BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

The Rise of Populist Actors in Slovakia

BACHELOR THESIS

Kristína Šidová   **February 2021**

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Declaration of Originality

I declare on my honour that I wrote the whole bachelor's thesis myself, and that the thesis was not published in whole or in part elsewhere. I also honestly declare that all sources used in this work are listed in the bibliography.

In Bratislava, February 15, 2021   **Kristína Šidová**

Abstract

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Author: Kristína Šidová
School: Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts
Thesis Advisor: Mgr. Dagmar Kusá, PhD.
Thesis Defence Committee: Prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc., doc. Samuel Abrahám, PhD., prof. PhDr. Iveta Radičová, PhD., Mgr. Dagmar Kusá, PhD., prof. Silvia Miháliková
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This thesis analyzes the sudden rise of populist political parties in Slovakia in recent years. In particular, it studies the success of populist actors in the 2020 elections in the Slovak Republic. The work describes the political culture and its importance for the development of democratic regimes. Subsequently, it deals with the link between the civic culture and democratic political system. This thesis finds that the core elements of stable democracy such as trust, education, social capital, and economic stability are in deficit. The second part portrays the main problems of the Slovak democracy such as corruption, mistrust toward democratic institutions, and a polarized society. The thesis explores the consequences of the globalization crisis, change in the nature of the political parties, and a partial shift towards post materialism on the existing trends.

The results of this thesis argue that the success of populist tactic in the 2020 elections was mainly caused by ongoing mistrust toward traditional democratic institutions and societal clash, deepened by the acute political crisis resulting from the murder of an investigative journalist. The case study focuses on the OĽaNO movement and its leader Igor Matovič and analyzes its marketing strategy and rhetoric.

Abstrakt

Kľúčové slová: OĽaNO, slovenské voľby v roku 2020, populizmus, elitárstvo v moderných demokraciách, konfliktná spoločnosť,OĽaNO marketingová kampaň

Táto práca analyzuje náhly nárast populistických politických strán v Európe. Konkrétne sa venuje postupnému rastu populistických aktérov v Slovenskej republike. Najprv, práca popisuje politickú kultúru a jej význam pre vývoj demokratických režimov. Následne sa zaoberá vzťahom medzi občianskou kultúrou a demokratickým politickým systémom. Táto práca skúma recept na stabilnú demokraciu, ktorou je dôvera, vzdelanie, určitý ekonomický rozvoj a sociálny kapitál. Druhá časť vykresľuje hlavné problémy moderných demokracií ako korupcia, nedôvera voči demokratickým inštitúciám a nárast sociálnych konfliktov. Skúma prechod od materialistickej kultúry k post materialistickej kultúre ako jednu z príčin náhleho nárastu populizmu

Výsledky tejto práce tvrdia, že nárast populizmu bol spôsobený hlavne pretrvávajúcou nedôverou k tradičným demokratickým inštitúciám a spoločenským stretom. Ako prípadovú štúdiu skúmam hnutie OĽaNO,a analyzujem jeho marketingovú stratégiu a rétoriku..

Kľúčové slová: OĽaNO,, slovenské voľby v roku 2020, populizmus, elitárstvo v moderných demokraciách, konfliktná spoločnosť, OĽaNO,marketingová kampaň

Acknowledgment

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Introduction

The rise of populism is a relatively new phenomenon which directly threatens the democratic principles. Despite of it, democracies are the main source of the new rise of populist political subjects (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, 2018). The aim of this bachelor thesis is to find out the main causes of such a populist popularity among people in Slovakia. This thesis examines whether society in crisis is a sufficient condition for the rise of the populism, or whether there are also other causes.

Populism is defined as a style of communication reflecting the importance of the person who should rule, arguing that the power is in the hands of people. The populist politicians usually have authoritarian tendencies and anti democratic tactic to misuse the dissatisfaction of citizens to their profit (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, 2018). This study studies the impact of political culture, education, and trust in democratic institutions on the success of populists. The case study here is the movement the Common People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO movement), which managed to jump from a small opposition party to a successful anti-cartel party that won the election in the end. Such a small party's success with a strong anti-corruption strategy was preceded by a great social crisis in the form of the loss of trust in the Slovak government (Kvetko, 2021). The people felt that the government had become elitist, meaning that politicians were more interested in fulfilling their own needs than the needs of the citizens (Barborík, 2020). The core of this thesis will be the lost of pillars of democratic stability such as trust, rise of corruption, social coherence, and polarization in society which causes rise of populist actor in Slovakia.

