

I, the undersigned, Roman Kalina, hereby declare that I have produced this thesis on my own using sources listed in “References“, under the guidance of my thesis advisor prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc.

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END OF HISTORY OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

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Abstrakt

V mojej bakalárskej práci porovnávam dve knihy, ktoré výrazne ovplyvnili sféru medzinárodných vzťahov a politológie po skončení Studenej vojny. Konkrétne sa jedná o knihy amerických autorov Francisa Fukuyamu: *Koniec Dejín* a Samuela Huntingtona: *Streť Civilizácií*. Cieľom mojej práce je zistiť ako sa tieto dve knihy odlišujú, a ktorá z nich bližšie a presnejšie predpovedala ako bude vyzerat' medzinárodná politika po Studenej vojne.

Zámerom mojej bakalárskej práce je vytvorit' za pomoci myšlienok týchto dvoch autorov predikciu ako bude vyzerat' svet v ďalších desaťročiach. Chcem poukázať na relatívnu silu Islamského sveta, konkrétne arabských štátoch, ktoré sú závislé na ropе, a taktiež na dôležitosť Číny pri presune síl v rámci medzinárodných vzťahov.

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Abstract

In my thesis I am comparing the two books that significantly affected the sphere of international relations and political science after the Cold War. Specifically, there are books by American authors Francis Fukuyama: *The End of History* and Samuel Huntington: *Clash of Civilizations*. The purpose of my work is to determine how these two books differ, and which of them predicted the shape of global politics more accurately after the Cold War.

The aim of my bachelor's thesis is to develop a prediction, with the help of ideas from these two authors, how the world will look in the next decades. I want to show the relative strength of the Islamic world, particularly Arab states that are dependent on oil, and also the importance of China in the shaping of new forces in global politics.

Foreword

The topic that I chose for my Bachelor Thesis was not new to me. I got in touch with Huntington and Fukuyama for the first time in the intensive course in my first year at BISLA. This part of course was at that time led by prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc. At that time Huntington's and Fukuyama's ideas literally caught me up. I read their theories and started to compare them with the situation today.

From the very beginning I thought that Huntington was not right. The phenomenon of cultural identity has clearly not been a primary reason of the ongoing conflicts. The concept of nation states is the invention of the populist leaders who gain the support from the masses by appealing to their feelings – irrationality.

After I read Fukuyama's End of History I realized that this is the path (democratization) that all the people should walk on in order to secure peace and stability in global politics.

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Introduction

The book *The End of History and the Last Man* was written by Francis Fukuyama in 1992. It was based on the article called “End of History?”, which was published in 1989 in *The National Interest*. The book *The Clash of Civilizations* was written by Samuel P. Huntington in 1996. It is also based on the article published in 1993 in *Foreign Affairs*. The article was called “The Clash of Civilizations?”. The reason why I chose these two books is simple. Articles that preceded these books were some of the most influential in the 20th century, and they are also shaping international relations theories today. These books are the most commented on, quoted and criticized books of modern political science. Both of them are trying to predict what will be the face of global politics after the end of the Cold War.

Fukuyama’s prediction is more “optimistic” than Huntington’s. The End of History symbolizes the victory of liberal democracy on the field of ideological struggles. Fukuyama is anticipating the global spread of liberal democracy. Huntington, on the other hand, is presuming that the clash between ideologies, during the Cold War, will be replaced with clashes between civilizations.

Who was right or who is closer to the current situation? This will be the main question which I will try to answer in my Bachelor paper. In my work I will analyze both books, I will provide critiques of them, and I will compare them with the situation today.

Is the world heading towards peace by establishing one liberal democracy after another, or is the world divided into civilizations which are willing to defend their own cultural uniqueness at all costs? These two books are considered as opposites, but do they have something similar or do they see the world in completely different views?

I am an optimist; hence I sympathize with Fukuyama’s ideas of the End of History. Liberal democracy is universal, and its principles can be applied worldwide, no matter what culture. Despite the fact that I am an optimist, I am not an idealist. I do not believe that main sources of conflicts are primarily cultural. Nowadays, when multiculturalism is everywhere, culture is surely not a primary source of conflict. This is idealistic, in a sense that people were fighting for their cultural identity, and wanted to be released from the oppression of the hegemonic culture. It is not like that. Culture and phenomena like nationalism are only means used by populists and demagogues to gain power. Money, wealth, and everything related to them have always been the primary source of conflict.

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In the first chapter of my thesis I am trying to analyze Fukuyama's book. At the very end of the first chapter I am providing some critiques of Fukuyama's theory. In the second chapter I switch to Huntington's book. The same as in the first chapter at the very end I provide critiques of his theory. In my last chapter I put together the theories of both of the authors and synchronize them and create the prediction for the next decades.

CHAPTER 1: End of History

Events that happened during and after the cold war led Fukuyama to the old Kantian question whether there is something as a Universal History of Mankind. The fall of Fascism, the collapse of authoritarian states, the fall of Communism, and the Liberalization of China are, according to Fukuyama, signs that Democracy is crucial in defining the End of History. In his book he was defending the argument that liberal democracy is the only regime that can satisfy all human needs and desires, and it leads toward the end of history.

1.1 An Idea for a Universal History

Universal History of mankind is not the same as world history. Universal history is not describing events which happened throughout time. The attempt to describe the universal history is a process which seeks patterns according to which history has been evolving. This formula can reveal which direction will be world evolving.

1.1.1 Immanuel Kant

According to Fukuyama, this pattern is not as old as philosophy itself. The idea of Universal History was first raised by German philosopher and thinker Immanuel Kant. Kant, although unable to resolve this issue, laid the groundwork for the answer. He presupposed that, despite the fact that history appeared to be chaotic, there may be some pattern that could prove historical development. Kant also presupposed that history has its final point, which according to him is human freedom.

“This end point was the realization of human freedom, for “a society in which freedom under external laws is associated in the highest degree with irresistible power, i.e., a perfectly just civic constitution, is the highest problem Nature assigns to the human race.” The achievement of such a just civic constitution and its universalization throughout the world would then be the criterion by which one could understand progress in history” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 58).

Kant also described the mechanism by which people are able to reach the end point. This mechanism is identical with the mechanism described in Hobbes’s Leviathan. It is a contributing actor which leads toward the end of the "state of nature" and the war of all against all. (Hobbes, 2008). It is a kind of a calculation, and an awareness of the benefit of agreement. Kant called it “asocial sociability”. This irrationality creates competition and leads people toward progress and claims for their rights.

1.1.2 Georg W. F. Hegel

Later on another German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, developed Kant's idea. Hegel saw, like Kant, the progress in the history. Progress was not caused by the development of reason, but by "asocial sociability" of men, which led people to the front. History, according to Hegel, is an ongoing process of conflicts, which brings together different ideas and political regimes. The old ideas and regimes are falling apart, because they cannot handle the confrontation with new ones. The evolving ideas and political regimes then again get into conflicts with new ones - this is called dialectics, which creates a crucial part in Hegel's concepts.

Therefore, Hegel claimed that the ideas from the past are not absolute and objective, they are only reflecting thoughts of a certain historical period. Human history is thus not only a rotation of governments and civilizations, but when we take a deeper look, it is changing of knowledge, ideas and consciousness - the way people respond to basic questions, what they deem as good and bad. Such a change in consciousness does not take several centuries, but it is constantly changing from generation to generation. The generation gap is a perfect example of changing attitudes in a decade. Another reason why the Universal History has been heading towards progress is human needs. Human needs played a crucial role in building a state in Plato's *Republic* (Plato, 2008). French philosopher Rousseau claimed that man has a huge amount of needs and it is not possible to satisfy all of them (Rousseau, 2003). Satisfying the needs of man thus led to progress, because continuing desire led people further. It did not matter whether it was the desire for material things, or the desire for freedom and rights.

Although the dialectical course of history leads us to believe that history will continue indefinitely, because whenever a new idea appears or the new political system will be found, there always will be someone who will find mistakes in them, and will try to change them. But Hegel defined **the end of history**. It was the year 1806, when Napoleon's army won the battle against Prussia. But what prompted Hegel to this view were revolutions in France and America and the ideas and principles of liberalism. According to him, in the world, there are no ideas which will exceeded liberalism; therefore liberalism is not contradictory. Historical dialectics ends at this point.

1.1.3 Alexandre Kojève

Successor and supporter of Hegel's ideas was a French-Russian philosopher, Alexander Kojève. Kojève agreed with Hegel that the end of history took place in the year

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1806. Despite the fact that Kojève witnessed two World Wars, the rise of fascism in Germany, and communism in the USSR and China, he argued that the type of state that was brought by the French Revolution is "universal and homogeneous". This type of state is the peak of the evolution of human thought and further progress is no longer possible.

