

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

**Well-behaved Small States?
The Minority Question in Slovak-Hungarian Relations
BACHELOR THESIS**

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Viktor Fudala

Declaration of Originality:

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and properly cited in references.

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Abstract:

State characteristics determine its behavior on the international scene. This thesis will examine the concept of small states and their foreign policy behavior towards their equally small peers. Construction of the foreign policy behavior of small states will be therefore the key issue in this thesis. In order to explain the foreign policy behavior of small states, we will look at the relations between the Slovak Republic and Hungary. The author presupposes that these two states represent what he considers to be a small state. Their relationship and behavior towards each other might give us an insight into this problem.

Small states do not perceive equal attention as big, more powerful ones in the research of international relations. There are many questions to be explained in small states studies as a subfield of international relations. The reason Slovak-Hungarian relations are the focus of this paper is the complicated relationship between these countries, which is perfect for studying the foreign policy behavior of a small state.

Firstly, the author will discuss the theory behind small states – what a small state is. The second chapter will concentrate on the Slovak-Hungarian relations: how the behavior of the Slovak Republic is constructed towards Hungary and vice versa. One of the key aspects of this chapter will be focused on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, as it represents a basic conflict between Slovakia and Hungary. This conflict may be a part of the best illustrations of the behavior and the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary.

The third chapter is the defining (evaluative) part of this thesis. The author will try to come to a conclusion if small state behavior is based on its domestic politics and whether the Slovak-Hungarian relations can provide us understanding into this inquiry.

This research will be supported by the argument that small states build their foreign policy behavior towards other small states primarily on their domestic background.

Autor práce: Viktor Fudala

Názov práce: Správanie malých štátov: Minoritná otázka v slovensko-maďarských vzťahoch

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Abstrakt:

Vlastnosti malého štátu určujú jeho správanie na medzinárodnej scéne. Autor v tejto práci skúma koncept malého štátu a jeho správanie v rámci zahraničnej politiky voči iným rovnako malým partnerom. Štruktúra zahraničnopolitického správania malých štátov je preto kľúčovým problémom tejto práce. Na vysvetlenie zahraničnopolitického správania malých štátov sa autor sústreďuje na vzťahy medzi Slovenskou republikou a Maďarskom. Autor predpokladá, že tieto dva štáty patria medzi malé štáty. Ich vzťah a správanie voči sebe nám môže načrtnúť tento problém.

V rámci štúdií medzinárodných vzťahov sa malým štátom nedostáva toľko pozornosti ako majú veľké, mocnejšie štáty. V podoblasti malých štátov vo výskume medzinárodných vzťahov existuje mnoho otázok, ktoré ešte nie sú plnohodnotne zodpovedané. Dôvod, prečo si autor zvolil slovensko-maďarské vzťahy ako predmet výskumu tejto práce, je ich komplikovaná podstata, ktorá je ideálna pre štúdium zahraničnopolitického správanie malého štátu.

Autor najprv rozoberá teóriu malých štátov – čo vlastne znamená pojem *malý štát* a aké sú prvky jeho správania. V druhej kapitole sa koncentruje na slovensko-maďarské vzťahy: ako je správanie Slovenska konštruované voči Maďarsku a naopak. Hlavný aspekt tejto kapitoly je maďarská menšina na Slovensku, keďže reprezentuje základný konflikt medzi Slovenskom a Maďarskom. Tento konflikt môže slúžiť ako najlepšia ilustrácia správania a vzťahov týchto dvoch krajín.

Tretia kapitola je hodnotiaca časť tejto práce, kde sa autor pokúša dosiahnuť záver či správanie malého štátu vychádza z domáceho pozadia a či slovensko-maďarské vzťahy nám môžu poskytnúť chápanie tohoto skúmania.

Autorov výskum je podporovaný tvrdením, že malé štáty budujú svoje zahraničnopolitické správanie voči ostatným malým štátom hlavne na základe ich domáceho pozadia.

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List of Abbreviations

i.e.	that is
e.g.	for example
EU	the European Union
OSCE	the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
NATO	the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SMK	the Party of Hungarian Coalition
SNS	the Slovak National Party
HZDS	the Movement for Democratic Slovakia

Introduction to the Thesis

This thesis cares about a very specific topic – small states and their foreign policy behaviour. The author of this thesis argues that small states build their foreign policy behaviour on their domestic background. The thesis statement is: If small states tend to build their foreign policy behaviour towards other small states according to their domestic background, then, considered that Slovakia and Hungary are small states, we should be able to explain behaviour of small states towards other states in the example of Slovak-Hungarian relations. The focus in these relations will be the impact of the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia on Slovak and Hungarian foreign policy behaviour.

The objective of this paper is to research foreign policy behaviour of small states; outline the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia; creation of relations between Hungary and Slovakia on the basis of the status of the minority; and last but not least to advert the assumption that domestic background is the primary source of foreign policy behaviour of small states.

Small states are an integral part of the world today. They participate in all kinds of matters on the international scene, and when they stand for a common concern together, they may be very influential. However, as every actor in the international affairs, they also have their interests and goals that they want to be fulfilled. These interests and goals sometimes do not match with interests and goals of other actors in the international affairs; thus conflicts between them arise. These conflicts then create different behaviours of interested actors. And such different behaviours are the scope of this study.

In the first part of the thesis, the author will uncover the theoretical background of small states and their foreign policy behaviour. The theoretical background is a significant part of this paper because it will outline us the crucial and fundamental understanding of what small state mean and how they behave towards other small states. Generally, as presented by many authors, the study of small states is undervalued and insufficient in the field of international relations (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 18) (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010, p. 7) (Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006, p. 652) (Katzenstein, 2003, p. 10). Yet, some say the study obtains rising recognition

among IR scholars (Lee & Smith, 2010). Behaviour of small states towards other small states will be especially significant because that there is not much literature written about this phenomenon, respectively the literature describes mostly how small states behave in general. The theory will specify in the small European countries, as they have more features in common than other kinds of small states, like shared history, more or less same cultural background, geographic closeness, etc.

For the beginning, the reader will be presented with four definitions of the state in international relations – one general definition and three definitions by the leading IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism¹). Later on, we will uncover what a state is, we can talk about what a small state means for the three mentioned theories, and for various authors. It is rather hard to specify which author belongs to which theoretical group because they tend to mix some elements of more than one theory together. The author will conclude this part by listing which theoretical approach will fit the best to this thesis.

The second part of the first chapter will deal with the foreign policy behaviour of small states. The broad idea of foreign policy and how it is built will be explained in the beginning. The three international relation theories have all different understanding what foreign policy is. Following that we will look what precisely means the term *foreign policy behaviour*. The broad concept of foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour will be put into the notion of a small state.

Having all important terms explained, a conclusion will be made of what we have revealed in the theory, which consequently is going to be linked to the second chapter.

The second chapter of this thesis will care about the Slovak-Hungarian relations, primarily focusing on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The reason the author picked these two countries is that the status of the Hungarian minority creates a tension between Slovakia and Hungary. This chapter will provide an illustration in order to understand the domestic and foreign policies which influence the relations between both countries. The reader may observe a complicated relationship: Slovakia – the Hungarian minority – Hungary. The Hungarian minority belongs politically to

¹ When talking about realism and liberalism, the author will mostly focus on neorealism and neoliberalism. Constructivism may be referred to social constructivism, which are synonymous, for the purpose of the thesis.

Slovakia, as they are its citizens, but ethnically and culturally they are part of Hungary.

The author will begin with the basic information about the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Following will be the historical background of the minority that is essential to comprehend the contemporary position of Slovak Hungarians. Most of the discord between Slovakia and Hungary, respectively the Hungarian minority, has its historical roots. The development of the status of the minority in the past twenty years in Slovakia will be deconstructed in the next section. During this time, Slovak Hungarians endured various attempts that wanted to undermine their rights. The author will also mention the political development in the democratic Hungary in respect to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

According to the author, there are four factors shaping the perceptions of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Hungary: Nationhood, historical narratives, populism and the minority status and policies. These four factors, therefore, partly construct the political cultures in both countries. The decisions and actions of the governments of both countries are influenced by these factors. The domestic background is an important aspect of the foreign policy behaviour of these countries. In order to comprehend this suggestion, the author will show two case studies of policy making in Slovakia and Hungary, with close attention to the foreign policy behaviour of both countries. The first case study is the Hungarian citizenship law that allows ethnic foreign Hungarians to apply for Hungarian citizenship. The second case study is the Slovak language law of 2009 which caused many controversies. Both policies directly affected the Hungarian minority as did the relations between Hungary and Slovakia. These two case studies may prove that the foreign policy behaviour of small states is largely influenced by their domestic background, and therefore we should be able to explain why states acted or behaved as they did.

The last chapter will serve as comparison between the provided theory from the first chapter and the case studies from the second chapter. The author will evaluate the benefits of constructivism to this thesis. Later, the question whether Slovakia and Hungary can be marked as small states will be assessed. Next, the foreign policy of these states will be briefly deconstructed. The most important part of this chapter will care about whether the foreign policy behaviours of the researched countries can be

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applied in general. Ultimately, the author will answer whether the thesis statement can be confirmed.

Chapter I: The Theory behind Small States

The State in International Relations

Karen Mingst lists four conditions for the standard definition of a state. This definition is not only used in international relations, but also in other social sciences, mainly in political science. In order for a state to exist, firstly it should have a defined territory. Secondly, a state should have a stable population. This population has to accept the government of that state. Lastly, other states have to recognize the particular state as a sovereign state (Mingst, 2010, p. 101). The last condition is especially important for international relations. Mingst reminds us that these conditions are not absolute and may vary: some states have disputes with another state over their borders. Some states' population changes depending on the movement of nomadic tribes. In some states, fragments of the population may not be loyal to it, like leftist rebels in Colombia, or various groups in totally disintegrated Somalia. And lastly there are many proclaimed states that are not recognized by all members of the United Nations. The best-known examples are the states of Palestine and Kosovo. However, most of the states in the world meet the previously mentioned conditions by Mingst.

What do realism, liberalism and constructivism say about a state? Both the liberal and the realist theory have developed through the history; therefore there are many similar, yet different theoretical views of them (like the classical realism, neorealism; institutionalism and neoliberalism). Therefore following observations will constitute common elements of the theories as well as neorealist and neoliberal ideas because they are considered to be the latest sub-theories of these theoretical groups. Constructivism as well includes more than one theory, but in this case it will purely consist of one view – social constructivism.