The bachelor thesis analyzes the sudden success of political populist in Slovakia. The populist actors who have anti democratic tendencies use their populist rhetoric in order to win the election and attract dissatisfied voters. The 2020 Slovak parliamentary election reflects this new trend very precisely. Was it just a coincidence that the OĽaNO movement won the 2020 election? The main research question of this thesis asks what the recipe for success of populist political actors is. It also seeks to answer other related questions, such as; what was the marketing strategy of OĽaNO movement? Does history of the Slovak political culture affect the preferences of voters toward more traditional politicians? Moreover, did the dysfunctional Slovak

institutions, especially due to a high level of corruption, helped OĽaNo to become a winner of 2020 election?

The hypothesis then stands that the sudden rise of populism is caused mainly by the crisis in democratic state caused by big mistrust toward the democratic institutions and its politicians. This hypothesis can prevent the future threat of populism posed on stability of modern democracies.

This bachelor thesis consists of a theoretical and practical part. In the theoretical part, the secondary literature will be used to build up the theory. In order to analyze the general rise of populism, it is required to know the history of political culture, the main pillars of the democratic state and its core values. In addition, the work analyzes the current changes in the society, not from the economical perspective but from the sociological development of civic culture, trust, and shift of values within the European democracy. The theoretical part concludes that democracies are in constant change due to societal shift toward post materialistic culture.

The practical part uses statistics, YouTube videos, and secondary literature. Moreover, in this part, the source of information will be also an interview with Martin Kvetko a marketer for political campaigns. This part analyzes the development of Slovak civic culture and answers the tendencies of Slovak to vote for certain types of politicians. Statistics will serve as a tool for measuring the relationship between Slovaks and the Slovak government. It also shows the current trends in politics. The interview with Martin Kvetko offers interesting insight into the campaign strategy of OĽaNO party. This interview explains what Igor Matovič and his OĽaNO movement did differently and why they actually won the 2020 election.

"Let's move millionaires out of the politics" was the motto of loud but small oppositional party OĽaNO, by the full name Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Minarechová, 2020). There are many reasons why this populist political party won the Slovak elections 2020; nevertheless, I will focus on the major causes of the OĽaNO's success in winning of Slovak parliament election.

Nevertheless, firstly, I have to explain the phenomenon such as development political culture, and its connection with the rise of populism. Certain traits of political culture support rise of populism while some traditions do not favour rise of populism. Therefore is important to define what kind of political culture and historical development supports populism. This part uses primarily the secondary literature: namely, the theories of authors Almond & Verba provide us with the

conceptualization of political culture. They ask questions such as, which processes and social structures can sustain or even improve the democracy (Almond & Verba, 1989). In order to analyze the development of civic culture: and how such a culture can develop (Almond & Verba, 1989). According to Almond & Verba, the civic culture is not a modern culture, but a mixture of modernity with tradition (Almond & Verba, 1989). This theory is crucial for explanation of the importance of political culture as well as types of political culture for political behavior. The theoretical part describes the political culture and its connection with the development of civic culture. This part analyzes the effect of civic culture on development of certain types of political culture and democracy.

Subsequently, Robert Putnam's theory in his writing "Explaining Institutional Performance" studies effectiveness of institutions in various Italian districts. He found out that district with longer tradition of civic culture has better horizontal relationships (Putnam R. D., 1993). The effect of horizontal networks of relationships improves indirectly the efficiency of the state performance. Directly, it highly increases the level of trust toward governance. These psychological factors cause higher satisfaction of citizens, better quality of life and coherence in times of crisis.

The second part deals with the major problems of modern democracies such as corruption and elitism, and the changing nature of political parties. This passage describes the new types of political parties, in particular cartel party and its consequence, the anti-cartel party. This part shows the link between the rise of corruption, distrust in governmental institutions and the rule of cartel parties. The main source of this passage is Katz & Mair's model, who characterizes the cartel party "as a subject with inclination toward clientelism" (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 16). According to the authors, the mass party gradually evolved and created another type, a so called cartel party, this type of party has however, closer relationship with the political subject or powerful organizations than with its own voters (Katz & Mair, 1995). This theory is a key part to define the direct relationship between elitism and the rise of the cartel party, which directly leads to higher corruption in government and increases the distrust toward traditional politicians. This creates logical reaction to that situation—the rise and success of anti carel party like OĽaNO

The third chapter discusses the importance of democratic institutions. To sum up, the democratic institutions are the tools of the state to fulfil the needs and interests of its citizens. The author Robert Putnam analyzes the performance of institutions and

its effect on the society. Moreover, his study proves that the same institutional mechanisms works differently in various Italian district based on their civic culture, cultural tradition, and history. In particular, Citizens can build up or gradually loss the trust toward government through level of functioning of institutional performances. In addition, this study analyzes what is the recipe for stable democracy. In simple words, the effective functioning of institutions means quick responses towards the demands of citizens, good transparency of finances and support of democratic values (Putnam R. D., 1993). The two main factors which most fully explain the effective functioning of democratic institutions are socioeconomic modernity and civic culture based on solidarity with patterns of high civic participation. Here Putnam explains two crucial factors for modern democratic state which are interpersonal trust and horizontal reciprocity. This provides good ground for proving whether the Slovak citizens are satisfied with the performance of Slovak institutions and their transparency or not.