He considered the periods of wars, fascism, and communism, only as a part of history. These periods as periods before the French Revolution will finally bring democratization and liberalization. According to Kojève these events will only strengthen the process of anchoring the liberal principles throughout the world:

"If the sovietization of Russia and the communization of China are anything more than or different from the democratization of imperial Germany (by way of Hitlerism) or the accession of Togoland to independence, nay, the self-determination of the Papuans, it is only because the Sino-Soviet actualization of Robespierrian Bonapartism obliges post-Napoleonic Europe to speed up the elimination of the numerous more or less anachronistic sequels to its pre-revolutionary past" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 67).

Events which happened at the end of the 20th century brought the wave of optimism instead of the pessimism which dominated in the early 20th century. And therefore, according to Fukuyama, we should ask ourselves: *"Is there such a thing as a Universal History of mankind, taken from a point of view far more cosmopolitan than was possible in Kant's day?"* (Fukuyama, 2006, p.70)

1.2 Progress in history

When we forget to find some sort of a moral progress, or pursuit of happiness, and throw away all attempts to describe the Universal history, where can be seen the progress? According to Fukuyama, progress is in knowledge, ergo in modern natural science. Why science? Literature went through various stages, but we can not say that Joseph Heller was a better writer than Victor Hugo. Science is about something completely different; Archimedes or Isaac Newton had much less knowledge about the world than any high school student in the 21st century. It is only because they were born in the wrong era. Science has shown a clear line of progress over time.

The development of modern natural science has also a large impact on society. A lot of its inventions, e.g., metal, printing press, and many more, played a major role in the transformation of society.

1.2.1 Progress and wars

The largest historical changes have occurred due to military rivalry, in which modern natural science has a significant share. With the help of scientific development, new technologies have shaped powers which conquered, by using new weapons, large territories. The war forces states to restructure old institutions, social order and policy, in order to be more effective in developing new technologies for the military. Wars also unify countries and create national awareness, which strengthen the country internally. Wars force states to expand the rights of people, because every man is needed in the army.

The war thus propels people to modernization, in order to maintain the country. The state, to be able to compete with the other states, must adopt modern technologies, change its organization, and make the other changes, which bring modernization along. *“It is conflict rather than cooperation that first induces men to live in societies and then develop the potential of those societies more fully”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 76).

Exceptions in this area are Islamic nations, which have huge oil reserves. These states have enough funds to be able to obtain the latest military technology without any change within the political or social sphere. This is the only exception, but it will be interesting to see when the oil runs out, as they compete with other countries in armaments, if they will not have oil revenues.

1.2.2 Progress and Industrialization

Another way in which science creates historical changes is connected by Fukuyama with the conquest of nature and satisfying the vast amount of human desires. The progressive conquest of nature began after the Industrial revolution. Industrialization has brought along many changes. Whether it was the emergence of new industries, or an establishment of new social classes – bourgeoisie and workers. However, the most important change according to Fukuyama was the rational organization of work, based on economic efficiency.

Rational organization of work has brought new technologies, changed social structures, caused the expansion of cities, increased education, and the jobs were increasingly given to the qualified professionals. Wages were rising, and so was the standard of living.

Modern science has brought with its inventions significant progress in human history. It carried people from the invention of the wheel to spaceships flying into space.

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Progress in this area is clear. Therefore we can say that history with the help of modern natural science is leaning towards a clear progress. Is the development of science linked with the rise of capitalism, or with the rise of liberal democracy?

1.3 Victory of Capitalism

Capitalism is an economic system whose theoretical basis consists of liberal economic theory. The main features of capitalism are therefore the free market and private property. These two components create a favorable environment for business. Since capitalism consists of liberal economic theory, it is thus strongly related to liberal democracy.

The first states that have undergone a process of industrialization were democracies with the capitalist economic system. The process of industrialization in democratic countries took decades, and the pace at which it was developing was very slow. On the other hand, there were totalitarian or authoritarian regimes with centrally planned economies that have undergone the process of industrialization much later. Industrialization in these countries took place much faster, thanks to civil terror that intimidated people and forced them to higher performance. Authoritarian and totalitarian states jumped over the democratic states. Because of their rapid modernization the figures showed where the totalitarian USSR surpassed even the U.S.

The process of industrialization greatly strengthened regimes with a centralized planned economy; hence in the 50's Communist regimes enjoyed a great popularity. The breakthrough occurred when western countries reached the so-called "Post-industrial" period, in which the tertiary (services) and quaternary (science and technology) sectors of the economy began to develop. Capitalist countries experienced vigorous growth in these sectors, and states with a centralized planned economy were unable to succeed in this competition. The economy of authoritarian and totalitarian countries began to decline, and huge budget deficits were created, which displeased not only the citizens, but also the ruling class. Economic development in the world is thus moving toward capitalism - the economic system based on liberal theories.

1.4 Victory of democracy?

Does the rise of modern natural science and capitalism lead directly to democracy? There are three types of arguments which are used to link modern natural science and democracy:

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1. Democracy, as the only regime, can reconcile and resolve conflicts that arise due to the economic development of the country.
2. Dictatorships or one-party rule have a tendency to degenerate, which is quickened by rapid economic development of the society which they must govern.
3. Industrialization in society creates a new stratum, the so-called middle class, which requires political participation and individual rights.

However, these arguments, according to Fukuyama, lack evidence of unconditional causal relationship with liberal democracy. Democracy can not effectively deal with ethnic and national conflicts within states. Nevertheless, the first argument claims that democracy is the best in managing conflict within the state. We find the irrelevance of this argument because if we look, for example, at the Soviet Union, where there almost did not exist ethnic or racial conflicts. On the other hand, we have a country that emerged from the collapse of the USSR with a democratic government in which arose a huge amount of national problems.

The second argument which challenges the instability of authoritarian regimes also lost its relevance. Democratic regimes, which arose from conflicts within the authoritarian regimes, are often only agreements among the elites of authoritarian regimes. There are only ostensibly democratic regimes that are in fact authoritarian regimes, because they were arranged by the elites that are still in power.

The third argument by Fukuyama is closer to the truth. Economic maturity creates a new social class – the educated middle class. Educated people seek their rights, which lead to liberal democracy. But according to Fukuyama, education does not necessarily lead to democracy namely for purely economic reasons. When the State wants to guarantee prosperity and wants to maintain the industrialization process, democracy is not convenient. In this case, people are not thinking economically rationally, because they claim individual rights, which on the one hand lead to democracy, but on the other hand would stop the economic expansion in their country. There is not a clear relationship between raising the level of education and the conversion towards liberal democracy.

We have empirical evidence that modern science and capitalism create a liberal democracy. However, we lack the theoretical justification. Three main arguments have failed in their explanation, hence justification must be found elsewhere.

1.5 A Battle for Prestige

Nations and people around the world fought against dictatorship and replaced them with liberal democracies, according to Fukuyama, because „*they want to get rid of the hated colonels or party bosses who oppressed them, or to live without fear of arbitrary arrest*” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 143).

People, therefore, are not only looking for prosperity, because it can also be achieved with the help of authoritarian governments. People around the world have been fighting for their freedom. To understand why they have been doing so, according to Fukuyama, we have to take a closer look at Hegel, because Kojève claimed that only with the support of Hegel we can “*understand the historical process, one based on the “struggle for recognition”*” (Fukuyama, 2006, p.144).

Hegel in his work *Phenomenology of Spirit* describes the First Man. This description, claimed Fukuyama, recalls the description of man in the state of nature, described by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Hegel’s first man had certain natural desires such as animals do. The desire to eat, sleep, and the desire above all of preservation of his own life. Kojève added that man desires the things that from a biological point of view have no meaning for him (e.g. diploma, cup). He does not want them for themselves, but because they are wanted by others. When he reaches them, he obtains recognition. “*This man wants not only to be recognized by other men, but to be recognized as a man. And what constitutes man's identity as man, the most fundamental and uniquely human characteristic, is man's ability to risk his own life*” (Fukuyama, 2006, p.147). Hegel’s first man in contact with other people gets into sharp conflict. In conflicts people put their lives at stake in order to be recognized by others.

Such conflict could have three outcomes: Combatants will kill each other, one kills the other, but nothing is solved by this situation because a dead man cannot recognize his vanquisher thus remains unsatisfied. The last outcome of the conflict is that one submits to the other one because of fear of a violent death, which leads to relationship of lordship and bondage. If we take Hegel’s interpretation of first man as the formulation of the state of nature, we can see striking differences in comparison with Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke. The significant difference is mainly the result which the state of nature brings. Hegel’s state of nature does not result in contract, but the very uneven relationship of lordship and bondage. Hegel thus came up with an entirely different understanding of man. “*Not only is man not determined by his physical or*

animal nature, but his very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate that animal nature” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 149).