Realism takes the state as the highest entity on the international scene. It is a very state-centric theory. The state is an autonomous, sovereign, unitary actor in the anarchic international system. All states are similar and behave alike – selfishly. States are limited only by the anarchical system of the international relations, in other words by other states. International institutions do not matter, because, as mentioned,

the state is the highest entity. The state has a fixed set of goals, or in other words its national interest. The national interest of the state is gaining power. Power is understood through material gains (military, population, natural resources, and geographical size). Therefore, power is the ultimate factor, which defines states because it is the determinant of the position on the international scene. In the neorealist theory, the idea that states always act rationally is crucial. Neorealists do not take into the account any domestic relations (i.e. domestic politics). They take states as black boxes (Hobson, 2003, pp. 18, 23-26, 46) (Mingst, 2010, p. 103). Neorealism understands the national interest in a slightly different perspective: the survival of the state is the national interest. The survival of the state is secured by gaining power. More power equals likely that the state survives (Waltz, 1990, pp. 35-36). In the neorealist theory states rather cheat, respectively pursue the idea of self-help. Cooperation is not perceived as beneficial (Hobson, 2003, p. 21).

In the liberal theory, the state is also a sovereign actor, but international institutions limit it. The state has many national interests, and these interests compete. The state sustains order in the plurality of different interests. The same idea is believed in the international system, where a set of rules is created through international institutions, which can punish the wrongdoers. Same as neorealism, the neoliberal theory does not recognize the internal structure of states (government, ideology) as relevant (Hobson, 2003, p. 97) (Mingst, 2010, p. 103). Unlike in neorealism, cooperation between states is perceived as beneficial, not because of moral or idealistic visions, but because of long-term power gains. Through cooperation, neoliberals believe that state gain a long-term gain (Keohane, 1988). Liberals are fascinated by economic status of their country; neoliberals reduced economic benefits into power gains.

Both neorealism and neoliberalism are considered to be empirical theories: they like to measure things such power and believe in the objectivity of their theories. They think that through their theories international relations are measurable. They are also labelled as rational theories because they count pros and cons before states execute an action (Wendt, 1992, pp. 391-392) (Hobson, 2003, p. 146).

Constructivism is rather an idealist theory: constitutive norms, created by social construction, are important how we (or states) created them, because they then shape states alone (Hobson, 2003, pp. 146-147). The European Union, the best example of

constructivism in international relations, currently encompasses twenty-eight states. These states create the idea of the European Union, and the European Union itself shapes identity (Europeanness) and interests (common market) among the member states. The European Union is a very good example of applying social constructivism into practice as it is a melting pot of norms and ideas influencing every member state.

Constructivism is a theory, which is in the middle of the mainstream and the non-mainstream theories. It opposes neoliberalism and neorealism. Constructivism criticizes these theories for their focus on materialistic gains and state-centric position. On one hand, constructivists think that the world around us is socially constructed, but, on the other hand, they also take materialism into account (positivist epistemology). However, constructivists argue that material resources only acquire meaning in human action through the structure or shared knowledge. Basically, constructivism says that what we think about world as granted is only our imagination: states are social constructs, and people think about them as something material. It is people's thinking like this which makes the idea of a state. States are not objective living things but created in minds of people. Same as with national interests, they are not material. They are ideational, and they tend to transform according to domestic factors and international events. The state has many identities that change, depending on other internal and external changes. It means that constructivist do not know the interests and they try to come up what the interests are (Mingst, 2010, p. 110). Constructivists emphasize the role of identity and language. Constructivism believes that states are limited by social normative structures (Hobson, 2003, p. 146). The identity of a state is constructed through norms, which in turn define a state's particular interests.

Small States

The biggest problem with small states in the field of international relations is that scholars are not able to come up with one unique definition of a small state. Many of them remind their readers about this problem (Karsh, 1988, p. 3) (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010, p. 4) (Hey, 2003a, p. 2).

Many authors like to begin with realistic approach (as Lee&Smith point out (2010, pp. 2, 4)). Katzenstein, even though he is constructivist, writes that what distinguishes small states from large ones are territory size and the scale of its operations (2003, p. 10). It is the most logical one because people like to compare population number and geographical size. Based on the general theory, realists take population number and geographic size as determinants of the size of a state, or in other words power (in some cases military power, but it does not apply for every country²). Many countries in the world can be classified according to these standards, but it is not a universal rule. Small states do not fit very much to the idea of power hungry states, which gain power in order to survive. This classification and theory are much more in favour of studying big powers, than small ones.

As many authors emphasize (Thorhallson and Wivel, 2006, pp. 653-654), population and geographical size are not the best determinants for state categorization. For realism, small states are those states with a lower population or small area size. However, there are some small sized states with a high population, like Taiwan. Taiwan is more than ten thousand square kilometres smaller than Slovakia, but its population is almost five times bigger than Slovakia (CIA, 2015c) (CIA, 2015d). Or there are large sized states with a low population like Mongolia. It is almost as big as Iran, but its population is roughly three million compared to forty-five million Iran (CIA, 2015e) (CIA, 2015f). Therefore using population and area size as factors that determine 'smallness' of a state are not the best, due to mentioned problems. While we should hold on the idea that population and geographical area are crucial for categorizing states, we should not take them as the only defining factors.

In liberal theory, the determining factor is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a state. Another determining factor could be participation and position in international institutions. Some small and even microstates have higher GDP per capita and standard of living than bigger states. Therefore, GDP per capita is also not favourable determinant. Participation and position in the international institution can be very prestigious for small states, but it does not say anything about their size. As

² As Hey correctly notes military power cannot determine the bigness or smallness of a state. Her example is Israel, which for its relative small size and low population (eight million), has a powerful military. It often acts aggressively on both regional and global international scene (Hey, 2003a, pp. 2-3). On the other hand, there are states more than five times bigger than Israel, like Poland. Poland's military expenditure is lower than of Israel's, but surely according to its population, size, influence it cannot be considered to be small.

Thorhallson and Wivel note international organizations create international law, under which every state is equal, the law does not categorize states by any conditions (2006, p 653). The neoliberal notion of cooperation for absolute power gains is a factor that may be rather used in the study of bigger states.

The constructivist idea of a small state is best explained through ideas of the following authors. The article by Hey stresses the perception of self and others is essential for the definition of a small state (2003a). If people inside a state claim that their state is small and others outside the state claim that it is small, then it should be taken so (Hey, 2003a, p. 4). She also analyzes how international relations scholars understand foreign policy behaviour of small states and uses a constructivist conclusion: individual, bureaucratic, and state levels have the same weight for a small state as international security problems (Hey, 2003a, p. 8). If we take Hey's argument as the representation of constructivism, constructivists consider small states as those which are recognized by themselves and by others as small. The perception of a state taken by both insiders and outsiders might be on the basis of material elements of the state: population and territory. If the perception of the state is imagined as small, it should be taken so. And usually this is what happens in reality. If a random Slovak was asked whether he thinks Slovakia is a small state, the answer would be likely yes. Such perception is based on the land size and number of people living in it, because it is socially constructed that Slovakia is a small state.

There are three categories of small states mentioned by Hey: microstates, developed small states, and third world small states (2003a, p. 2). For the author, microstates are a particular category of states. They are completely different in many aspects. They are the most vulnerable to all kinds of external elements: not only to other states, but also to natural disasters or economic downfalls. Many microstates survive only because of benevolence and acceptance of bigger states. Of course again there are exceptions. Singapore is economically very strong, and its population is rather an exemption among microstates. Luxembourg is also on the margin whether it should be considered to be a microstate. In comparison to Monaco, it is clearly bigger. But in relation to Denmark, it falls behind.

Developed small states will be the theoretical focus of this thesis. More precisely developed small states in Europe. If we look at the population as the criteria for easy recognition of what is a small state, Europe

has only ten countries with population above fifteen million³. Europe, even though it has perceived different historical development, is bound by its geographic location, the closeness of the states, and current contemporary development.

All European small countries are included, even those which are not in the EU or the EEA, because they are very similar to the EU countries and the idea of Europeaness. If we excluded them, we would have to exclude Switzerland, which is economically on a very high level comparable with other small EU developed countries like Denmark or Luxembourg. We would also have to exclude Serbia and Montenegro, which are not yet in the EU, but are economically similar to Croatia, which is in the EU. Henceforth, referring to small states will be referred to small European states.

The third world countries and other developed non-European countries are excluded from this thesis because third-world small countries are too scattered, and it is hard to find a binding mechanism between them. Other developed countries outside of Europe, such as New Zealand, have had different cultural and historical development that does not much correspond with the development in Europe. New Zealand, due to its geographic isolation, does not have to deal with a lot of neighbours; therefore we may expect different behaviour than in Europe, where countries constantly interact with each other.

Foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour

Foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour of a state are not synonyms, even though they are similar terms. Before we can make a conclusion what foreign policy behaviour of a state is (and consequently of a small state), the term foreign policy needs to be discussed according to the three IR theories mentioned before. Next, we have to say how foreign policy develops. Afterwards, we can apply the general theory of foreign relations to small states. Having these concepts in our mind, it will be possible to differentiate foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy behaviour is one of the core terms of this thesis; therefore the author will pay more

³ These countries are Russia (the European part), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Ukraine, Poland, and Romania.

attention to it. The theoretical background of foreign policy behaviour will be taken from few perspectives of different authors, and it will be applied to both small European states and 'big states' in order to grasp the distinction.

According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, *the foreign policy* of a state means general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states (2009). That is, however, a very simplistic explanation. Foreign policy is a product of decision-making in a state. The decision-making is driven by different factors. Decisions are carried by actions. The main role of the action is to change or influence other states and actors on the international scene. Every foreign policy of a state is set up to deal with other actors of international relations in all manners. Foreign policies can care about economic cooperation or even about how a certain actor treats citizens of a particular state (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010, p. 127). All of the three main theories have a different interpretation of how foreign policy is created.

In the neorealist view, foreign policy is strongly determined by the external environment (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008, p. 5). Anarchy in the international system is a dangerous issue for states, which, therefore, focus primarily on their security. According to the neorealist theory, foreign policy is then shaped by state's relative power. As already mentioned, power is measured by military strength, natural resources and population.

Neoliberals consider foreign policy mainly in the economic terms, where a state should focus on its economy and cooperation with others (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008, p. 5). The neoliberal theory believes that there is anarchy in the international system, but states form international institutions, which limit the anarchy. Foreign policy in neoliberal terms focuses on cooperation, economic benefits to own state, and peace, even though a war is also possible, but only as the last option when international institutions fail. This kind of foreign policy assures state's security⁴.

Constructivists' foreign policy is based on a system of norms and values at the international scene (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008, pp. 5-6). If there is anarchy on the

⁴ For instance, Germany's foreign policy aims for economic partnerships (as it is the biggest economy in the EU), obeying the international law, which limits the danger of anarchical system, and tries to maintain peace.

international scene, it is constructed by the states through their foreign policies⁵. Foreign policy is ‘an semi-autonomous exercise of an agency (state)’, which determines the states position in the world. In other words foreign policy of the state ‘A’ defines the foreign policy of the state ‘B’, ‘C’, etc. – all the foreign policies are interconnected. Foreign policy, in this case, is then a set of rules defining a state itself and also the world around it. States (and other actors on the international scene) then behave and interact depending on their foreign policies. When it comes to foreign policy, constructivists also take into account historical development of countries, national identities, cultures, and even religions. For neorealism and neoliberalism, these terms fall into ‘the black box’.