Afterwards, this third chapter also deals with a crisis, that contributed to the social clash in Slovakia. The book "*Cultural Backlash*" written by authors R. Inglehart and P. Norris serves as a theory for the study of the clash of values in European societies. The authors argue that it was the backlash between the traditional and post–traditional values that caused the outbreak of populism in modern democracies (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, 2018, p. 398). The people with traditional values felt lost in a changing world which, moreover, gradually changed to the world which preferred post materialistic values and gradually shifted toward liberal culture which promotes feminism, environmentalism, or same sex marriage. This change also caused that a certain part of the population suddenly felt omitted. Those people did not feel that they had someone to represent their interests. This source unifies the theory of the causes of the rise of populism. In the end, the book of S. C. Roop about populism, I used it to define the term of populism, populist actor and their rhetoric tha winner will take everything.

The fourth chapter is the practical part of this bachelor thesis. The main sources of this part are statistics, analysis of YouTube videos released during electoral campaigh, and an interview with the political marketing strategist Martin Kvetko. The first part of this chapter describes the characteristics of the OĽaNO party and its leader Igor Matovič. This part answers the question whether Igor Matovič is a populist politician. The interview with Martin Kvetko indicates that the role of the

media in the 2020 election was vivid more than ever in the modern history of the Slovak Republic. Many politicians used Facebook, YouTube videos as the expansion of the more traditional campaigns in newspapers, on billboards, and in the television (Minarechová, 2020). Martin Kvetko claims that it was only Igor Matovič who understood the message of the 2020 election. He explains which strategies Igor Matovič chose differently from his fellow oppositional rivals (Kvetko, 2021). Additionally, Martin Kvetko offers the main themes which the OĽaNO party used in their advantage, in particular they used corruption and distrust toward the cartel parties such as SMER – SD as their main weapons. Also, the OĽaNO video from Cannes, especially the rhetoric of Igor Matovič is analyzed. Martin Kvetko thinks that also the fight between liberalism and traditional values plays a crucial role in the 2020 election. The next source is the article from R. Minarechová who discusses the reasons why Igor Matovič, who was not a predicted winning candidate, not only got into parliament, but became the leader of the election. Igor Matovič and his political party OĽaNO defeated the leading political party Smer – SD (Minarechová, 2020). This part studies the character of theOĽaNOparty, rhetoric, structure and marketing

Chapter 1: Political Culture

The performance of the state functioning can be predicted through the history of political culture (Putnam R. D., 1993). Political culture also determines the preferences of citizens. Many scholars agreed that political culture shapes civic attitudes and opinions (Oxendine, et al., 2006, p. 32). Additionally, the model of political culture requires knowledge of historical background as well as the role of education and societal relationships (Almond & Verba, 1989). Political culture is thus the first element in understanding the complex system of political processes and the rise of populism.

So, what does the political culture mean? The term political culture can refer to various political processes. Even though, the authors Almond and Verba, and Rose, refers to the term political culture as to the overall attitudes" of individuals to political system and their internal feelings and evaluation toward the government (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 13). This is the general definition of political culture which includes also interests of citizens and their expectation from the government. Other authors of political culture suggests that attitudes of people which direct political behaviour in the society are "not just random congeries" but represents specific patterns "which fit together" (Pye & Verba, 1969). People who study political culture study people's orientations to politics. Essentially, the model of political culture is psychological because it refers to what people think about politics, not to the actual political actions (Hague, Harrop, & Breslin, 1992). Despite the fact that political orientations are very diverse, there is still that political culture of specific patterns such as preferences or expectations, which fit together and offers meaning and most importantly predictability to the political processes.