1.6 Thymos

The concept of desire for recognition was not invented by Hegel; Fukuyama claimed that it is as old as philosophy itself. Of course, the desire for recognition has never sustained the same name. The first who specifically described it was Plato in his work *Republic*. According to Plato, the human soul is divided into three parts: The Appetitive part (The Eros) - is composed of desires like hunger, thirst, etc. Secondly, the Rational part (The Logos) is based in reason and can affect other parts of the soul. Finally, The Spirited part (The Thymos) is associated with the willingness to risk one's own life and anger in one's own interest (Plato, 2008). *“Thymos is something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people act as though they are worth less—when they do not recognize their worth at its correct value—then they become angry.”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 165) Hegel's desire for recognition thus has its base in thymos.

According to Fukuyama, people often used the term thymos interchangeably with the term desire. The fact that a worker calls for a higher salary is not a result of the function of thymos. It is only the expression of the desire for economic advantage. In a communist regime *“the desire for prosperity was accompanied by a demand for democratic rights and political participation”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 177), where people were struggling for recognition.

These revolutionary processes, according to Fukuyama, closely relate with a phenomenon called thymotic anger. *“Thymotic anger played a critical role in catalyzing revolutionary events”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p.179). This statement is supported by a situation from the 17th of November 1989, which happened in Prague. People did not start to gather in the streets because they suddenly got courage to speak publicly against the communist regime. The reason of their gathering was a report of the alleged killing of a student by the secret police. The collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia was caused by a demonstration in Prague, which was brought about by the thymotic anger of the mob.

Thymos is appearing in two forms: Megalothymia and Isothymia. Megalothymia leads man to struggle for recognition, and in its radical form can lead to

tyranny or despotism. Isothymia leads man to desire to be recognized as an equal among others.

Thymos in form of the Megalothymia was banished from political life, but Thymos is still present in politics in the form of Isothymia. The reason why thymos is still present and is surviving the pressure from Eros – Appetitive part of soul – found Fukuyama in Hegel.

1.7 Lordship and Bondage

The result of Hegel's state of nature is the relationship of lordship and bondage. As can be seen today, development of this relationship has not stopped, but still continues. Hegel continued with the application of the dialectic, because the newly emerged state of lordship and bondage encountered newly emerged conflicts. Since the master overcame his human nature by putting his life at stake, he becomes Master. On the other hand, the unwillingness to sacrifice his own life created a slave from the opponent of master. From their newly achieved statuses arose conflicts on both sides.

1.7.1 Conflict of master

After putting his life at risk, the master receives recognition from the slave. Although the master is not satisfied with this kind of recognition. After surrendering to the master, the slave did not overcome his human nature, hence he is not equal to the master. Master is thus not satisfied with the recognition by somebody who is below him. Slave is doing all the work for the master, therefore he stagnates and he does not make any progress.

1.7.2 Conflict of slave

Slave, who voluntarily surrendered to the master, is not recognized as a human being. He is taken as a thing. But unlike master, slave does not stagnate, but quite the contrary. Slave, according Hegel, becomes a human being with the help of labor. *“The slave uses tools; he can use tools to make tools, and thereby invents technology. Through science and technology, the slave discovers that he can change nature, not only the physical environment into which he is born, but his own nature as well”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p.194).

Slave, with the assistance of work for master, created an idea of freedom. Ideas of freedom were reflected in various ideologies, which were invented by slave. Hegel claimed that by improving ideologies slave finally stroked off rebellion against master. The crucial ideology was Christianity.

Christianity first formed the idea of human equality. Christianity defined freedom as the choice between good and evil. The disadvantage of Christianity was the fact that it was the only ideology which assumed equality in the afterlife. Despite that, Christianity was extremely helpful. Its rise caused the thymos of the slave, the slave's desire for recognition, which created the foundations of freedom for everybody.

For Hegel, the French Revolution was thus the implementation of the Christian idea of equality on earth. Hegel thus provides a completely different view of modern liberal democracy, which is understood as the *"reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to mutually recognize each other"* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 200). The liberal State of Fukuyama must be **universal** in a way that it guarantees all citizens recognition on the basis that they are human beings, and **homogeneous**, i.e., classless (elimination of the relationship of lordship and bondage).

The universal and homogeneous state is, according to Fukuyama, at the end of history. This state is built on two pillars: economy, and recognition. The development of economies is linked to the appetitive part of the soul, and recognition with its thymotic part. Therefore, the universal history of mankind, according to Fukuyama, cannot be explained only in economic terms because thymos was a significant mover of the history. *"The universal and homogeneous state would be the last stage in human history because it was completely satisfying to man"* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 206).

1.8 Culture and Liberal democracy

"But now, outside the Islamic world, there appears to be a general consensus that accepts liberal democracy's claims to be the most rational form of government, that is, the state that realizes most fully either rational desire or rational recognition" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 211-212) Why has liberal democracy not spread all around the world? Fukuyama claims that this problem has its roots in conflicts between peoples and states. State in terms of "purposeful political creation" and peoples in terms of "pre-existing moral communities". The state is putting peoples aside, which is often a source of conflict. Fukuyama sees that liberal democracy would not win a particular territory only with its rationality, but it must seek a consensus among states and nations.

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Fukuyama is, therefore, setting the example of Japan, a country that has always been putting emphasis on its culture and its uniqueness. But despite this fact, in Japan, democracy works very well because they found a correlation between the principles of the liberal-democratic system of government and their culture. *“Successful political modernization thus requires the preservation of something premodern within its framework of rights and constitutional arrangements, the survival of peoples and the incomplete victory of states”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 222).

Just as culture is an obstacle to the emergence of a liberal state, it is also active in the economic field. The success of capitalism, the representative of the liberal economic system, depends largely on the relationship of man to work - work ethic. This relationship is also noted by Max Weber in his book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber described the emergence of capitalism as dependent on Protestant ethics. The Protestant ethic enabled the emergence of capitalism, because it did not consider work as an unpleasant activity. The Protestant considered his work as his profession, under which he could be saved (Weber, 2008). According to Fukuyama, work had a thymotic character, because man had an irrational goal - salvation. Satisfaction from work gave him primarily an acquired status and recognition; material things were secondary. Therefore, as we see nowadays, ambitious people, who work almost 20 hours a day.

Although liberal democracy today does not have an ideological opponent it is not spread all over the world. Its opponents in the future may be yet unrealized types of authoritarian regimes, which according to Fukuyama, can be created by two different groups of people:

1. People who want to impose liberal democracy, but economically failing mainly due to cultural differences
2. People who are successful in the capitalist game, but do not have democratic intentions

The first case is, according to Fukuyama, clearly visible in the Islamic countries, which are not able to compete with Western countries, so that there arise various fundamentalist groups. In the latter case, the threat to democracy comes from Asia. Asian countries such as Singapore achieved huge worldwide success, thanks to its liberal market, but in the field of human rights this country has been lagging. Women are oppressed, and for small infractions are awarded heavy penalties.

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“This suggests that even as ideological differences between states fade into the background, important differences between states will remain, shifted however to the plane of culture and economics. [...] The nation will continue to be a central pole of identification, even if more and more nations come to share common economic and political forms of organization” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 244).

1.9 International Relations

Liberal democracy, according to Fukuyama, is reflected not only in the domestic policy; it has an impact on relations between states. Fukuyama admits that in international relations the dominant ideological flow is realism.

Realism sees the relations between states as Hobbes saw people in his state of nature. According to realists, anarchy governs in the field of international relations, because there is not any institution that would effectively sanction all aggressions of states against others. Realists are not concerned with an internal structure of a state, because to them it has no impact on its international policy. Even though internal regimes of countries have undergone tremendous development, according to realists, in international relations no change has taken place since the times of Thucydides.

The last two characters of realism are considered by Fukuyama as very shaky. According to him, the political regime of a state largely influences its appearances on the international scene. Modern states, whether they are democratic or undemocratic, are based on legitimacy. This means that the state cannot arbitrarily go forth to battle, because people would be stirred up, and no world leader can afford to anger the entire country.

Legitimacy is also related to another weakness of realism. Realists do not take into account historical development – The Universal history of man. Imperialism - domination of one state over another is, according to Fukuyama, closely linked with the desire of the master to be recognized by other states, the cause of war is the desire for recognition. Within the state slaves became masters, therefore the character of the foreign policy of the State must also change. *“Today leaders of democratic countries do not lead their countries to war for other than serious national causes, and must hesitate before taking such grave decisions for they know their polities will not permit them to behave recklessly”* (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 261).

1.10 Victory of Liberal democracy

Fukuyama claimed that a world with liberal democracy and with capitalist economic system is at the End of history. Although he realized that not all the countries in

the world established liberal democracy or the capitalist economy. Therefore he distinguished between a post-historical and a historical world. Countries of a post-historical world are those which reached the End of history. Countries of the historical world are autocratic countries, which are not liberal democracies and whose economies do not fully work on the capitalist basis.

The concept of the End of History appeared at first sight that it is without conflict. Even though Fukuyama is not avoiding conflict. The historical and post-historical world would not remain calm. There are world issues that will be crucial for the next decades: oil, immigration and weapons of mass destruction. Nowadays we can see conflicts between countries from the post-historical and historical parts of the world.