For example, North Korea’s nuclear program is part of their foreign policy, and this foreign policy interacts with foreign policies of other states. The other states then construct their foreign policies according how they understand North Korea’s nuclear programme, and how overall world norms and values look at it. In this case, an atomic bomb of North Korea can be more dangerous, than the French weapons of mass destruction.

Construction of foreign policy

Both neoliberal and neorealist use the rational model that is based on the game theory. States calculate their actions on the base of highest benefits and lowest costs. Logically, both theories focus on benefits, but while neoliberals think that benefits are best acquired through cooperation, neorealist think that states should rather cheat. Foreign policies then, according to these theories are benefit-oriented – a state interacts with other states in order to gain something. Top decision makers are those who calculate the benefits and costs and do appropriate move according to their rational thinking. The problem is that a state is not purely a unitary actor. There are more agencies in a state, which may have different foreign policies. This kind of model is called government bargaining model, where the two or more agencies create mutual foreign policies. Creating a joint foreign policy ensures that all agencies are

⁵ As Alexander Wendt wrote: Anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1992)

satisfied with the actions made through foreign policy (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010, pp. 127-128).

The organizational process model is a process of foreign policy, which is carried only by low ranked officials. For example departments of ministries of foreign relations send to embassies over the world instructions. These instructions are given according to the official foreign policy. However, they might change, because of various positions and interests of low ranked officials (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010, p. 128).

Foreign policies are also created and carried by high ranked individuals – representatives of states and international organizations. These individuals have different values, worldviews and personalities. All three have various impacts on foreign policies of states. The trouble is that the representatives of one state may have disputes with each other over the foreign policy, so it happens that a president acts differently than a minister of foreign affairs. They create two types of foreign policy within one state (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010, p. 129).

It is also possible that individual decision-making is fallible, respectively bent by ‘outside forces’. Individuals are influenced by countless aspects: history, ideology, attitudes, system, public opinion, etc. These aspects may, therefore, interfere with individual’s decision-making. Thus, foreign policies are constructed upon social norms (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010, pp. 130-131).

Foreign policy can also be directly connected to domestic policy. A state may try to change its domestic policy and it either intentionally or unintentionally influences or acts against (or for) another actor(s). In bilateral relations between small states, as Nič suggests, domestic policies create foreign policies (Nič, 2010). He puts it in the scope of Slovak-Hungarian relations.

Doeser’s study points out that foreign policies of democratic small states are influenced both by the international scene and domestic relations. According to him governments of small states take into account both international and domestic relations when creating foreign policy. Domestic relations are influenced by public opinion and political opposition (Doeser, 2011).

There are many interest groups following their interests not only on domestic scenes but the international scene as well. A good example of interest groups is ethnic

groups. Ethnic groups are very interested in the relations of their 'homeland' country or a country with the same cultural and national background. Therefore, in a process of creation foreign policies ethnic groups may have a substantial leverage on government (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2010, p. 138). This will be the very case in the second chapter: the Hungarian minority in Slovakia tries to persuade the government to set foreign policies (and in fact also domestic policies) towards Hungary favouring their preferences.

Foreign policies of small (democratic) states, as again Doeser suggests, are restrained internationally by others states and supranational institutions (Doeser, 2011, p. 236). One could say that small states follow the neoliberal concept of foreign policies. But, the author's argument is that foreign policies of small states are mainly influenced by social constructivism: different rules and norms constructed worldwide apply for small states. Small states are also behind constructing these norms. Foreign policies of small states are interrelated with foreign policies of other states based on worldwide social constructs.

Foreign policy behaviour

As we discussed before, foreign policies consist of goals, which state wants to be fulfilled. It uses foreign policy behaviour to try to achieve it. Foreign policy behaviour is 'a systematic purposeful action made from implementation of a political decision, which wants to influence believes, attitudes, actions, and stances of other actors of international relations therefore actors outside of the original jurisdiction. These actors are either the matter to influence or only intermediaries to influence domestic actors of a state (Hermann, 1983, pp. 275-276).' In other words, foreign policy behaviours are attempts to influence others (Hudson, Hermann, & Singer, 1989, p. 124). Behaviour of a state is a form of interaction, or a tool, how the state interacts with other actors of the international system. This behaviour may be connected to the state's foreign policy. The foreign policy determines what the goals of a particular state are. Foreign policy behaviour means how this state tries to implement its foreign policy.

However, not all foreign policy behaviours are related to official foreign policies; they may be reflexive or habitual behaviours. That means there is a purpose to influence the other actor without a particular reason. States, governments, and political parties are not the only carriers of foreign policy behaviour. Non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, sub-national governments, corporations and even important individuals can make an action, respectively foreign policy behaviour toward foreign recipients. What is important is that unlike foreign policy, foreign policy behaviour is observable – it is usually left as written records (Hermann, 1983, pp. 275-276).

The foreign policy behaviour of small states

At the beginning of his book, Efraim Karshe mentions a crucial characteristic of a small state: ‘...it is an autonomous entity with its own unique psychological as well as behavioural characteristics and modes that distinguish it from large states’ (Karsh, 1988, p. 3). Therefore, we may conclude that small states ‘psychology’ is constructed in a way, which is different from other types of states. The same idea may be found in an older study by Maurice A. East, who claims that there are similar behavioural patterns of same- sized (or powered) states (1973).

The foreign policy behaviour of a small state differs from another type of states. A small state cannot afford to set their foreign policy behaviour in relation to other states, as ‘world powers’ can. Väyrynen makes a remark that a small state has behavioural restriction to its geographic area (Väyrynen, 1971, p. 96). However, this study is very old and not actual.

Doeser briefly mentions that small states cannot afford to behave aggressively as world powers can because small states are constrained by international norms and structure (Doeser, 2011, p. 236). The foreign policy of small states is very much limited by the international system, its norms, domestic background and attitudes.

Hey lists the most used assumptions about small state behaviour by scholars: small state participate very little in world affairs. They restrict their behaviour to their geographic arena. They tend rather use diplomatic and economic leverages than military use. Small states follow international principles such as international law.

They tend to join international institutions if possible. They are rather neutral. Small states focus on strong powers in the question of defence, cooperation and resources. Small states avoid conflicts and cooperate more. They use foreign policy resources in a disproportional amount to secure their defence and survival (Hey, 2003a, pp. 8). However, these assumptions are not definite. She makes a conclusion of small states foreign policy behaviour from conclusions made by her colleagues:

1. Small states foreign policy behaviour is limited by the international system;
2. The degree of development has impact on some domestic and international factors;
3. Level of development influences the role of the leader. (Hey, 2003b, pp. 193-194)

The role of the leader depends again on the level of development in a country. Hey says that leaders in less developed countries like to put personal values in the foreign policies. On the other hand, the leaders in more developed countries play an important role in the development and exercise of foreign policy. They are constrained by international and domestic factors: culture, system, geography, ideology, security, etc. (Hey, 2003b, pp. 194). Hey finishes that, even though, domestic level, when it comes building small states' foreign policy behaviour, was undervalued; now it is considered to be more important (Hey, 2003b, p. 194).

In this work, we will closely pay attention to the attitudes of leaders, respectively to governments implementing policies affecting both domestic and foreign relations. Therefore, the third point made by Hey will be crucial. The first and the second points are not that necessary for this study: International institutions are important, they are not defining. Even though the international institutions such as the EU, the OSCE, and in our case the Visegrad group play a big role in the formation of foreign policy behaviour, this thesis will mainly focus on the influence of domestic background of the foreign policy behaviours of Slovakia and Hungary. This research wants to study the foreign policy behaviour of two small European countries with a non-violent conflict happening between them.

To recapitulate, we have uncovered that small states may be categorized by physical restrictions like size, population, or military power, but they do not define small states as such. What counts is the idea constructed by the citizens and foreigners about a particular state. The question whether a state is small or not is decided on the social level.

We have covered what foreign policy behaviour is: a purposeful action of a state (or an actor inside the state) who tries to influence another foreign actor. These actions, or foreign policy behaviour, do not need to correspond with the official foreign policy.

Moreover, the foreign policy behaviour of small states with similar traits will be analogous. The role of the leader(s) or the government in the foreign policy construction and behaviour will be crucial, even though limited by various factors. The domestic background of small states is an essential element in order to understand the foreign policy behaviour of small states.

Chapter II: Slovak-Hungarian Relations over the Status of the Hungarian Minority

Basic information about the Hungarian minority in Slovakia

The Hungarian minority in Slovakia represents roughly nine and a half percent of the Slovak population. Considered that it consists of around five hundred and twenty thousand people (Bárdi, 2011, p. 146), it is not a negligible part of the country. Most of the Hungarian population in Slovakia lives in the south of the country⁶. The Hungarian minority is the most organized one among those living in Slovakia. There are various cultural and educational institutions representing it. The strength of the minority rights is always in a question. On one hand, Hungarians enjoy quite a lot of rights: they have their schools; they may use their mother tongue in official matters in municipalities, where at least twenty percent of the population are Hungarians. Most of them have Slovak citizenship, which may seem obvious, but it is not like this in every European country with minorities⁷. Not to mention that there are two Hungarian political parties. On the other hand, there are some limitations to all of these rights. The educational and cultural organizations are controlled by the Slovak ministries. The question of the Slovak citizenship is also problematic, and it will be discussed later. These Hungarians were born in Slovakia and consider it as their home. However, they want to remain in the cultural connection with their nation. Hungary feels and takes moral responsibility for the Hungarians living outside of Hungary and takes them as their own. It gives the Slovak nationalists and populists a pretext for contesting the minority. And that gives Hungary the duty to react as the fourth article of the Hungarian constitution of 2011 mentions. It states that Hungary takes responsibility for ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary (The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011). It is a vicious circle where the Hungarian minority stands between Slovakia and Hungary.

⁶ Figure 1 in the appendix shows the dispersion of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia

⁷ In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia many of the ethnic Russians living there are not citizens of these countries.

The historical background of Hungarians in Slovakia

One may ask: How did the Hungarian minority get into Slovakia? They did not get here. They have lived in the Carpathian basin for centuries along with other nations and ethnicities. They were incorporated into Czechoslovakia in 1918, respectively in 1920, when the Trianon treaty was signed. The Trianon treaty was a peace treaty between Hungary and the victory powers of the First World War, along Czechoslovakia. Until to these days, Trianon represents a national disaster and humiliation to Hungary because it left the Hungarian kingdom mutilated (Romsics, 2006, pp. 226-227) (Marušiak, 2011, p. 209). Therefore, during the interwar period they found themselves in a state, with which they could not identify themselves. According to the census data from 1921, there were around 650 000 ethnic Hungarians⁸ in Czechoslovakia, and they were the fourth largest ethnic group (Seton-Watson, 1931, p. 340). Before the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, they were identified with the Hungarian kingdom as something omnipotent and as their homeland. So conflagration of passions was understandable on the side of Hungarians living both in the new Czechoslovakia and in the mutilated Hungarian state. As a young democracy, Czechoslovakia wanted to compensate for the 'loss' and undertook series of measurements. All significant minorities in the interwar Czechoslovakia had considerable minority rights, and the Czechoslovak citizenship was granted to all of them (Seton-Watson, 1931, p. 341). However under the pressure of nationalism and revisionist tendencies, not all Hungarians were satisfied with these measures. Therefore, the main goal of the foreign policy of interwar Hungary was to get at least some of the land and the former population back (Zeidler, 2014). That was done with the help of the Nazi Germany after the first Vienna Arbitrage in 1938. Hungary took the southern parts of (Czecho)Slovakia where the dominant Hungarian population lived. From the point of view of Czechoslovakia, it was a treachery and a move Czechs and Slovaks would not forget.