There are three main types of political culture which help to determine whether society prefers democratic regime or authoritarian regime. The first type of political culture mentioned by Almond and Verba is the parochial political culture. A parochial political culture represents citizens of a particular nation who have no understanding of the political system (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 17). This parochial political culture is the traditional pre-modern culture, their "political system" have most "diffused political-economical –religious roles". The second type is a subjective political culture in which are people aware of a specialized governmental authority, but are not allowed or willing to participate in the political system. This type of

political culture represents all authoritarian political systems. It is "passive relationship," because citizen does not participate in politics (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 17). In the subject political culture, citizens "see themselves as subjects of a government" not as participants in the political process "as with people living under a dictatorship" (Hague, Harrop, & Breslin, 1992, p. 136). The third type is participant political culture where the citizens are involved in the decision-making process and in some extant has a say in public policy decisions (inputs and outputs) (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 18). This is an "active relationship" between the state and its citizens, good examples of participant political culture are Great Britain and USA. The society with historically subject political culture has a tendency toward authoritarian types of government. Therefore, it is important to know the political culture of a given country and explain the evolution through mixtures of political culture that is important

1.1 The Relationship between the Civic Culture and Political Culture

The civic culture plays crucial role in predetermination of the type of political culture. Democratic political culture is the civic culture, which means a combination of all three ideal types. So what is the difference between the political and civic culture? Civic culture means a mixed set of values that contains attributes from both modern and traditional cultures and allows them to interact and change without destroying each other (Almond & Verba, 1989). This culture refers to a wider spectrum of attitudes and habits of people. On the contrary, political cultures refer specifically to the people's attributes toward politics. Nevertheless, the civic culture determines the implication of new reforms, degree of corruption or preference toward authoritarian leaders (Putnam R. D., 1993). A certain type of civic culture develops democratic structures in society (Dalton & Welzel, January 2015). Authors claim that the society must undergo a certain cultural and economic development in order to enter into a stable rule of democracy. This process emerged "third culture neither traditional nor modern but partaking both" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 6). This transition is described by the British example where the civic culture was born. It is "the pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderate it" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 6). This culture refers to a wider spectrum of attitudes and habits of

people. This means that society has to undergo specific development in order to achieve a higher proportion of a participant civic culture which directly supports liberal democracy.

1.2 Education, Social Capital and Trust

According to the authors, one of the most important sources for the development of a participant political culture is education and social capital. Education is one of the most important factors of various forms of civic engagement (Helliwell & Putnam, 2007). Education is essential for our life in shaping our political views and attitudes. However, education plays so complex role in people's lives that I will focus only on the role of education and its contribution towards the political culture. How does the education improve the civic engagement of citizens such as voting, or trusting each other? Education has two main tasks: to teach children moral virtues and to teach them practical facts and information which ensure their development (Lipset, 1959). Both parts are crucial for democratic education. Martin Lipset gives priority to the role of education because it promotes economic growth and political development in general, and democracy in particular. He argues that "Education presumably broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrine and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices." (Lipset, 1959, p. 79). Education is a tool for people's development which main goal is to broaden their perspectives and increases their tolerance and competency to make rational decisions. This claim also shows the direct correlation between education and democracy.

Education is a necessity for development of democracy. The foundation of a successful democratic society is the ability of the people to come to an agreement. Even though it sounds very simple, it is not so easy to achieve in reality. To achieve a consensus requires skill of argumentation and sense for cooperation (Tomasello, 2009). Moreover, this consensus must be achieved according to democratic principles. Additionally, if the country is going through the process of democratization, it requires the diffusion of positive orientations toward a democratic infrastructure, the acceptance of norms of civic obligation, respect and "sense of civic competence among a substantial proportion of the population" (Almond & Verba, 1989)(Rose,

Theories of democratic transitions: "The Civic Culture", 2018). The democracy cannot be reached without proper education which should teach every generation about the democratic values, ideals and importance of cooperation and agreement.

The last but not least, we should not overlook the role of social capital because it is key cause of raise in social trust and horizontal reciprocity. Social capital refers to social networks, norms, and social trust that promote cooperation for mutual benefits (Putnam, 1993). Here Putnam explains two crucial factors for modern democratic state which are trust and horizontal reciprocity. According to social theorist Alexis de Tocqueville, social networks and communities contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government, it is argued, both because of their "internal" effects on individual members and because of their "external" effects to be active in public affairs (Putnam, 1993). The social capital is least political because it is not directly linked to the government. Despite of it, the building of social capital improves relationships, efficiency, institutional performance, and trust.

Social capital developed long time and foregoes rapid social changes which dissolves social coherence and political stability that can be dangerous for stable democracy. The rapid social changes are very dangerous for stability of the country's regime. Trust can be spread only through the relationship and other social networks which create a web of trust which can be transferred even indirectly "I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you" (Putnam R. D., 1993, p. 169). This social capital also allows citizens to trust political institutions because the institutions should represent them and their interests. However, this horizontal relationship is not blind and requires predictability, stability, trust and the competent people (Coleman, 1988). Personal trust can evolve into social trust, such as trust in institutions. Social trust is more a generalized form of reciprocity and does not require the personal relationship between the citizens. Social trust creates reciprocity which serves as the problem–solving tool. Reciprocity and mutual aid help to keep solidarity, trust and stability of society.