In the post-historical world liberal democracy still remains the only political regime that can satisfy the majority of the people. The crucial question is whether liberal democracy will spread to the rest of the world.

Objections

As I had written in the introduction, Fukuyama's theory was one of the most discussed theories after the Cold War. Here I provide some critiques of Fukuyama's theory:

According to Azar Gat, professor at the University in Tel Aviv, liberal democracy is challenged by radical Islam and rising authoritarian powers. In the case of radical Islam the threat is not as big as in the case of rise of authoritarian powers. According to Gat, the rise of authoritarian states such as Russia or China can cause huge harm to Western democracy (Gat, 2007).

Jacques Derrida is criticizing Fukuyama in his book *Specters of Marx*, where he argues that liberal democracy is not the End of History, and Fukuyama wanted only to describe the "death of Marx". Derrida is a Marxist so he considered communism as the end of history. He believed that once we experience the theory of communism it is only a matter of time when it will be implemented (Derrida, 2006).

Libertarian Hans-Hermann Hoppe in his book *Democracy: The God That Failed*, likens liberal democracy to the monarchy and claims that liberal democracy is on the same decline as monarchy. The main reason why liberal democracy is on the decline is, according to Hoppe, the fact that the basic liberal human rights have been devoted to the public interest (Hoppe, 2001).

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The critique that is most of the time used on Fukuyama's theory is Huntington's *Clash of civilizations*. According to Huntington the clash between the ideologies was replaced by the clash among civilizations (Huntington, 1998). Despite the fact that these two theories are used as contrary, there are some similarities that are binding them together.

Further on in my thesis I will take a look at Huntington's view of global Politics after the Cold War.

CHAPTER 2: Clash of Civilizations

Huntington in his book also reacted to the situation that occurred in global politics after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In comparison with Fukuyama, Huntington sees the post-Cold War world in a quite different perspective.

2.1 The face of the post-Cold War world

“In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational” (Huntington, 1998, p.13). Huntington claimed that this situation in history has never occurred before. *“With the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions”* (Huntington, 1998, p.13). The first dimension was the multipolar international system among Western civilization created by nation states like Great Britain, France etc. The second dimension was the bipolar world during the Cold war. After the fall of communism the ideological difference lost its importance. It was replaced by cultural differences.

“Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. [...] We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against” (Huntington, 1998, p.14).

After the end of the Cold war there was a shift in thinking. Development in this field was obvious because after the fall of communism global politics was no longer the same. There was presented a lot of ideological material, but only some of it was unique and created paradigms. Huntington was not in favor of any paradigm that was created, thus he created a paradigm of his own. The main role in his paradigm is played by civilizations.

2.2 Civilizations

Huntington divided the world into civilizations which differ from each other with their cultural background. The main civilizations according to Huntington are:

- **Sinic** – This civilization consists of China, Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Korea.

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- **Japanese** – Huntington distinguishes between Sinic and Japan civilization, because he saw major differences between these two civilizations. This is the only civilization that consists of only one state.
- **Hindu** – Most of the territory of Hindu civilization lies in India. Hindu civilization is very old and thus it is reaching into countries that are close to its core state.
- **Islamic** – This civilization spread from the Arabian Peninsula in all directions. Islamic countries are nowadays in North Africa, Middle East, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula.
- **Orthodox** – Huntington, like many other scholars, distinguishes Orthodox civilization from the West because of its different religion and cultural development. States of the orthodox civilization are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and many of the post-Soviet republics.
- **Latin American** – Despite the fact that many scholars are putting Latin American civilization under the West, Huntington argued that it has its own uniqueness and is distinct from the West. Latin American civilization consists of South America, Mexico, and some states from Central America, e.g., Cuba.
- **Western** – Western Civilization consists of North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand.
- **African** (possibly) – Africa is a specific continent. The North is Islamic, and the other parts were largely colonized by Europeans. Within Africa there is a huge number of tribes which fight with each other. Africa lacks unity and the common sense of African identity, but besides that Huntington saw African civilization as unique and culturally independent from other civilizations.

Huntington argued that the main characteristic of civilization is religion. The most important religions that are bind with civilizations are: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism. He excluded Buddhism: *“The virtual extinction of Buddhism in India and its adaptation and incorporation into existing cultures in China and Japan mean that Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization”* (Huntington, 1998, p.41).

2.2.1 Relations among civilizations

Not all civilizations are permanent, e.g., the Mayans or Babylonians were great civilizations, and they became extinct. Civilizations must overcome a lot of obstacles, they are developing, and they must be dynamic in order to maintain their existence. Relationships between civilizations are also developing. According to Huntington, relations among civilizations are now in the third phase. *“Contacts among them were, with some exceptions, either nonexistent or limited or intermittent and intense”* (Huntington, 1998, p.41). A result of the interactions was that Western civilization became dominant among other civilizations. The West colonized countries all over the world, ruled world trade and was importing its ideas and values to other civilizations.

The West started to lose its hegemony with the rise of Marxism in Russia and its spread to China. The world was not exclusively ruled by the West and it was divided into three parts – the West, the Communist states, and states that were not involved. After the fall of USSR, the West was not able to claim its dominance and *“relations among civilizations have thus moved from a phase dominated by the unidirectional impact of one civilization on all others to one of intense, sustained, and multidirectional interactions among all civilizations”* (Huntington, 1998, p.47).

According to Huntington, struggles between ideologies shifted to struggles between religions. Ideologies are, Huntington, products of Western civilization and the greatest religions are creations of all non-Western civilizations. This is a quite false assumption, because Christianity, as one of the greatest religions in world, is clearly a product of the Western civilization. *“Global political geography thus moved from the one world of 1920 to the three worlds of the 1960s to the more than half-dozen worlds of the 1990s”* (Huntington, 1998, p.48).

Before continuing to examine how the world will be organized after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Huntington analyzes the possible alternative to his multicivilization world – Universal civilization.

2.3 Universal Civilization?

Every civilization has its own features, which characterize and differentiate civilizations from each other. In order to find something which might be called a Universal Civilization, there must be features that are universal and will define universal

civilization. Huntington claimed that crucial features of civilization are language and religion.

2.3.1 Features of Universal Civilization

Is there any world “lingua franca” nowadays? “*The world’s language is English*” (Huntington, 1998, p.56), claimed Robert Bartley, editor of the Wall Street Journal. According to Huntington, there is not so much evidence to support this claim. But, if we look at business there is clear dominance or even hegemony of the English language. “*English is the world’s way of communicating interculturally just as the Christian calendar is the world’s way of tracking time, Arabic numbers are the world’s way of counting, and the metric system is, for the most part, the world’s way of measuring*” (Huntington, 1998, p.58). But English is used in intercultural communication, thus it presupposes the existence of the different cultures. Another obstacle to the dominance of English in the World is that the decline of the West can affect the usage of English in the same way as happened in former USSR states after ‘89. In the USSR, as in its satellites, the Russian language was the “lingua franca”. After the fall of communism the Russian language disappeared from the schools as quickly as possible. English is a different case because it was not forced on the other states as Russian was in the case of obligatory Russian language classes in primary and high schools. English was also spread to the world by the internet. Almost every webpage is made in the domestic language, but also in English in order to have more impact on the worldwide customers or supporters. English is also dominant in the academic field, where almost every book can be found in English, and universities, in order to acquire international students, have their programs completely in English.

Universal religion as the second most important feature of the potential Universal civilization is, according to Huntington, impossible to create. “*The late twentieth century has seen a global resurgence of religions around the world. That resurgence has involved the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalist movement.*” (Huntington, 1998, p.61). In other words, there is a tendency in the world to point out the differences instead of the similarities. In the world there are two religions which are most spread around the world – Christianity and Islam. Christianity is, according to Huntington, in decline because of low birthrates in the Christian countries and because of the fact that “*Christianity spreads primarily by conversion.*” (Huntington, 1998, p.63)

Islam, on the other hand, is on *the* rise because of the high birth-rate in Muslim countries, (Total Fertility Birth-Rate in Muslim countries (TFR) is 4.4 (Mathew, 1996) and unlike Christianity, Islam is spread also by reproduction, besides the spread by conversion.

2.3.2 West and Universal Civilization

Universal civilization is a significant product of Western civilization, claimed Huntington. *“The concept of a universal civilization helps justify Western cultural dominance of other societies and the need for those societies to ape Western practices and institutions. Universalism is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures”* (Huntington, 1998, p.63). From this point of view, the ideas of universalism are clearly Western ideas and values, which did not appear to the non-Westerners as universal, but Western. The idea of Universal civilization was raised after the fall of Communism, which should mean the End of History.

The fall of communism was not given as the only reason which should bring Universal civilization. Universal civilization can also be brought through the higher interaction between different nations through business, tourism or electronic communication. Huntington is unsure and skeptical of this argument. Trans-national business does not necessary mean that the nations share more interests than the economic ones. Trade between the United States and China will not cause democratization of China or communization of the United States.