The period of the Second World War was relatively stable between the Slovak State and Horthy's Hungary, even though the hostility between them remained on the place. Thanks to the Slovak National Uprising in 1944, Czechoslovakia was not considered as a defeated state in the Second World War. Unlike Hungary, which

⁸Many Jews registered themselves as Hungarians, that is why the number is high.

under the conditions of the peace treaty had to give up the land it had captured from surrounding countries before the beginning of the war. The consequence of it was that the Hungarian minority was again under the power of Czechoslovakia. They were not treated as during the interwar period. Under the decrees of the Czechoslovak President Beneš, all Hungarians, except those who fought against fascism, were considered traitors (Vadkerty, 2002, p. 31). Their Czechoslovak citizenship was revoked. Under the agreement with the victory powers, a forced exchange of population between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was possible (Hunčík & Gál, 1993, pp. 24-25). The Czechoslovak government after the war wanted to limit the numbers of Germans and Hungarians in order to increase the percentage of the Czech and Slovak population. They were also worried about next potential conflict with Hungary and Germany. Between the years 1946 and 1948, around 90 000 Hungarians were exchanged for around 70 000⁹ Slovaks who lived in Hungary (Popély, 2009). Some Slovak politicians, and surprisingly even communists, wanted a total eviction of the Hungarian minority (Hunčík & Gál, 1993, pp. 24-25). During this time, the so-called 're-Slovakization' was under process. That included renaming traditional names of villages and towns with new names. Other elements of re-Slovakization were closing down the Hungarian schools, minority language restrictions, etc. (Hunčík & Gál, 1993, pp. 25-26) (Vadkerty, 2002). The exchanges and evictions had gradually stopped after the Communist party came into power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 (Hunčík & Gál, 1993, p. 26). The question of Hungarian minority had to be 'swept under the carpet.' The position of the Hungarian minority during the communist regime was not ideal. They could not express their needs, contact with their families in Hungary was limited, and overall they were being ignored by the government. Despite these measurements, the Hungarian schools were reopened, and some other minority rights were introduced (Hunčík & Gál, 1993, pp. 26-27). A huge change happened after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Five Hungarian parties were formed, from which the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) was the strongest. However the fall of communism and the partition of Czechoslovakia, respectively the Slovak independence, did not bring an immediate ideal change for the Hungarian minority.

⁹ These numbers vary according to different sources

Contemporary development of the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia

The first years of the newly-established Slovak Republic were chaotic in many aspects. The semi-authoritarian rule of Vladimír Mečiar was a threat to both Slovaks and Hungarians. Mečiar was not popular among the minority. Slovakia signed a bilateral treaty with Hungary in 1995, in which both countries pledged to respect minority rights and discuss every topic regarding Slovak-Hungarian relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1997). However, the government of Vladimír Mečiar created laws that limited the minority rights (at least from the point of view of the minority), without any previous discussion with Hungary.

In 1998, the government of Mikuláš Dzurinda came to power with coalition where SMK was also represented. The party played a significant role in bringing Slovakia back from international isolation to the integration path with the aim of joining the European Union and NATO. It was part of the ruling government for eight years. The government undertook series of changes in laws, favouring the Hungarian minority. The relations with Hungary were improved. In 2006, Robert Fico's SMER-SD won the parliamentary elections, and he chose Ján Slota's SNS and Mečiar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) as coalition partners. Under this government series of conflicts happened between Slovakia and Hungary. This coalition was very strange in its nature: the social democratic SMER-SD combined with nationalistic right-wing SNS. In Western European countries, social democrats are those who usually stand for minority rights. SMER-SD was even suspended from the Party of European Socialist for bringing SNS to the government (Petőcz, 2011, p. 69). The government could be described as nationalistic populist. Both the Slovak and Hungarian media brought out the case of Hedviga Malina(ová), an ethnic Hungarian, who was beaten in Nitra in 2006 for speaking Hungarian in public. The questionable police investigation concluded that the attack was self-fabricated (Bútora, 2007, p. 205), and the government took it as an opportunity to promote its national populism. In 2009, Slovakia blocked the visit of the Hungarian president László Solyom to an event commemorating Saint Stephen in Komárno (Petőcz, 2011, p. 83). The result was a diplomatic discredit of Slovakia and again worsening the bilateral relations. Under this government, the relationship between Hungary and Slovakia was on the lowest level since Mečiar's government.

Before the 2010 parliamentary elections, Béla Bugár and more moderate Hungarian politicians left SMK and created Most-Híd, a party that is no longer based on the Hungarian minority, but rather on the cooperation between Hungarians and Slovaks. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, the party attracted not only Hungarian voters, but also a considerable amount of Slovaks (The International Republican Institute, 2011, p. 3). It was a part of the short-lasting government between 2010 and 2012.

After the early parliamentary elections in 2012 Fico formed one party government. The government has limited its national populist rhetoric; however it still has remained nation-oriented. This is Fico's statement on the 150th anniversary of Matica Slovenská in 2013, a cultural organization dominated by nationalistic ideas: 'This has to change. We have not primarily created our independent state for minorities, however we appreciate them, but for the Slovak state-building nation. The state is national, and the society is civic. There is a strange tendency to put the problems of the national minorities purposely in front at the expense of the Slovak state-building nation. Like there are no Slovaks living in Slovakia' (Buzalka, 2013, p. 161).¹⁰

Contemporary political development in Hungary in regards to the Hungarian minorities

After the fall of communism in 1989 the government of József Antall (1990-1993/ resp. 1994) concentrated on protection of the Hungarian minorities in the principles of human and minority rights. The minority law passed in Hungary in 1993 had to serve as a model for other countries with ethnic minorities. The government also recognized Hungarian parties in other countries as representatives of Hungarians living outside of Hungary (Bárdi, 2011, p. 160). Various governmental institutions for abroad Hungarians were created during this government.

¹⁰ This is an example, how state representatives can form public perception on state issues. Elites have the best means and the voice and the attention to spread their ideas; they are crucial in setting role-models in Slovakia.

The following social-democratic government of Gyula Horn (1994-1998) had the task to sign agreements with neighbouring countries concerning the status of Hungarian minority in order to become a member of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization¹¹. The government focused on Hungarian minorities as handicapped groups and through foundations it wanted to improve their economic situation (Bárdi, 2011, p. 163).

The first government of Viktor Orbán continued in this endowment policy and extended it with education support¹². In 2001, the parliament created so-called 'identification card of ethnic Hungarian.' Every foreign Hungarian with such ID had the right for education, culture, employment, health care, and travel in Hungary (Bárdi, 2011, p. 165).

The following social-democratic government of Péter Medgyessy (2002-2004) wanted to pull through the norm in other countries. It made a compromise and limited it, which was more suitable for Slovakia (Bárdi, 2011, p. 166). The governments of Ferenc Gyurcány (2004-2009) were struck by the discussion of the double citizenship which ended in a failed referendum. Gyurcány's representation was not very fond of it. This topic will be discussed later in one of the case studies.

In 2010, Viktor Orbán's party Fidesz won the parliamentary elections. He too used national populist rhetoric to attract voters with nationalistic feelings. He managed to pass the double citizenship, and overall his government was very protective of the Hungarian minorities (Bárdi, 2011, pp. 172-173). Fidesz is more popular among ethnic Hungarians outside of Hungary than the social democratic party or the social liberals. In 2011, Fidesz was able to implement a new constitution. It was criticized by many international organizations for its content. The important part is the Article D that directly calls for protection of the Hungarian nation, which counts in also all foreign Hungarians:

'Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities, shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the effective use of their individual and

¹¹ Treaty with Slovakia was signed in 1995 as mentioned previously

¹² For example, the University of J. Selye in Komárno was founded with the financial help of the Hungarian government

collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary (2011, p. 4, Article D).’

The preamble of the constitution indirectly mentions Trianon: ‘We promise to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of the last century (2011, p. 2).’ It is a proof that Fidesz and Orbán like to use nationalist connotations, but also that it is still an important topic for the Hungarian society.¹³

The four factors which influence foreign policy behaviours of Slovakia:

Nationhood

The question of ethnicity and nationhood is discussed among a large spectrum of authors. The first books to present are very similar works in their name as well as in their content; they are the *Slovak-Magyar Relations* by Augustín Marko and Pavol Martinický (1995) and the *Slovaks and Magyars* (1995) by a group of authors. The first thing that strikes the reader is the use of the word ‘Magyar’. Magyar is the nomadic name for the Hungarian tribes who came in the 9th century to the Carpathian basin. The proper name in English is Hungarian (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). The authors of the first book defend the use of ‘Magyar’ as a label of ethnicity and that the term Hungary ceased to exist in 1918 (Marko & Martinický, 1995, p. 4). This argument is based on the fact that the Slovak language differentiates between Magyar and Hungarian.

In the *Role of History and Identity in Shaping Trans-Atlantic Relations* (2002), Gyarfášová and Lukáč write that the Hungarian identity is closely linked to the Hungarian minorities who are ‘lost’ since the Trianon Treaty in 1920. According to them, Hungary perceives moral and political responsibilities for Hungarian minorities. Thus when the Hungarian identity is linked to the Hungarian minorities, we may say that it is also related to its foreign relations to its neighbour countries (p. 25-26). The national identity of Slovaks has been defined by relation to Hungarian and Czechs, however, the struggle for own statehood is a mythical phrase (Gyarfášová & Lukáč,

¹³ An important point to note: every Hungarian government tries to protect the rights of ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary – they are morally obligated to do so.

2002, p. 31). There is an important observation by the authors: the greatest distrust in the Visegrad group¹⁴ is between Slovaks and Hungarians (Gyarfášová & Lukáč, 2002, p. 42).

The role of nationalism is strong in both Slovak and Hungarian post-communist transformation. However, Hungarians did not need to struggle with national identity. Unlike Slovakia, which had to undergo a process of nation-building (Marušiak, 2011, p. 209).