Trust is key ingredient for functioning democracy, but it is the trust which holds society together especially in times of crisis and prevents destabilization of main values of society (Putnam R. D., 1993). The main focus of this part is to present the significance of trust and to show the connections between trust in government and its policies of institutions. Trust in government can be defined and measured. It influences citizens' attitudes and preferences towards government. The general

definition of trust means "trust is about trusting someone even when we don't see them directly — it's about predictability that we can count on us to do what they have even when we're not looking at them" (Easton, 1965). Trust in the government is based on two main elements: the first is social trust, that refers to citizens' confidence to community and second is political trust, when citizens have confidence in government and its institutions (OECD, 2013).

Why should we care about trust in a democratic society? Trust maintains the stability and coherence of the political system. Additionally, it increases efficiency of government operations such as implementations of new reforms (OECD, 2013). Citizens' trust towards government is molded variously, according to their positive or negative experience with government functioning. A negative experience has a much stronger impact on trust in government than a positive one (Kampen, De Walle, & Bouckaert, 2006). Growing mistrust which is unresolved for a longer time can lead to the rise of distrust and rise of populist alternatives (Ropp, 2014). Therefore is crucial to target public policies towards dissatisfaction of citizens because it will have stronger impact on trust towards government.

1.3 Political Parties

Changing form of political regimes threatens the trust in government. The concept of political parties evolves along with societal changes which are slow. Various parties promote different ideals, plans, reforms. Also, they differ in the organization, size, and internal structures. Not all parties are the traditional mass parties anymore; the modern traditional parties have a close relationship with civic culture and democratic ideals such as social structures (Bolleyer, 2009). Examples of mass parties are numerous, such as socialist parties, nationalistic parties, or parties based on religious values (Katz & Mair, 1995). The type of political party which concerns us, for the study of populism, is a cartel party. The cartel party emerged as a new type of political party in recent years. In particular, cartel party evolved from the "tendency of the political parties to get closer ties with the state" (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 6). The essence of a cartel political party is the exploitation of the state, which is "their institutionalized structure of support and keeping the outsiders out" (Katz & Mair, 1995).

The risk associated with the dependency on the state is the very strategy of cartel party. The cartel party is gradually becoming dependent on continuous access to resources that in principle lie outside its own control. Concretely, the risk is that the party will be excluded from government which result in exclusion from access to resources (Bolleyer, 2009). Even though the state allows this party to ensure their own survival, this is very risky for cartel party. As a result of vulnerability, the cartel party evolved into a new stage of cooperation. In order to minimize this risk, they change the rules of competition between the political parties. Of course, the parties still compete, however, they share with their competitors a new organization goal of survival and, in some cases, even the limited interest to defeat other political parties has actually been replaced by a controversial interest to be defeated (Blyth & Katz, 2010).

In the end, this creates elite politics which is closer to other organizational political subjects than toward its own voter base. This cartel or elite politics are among the main causes of distrust of citizens towards government because of corruption scandals and other misuse of state power. "Elite politics encourages participation of people in powerful organizations, parties and movements who are inclined towards authoritarianism (either through personal characteristics or through connections) in order to influence the political outcomes" (Kubbe, 2017, p. 256). Usually, the elites are seen as a major cause of corruption and abuse of power in the country.

Chapter 2: Role of Clientelism, Corruption and Education

The role of corruption is very complicated in the stable democratic society. Some countries, especially with subject political culture, accept the political corruption. So the issue of corruption and clientelism is not improved by higher education because it is a cultural problem. This cultural tradition will lead to the rise of corruption and crisis in society caused by deepening mistrust toward government. Education serves various goals, and not always strives for expansion of solidarity and democratic values but usually for securing a stable job with good income in the future.

Some authors argue that education also serves as a tool for elitism, especially these days. They argue that education does not prevent spread of corruption and clientelism, especially in countries with short democratic history, unstable economy and less civic society (Putnam R. D., 1993, p. 104). On the contrary, it is the

education in less civic societies that provides the basis for this elitism. The elite is drawn from a narrower slice of the society and level of education is a ticket of entrance, leading to the inflation of higher education.

Nevertheless, let us be clear, clientelism appears in every society into some extent. The author Van De Walle claims that "clientelism exists in all polities; the form it takes, its extent, and its political functions vary enormously, however, across time and place" (Van De Walle, 2007, p. 50).