The third, and last, argument which Huntington was pointing out, claimed that creation of Universal civilization was caused by a huge wave of modernization throughout the world which started in the 18th century. Huntington distinguishes between Modernization and Westernization. Modernization is bound up with the technical development, Westernization with values and ideas. Modernization brought industry and better technologies, Westernization democracy, liberalism, capitalism, rule of law, and many more. Modernization thus does not mean rise of democracy, or individual human rights; it is the industrialization and technological development.

Non-Western states reacted to the westernization and modernization in three different ways. “Rejectionism” is a complete refusal of modernization and westernization. A clear example of this is historic China with its Great Wall, which isolated it for centuries. Totally opposite to the rejectionism is “Kemalism”, which completely allows both of the phenomena. Huntington named Kemalism after the first president of the

Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kemal transformed the Ottoman Empire into a republic with a democratic regime. The third reaction is “Reformism”, which allows modernization but refuses westernization. This is the case of China today.

Through reactions of non-Western states to western modernization and westernization Huntington wanted to show that “*Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization. Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices*” (Huntington, 1998, p.79). He wanted to deny the arguments which claim that modernization leads to democracy, adoption of Western values – Westernization.

2.4 Power of West

Every coin has two sides, and this is also the case of Western power. Thoughts about the power of Western civilization are also two-sided. On one hand the West is presented still as a hegemonic power, because it controls worldwide business, it spends the most money on financing its armies, and last but not least because it is trying to spread democracy and other western ideas.

On the other hand, Western civilization is considered to be declining. Supporters of the decline of the West do not present the West as a civilization which has no impact on global business or politics. In comparison with the past, they claim, the West has significantly lower world influence. Its decline is caused by the rise of the other civilizations, which are gaining more and more world influence.

Which one of the sides describes the real situation? According to Huntington, both of them are right. “*The West is overwhelmingly dominant now and will remain number one in terms of power and influence well into the twenty-first century. Gradual, inexorable, and fundamental changes, however, are also occurring in the balances of power among civilizations, and the power of the West relative to that of other civilizations will continue to decline*” (Huntington, 1998, p.85). On the other hand, Chinese civilization is on a constant and significant rise and it is a greatest competitor of the West. Huntington on one hand sees the present power of the West, but he tends to the idea that the West is in decline in questions of the Western future. According to him, the West will remain the superpower in the early decades of the 21st century. Western civilization will

probably remain in its leading position in science and technology, but non-Western states will control the important power resources.

“In 1919 Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau together virtually controlled the world.[...] The successors to Reagan, Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Kohl will be rivaled by those of Deng Xiaoping, Nakasone, Indira Gandhi, Yeltsin, Khomeini, and Suharto. The age of Western dominance will be over. In the meantime the fading of the West and the rise of other power centers is promoting the global processes of indigenization and the resurgence of non Western cultures” (Huntington, 1998, p.96).

2.5 Importance of culture

The West lost its hegemonic status, and it is no longer an imperial power which owns more than half of the world's total area. With the declining tendency of the Western world influence, Huntington claimed that the economy and army are no longer powers that can rule masses. Countries now use the attractiveness of their culture to pursue their interests and goals. Culture must bring economic advantages and power in order to be attractive. When culture can bring prosperity and power it is used as a tool to rule over the masses.

With the decline of West, which brought technology to the non-Western countries, but whose ideas were not completely accepted in the non-Western states, comes hand-in-hand the refusal of Western values. Most of the states were thus returning back to their own values. *“Indigenization has been the order of the day throughout the non-Western world in the 1980s and 1990s”* (Huntington, 1998, p.99) *“Re-Islamization”*, *“Hinduization”*, and other processes overrun the Western values and create antipathies towards the West.

Huntington claimed that the process of indigenization is manifesting itself mostly through resurrection of religious influence and through *“the cultural resurgence in Asian and Islamic countries generated in large part by their economic and demographic dynamism”* (Huntington, 1998, p.101).

2.6 Rising influence of religion

With the process of indigenization religion gained a lot of power. Modernization of societies reached worldwide impact, but along with modernization religion spread worldwide. New religious approaches occurred in the modernized society which advised moving from modernization towards God. Within religious groups occurred a new

phenomenon of fundamentalism, a phenomenon of promoting religion militarily. Fundamentalism has a dynamic and can have a huge impact on politics. In ex-Communist states religion played a role of filling the vacuum which was created by the collapse of Communist ideology.

Huntington wrote about the emergence of religion, but what are the factors that caused the rise of religion? The most important factor is one that was considered to be deadly to the religion, modernization of everyday life. Modernization forced people to completely change their way of life and their identity. They began to meet people from different states and cultures, and they needed *“new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion meets these needs”* (Huntington, 1998, p.104).

Another factor of the global religious resurgence is, according to Huntington, the decline of the West and end of the Cold War. In the Cold War era people used ideology to identify with. When communism fell, people were lost, and religion was the easiest option for them to identify with. Religion as a set of beliefs, rules, and ideas was a perfect replacement of ideologies.

“The revival of non-Western religions is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies. That revival is not a rejection of modernity; it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the West” (Huntington, 1998, p.110).

2.7 Challenges of non-Westerners towards West

Indigenization and the revival of religion towards West are mostly visible in Asia and Islam. The success of Asia lies in economic development; the success of Islam lies in population growth and social mobilization. Either of the successes, whether it is economic development or population growth and social mobilization, has a strong impact on the other civilizations. *“Economic growth strengthens Asian governments; demographic growth threatens Muslim governments and non-Muslim societies”* (Huntington, 1998, p.112).

2.7.1 Asia

According to Huntington, economic development of East Asia is one of the most crucial changes in global politics. Economic development of East Asia started in Japan, then it went through Asian tigers, then to China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and

finally to the Philippines, India and Vietnam. *“East Asian economic development is altering the balance of power between Asia and the West, specifically the United States”* (Huntington, 1998, p.114). The economic development brought more independence from the West, and thus East Asian countries, which were no longer dependent on the West and its ideas and institutions, started to promote its own cultural uniqueness. East Asian countries, through economic development, can afford to refute westernization.

There are two states from East Asia which are most explicitly showing their cultural uniqueness and difference from the West. China and Japan are the states that through their economic development achieved a position in the world where they can independently cooperate with other countries. They are not obliged, in order to achieve economic advantage, to accept and adopt ideas and values from other countries. Asian countries found in their own culture values that were confronted with Western ones, and with the success in economic growth, showed Asians that their culture and its traditions and values are far more important than the Western ones. This process of deepening the old values Huntington called Asian affirmation, which consists of four components.

Asians are sure that they are going to maintain the current economic growth, and they can even outrun the states from Western civilization. The West is losing its dominance in East Asia, and with the continual growth of the East Asian states it would lose it completely. Secondly, East Asians believe that the core success in their economic growth has its roots in Asian culture. Order, discipline, collective feeling, and more were challenging Western individuality and brought them its fruits. Another component of Asian affirmation is that despite their differences, East Asian countries have a strong sense of unity, which is reflected in the development of ASEAN. With the countries like China, Japan, Singapore etc., the West has a strong competitor in global politics, and business as well. Fourth, and last, thanks to the constant economic growth, East Asian countries are presenting their culture as the best. East Asians can be compared to the Westerners from the early 20th century. It becomes universalistic, which is, according to Huntington, a sign of a strong society.

2.7.2 Islamic countries

Muslim countries are seeking sources of legitimacy, development, and identity in Islam. Muslim countries are going through a process of Islamic resurgence. This process brought modernization along and refused westernization, which was swapped by

Islamization – implementation of Muslim ideas and values. Islamic fundamentalism is not a manifestation of the radicals, or extremists, in Muslim countries; it is a mainstream phenomenon. The influence of Islam is not only in the cultural and social sphere but, according to Huntington, Islam is still more and more influential in politics.

Huntington claimed that Islamization is not supported by peasants, countryside intellectuals, or elderly people. The vast majority of supporters are young people: Young intellectuals, women, middle class people, and recent migrants to the cities. The problem can be whether in Muslim and especially in Arab countries can be found a middle class, or if there is a middle class, how many people are in it? Women are also part of the Muslim society that does not have an enormous impact on the decision making, and I am not quite sure whether they are supporting the resurgence of the values which are diminishing their own rights.

Islamic countries as well as the East Asian countries have a growing tendency of being influential in global politics. East Asian countries are more and more powerful because of their constant economic growth. What is the power of Muslim countries? The economy of Muslim countries is not growing as fast as the economy of East Asian countries, but the power of Muslims is rooted in oil and population growth.

Due to their huge oil resources Muslim and especially Arab countries have been playing a major role in global politics. The oil crisis in the 1970s and its world impact was a demonstration of the power of Arab countries in the oil market. *“Just as Western wealth had previously been seen as the evidence of the superiority of Western culture, oil wealth was seen as evidence of the superiority of Islam”* (Huntington, 1998, p.130). Through the huge profits from oil, Arab countries compete with the West economically, but also militarily, because of their capability to buy weapons.