A good example how to understand the Slovak process of nation building is to look at the Slovak constitution. The very first words in the preamble say: 'We the Slovak nation'. It could evoke in one's mind that Slovakia is a more or less homogenous country. The Constitution also mentions the minorities living in Slovakia in the preamble. Bohumila Ferenčuhová in her article argues that the preamble is too historical; it goes back to traditions and has a nationalistic undertone. Back in 1992 when the constitution was adopted the Hungarian minority was not satisfied with it (the Hungarian MPs left the parliament during the vote) because even though it mentions minorities and other ethnicities, it predominately focuses on the Slovak nation (Ferenčuhová, 2007, p. 174).

The question of nationhood is much more crucial for Slovak domestic politics since Slovakia is a young country, and so is the nation-building process. Hungarian nationhood does not have the problem with nation-building. It rather is oriented on the idea that Hungary is a vanguard of all Hungarians.

Historical narratives

In one of the episodes of the *Dinner with Havran*, a discussion program, Pawel Ukielski, a Polish historian, said that the conception of historic nations is very crucial for the relations between the nations in the Central Europe. Hungarians, as well Czechs and Poles, consider themselves as historic nations because there was the link with Hungarians and Kingdom of Hungary (Ukielski, 2014). Slovaks do not have such reference to history, and that is why they go deeper in history, before the creation of the Hungarian Kingdom. One may call it an unimportant fact to the Slovak-

¹⁴ A regional group of countries consisted of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Hungarian relations, but as constructivism explains, history is important in order to understand the behaviour of a state. We can see this in the books *Slovaks and Magyars* and *Slovak-Magyar Relations* where the authors have the need to go back to history; they go deep as they can even to the times of the Great Moravia and the Hungarian Kingdom. They victimize Slovaks as the nation who is in ongoing conflict with Hungarians without any share in it. Both books talk with huge dissatisfaction about the statement of the first Hungarian prime minister Jozsef Antal, who said that he feels to be the prime minister of 15 millions of Hungarians in 1990 (Marko & Martinický, 1995) (Števček ed., 1995).

Gyarfášová and Lukáč are correct when they say that ‘the nations of Central Europe are obsessed with history and that it has impact on shaping the contemporary politics (2002, p. 12).’

As already mentioned, the biggest unsolved question in regards to Hungarian history is the dissolution Austria-Hungary or the Trianon Treaty in 1920. For some Hungarians, Trianon presents national tragedy (Romsics, 2006, pp. 226-227) (Marušiak, 2011, p. 209). They are not settled with it, and the consequence is a strong right-wing nation oriented group in Hungary (Marušiak, 2011, p. 209), which leads us back to the question of nationhood.

Populism

Populism, or for the purpose of this work national populism, as Peter Učeň writes, ‘‘features nationalism as a prominent element of their electoral appeal and claim to represent the interests of an often mythical and idealized national collectivity’ but they refrain from radical actions (as cited in Učeň, 2009).’

Kalmán Petőcz summarizes almost all cases of national populism on the topic of Slovak-Hungarian relations and the Hungarian minority during the first Fico’s government. Petőcz writes that the most of the radical views were presented by SNS. They constantly verbally attacked the Hungarian minority, Hungary and its representatives. However, SMER-SD and Fico did not explicitly distance themselves from these views (2011, p. 81). The use of language in politics is crucial. To illustrate, both Fico and Orbán use forms of language as a populist tool. Fico conveyed the term

‘loyal minorities’, in one of his statements about the coexistence of Slovaks and minorities. As Petőcz writes, that implies that there are also disloyal minorities in Slovakia (2011, p. 76). Using such terms undermine the status of the Hungarian minority and deplore it. Orbán, before he became prime minister in 2010, in one of his speech at SMK congress used terms like Felvidék and Hungarian autonomy in Slovakia (Petőcz, 2011, p. 85). Such national populist terms are considered to be very sensitive even for moderate Slovak elites. Jobbik, a far-right party in Hungary, sometimes work hand in hand with Fidesz. There were few cases when Fidesz should have reacted and condemn Jobbik’s action, but did not, similarly like SMER-SD should have condemned the statements of SNS. The only difference is that Jobbik was not coalition partner of the first government of Fidesz. The problem of nationalism is current on both sides of Danube.

The 2006 Fico’s government showed itself how some Slovak elites think and use very sensitive topics for own political gains. National populism was a tool how to get attention and the Hungarian minority played a great scapegoat for them. Orbán proved that he also employs populism for political gains. Use of national populism on domestic scene profoundly affects the relations between both of the countries and creates an artificial alienation between Slovaks and Hungarians.

Minority status and policies

Juraj Buzalka argues that there is reluctance in Slovakia to accept multi-ethnicity of the country. He says Slovakia of the 21st century is not just for pure ethnic Slovaks, but rather a multiethnic country where the majority and minorities live together (Buzalka, 2013).

Probably the best insight into the Slovak-Hungarian relations on a wider spectrum is written by Milan Nič (2010). He tries to answer the question why is Hungary so focused on the Slovak Hungarian minority and not so much of the Hungarian minorities in other states. He provides an example of Romania, which is much bigger than Slovakia. He says that Hungary found a very precious partner in Romania in terms of both regional and European partnership. Romania is much more benevolent towards the minority policies than Slovakia (Nič, 2010, p. 122). Nič

criticizes Slovak minority policies during Mečiar's period and various controversial moves by Fico's government and his coalition partners. He makes an important observation: the bilateral relations between Slovakia and Hungary are firstly the product of the domestic and not of foreign policies (Nič, 2010, p. 125). The foreign policy is, according to him, directly dependent on the domestic policy. He states that until the Hungarian minority will be the key problem in the relations between these two states, the partnership and cooperation between them will be minimal. Nič stresses the importance of the first compromise move from Slovakia in order to progress in the regional cooperation (Nič, 2010, p. 126-127). On the other hand, he states that Hungary has to wake up from the Trianon tragedy and leave it behind (Nič, 2010, p. 129). He cites an editor from the weekly newspaper the Economist who says: 'Hungary has a conceptual problem in accepting the fact that Slovakia is a real state' (Nič, 2010, pp. 129-130).

According to Nándor Bárdi, when there is real or notional injustice made on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia or its future is in a question, it may cause a feeling of injustice to the whole nation in Hungary. On the other hand, Slovakia may see discussing such problems as a violation of its sovereignty (Bárdi, 2011, p. 174).

In the *Slovaks and Magyars*, Peter Prochávka points out how many institutions the Hungarian minority has, like schools, and libraries (1995). One may find arguments in both books (the *Slovak-Magyar Relations* and *Slovaks and Magyars*) about how the minority rights are sufficient and do not need to be extended and how Slovakia is actually on a very good level in terms of implementation of the minority rights. Fico, too, stated that the minority rights in Slovakia are on an upper standard level (Petőcz, 2011, s. 79-80). By claiming minority rights are sufficient in Slovakia, Slovak politicians justify their policies that may be perceived by the minority as limiting.

László Öllös (2009) agrees to the idea of peaceful coexistence of both nations. But he argues that it cannot be done without the participation of both Slovakia and Hungary, not only on the basis of the state but also between the nations. However, he stresses that the fear of Hungarians is presented as a national threat, which serves purely as a political tool (Öllös, 2009, pp. 11-12). Populism is strong in both Slovakia and Hungary, and he admits that the unpredictability of Hungarian populism might be frightening to the surrounding states (Öllös, 2009, p. 18). He opposes Prochávka in the

fact that, even though, the Hungarian minority has its schools, the school system is directed by the state; therefore there is a tendency to limit the minority school system.

The dual citizenship dispute between Hungary and Slovakia

The dispute over the dual citizenship is the first case study of this chapter. This conflict directly affected the Hungarian minority and Slovak-Hungarian relations. The whole case had started in 2004 when the Hungarian party Fidesz, which at that time was in the opposition, declared a referendum. The second question of the referendum was whether the Hungarians living outside of Hungary should be able to get Hungarian citizenship (Bárdi, 2011, p. 168). The referendum was not successful, because of the low turnout. Despite the failure, the results of the second question were very close: 51,4% in favour and 48,6 % against. The referendum was preceded by a huge campaign, in which the ruling coalition with the Prime Minister Ferencz Gyurcány argued that there will be an influx of migrants (Bárdi, 2011, p. 168). The negative attitude of the government towards the second question caused bigger support of Fidesz by foreign Hungarians (Bárdi, 2011, p. 168). Fidesz had not stopped dreaming about implementing the law, despite the failure.

In 2009, Fidesz won the parliamentary election and formed the government in 2010. Before the parliamentary election in Slovakia in June 2010, Fidesz passed the citizenship bill in May. This bill provides the possibility to foreign ethnic Hungarians (or in other word are ethnic Hungarians) to apply for Hungarian citizenship. Slovakia produced a contra law forbidding dual citizenship just three weeks before the election as a protest. The conclusion of this contra law was that more people lost their Slovak citizenship toward other countries than Hungary, mostly to Great Britain, Germany and Austria¹⁵. The Slovak government argued that the Hungarian side did not discuss the proposal of the law with them. As stated by Fico, the bilateral agreement from 1995 obligated both countries to discuss every proposal that would affect the relations between them (SMER-SD, 2010).

¹⁵ Until January 2015, more than nine hundred people lost their Slovak citizenship, out of which only fifty nine were to Hungary (TASR, 2015).

Granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians does not mean the right to vote in Hungary. The possibility could be there, which would bring Fidesz more votes because as mentioned the Hungarian communities outside Hungary are keener to Orbán.

The Treaty of Trianon plays a role in this law in some extent too. There were some arguments that the citizenship law was a political populist move made by Orbán to bring 'lost' Hungarians back to 'homeland'. However, as the website *madari.sk* writes, a project that tries to deconstruct hasty assumption of some Slovaks about the Hungarian minority, there are no strong arguments against the Hungarian citizenship bill, because it does not limit Slovak concept of citizenship, Slovak laws or interferes with the Slovak sovereignty (*madari.sk*, 2012). Yet, the Treaty of Trianon had an implicit impact on the Hungarian law. We can see that the rhetoric of the Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán hinges on Hungarian nationalism as presented in his recent statement: "Hungarians living in the Carpathian basin are entitled to have dual citizenship, are entitled to community rights, and also autonomy (Than, 2014)." Therefore, even though it is not expressed explicitly, this law is still influenced by the Hungarian historical narration.

As mentioned, the Slovak government produced a law banning dual citizenship in very short time. Prime Minister Fico in the official statement expressed that Fidesz is a threat to good relations between Slovakia and Hungary. He continued that giving Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia represents a security risk for Slovakia. 'It will strengthen the Hungarian identity within the Hungarian community and weaken the identity with the Slovak Republic. It is against our national interests,' Fico said (SMER-SD, 2010). SNS went even further. The chairman of the party Ján Slota compared the Hungarian citizenship law to Hitler's actions that lead to the Second World War (Bariak, 2010). SNS also suggested withdrawing the Slovak ambassador from Hungary.