When is clientelism a real threat for society? The clientelism is a political problem because the client has to vote or support the chosen patron in election. The definition of political clientelism is the giving of material resources in exchange for political support of the patron. The relationship is best understood as a deal between the patron and client with some norms of reciprocity that sustains it (Stokes, 2011). The political clientelism is the indirect vote buying and patronage (Putnam R. D., 1993). Robert Putnam's study proved that regions where citizens use personal preference votes, and do not participate in referenda, do not join civic communities, and do not read newspapers are the regions whose political leaders describe their regional politics as clientelistic, rather than programmatic commitments on public issues (Putnam R. D., 1993). In the Southern Italy, citizens often report relationship that is more personal with their representatives; they often call them to seek personal help about licenses, jobs and so on. In the Northern Italy, citizens often call in order to inform themselves about the next policies, and much less about job positions or matters of personal interest.

The clientelism is not good sign for functioning democracy because it is linked with the rise of inequality and corruption. "If most scholars of the topic are right, political clientelism slows economic development, vitiates democracy, and allows dictators to hold onto power longer than they otherwise would" (Stokes, 2011, p. 2). Firstly, it is caused by personal favoritism, campaigns which do not serve for the good of people but for a good of some people. This undermines democracy because it dismisses the objectivity of voting, creates inequality and supports authoritarian regime alive because people cannot afford to disobey the patron's request. The core of clientelism is simple: If you will support me, I will ensure you something what you need in exchange.

Secondly, it supports unfair practices such as corruption which is usually main cause of distrust of citizens towards the democratic government. Authors define

corruption "as the breaking of a rule by a bureaucrat (or an elected official) for private gain. This definition includes the most obvious type of corruption—a bureaucrat taking an overt monetary bribe to bend a rule, thereby providing a service to someone that he was not supposed to" (Banerjee, Mullainathan, & Hanna, 2012). Additionally, corruption includes more forms such as nepotism, meaning when you favor one company owned by your friend rather than a company that should win the tender. Not only is corruption a problem for countries that are poor or less developed, but also it is a problem of many democracies as well (Stokes, 2011).

Why is corruption such a threat for democracy? Firstly, this indicates that politicians are unreliable people who are not interested in solving the problems of their citizens. Politicians are elected to their functions in order to, solve problems, manage and represent the interests of their citizens. The voters perceive a politician whom they elected into the office as a credible and trustworthy person (Putnam R. D., 1993). If this politician, after being elected to office, uses corrupt practices, he or she becomes unreliable and for some people it is a sign of deception and great disappointment. The author Christine Lagarde writes "I am convinced that corruption both feeds and is fed by the broader crisis of trust, which sustains a vicious cycle that undermines trust in institutions, economic health and social cohesion" (Lagarde, 2018). In the worst cases, the traditional politician" who represents democratic values commits over and over corruption (Ropp, 2014).

Secondly, it creates deepening inequality among the civilians who are left out of the system. One of the central theoretical arguments in the literature is that corruption is a function of motivations (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999; Klitgaard 1988). The rich represents a class or interest groups who can "employ legal lobbying and political contributions or bribery to influence law-making processes" (You & Khagram, 2005, p. 8). The rich, as elitist groups, firms, or individuals may use bribery or connections to influence "law-implementing processes in form of bureaucratic corruption and to buy favorable interpretations of the law and commit judicial corruption" (You & Khagram, 2005, p.10). If this condition last for a period of time such as few years and elitism is a long issue, it will create slow but deepening inequalities among citizens. Citizens will look for a new alternatives, which will not be the old traditional democratic politician but something new, radical or populist with authoritarian tendencies (Ropp, 2014).

Chapter 2.1 Role of Institutions

In order to analyze the success of populism is important to examine the role of institutions. The functioning institution serves for people, however when they serves elitist politician their perception directly affect the image of state and its meaning. The institutions are main pillars of functioning democracy. The role of democratic institutions in the democratic country is to promote the benefits of liberal democracy and improves human rights and economic status of civilians among others. The author R. Putnam offers the argument from the position of "the new institutionalism" which "argues that politics is structured by institutions" (Putnam R. D., 1993, p. 17). The institutionalism offers the summarization about impact of institution by James March and Johan Olsen:

> Actions taken within and by political institutions change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new actors and identities, by providing actors with criteria of success and failure, by constructing rules for appropriate behaviour, and by endowing some individuals, rather than others, with authority and other types of resources. Institutions affect the ways in which individuals and groups become activated within and outside established institutions, the level of trust among citizens and leaders, the common aspirations of political community, the shared language, understanding, and norms of the community, and the meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, liberty, and equality. (Putnam R. D., 1993, p. 17)

According to institutionalism, this is the effect of the institutions on our society. If this argument is true, it is really very good news for the policy reformers. Nevertheless, is it really as good as the institutionalism has us believe? Robert Putnam described his 20 years of research, which maps the impact of the political reform in Italy, which began in 1970. This research, among other studies can prove or refute this institutionalism idea about the effect of institutions on the stability and effectiveness of democratic governance. Will institutions behave in the same manner due to its systematic change which institutions should cause or they will behave differently based on political culture and traditions?