Population growth is, according to Huntington, another sign of the power of Muslim states. There are 1.66 billion Muslims in the world (Muslim Population Worldwide, 2009), and with its huge fertility rate (4.4) (Mathew, 1996) 30% of the population in 2050 will be Muslim. Population growth will have, according to Huntington, huge political impact. *“Young people are the protagonists of protest, instability, reform, and revolution”* (Huntington, 1998, p.131). Young Muslims have been spreading the Islamic resurgence across all Muslim countries, and they are making Islamic consciousness even stronger. Population growth has also a large impact on the labor market, and the growing tendency of spreading literacy throughout the world will

create educated youngsters contrary to uneducated elders which will “*put a strain on political systems*” (Huntington, 1998, p.133).

Population growth and pressure on the labor market, will force young Muslims to migrate to other states. Muslims often migrate to non-Muslim states, where “*the juxtaposition of a rapidly growing people of one culture and a slowly growing or stagnant people of another culture generates pressures for economic and/or political adjustments in both societies*” (Huntington, 1998, p.133).

Nothing lasts forever. This is also the case of East Asian and Islamic countries. According to Huntington, East Asian economic growth will normalize and be on the same level of other developed countries; Islamic resurgence is also not an everlasting process, and it will become history. “*That is most likely to happen when the demographic impulse powering it weakens in the second and third decades of the twenty-first century*” (Huntington, 1998, p.135). Asian economic development will leave a strong middle class, which will, according to Huntington, bring more plurality and democracy, but it would not be a pro-Western policy.

The rise of East Asian and Muslim countries will bring “*a massive shift in power among civilizations*” (Huntington, 1998, p.136). This will not necessarily mean that all the rising civilizations will be only in conflict with the West, they will also be in a conflict among each other.

2.8. Political structure of the civilizations

Every political entity in order to function has to have its own structure. So do civilizations. Huntington divided countries among the several types, according to their relation to the civilization and role in it. Countries can be: member states, core states, lone countries, cleft countries, and torn countries.

Member state is fully identifying itself with the culture of a particular civilization. *Core state* is a cultural center of the civilization; it is also the most powerful state of the whole civilization. The number of core states may vary throughout time. Western civilization has maybe four core states, and on the other hand Islamic civilization has not any. *Lone country* is lacking cultural similarities with other societies. Ethiopia, Haiti, and the most significant example of the lone country, Japan, have a significant and original

culture, which is not binding them with other states. These countries are homogeneous, within their territory there is a majority of people that belong to a particular civilization.

On the other hand, heterogeneous countries have a much more different and harder role in maintaining one civilization. *Cleft countries* have a large diversity within their territory. They consist of different groups of peoples from other nations, which belong to a different civilization. A perfect example of a cleft country was Yugoslavia; nowadays there are several cleft countries: Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, and more. *Torn countries*, unlike cleft countries, have one dominant culture, but political elites are trying to change their cultural identity. This model of civilizational change is a Platonic one because Plato, in his book *The Republic*, argued that change of a constitution can be made only from above, i.e. regime of the country can be changed only by decisions of the political elites (Plato, 2008).

According to Huntington, this kind of change can not be made only from above, but it requires also the consent of the people within the country, which is the Aristotelian view (Aristotle, 2006). Civilizational change also requires the approval of the civilization as to which culture will be established in a particular country. This process has, according to Huntington, always been a failure. Countries like Russia, Turkey, Mexico, and Australia wanted to overcome their cultural and civilizational identity, but all tries ended up the same – by failure.

From all the various types of states described above the one of most importance is the core state. *“In the emerging global politics, the core states of the major civilizations are supplanting the two Cold War superpowers as the principal poles of attraction and repulsion for other countries”* (Huntington, 1998, p.179)

2.8.1 Core states

Stability and the unity of the civilization are secured by the power of the core state. The Core state is a leader of the whole civilization, on which other members of the civilization rely. Lack of the core state is causing the external and internal instability of the whole civilization. The Islamic civilization is one that is mostly harmed by the lack of the core state.

“An Islamic core state has to possess the economic resources, military power, organizational competence, and Islamic identity and commitment to provide both political and religious leadership”(Huntington, 1998, p.207). According to Huntington, Muslims

have six possibilities for a core state. Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey are candidates to fill the role of the Islamic core state. However, every one of them lacks an important feature which will guarantee them its position.

Indonesia lies too far from the other Islamic states, and Indonesian Islam is not as strict as, for example, in the Arab countries. Egypt is not as much economically developed to become a core state. The problem of Iran is that Iran's population is Shia, and the majority of Muslims are Sunni. Pakistan is the same as Egypt, is not economically developed, and there are also huge ethnic and religious clashes which are destabilizing the country. Saudi Arabia is so dependent on the West because of its inability to defend its own territory.

Turkey, Huntington, has a strong potential to become a core state of Islam. As with the South African Republic, Turkey can refuse Western imported secularism, the same as South Africans refused apartheid. Turkey's refusal of secularism is not likely to happen, because it has an eminent interest to join the EU, which clearly represents the Western civilization. And it will be unthinkable to have a core state that belongs to the organizations that are essential to the rival civilization.

2.9 West and the rest

According to Huntington, in a world with the changed order, relationships among civilizations will not be friendly and calm, but rather antagonistic. The power of all the civilizations is not the same and they will not be all involved in the conflict. *"The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness"* (Huntington, 1998, p.213). Huntington is not sure which civilizations will be fighting with each other first, but he argued that the most probable conflict will be between "the West and the rest".

The West and the rest conflict derives mostly from the Western universalism. *"What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest"* (Huntington, 1998, p.214). Huntington pointed out that conflicts between Western and non-Western civilizations would have three different types.

The first type will be the permanent conflicts with the Islamic and Sinic civilizations. The second type will be relationships with Africa and Latin America, which are weaker and are dependent on Western money. The third and the final type will be the relationship with Japan, Russia, and India, which will be, according to Huntington, very

ambiguous and unstable. The relations between civilizations in the “West and the Rest” conception will be dealing with three major problems: weapons proliferation, human rights and democracy, and immigration. In solving each of these three problems West is, according to Huntington, opposing the interests of the other cultures, thus is getting into the conflict with other civilizations.

According to Huntington, the West, in order to survive in the new world order, which is based on the cultural differences, has to declare its cultural uniqueness and must stop spreading its values to the other civilizations.

Objections

Huntington’s book is the same as Fukuyama’s. In fact, along with the *End of History, Clash of the Civilizations* is the most commented on book in modern political science. Therefore I will provide two critiques of Huntington’s theory.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former ambassador of USA in the UN, was mostly concerned with the differentiation of the civilizations. She argued that when we have given certain features in definition of civilizations, which are common history, language, religion etc., why did Huntington separate Latin America and Russia from the West? According to Kirkpatrick, they have common religion, language, history, and etc., why are they then designated as different civilizations? (Kirkpatrick, 1998)

Albert L. Weeks, professor of international relations at the New York University, claimed that the borders of the civilizations are no longer decisive in the global politics. Most decisive borders are the borders of the sovereign states, which are bonded not with the cultural affiliation, but with the stronger element which is the political regime i.e., countries tend to create unions but not with the countries with common culture, but with the countries with common political regimes (Weeks, 1998).

CHAPTER 3: Fukuyama or Huntington?

To which extend was each of them right in his theory? Fukuyama argued that after the Cold War, there will be a massive spread of democracies throughout the world, because liberal democracy is the only regime, which satisfies the needs and desires of all the people, regardless of age, gender, or cultural affiliation. Now look at the facts: after the Cold War there were established 51 new democracies (Scaruffi, n.d.), which is a quite high number in comparison with the fact that until 1987, were only 30 democracies in the world. Not all democracies are stable, or liberal, but establishment of 51 democracies is clearly a sign of progress, and it is supporting Fukuyama's theory. On the other hand in the world there are about 195 countries (Rosenberg, 2009). Only 81 of them are count as democracies, and even smaller number of them is those described by Fukuyama. There is not a clear sign of victory of democracy throughout the world.

On the other hand Fukuyama did not predict the immediate spread of democracy throughout the world. He claimed that the states that are at the end of history belong to the post-historical part of the world. Those states, which are not established liberal democracy and capitalism as an economic system will remain in the historical part of the world, and thus they are not at the end of history. He presupposed that the states of post-historical world and historical world will be in conflicts, over the three major issues: oil, weapon proliferation, and immigration. If we compare it with the Huntington's theory, we will realize that they have more commonalities, than differences.

Fukuyama also put emphasis on the importance of culture, which according to him, will play an important role, the same role as played ideology during the cold war.