The Slovak ban on dual citizenship is still valid in 2015. However, there are intentions to reform it because more Slovak citizens gained new citizenship in other countries than in Hungary. It shows that the law was produced hastily as a reaction to the Hungarian law. The Prime Minister and his coalition partners used national populist rhetoric to defend the contra law, without thinking about the consequences on other people.

The Slovak language reform in 2009

One of the biggest disruptions between Slovakia and Hungary which directly affected the Hungarian minority were the changes in the language law in 2009. It favoured the use of the Slovak language even in places where the Hungarian minority was dominant. Cultural events, memorials, and advertisement in minority languages had to have a Slovak language equivalent that had to be either the same size or bigger than the Hungarian translation. An institution or a business could face a fine up to five thousand Euros for violating the law. The law had an ambiguous statement about limiting the minority languages in the public sphere. The government claimed the law would protect Slovaks living in the southern parts of Slovakia (SITA, 2009c). The Hungarian minority was supported by Hungary, and the EU and the OECD argued that the law violates the minority's rights.

The case originates with the government of Vladímír Mečiar. In 1995, the government introduced a new state language law. The law made Slovak language the state language. The use of minority languages had to be included in an additional law, which, however, was not introduced (Smetanková, 2013, pp. 63-64). Therefore, it limited the use of minority languages in official communication. It also penalized the wrong use of the Slovak language and threatened with quiet high fines (The National Council of the Slovak Republic, 1995, p. §10). The government of Mikuláš Dzurinda abolished the penalties in 1999 and it introduced a law about the use of minority languages in official communication (Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, 2011) (Smetanková, 2013, p. 64).

The government stressed the importance of passing this law, arguing that it is a symbol of Slovak sovereignty. Kalmán Petőcz writes that sovereignty has nothing to do with the state language. According to him, other countries that do not have such laws could be considered as un-sovereign, which is nonsense (Petőcz, 2009a, p. 27).

The 2009 reform was 'the holy mission of Slovakia' as the Prime Minister Fico claimed (Hungarian Spectrum, 2009). The biggest criticism was the re-introduction of penalizations for not following the law. After passing the law, Fico said the Hungarian politicians cannot press Slovakia to cancel the law because the Hungarian kingdom does no longer exist (SITA, 2009b). The whole case was concluded with the statement by the high commissioner for minority rights from the OSCE, Knut Vollebaek. His

finding was that the law did not violate any international law and international commitments of Slovakia. This part of the statement was stressed by Slovakia. Yet, Vollebaek was also concerned about the vagueness of the law which was emphasized by Hungary (Petőcz, 2011, p. 82). Thus, every side of ‘the conflict’ interpreted the finding of the commissioner in their way.

The criticism came from all parties from Hungary, but the most vocal was Fidesz. One of the MPs from Fidesz, Zsolt Németh, stated that such moves are purposely created by Slovakia to persecute the Hungarian minority (Groszkowski & Bocian, 2009, p. 3). Hungary even brought this case to the floor of the United Nations (Hungarian Spectrum, 2009). The Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai declared that this law disrupt the Slovak-Hungarian relations and that it did not follow the European standards (SITA, 2009a). The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade also reacted on the language law. It ‘respected the right of any country to pass any law, but regrets the way, how the Slovak Parliament uses this right. This move of the Slovak Parliament is alarming from the viewpoint of the international law at it leaves a doubtful political message (SITA, 2009a).’ At the end of 2009, The Slovak Foreign Minister Lajčák criticized Hungarian representatives, who, according to him, ‘came to a conclusion that they have the right to govern and judge what other governments do in countries where the Hungarian minority lives (TASR, 2010b).’

The Prime Ministers Fico and Bajnai eventually met in September 2009, producing an agreement of cooperation between the countries. Fico also agreed to reconsider the advice made by the commissioner Vollebaek. Despite the promise made by Fico, there were no additional changes in the law by the government. The new government of Iveta Radičová, reformed the law in 2011, bringing changes like lowering the possible fines and reduction of some of the regulations made by the previous government (SITA, 2010).

There is a slight resemblance to the Hungarian citizenship law. The Slovak government introduced the language law one year before the Slovak parliamentary elections, making it a pre-election campaign. In the end, it was not successful, mainly for SNS, which did not get into the parliament in 2010. Furthermore, an important fact to note is that both countries limited or refused talks about both mentioned laws with the other side. It seems like both governments did it on purpose.

Results from the second chapter

Both case studies were examples of actual policies implemented by the mentioned countries. However, there are differences in these policies. The Slovak language law was a domestic policy, but since it cared about the Hungarian minority it directly attracts Hungary, it became an issue of the relations between these states. The Hungarian citizenship law is both domestic and foreign character. It attracts domestic voters with nationalistic feelings and simultaneously it is a foreign policy of Hungary, which is oriented on foreign citizens who are Hungarian ethnics.

The foreign policy behaviour of Slovakia concerning the Hungarian citizenship law was defensive and reactive. It relied on the sovereignty of Slovakia and its right to deal with domestic matters, which according to Slovakia might have been breached by the actions of Hungary. Nevertheless, the foreign policy behaviours of both countries were influenced by the domestic backgrounds. Slovakia, or the first government of Robert Fico, acted on the foreign policy behaviour of Hungary which rooted from the official foreign policy of Hungary – the protection of ethnic Hungarians outside of Hungary. The Hungarian foreign policy behaviour had two stages: Introducing the law and reaction on the countermeasures of Slovakia.

The Slovak language law did not start as Slovak foreign policy behaviour because it was a domestic policy. However, after the reaction of Hungary, it began to serve as foreign policy behaviour. Hungary's foreign policy behaviour was again influenced by the protection of the Hungarian minorities. The Slovak language law was later manifested as foreign policy behaviour towards Hungary as an action to show the inability of Hungary to interfere with Slovak domestic relations.

Both countries used foreign policy behaviour to affect the other one. In the end, they (or the governments) were not successful because both countries continued with passing their domestic policies. While Slovak foreign policy in relation to Hungary has been hard to define because it varies depending upon who is in the government, the Hungarian has been consistent due to clearly defined criteria which Hungary follows.

In this chapter, we have discussed the complicated status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia both in the past and present. Then the author described four

factors, nationhood, historical narratives, populism and the minority status and policies, which he thinks that influence creation of policies and behaviour of both states towards each other. The two case studies provide an insight how countries implement and react upon implementation of their policies.

In the third, chapter the author will analyze the findings from the first chapter and the second chapter.

Chapter III: Evaluation and Discussion

The last chapter will serve as comparison between the provided theory from the first chapter and the case studies from the second chapter. Ultimately, the author will answer whether the thesis statement can be confirmed.

The thesis statement presupposes that the domestic background significantly influences the foreign policy behaviour construction of both Slovakia and Hungary. The author believed that by the example of these two countries we can make a more general conclusion of how small states behave. The domestic background is decisive in the creation of the foreign policy behaviour in all small states, respectively in all small states in Europe.

Why is constructivism a helping theory to this thesis?

The author has described three theories that are regarded as the leading theories of international relations today. Neorealism and neoliberalism discuss some thought-provoking concepts. Nonetheless, they end up with one notion – power. They both are unable to consider the domestic background because they do not pay attention to it. The author does not intend to undermine the importance of these theories; however, when operating with them, one should know their limits.

Constructivism considers domestic background (identities, ideas, history) important when studying actors of the international relations in detail. Listing such factors gives researchers and readers a better understanding how actors of international relations have come to be, what they represent, what is their position in the world, how they behave, etc. The ideas of constructivism fit accordingly to this thesis. Due to the inspiration of constructivism, the author was able to employ and discuss such factors as history, populism, nationhood and minority status. The author thinks that without these factors, it would be hard to explain the relationship between Hungary and Slovakia, and their behaviour.

Classification of small states – are Hungary and Slovakia small states?

There is no need to discuss widely whether Slovakia and Hungary are small states. If we take either the material factors (population, geographic size, power), which, however, are not decisive, or constructed ideas about the countries, we end up with the notion that both Slovakia and Hungary are considered to be small states¹⁶. However, as we might have seen in the second chapter, there is a slight difference in how the idea of ‘smallness’ of these states is perceived. Slovakia has been always considered to be a small country. On the contrary, Hungary was downgraded from a medium-sized country to a small country due to the events connected with the loss in the First World War. Therefore, even though Hungary is a small country today, the identity of the country is still connected to the ‘greater’ past.

While material factors should be taken into account when asking whether a particular state is small or not, the social constructed identity of the state (which is also constructed by material factors), both domestically and internationally, should be the primary factor in identification of states¹⁷.

Foreign policy

It is rather difficult to note whether there exists something like ‘the foreign policy of a small state’ (however, we can claim that there is ‘foreign policy behaviour of small state’). The only difference as Doeser points out is that foreign policies of small states are restrained by international relations (Doeser, 2011). The size of a state does not determine its foreign policy because both small and big states may contest for the same goals, i.e. for the idea of world peace.

¹⁶ The population of Slovakia is around 5.4 million, and its area is 49 000 km². The population of Hungary is around 9.9 million, and its area is 93 000 km². To compare them with a large European state, Germany has 81 million citizens, and its area is 357 000 km² (CIA, 2015a) (CIA, 2015b) (CIA, 2015c). Simply put, Germany is bigger than Slovakia and Hungary. Consequently, Slovakia and Hungary are small states.

¹⁷ In order to provide an example to show that the idea of population as the only determinant of size of a country is socially constructed, the author provides a theoretical model (this model does not take other determinants into account). Today, countries with population above hundred million may be perceived as big states. However, if every state except Slovakia and Hungary, had a population under one million, Slovakia and Hungary, with population around five and a half respectively ten million, would become perceived by the world as big states, because it is socially constructed that more population determines the size of a state.

When talking about foreign policies, we have to remember what constructivism claims about them. Foreign policies are created upon some ideas, norms, and identities. These ideas and identities form goals of foreign policies. Goals of foreign policies may be different; yet, they are interconnected because foreign policies are further constructed upon goals of other foreign policies. Therefore, they influence each other and are always under formation since goals may change over time, depending on new ideas, norms, and identities.

We may see this in the case of the Slovak-Hungarian relations. Hungary has an official foreign policy that cares about well-being of foreign Hungarians. This foreign policy originates from the Hungarian constitution. The Slovak foreign policy does not deal with well-being of the Hungarian minority since it is a domestic issue. However, it determines the goals of Slovak foreign policy, which we can call as protection of Slovak sovereignty. These two goals of Hungary and Slovakia are abhorrent, but they are interconnected since they both deal with the opposite country.

We may suppose that both Hungary's and Slovakia's goals of foreign policies are good and friendly cooperation with its neighbours. To prove this argument, there is the bilateral agreement between Slovakia and Hungary from 1995 (which is called a Treaty about Good Neighbourhood and Friendly Cooperation). These goals of foreign policy then limit the other goals of their foreign policies: i.e. if Hungary wants good relations with Slovakia, it cannot press on it too much over the issue of the Hungarian minority, and vice versa Slovakia cannot be too protective for the sake of good relations with Hungary.