Many researchers proved that institutions do not behave in the same way in every democratic society as it was presented by institutionalism. Institutions are defined as "sets of formal and informal rules governing the actions of individuals and organizations and the interactions of participants in the development process" (World Bank, 1999/2000, p. 22). The most important institutions in a society are, of course, the government, judiciary, and parliament. Mistrust in these particular institutions

directly damage the ability of the state to represents the interests of the state. We analyze the democratic institution in order to find out how they impact the success of populism. What are the causes that create the differences among the same systematic institutional processes? According to the authors, there are various factors: first factor is the development of civic culture, second factor is the history of the country, and third factor is the democratic education and respect towards democratic values (Almond & Verba, 1989) (Hague, Harrop, & Breslin, 1992) (Helliwell & Putnam, 2007) (Ronald Inglehart, 2005). This is the recipe for effective and stable institutions which produce economic growth and trust toward the democratic regime. Institutions without these ingredients are less sufficient and effective than institutions in countries with long democratic history, developed civic culture and quality educational system.´

Institutions are tool of the state apparatus which can have both positive and negative impact on society. The authors claim that institutions cannot be effective until society is ready for that change. It is very crucial to understand how the norms, traditions and values affect the functioning of the institution.

The same formal rules implied by institutions have quite high different outcomes in various societies. The study of Robert Putnam shows that in regions, in particular the north, the institutions performed more effectively with more effective reforms. The North regions of Italy had developed culture of high trust, participant political culture with horizontal connections (Pollock, 2019). On the contrary, the regions, in particular the Southern Italy's region, the reforms which were established by institutions had a little effect. These regions had less developed civic culture with low trust, the common unfair practice like clienteles, corruption, and vertical relationships (Putnam R. D., 1993). This means that cultural values and traditions determine the diversity of performance of institutions. This shows the importance and changeability of the cultural norms, which affect the performance of institutions.

Chapter 3: Changing Society

Democracy is not the machine which directs itself, but it is influenced by people and can be changed. Societies, as well as civic culture are living organism which goes through various changes and processes. The democracy responds to various problems, obstacles and tries to adapt to them. The author Ronald Inglehart argues that the society is changing. Mainly by people's values and beliefs which are

cause of this change (Ronald Inglehart, 2005). He writes "the democracy is dependent on the people with orientations towards liberties and responsive government" (Ronald Inglehart, 2005, p. 2). When people's orientations and values change, the society changes itself as well. Additionally, the socioeconomic development can usually predict new changes in people's values. There are two predicted options; first is that society change from materialistic to post materialistic culture and the second is that society will face sudden rise of populist actors.

The authors of 20th century predicted a shift of society toward post materialistic culture. This transformation is directly linked with economic development which caused the rise of liberal ideas. The long surveys from 1970 to 2008, indicates that post-war generation indeed create intergenerational shift from materialist to post-materialist values, as younger generation progressively substituted older generation (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 13). Additionally, this study shows the pattern of predictability which reveals the direct link between the society and its economical development: In years of economical insecurity, unstable job positions the society tend to shift from post materialistic values to a materialistic values. Societies with economic prosperity and low inequality return toward post materialist ideas with emphasis on self expression values (Ronald Inglehart, 2005). For example, in most economically developed countries, there is a rise of progressive values such as environmental protection, racial and gender equality and same sex marriage.

Nevertheless, as these progressive values became most visible in the society they brought new political polarization. The World Values Survey shows that Western societies have been shifting more toward Post-materialist values, particularly the younger generation and people with higher education (survey, dátum neznámy). Other crucial factor, which was already mentioned, is the importance of trust in democratic institutions, particularly government. However, developed democratic countries faced significant decline in trusting of institutions in western democracies (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, 2018). The change from materialistic to post materialistic culture was visible in data, mainly in states with developed economic. Despite of it, this new social change caused greater political polarizations, especially on issues such as identity and economic security. The traditional society found itself in clash with new progressive ideas and this revolution did not lead to rise of post modernism but to predicted rise of populism.

3.1 People who are left out

This societal backlash creates new rise of racism, xenophobia and rejection of liberal values, especially with the older generation and less educated classes. This backlash diffused among the post industrial societies and actually rejects many liberal values (Inglehart R. , Cultural shift in advanced indestrial society, 1990). Nowadays, the liberalism is presented by various traditional politics as something very dangerous and morally wrong. According to substantial evidence, the generation which is growing up in secure and economically stable society prefers tolerant society, with high level of trust and secularization. The classes of white men went through radical changes because their role was gradually changed by progressive feminism. For older generation, the many liberal values such as same sex marriage and other liberal values are unprecedented, because the majority of them have traditional belief system.