“Even as ideological differences between states fade into the background, important differences between states will remain, shifted however to the plane of culture and economics. These differences further suggest that the existing state system will not collapse anytime soon into a literally universal and homogenous state. The nation will continue to be a central pole of identification, even if more and more nations come to share common economic and political forms of organization” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 244).

Huntington argued that after the Cold War, which divided world into three parts: Western, Communists, and Neutral, the future divisive feature in the global politics will be the cultural differences between civilizations i.e., the source of the future conflict will be cultural difference. Look at the first Huntington's argument that cultural difference will

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be the source of the future conflicts. I will pick up two conflicts that seem to be intercivilizational and are present in the nowadays world: Israel and Palestine and US and Iraq.

Israel and Palestine conflict can be judged as an intercivilizational conflict. Israel as a member of the Western civilization and Palestine as a member of Islam civilization are fighting together, and there is no progress in peacemaking at all. This can be used as a clear supporting example of the Clash of the civilizations theory, however the source of conflict is somewhere else than in their cultural difference. In short, the Israel and Palestine conflict is conflict about territory. It has nothing to do with the cultural difference between Israeli and Pakistani, it is the historical conflict about the territory.

The other ongoing conflict, which started in 2003 with the war in Iraq, is between US and Iraq. Again, this can be also supporting example for Huntington's theory, but in fact it is not. Official reasons that Americans provided to justify the Invasion were that Iraq has WMD, which are available to the terrorists and can be used against every state in the world. When they did not find the WMD they changed their standpoint, and proclaimed that they wanted to bring democracy to the Iraqi people. Some speculations showed that the true reason for invasion in Iraq was its oil reserves (Adams, 2007). Does not matter which one of these three reasons is true, but none of them refer to cultural difference. Culture interests are not as strong as the economical interest, thus they cannot be placed above.

Second part of Huntington's theory is that West, which was a hegemonic civilization until the second world war will have two strong opponent civilizations: Sinic and Islam. China is economically most developing country in the world with annual growth of GDP around 11.9% this year (China GDP Growth Rate, n.d.), when countries have been stroked with financial crisis. China is getting stronger and stronger and its policies have worldwide impact, however the power of Muslim civilization lies in oil, which is not unexhaustible, thus the power of Islam civilization falls when they will run out of oil.

There is only a slight difference between Huntington and Fukuyama. In fact, the only difference between them is that Fukuyama sees liberal democracy as universalizable, and Huntington divides the world into civilizations which all have their unique values and characteristics. Both of them are presupposed conflict between West and the other states, but they described them in a different ways and with different conceptions. Despite the

different conceptions or terminology, West and liberal democracy have two strong opponents, countries from Islam civilization and China. What will be their role in future?

3.1 Islam on the rise?

Fareed Zakaria, argued in his book *The Future of freedom*, that Islam civilization is not that unified as described by Huntington. Zakaria distinguished between Islam and Arab world. Islam resurgence, described by Huntington, occurs mostly in Arab countries. From 1.2 billion of Muslims living in the world, less than 1/5 of them live in Arab countries. Freedom House noted that: “Majority of the world’s Muslims live in the electoral democracies today” (Zakaria, 2007, p.127). More than 800 millions of Muslims thus live in democratic countries. Huntington, in *Clash of Civilizations* argued that democracy, which is clearly a Western idea, is incompatible with values and habits of the Muslim world. Turkey, which is one of the largest Islam states, is even considered as a liberal democratic state.

Is then Islam culture really on rise, and is one of the bigger threats to the West? Of course, Islam countries are one of the biggest players on the field of global politics. The reason why they are so influential is, because of oil. They have 75.9 % of total world reserves of crude oil (Muslim countries oil resources, n.d.), one of the most wanted commodities on the world market. Majority of these countries are Arab. Through oil Arab countries have impact on the world market and also on the economies on the states that are dependent on their supply. The power of Arab states can be seen on the influence of oil crisis in 1970s, which paralyzed whole Western Europe and it was harmful to the US, as well. Profits from oil are giving the owners of the land capital to buy weapons, and it allows them to rule in the country without any opposition. There are no middle class within these countries, which is according to Aristotle one of the basic features of democracy. (Aristotle, 2006) What will Arab countries be like without oil?

Recent surveys shown, that the world’s oil reserves are sufficient for approximately 30 years (Zysk, n.d.). This is catastrophic information for Arab countries. In Iran for example the export of oil composes 80% of total earnings from export, and the profits from it create 50% of total annual budget of the country (Globalsecurity, n.d.). Imagine how harmful will the loss of oil be for the Iran.

Another Arab country Kuwait is even more dependent on oil than Iran. Their export revenues consist from 95% from oil export and 46% of its GDP consists from oil

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profits (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 2009). Iran and Kuwait are not the only Arab countries, which economy is dependent on the export of oil. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, United Arab Emirates, and more will be economically crushed with the run out of the oil resources. What will be the possible scenario after the Arab countries lose their oil resources?

In order to secure the economic situation, firstly they will have to lower their military expenditures. Kuwait and Qatar spend annually more than 900 dollars per capita on military, UAE and Saudi Arabia more than 600 dollars per capita (CIA, n.d.). With lower military expenditures Arab countries will lose their influence worldwide, and maybe they will even be forced to sell some of its military equipment. States would become weakened and they start to form unions, or they start to search for allies. They would not be able to form a union among themselves, because to form a union from a weakened stat will not be effective. In search for an ally they will most probably have two alternatives. United States (or West as a whole, it will depend on the efforts of the European Union to become an influential global player) and China are two possibilities, that Arab countries have. Saudi Arabia will definitely lean toward US, other probable allies of the US can become Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, and Iraq. Iran and the other states will lean more to the China, but relationship of these Arab countries with America can change throughout the time.

After lowering the military expenses Arab countries, in order to stabilize their economy, they must come through the process of total reformation of the country. They would have to open their markets for the foreign investors, allow private ownership, change the whole infrastructure, and inhabitants of the state would have to join labor market. This economical reforms and changes will cause also the political changes. What will be the possible political changes that would derive from the economical changes?

Firstly, the float of the foreign capital will require the special conditions for the foreign investors. Changes like tax holidays, changes within police department, which would have to secure peace and the indefeasibility of the property, and capital, must create a comfortable environment for the investors. Investors will create working spaces for inhabitants. This will create a middle class, which will consist mostly from workers. The float of modern technology will demand them to be educated. Education will enrich the working class, and suddenly we are in the process, where second political change must be made. As described above by Fukuyama, middle class will press on the government, to

secure their rights. To sum up the present situation: Country that has capitalist economical system, which is supported by the foreign investors (let set up an environment, where most of the investors are from West), with the growing educated middle class, which started to press on the government to secure their rights. Industrialization, capitalism, and thymos are those three important and necessary factors that according to Fukuyama lead toward democracy.

Arab countries will lose their power when they run out of oil. After that they would most probably follow the process of democratization. With the 216 million of people from Arab world, nearly all the countries of Islam civilization would have democratic regime. Will be the democratic Islamic civilization threat to the West? I think there will always be tensions, but they are also between the Western states as well, but armed conflict between West and the Muslims will not likely to happen.

3.2 Democratic China or bipolar world?

China or Sinic civilization, as described by Huntington, is the second possible civilization that can cause conflict with the West. In comparison with Arab countries China is economically independent. Its economy does not depend on one commodity as in the case of Arab countries. China is constantly economically developing e.g., from 2002 to 2008 Chinese GDP annual growth did not fall below 9% (China's gross domestic product (GDP) growth, n.d.). Some economists predict that China would outrun the US in total GDP by year 2026 (McIntyre, 2009). Through economy China will dominate its region and it will become a strong challenger to the US. What are the possible outcomes of Chinese economic growth?

There are two possible outcomes of the Chinese economic growth. First, due to Chinese economic growth, there will be strong pressure from the newly created middle class towards government to recognize their basic human rights. China came through a long process of liberalization from the Maoistic totalitarian state, to the nowadays autocracy with features of liberalism, mainly economic liberalism. This process of liberalization can end-up with China as a liberal democracy.

Secondly, China as a constantly developing country can remain autocratic, and it will become one of the most powerful countries. China as an economically independent, but still autocratic country will cause a huge change in global politics.

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In order to remain strong, powerful, and maintain its spheres of interest and influence US will be forced to the closer cooperation with EU. Close cooperation with EU, will strengthen the economy and also will increase the population, in the rivalry with China.

Russia along with Arab country will also at that time loses its oil reserves, and also partially loses its influence and its power. Oil and natural gas account around 20% of Russian GDP, and 64% of total export revenues (EIA, n.d.). Russia will be forced to make reforms, similar to the reforms made in Arab countries, and they would have to cooperate more closely with the West, in order to maintain its position in global politics. Cooperation of US, EU, and Russia with China on the other side can create a bipolar world, similar to the world during Cold War era. China on one side against the West with Russia on the other side will be competing in order to gain influence in the other countries. China will have the support of the East Asian countries, and their sphere of interest will grow. Most important countries, which are not decided, where to join will be India and Japan. Both of them are democracies, Japan is also considered as a liberal democracy, thus they will maybe join West in the competition with China.