Domestic actors, policies, and background are a strong source of the implementation of foreign policies. Individual leaders, interest groups such as ethnic groups, and even laws have an impact on foreign policies. However, this is not a particular trait of small state foreign policies, but it should generally apply for every state. In Slovakia, the Hungarian minority might have a say when dealing with Hungary; even more when Hungarians are represented in the Slovak government. The individual leaders, mostly prominent persons like prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, may influence foreign policies, but as mentioned, they may be fallible, thus doing more harm to the direction of foreign policy. We may observe that during Fico's first government the shift of Slovak foreign policy toward Hungary caused worsening the relations between these two countries.

The author did not take into account the international influence upon foreign policies of small states. We may have seen that the international community, like the EU or the NATO, has pushed Hungary and Slovakia to deal with each other. One of the examples is the bilateral treaty between Hungary and Slovakia in 1995 when the NATO pressed Hungary to settle relations with its neighbours.

To conclude this section, it is false to claim that small states' foreign policies are just based on their domestic issues. International pressure has considerable strength in the creation of foreign policies of small states. We may presume that foreign policies of other types of states are also influenced by domestic and international factors.

The foreign policy behaviour of small states – comparison to Slovak and Hungarian behaviour

The authors discussing the foreign policy behaviour of small states do not say how they behave. They list assumptions what influences their behaviours. To repeat, Hey argues that small state foreign policy behaviour is limited by the international system; the degree of development has an impact on some domestic and international factors; level of development influences the role of leader. She states that the role of domestic background is also crucial (Hey, 2003b, pp. 193-194)¹⁸. Doeser claims similarly – behaviour is limited by the international system, its norms, domestic background and attitudes (Doeser, 2011, p. 236)¹⁹. The author of this paper took some of their assumptions and adjusted them.

When we look at the Slovak-Hungarian relations, we may see three patterns of behaviours. The first is behaviour according to the official foreign policy. This may be observed in the Hungarian case, which behaves according to their moral obligation towards protection of foreign Hungarians. Later this foreign policy was strengthened by the new Hungarian constitution. Even the introduction of the new constitution can be considered as a part of the Hungarian behaviour. The purpose of this foreign policy behaviour is to let other states know that Hungary will defend the rights of all Hungarians.

¹⁸ As seen in the first chapter, pg. 28

¹⁹ As seen in the first chapter, pg. 27

The second pattern of behaviour is connected to domestic politics (and policies), which later become foreign policies. Through implementation of domestic policies, both states behaved in a way to influence each other, respectively to show their positions towards each other. This was clearly showed in the case studies, where both countries implemented laws - policies, which by the end of a day served as foreign policy behaviours. The Slovak language law became foreign policy behaviour from the time Hungary reacted on it. The implementation of the Hungarian citizenship law is also a foreign policy behaviour, due to its purposeful character influencing states out of Hungary's jurisdiction. It is possible that foreign policy behaviour changes when a new government comes to power. We may see this transition in comparison to Fico's and Radičová's governments. The change of foreign policy behaviour of Slovakia towards Hungary took place when Radičová's government reformed the Slovak language law in 2011. This reform served as foreign policy behaviour, among other things, to influence the Hungarian perception of the relations of these states. The role of the government can be compared to Hey's assumption of the role of leader.

The third pattern of behaviour is the statements made by official representatives (prime ministers and other politicians) and institutions (foreign ministries). In some situations, the foreign policy behaviours of both states were carried as reactions to the previous foreign policy behaviours of the other side. Statements, like the one made by Fico about the Hungarian citizenship law threatening the security of Slovakia, is understood as a purposeful action to justify the state behaviour – creating the contra-law in Slovakia. The statement by Zsolt Németh²⁰ that Slovakia purposely created the language law to persecute the Hungarian minority, influences the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and other actors interested in this topic. This pattern can be connected to Doeser's claim of attitudes being able to shape foreign policy behaviour.

If we look back to theory, foreign policy behaviours are explained as purposeful actions to influence an actor out of reach of the original jurisdiction. Thus, all three assumed patterns can be marked as foreign policy behaviours since their purpose was to influence the other state.

These foreign policy behavioural patterns have a common trait: they root at least from one of the four mentioned domestic factors outlined the second chapter:

²⁰ Zsolt Németh is a Hungarian MP from Fidesz, at the time when he said that statement he was the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee. His statement is mentioned in the second chapter.

nationhood, historical narratives, populism, minority status and policies. These four factors are not decisive. They are just illustrative assumptions made by the author, to show the change in behaviour of Slovakia and Hungary. There may be other factors under which we consider how these states create foreign policy behaviour, like the level of development, economic strength, political regime, etc.

The author of this paper did not consider the pressure by international actors on the foreign policy behaviour. There are few remarks to this factor in the second chapter. The case study about the Slovak language law mentioned that in 1995, the EU pressed Slovakia to resolve the double language report cards dispute. Later in 2009, Slovakia claimed that it will take into account the findings of the OSCE commissioner. Both Slovakia and Hungary waited for the results and afterward respected them, even though they highlighted different aspects of the findings. Most importantly, the international pressure also encompasses the behaviour and positions of one of the state to the other. Doerer and Hey are right when arguing that international forces take part in shaping the foreign policy behaviour of small states.

The scope of this paper is very specific. The author identifies what the behaviours of Hungary and Slovakia are in the question of the Hungarian minority in their relationship. We cannot be sure that these assumptions apply to the behaviour of small states generally. For example, these states may build their foreign policy behaviours in their economic interest in a totally different way because their economic relations may encompass different factors. The results may not fit the assumptions made by the author. We may expect a similar behaviour of small states in comparable situations. The author presupposed that the behaviour of Hungary and Slovakia might tell us how small states (in Europe) in general behave. However, we do not know how they behave in other situations. We may suppose that small states when it comes to minorities, build their behaviour according to the domestic background. The four provided factors (nationhood, historical narratives, populism, and the minority status and policies) are helpful to understand why small states behave towards another small state, especially when the states have a shared history or their histories are interconnected. However, as we have seen, international institutions and actors have had a say in the foreign policy behaviours of these states.

When we look back at the thesis statement, it is not possible to prove it. First of all domestic background is not the only factor shaping foreign policy behaviour; the

international pressure should be also taken into account on the same level as domestic background. Secondly, the scope of this study – Slovak-Hungarian relations over the Hungarian minority issue – is limited when studying foreign policy behaviour, even though it has provided us with some interesting conclusions. Lastly, if we want more general conclusions on how small states behave, the study should be widened to other issues of Slovak-Hungarian relations.

Conclusion

The hypothesis of this paper is not proven. Considering that the domestic background is the only factor shaping the foreign policy behaviour of small states is not sufficient and explanatory. The international pressure is equally important when determining the foreign policy behaviour of a small state. It is not possible for small states to limit or ignore international norms, ideas, values, as small states are dependent on the international community if they do not want to be isolated.

Nevertheless, when studying small states' foreign policy behaviour, it would be a fault for researchers not to include domestic background as one of the factors shaping the behaviour of small states. There are many domestic factors that form behaviour-shaping of small states.

A crucial issue when studying the foreign policy behaviour of a small state is positions of governments. As we have seen, foreign policy behaviour changes upon what political forces are represented in the government, as well as what values and ideas governments represent. The author argues that this is argument applies for small states in general. It does not answer us how small states behave, but show us their behavioural changes when one of the domestic factors, government, modifies. We also have to keep in mind that the historical development of small countries leaves a trace on their foreign policy behaviour.

This study was quite challenging because it interconnected two 'universes.' On one hand, there is a theory of small state behaviour and on the other there are Slovak-Hungarian relations over the scope of the Hungarian minority. It is somewhat a strange combination to presuppose how small states behave in general. This study uncovered how small states may behave in the question of the status of minorities. The conclusions of how states behave in this paper may be too specific to the minority issue; however, they may supportive to other studies on how to approach the topic.

If we want to stick to the minority issue and its impact on the foreign policy behaviour of small states, then research of small states with minorities should be more widely studied. For example, Serbian-Hungarian relations, Serbian-Croatian relations, Macedonian-Albanian relations, might give us a broader understanding how the

domestic background shape behaviour of small European states when it comes to minority questions.

If we want a more general idea on how states behave, research should be widened to other fields: economy, political culture, defence, environment, etc. In addition relations and behaviours of other small countries should be studied in order to compare them with Slovak-Hungarian relations.

To conclude, when studying the foreign policy behaviour of small states, their domestic background is essential, yet it is not the only defining factor shaping their behaviour. Coming back to the name of this thesis, whether small states are 'well-behaved' is left to decide on the readers.

Resumé

Práca sa zaoberá veľmi špecifickým konceptom malého štátu, respektíve zahranično-politickým správaním malého štátu. Väčšinu súčasných štátov v dnešnom svete možno považovať za malé štáty. Autor sa v tejto práci pokúša presadiť názor, že ak majú malé štáty sklon budovať svoje zahranično-politické správanie voči ostatným malým štátom podľa svojho domáceho pozadia, potom, berúc do úvahy, že Slovensko a Maďarsko sú malé štáty, by sme mali vedieť vysvetliť správanie malých štátov voči iným malým štátom na príklade slovensko-maďarských vzťahov. V rámci slovensko-maďarských vzťahov sa autor upriamuje na maďarskú menšinu na Slovensku a jej dopad na vzťahy týchto dvoch štátov.

Dôvod, prečo si autor vybral túto tému, je, že výskum malých štátov v rámci štúdií medzinárodných vzťahov ako vedného odboru je v úzadí. Na tento problém upozorňuje mnoho autorov (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p. 18) (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010, p. 7) (Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006, p. 652) (Katzenstein, 2003, p. 10). Autor si vybral slovensko-maďarské vzťahy a špecificky ich spor o pozíciu maďarskej menšiny, pretože vytvára napätie medzi týmito štátmi. Autor teda predpokladá, že preskúmaním postojov týchto dvoch štátov je možné prísť k určitým záverom ako sa malé štáty správajú.

Cieľom tejto práce je preskúmať správanie malých štátov, načrtnúť čitateľovi pozíciu maďarskej menšiny a vytváranie vzťahov medzi Maďarskom a Slovenskom na základe pozície tejto menšiny, a neposlednom rade poukázať na predpoklad, že domáce prostredie je hlavným zdrojom správania malých štátov.