We have thus the two possible outcomes world heading towards liberal democracy and peace, or bipolar world with the west along with Russia on one side and the autocratic China on the other side. Both Fukuyama and Huntington had true that there is a change in powers within the global politics and we – optimists, can only hope that China would become a democratic country.

Conclusion

Fukuyama or Huntington? End of History or Clash of Civilizations? Those were the questions that were discussed in my Bachelor thesis. Both of them were partially true. Fukuyama succeeds in prediction that we will witness the emergence of the democracy, and the conflict of the ideologies which was present during the cold war, will be replaced with the conflict between liberal democratic states and autocratic states.

Huntington succeeds with his part of the theory where he is describing the enemies of the West, which will be Islamic states and China. If we take a closer look at the outcomes of their theories we realize that they are not that different as it is generally claimed. Actually they both predicted conflict between the states that are liberal democracies and those which are not.

In the last part of my thesis I was questioning power of Islamic states which lies in oil. After they run out of oil there will be no threat from Islam countries to the West. The only possible enemy of the liberal democracy thus remains China. The future of the spread of liberal democracy, peace, and the future conflict lies in the hands of China, whether it remains autocratic or will continue its way of liberalization which will also lead to democratization.

Resumé

V mojej bakalárskej práci som porovnával dve najvýznamnejšie knihy politológie a medzinárodných vzťahov obdobia po Studenej vojne. Sú to knihy amerických autorov Francisa Fukuyamu: *Koniec Dejín* a Samuela Huntingtona: *Stret Civilizácií*. V prvej kapitole som analyzoval knihu prvého menovaného autora Francisa Fukuyamu.

Fukuyama začína svoju knihu konštatovaním, že po pesimizme, ktorý panoval v 20. storočí, najmä z dôvodu vzniku totalitných štátov ako fašistické Nemecko a socialistický Sovietsky zväz a jeho satelitné štáty. Pád obidvoch týchto totalitných režimov prinútil Fukuyamu zamyslieť sa nad starou Kantovskou otázkou, či existuje niečo ako univerzálne svetové dejiny ľudstva, v zmysle či existuje nejaký vzor, ktorý nám ukáže smerovanie dejín. Víťazstvo demokracie na poli ideológií primälo Fukuyamu zamyslieť sa nad tým, či univerzálne dejiny naozaj existujú a či Liberálna demokracia neznamená ich koniec. Fukuyama podľa Kantovského vzoru začal hľadať v dejinách pokrok. Podľa neho jediný jasne pozorovateľný pokrok sa nachádza len v modernej prírodovede. Iba tam je možné vidieť neustále dopĺňovanie poznatkov, ktoré vedú k pokroku.

Vynálezy modernej prírodovedy viedli ďalej k industriálnej revolúcii, k vývoju nových zbraní a k racionalizácii práce. Všetky tieto zmeny spôsobili veľké sociálne zmeny, ktoré mali za dôsledok nástup kapitalizmu. Kapitalizmus ako zástupca ekonomického liberalizmu si vyžiadal rozsiahle zmeny v rámci politiky štátov, ale podľa Fukuyamu, spolu s technologickou vyspelosťou nevedú priamo k nastoleniu liberálnej demokracie. Fukuyama sa teda vrátil späť k filozofii, konkrétne ku Georgovi W. F. Hegelovi, ktorý sa ako prvý začal zaoberať Kantovskou otázkou svetových dejín.

Hegel vo svojej knihe *Filozofia Dejín* opisuje tzv. prvého človeka, ktorý sa nachádza v podobnom prostredí, ktoré Thomas Hobbes opísal ako tzv. prirodzený stav. V prirodzenom stave neplatili žiadne zákony a prvý človek si musel len za pomoci boja vy dobyť uznanie. Na rozdiel od Hobbesa, Hegelov „prirodzený stav“ nekončí dohodou, ale stavom, ktorý nazýva vzťah pána a raba. Pán sa stal pánom preto, lebo dokázal vsadiť svoj život do boja o uznanie a rab sa stal rabom, pretože odmietol vsadiť svoj život. Schopnosť vsadiť svoj život urobilo z pána niečo viac ako obyčajného človeka. Táto vlastnosť vychádza z časti duše, ktorú Platón vo svojom diele *Ústava*, nazval thymos.

Práve Thymos je pre Fukuyamu dôležitým faktorom pri vzniku demokracie. Thymos núti ľudí k vzbure. Thymos, ženie ľudí do boja za uznanie. Tak to bolo aj Heglovom prípade raba, ktorý sa podvolil pánovi. Keďže bol neustále utláčaný pánom,

musel pracovať, vytváral si myšlienku slobody za pomoci ideológií. Najdôležitejšiu ideológiou bolo pre Hegla kresťanstvo, pretože berie všetkých ľudí ako rovných. Rabi začali uplatňovať ideu rovnosti a začali sa búriť proti pánovi, pre Hegla bola príkladom takejto vzbury Francúzska buržoázna revolúcia v roku 1789.

Fukuyama teda za pomoci Hegla prišiel na to podľa akého vzorca vznikol nástup demokracie vo svete. Podľa neho je liberálne demokracia jediným režimom, ktorý dokáže uspokojiť všetkých ľudí, bez rozdielu aké majú ciele a ambície, pretože ponúka širokú škálu možností realizovať sa. Nepredpovedá, ale okamžité rozšírenie liberálnej demokracie do sveta, ale konflikt medzi štátmi, ktoré dosiahli konca dejín a medzi štátmi, ktoré sa do tejto fázy nedostali – autokratické štáty.

V druhej kapitole mojej práce analyzujem argumenty Samuela Huntingtona, ktorý vidí svet po Studenej vojne v odlišnom svetle ako Fukuyama. Huntington tvrdil, že po skončení ideologických vojen, bude ďalším rozdeľujúcim faktorom vo svete kultúra. Predpokladal, že svet sa rozdelí na sedem, alebo osem hlavných civilizácií, ktoré budú medzi sebou súperiť. Najväčšiu pravdepodobnosť vzniku konfliktov predpokladal medzi Západnou, Čínskou a Islamskou civilizáciou.

Sila západu podľa neho v porovnaní s týmito dvomi civilizáciami upadá. Čínska civilizácia na čele s Čínou ako ústredným štátom dosahuje enormného ekonomického rastu, ktorí im umožňuje byť stále viac a viac nezávislejší od Západu, ktorý mal dlhé roky postavenie hegemóna vo všetkých sférach.

Sila Islamskej civilizácie pramení z veľkých zásob ropy, ktorá je jednou z najžiadanejších a najdôležitejších komodít na svetovom trhu a z vysokej miery natality, ktorá dosahuje čísla 4,4 dieťaťa na jednu ženu v priemere v Islamských krajinách. Pomocou ropy si môžu Islamské krajiny diktovať svoje podmienky a nakupovať zbrane a vysoká natalita im dáva výhodu do budúcnosti, pretože v krajinách Západnej civilizácie sa pohybuje v mínusových číslach, alebo len v zlomkoch celých čísel. Huntington teda predpovedá, že v rámci udržania sily vo svete, ktorý je po novom rozdelený, západ musí uznať svoju kultúru za jedinečnú a prestať ju vnucovať ostatným a starať sa o svoje vlastné veci a prestať presadzovať svoje záujmy na územiach iných civilizácií.

V úvode tretej kapitoly porovnávam Huntingtona a Fukuyamu a dospel som k záveru, že teórie, ktoré predostreli nie sú až tak v protiklade ako sú prezentované. Obidve vlastne predpokladajú konflikt medzi západom, alebo Fukuyama to nazval post-historickým svetom a ostatnými civilizáciami. Ďalej v tretej kapitole rozoberám tento

konflikt, v ktorom sa dal za pravdu Huntingtonovi, pretože najväčšími súpermi západu sú Islamské krajiny a Čína. V prípade Islamských krajín, som vyčlenil tie najreakčnejšie, tie ktoré vyčlenil Fareed Zakaria vo svojej knihe *Budúcnosť slobody* a nazval ich arabskými. Tieto krajiny sú do značnej miery závislé na ropе, a preto vedecký predpoklad o minutí zásob ropy ich značne oslabuje, a ich sila sa po minutí týchto zásob minimalizuje.

V prípade Číny je situácia iná a priniesol som dva možné závery: Buď Čína, ktorá každoročne zaznamenáva obrovský ekonomický rast nastúpi na cestu, ktorú popísal Fukuyama v úvodných kapitolách svojej knihy, alebo Čína dokáže zostať autokratickou krajinou s obrovským ekonomickým rastom a z neho vyplývajúcou ekonomickou nezávislosťou a vytvorí protipól k Západu a vznikne bipolárny svet. Tvár medzinárodnej politiky teda záleží na akú cestu sa vydá Čína.

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