Prvá kapitola poskytuje čitateľovi teoretický aspekt výskumu. Kapitola začína všeobecnou definíciou štátu a tromi definíciami štátu podľa teórií medzinárodných vzťahov: realizmu, liberalizmu (respektíve neorealizmu a neoliberalizmu) a konštruktivismu. Predpokladáme, že štát operuje na určitom definovanom území, má stabilnú populáciu, ktorá je voči štátu lojálna a štát je medzinárodne uznaný. Po všeobecnom úvode sa autor sústreďuje na definíciu malého štátu. Kritizuje obmedzenosť definícií malého štátu podľa materiálnych faktorov štátu ako sú populácia, veľkosť územia, hrubý domáci produkt či moc. Tieto názory sú

prezentované realistickou a liberálnou teóriou. Konštruktivizmus hovorí, že identity, idey a normy sú sociálne vykonštruované, a teda rozšírené v rámci spoločnosti, v tomto prípade v rámci štátov. Konečnú definíciu poskytuje konštruktivistický pohľad prezentovaný J. A. Hey, ktorá tvrdí, že malé štáty sú tie štáty, ktoré sú uznané ako malé sebou samými tak, ako aj ostatnými štátmi (Hey, 2003a, p. 4). Hey tiež rozoznáva tri typy štátov: mikroštáty, malé rozvinuté štáty a malé rozvojové štáty (2003a, p. 2). Táto práca sa upriamuje na malé rozvinuté štáty v Európe, pretože štáty v Európe sú prepojené zemepisnou lokáciou, svojou blízkosťou a súčasným vývojom. Mikroštáty sú špeciálna kategória malých štátov. Rozvojové krajiny sú príliš roztrúsené a je ťažké medzi nimi nájsť spoločné znaky. Rozvinuté malé štáty mimo Európy majú odlišný kultúrny a historický vývoj, ktorý nekorešponduje s vývojom v Európe.

Ďalšia časť prvej kapitoly definuje, čo je zahraničná politika a ako sa vytvára. Odpovede nám znova poskytujú tri spomínané teórie. Neorealistickej pohľad vyzdvihuje vymedzenie zahraničnej politiky štátov na ich bezpečnosť a moc. Zahraničná politika z neoliberalného pohľadu sa upriamuje na kooperáciu, ekonomické benefity a mier. Konštruktivizmus hovorí, že zahraničné politiky sú vytvorené na základe určitých noriem a hodnôt. Konštruktivisti vyzdvihujú aj faktory ako historický vývoj či národná identita na rozdiel od neorealizmu a neoliberalizmu, ktoré takéto prvky do úvahy neberú.

Neskôr autor vysvetľuje, čo vlastne znamená zahranično-politické správanie: je to systematická cieľavedomá akcia vytvorená prostredníctvom implementácie politického rozhodnutia, ktorá chce ovplyvniť presvedčenia, postoje, akcie a pozície iných hráčov medzinárodných vzťahov, ktorí sú mimo jurisdikcie štátu pôvodu tejto akcie. Autori ako Doeser a Hey nespomínajú, aké sú znaky zahranično-politického správania malých štátov. Doeser hovorí, že správanie malých štátov je limitované medzinárodným systémom, jeho normami, domácim pozadím a postojmi (Doeser, 2011, p. 236). Hey vyjadruje tri predpoklady: správanie malých štátov je obmedzené medzinárodným systémom, stupeň rozvoja má dopad na domáce a medzinárodné faktory a úroveň rozvoja pôsobí na rolu lídrov (Hey, 2003b, pp. 193-194).

Druhá kapitola rozoberá slovensko-maďarské vzťahy v rámci postavenia maďarskej menšiny na Slovensku. Autor začína základnými informáciami o dnešnej situácii menšiny. Nasleduje krátka rekapitulácia historického vývoja maďarskej

menšiny na Slovensku. Z histórie si je dôležité pamätať význam Trianonskej mierovej zmluvy z roku 1920, okupáciu južného územia vojnového slovenského štátu horthyovským Maďarskom a Benešove dekréty, ktoré riešili vyst'ahovanie maďarského obyvateľ'stva v povojnovom Československu. Tieto historické udalosti sú dodnes súčasťou sporu medzi Maďarskom a Slovenskom.

Kapitola pokračuje opisom stavu maďarskej menšiny od vzniku Slovenskej republiky. Spomína zložité obdobia počas vlády Vladimíra Mečiara, zlepšenie stavu za vlády Mikuláša Dzurindu, na ktorej sa podieľala aj maďarská menšina. Dôraz kladie na vládu Roberta Fica medzi rokmi 2006 – 2010, počas ktorej sa vzťahy medzi Slovenskom a Maďarskom zhoršili vzhľadom na horšie postavenie maďarskej menšiny v týchto rokoch.

Autor sa venuje aj politickému vývoju v Maďarsku so zameraním na zahraničných Maďarov. Autor rozoberá prístupy jednotlivých vlád. Spomína rôzne programy a zákony, ktoré boli orientované na zlepšenie postavenia maďarských menšín ako preukaz zahraničných Maďarov či podpora vzdelávania. Autor v rámci práce najčastejšie spomína stranu Fidesz, ktorá je v otázke maďarskej menšiny najaktívnejšia.

V rámci tejto kapitoly autor rozoberá štyri domáce faktory, o ktorých predpokladá, že ovplyvnili zahranično-politické správanie oboch štátov. Tieto faktory sú: pojem národa, historické narácie, populizmus a postavenie menšiny a menšinové politiky.

Príklady zahranično-politického správania Slovenska a Maďarska vzhľadom k maďarskej menšine na Slovensku sú prezentované v dvoch prípadových štúdiách. Obe štúdie sa týkajú konkrétnych politík implementovaných Slovenskom a Maďarskom. Prvá štúdia sa týka maďarského zákona o udeľovaní občianstva zahraničným Maďarom z roku 2010, respektíve reakčného zákona zakazujúceho dvojité občianstvo na Slovensku. Autor rozoberá tieto politiky a poukazuje ako spomínané štyri faktory interferujú so zahranično-politickým správaním. Podobne autor pristupuje k druhej štúdii, ktorá sa zaoberá slovenským jazykovým zákonom z roku 2009 a maďarskou reakciou naňho. Autor v oboch štúdiách okrem konkrétnych politík uvádza vyjadrenia rôznych politikov a politických inštitúcií. Implementácia týchto politík, tak ako aj

vyjadrenia, spĺňajú predpoklad, že sú príkladmi zahranično-politického správania spomínaných štátov, ktoré v závere hodnotí.

Posledná kapitola spája teoretický a praktický aspekt tejto práce. V prvej časti tretej kapitoly autor rozoberá, prečo konštruktivizmus slúžil ako pomocná teória. Autor zdôrazňuje schopnosť konštruktivizmu skúmať aj domáce faktory, na rozdiel od neorealizmu a neoliberalizmu, ktoré sa upriamujú hlavne na moc.

V ďalšej časti autor venuje pozornosť zahraničnej politike. Hodnotí, že je ťažko povedať, či existuje niečo ako „zahraničná politika malého štátu“, pretože ciele zahraničných politík malých ako aj veľkých štátov môžu byť tie isté. Taktiež vyjasňuje, na základe čoho sú konštruované zahraničné politiky Maďarska a Slovenska. V prípade Maďarska sa jedna časť jeho zahraničnej politiky upriamuje na ochranu maďarských menšín, čo potvrdzuje aj nová maďarská ústava. Slovenská zahraničná politika nevymedzuje problém maďarskej menšiny pretože táto je súčasťou domácej politiky, ale vymedzuje ho skôr na obranu slovenskej suverenity.

V najdôležitejšej časti kapitoly autor zhodnocuje, či je hypotéza tejto práce potvrdená, teda či môžeme vysvetliť zahranično-politické správanie malých štátov na pozadí slovensko-maďarských vzťahov. Autor prichádza s tromi vzorcami správania odpozorovanými z druhej kapitoly. Prvý vzorec správania sa drží oficiálnej zahraničnej politiky. Ako príklad je uvedené Maďarsko, ktoré sa správa podľa morálnej povinnosti ochrany zahraničných Maďarov. Druhý vzorec správania môže byť pozorovaný na základe domácich politík. Tento vzorec správania môžeme pozorovať v oboch prípadových štúdiách – slovenský jazykový zákon sa stal zahranično-politickým správaním vo chvíli, keď Maďarsko naň reagovalo. Implementácia maďarského zákona o občianstve je tiež zahranično-politickým správaním kvôli jeho cieľavedomej vlastnosti ovplyvňovania štátov mimo Maďarskej jurisdikcie. Takisto slovenský zákon obmedzujúci dvojité občianstvo má charakteristiku zahranično-politického správania, ako je reakcia na maďarské kroky. Autor tiež poznamenáva, že je možné, že sa zahranično-politické správanie mení vzhľadom na politické zmeny vo vláde. Tretí vzorec správania súvisí s oficiálnymi vyjadreniami predstaviteľov týchto dvoch štátov. Vyjadrenia slúžili ako reakcia, ale aj ako ovplyvnenie druhého štátu či iných zainteresovaných subjektov.

Autor ďalej poznamenáva, že minoritná otázka v rámci slovensko-maďarských vzťahov, teda kreácia správania týchto štátov vzhľadom k tomuto problému, je ťažko prenesiteľná do všeobecného modelu správania malých štátov. Prinajlepšom môžeme usudzovať, ako sa správajú malé štáty pri podobnej situácii a vzťahoch.

Táto práca nebrala do úvahy medzinárodný tlak na zahranično-politické správanie. Avšak v druhej kapitole boli takéto náznaky spomenuté: napríklad v prípade slovenského jazykového zákona brali štáty do úvahy záver komisára OBSE.

Autor predpokladal, že správanie Slovenska a Maďarska nám môže objasniť, ako sa malé štáty správajú všeobecne. Dochádza k záveru, že z týchto poznatkov nemôžeme usúdiť, ako sa štáty správajú v iných situáciách. Podobné správanie môžeme predpokladať len v prípade, ak sa jedná o postavenie minorít vo vzťahoch dvoch štátov. Domáce prostredie je určite dôležité pri skúmaní správania malých štátov, ale pri podobných štúdiách by sa mali brať do úvahy aj názory medzinárodných sub-jektov.

Hypotézu nie je možné potvrdiť z troch dôvodov. Prvý dôvod je, že domáce pozadie nie je jediným určujúcim faktorom pri tvorení zahranično-politického správania. Po druhé, škála tejto štúdie – slovensko-maďarské vzťahy na pozadí otázky maďarskej minority – je pri štúdií správania malých štátov obmedzujúca. A na koniec, ak chceme vyvodiť všeobecné závery o správaní malých štátov, štúdia by mala byť rozšírená o ďalšie predmety a problémy slovensko-maďarských vzťahov.

Autor v závere poznamenáva, že ak chceme zistiť viac, aký účinok majú menšinové otázky na zahranično-politické správanie malých štátov, tak by sa budúce štúdie mali zameriavať aj na srbsko-maďarské, srbsko-chorvátske či macedónsko-albánske vzťahy. Pre vytvorenie všeobecnejšej teórie správania malých štátov by sa mali štúdie upriamovať tiež na ďalšie odvetvia, ako sú ekonomické záujmy, politická kultúra, obrana, ochrana prírody atď.

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
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Appendix:

Figure 1: Dispersion of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

Red: population above 50 percent. Yellow: population between 10 and 50 percent. Blue: population between 0 to 10 percent



Source: www.madari.sk, retrieved on April 1, 2015