Who are the ones who feel mostly left out? From this new change, the most omitted are men, less educated people and older people. These changing cultures which shifted the social status of those groups in the society generate anger, insecurity, and loss of importance in the society. The authors of sociology argue that "the more rapid the pace of value change challenging the predominant groups, the more rapid rise of Populism culture" (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 19). It means that this phenomenon is additionally linked with social psychological position referring to "silent revolution" against the changing processes of value shift which modified the Western culture in the twentieth century (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, 2018). This phenomenon is proved by the well-established pattern where are men repeatedly found to give greater support politics with traditional values (Givens, 2004).

Populists who prosper from mistrust toward liberal democracy and hostility to progressivism uses the feelings like fear, anger, revenge and insecurity of those who are left out. This created new intolerant attitudes, in particular, against Muslim immigrants who were presented as a security threat for European beliefs, values and traditions (Crisp, 2003). The great example is the Brexit referendum, which brought the evidence about the very paradoxical reason for leaving the EU membership. Even though, people who were aware of the economical benefits of staying in EU they voted for Brexit because they were deeply concerned about the cultural threat posses by immigrants (Curtice, 2015). This view was strongly supported by the various

media, which described migrants as a major threat to the country's future. The populist's rhetoric plays the key role in promotion of their "right ideas" and world views which is able to change the mistrust to established system to trust toward new leader who will change the wrongdoing of the previous regime.

The evidence shows that people, who are left out, of this cultural backlash, are mainly concerning less educated people, males, and older generation. In the late twentieth century, there was clear shift toward post materialism presented by various movements such as LGBT, feminist movements as well as creation of green parties. However this was unstable environment for those with traditional outlooks. This change triggered cultural war of identities and fight for mainstream order in society. In addition, this shocking change was exacerbated by the migration crisis, which highlighted this social change in an even more significant way. People realize that society is open to new cultures, religions, languages and that created an impression for civilian with a traditional way of thinking that it erodes the basic values and norms of Western Europe (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30). Suddenly, you had someone as your neighbour who didn't even speak your language, didn't profess your religion, and had completely different way of life. This evoked a feeling that the traditional system disappeared even faster as before. The analysis of Inglehart and Pippa Norris shows an evidence that rise of populism, is not only caused by economic instability, but especially by psychological factors such as distrust in government, insecurity, feeling of loss and upholding old-fashioned gender roles. This rise is a reaction of unsatisfied citizens who do not feel that their interests are represent by established political parties with high percentage of corruption and post materialistic solutions for moral issues (Ropp, 2014). These people who are left out are looking for a new solution for their feeling of anger or misery and if we add to this social crisis, long-term distrust to democratic institutions and a society that prefers an authoritarian leader, what we can predict is the growth of populist actors with authoritarian tendencies.

3.2 New Solution Populism

Populist's main advantage is their ability to respond to urgent need of citizens. The formal definition of populism admits that populism is "neither a set of particular ideological contents nor a given organizational pattern, but rather a discursive logic" (Stavrakakis 2006, 256) that can be taken over by "parties across the entire political

spectrum" (Nicolette Makovicky, 2019). Definition of discursive logic means "a deductive system developed by the logician Stanisław Jaśkowski (1906–1965) as a formal analysis of what may be" (Press, 2016). Other definition of populism is in ideological content that creates an "internal divide" between the "people" (Laclau, 1977), Ernesto Laclau refers that such ideological jargon is allowed by the sincerity and openness of populist discursive logic itself (Nicolette Makovicky, 2019). The author Steve C. Ropp, see various definition of populism as very helpful but he rather focused on an emotional relationship between the people and populist actors (Ropp, 2014). This view clarify what threat populism really constructs and under which conditions gains even more popularity.

The feeling of change creates the need of new face with clear responses to citizens' problems. S. Ropp explains that citizens who cannot see that the actions of the government does not improve their lives, or even worse it brings them into stressful situations, they can very easily "identify with a new leader" who responds to these problems with his emotional rhetoric and criticizes the government's inability to solve such problems (Ropp, 2014, s. 3). If the populist leader proves that people can trust him with his actions, they see him as a future politician who should be running the country (Ropp, 2014, p. 3). It is crucial to underline that I am describing the citizens who lost confidence in their current government and are looking for someone new who can fulfil their needs. "Populism "is always expresses itself in the form of a direct and unmediated relationship "between the people" and their leader. This is one of the ways how to "bypass" the traditional system and media and simultaneously "reach directly emotions of the chosen people" (Ropp, 2014, p. 3). The traditional institutions, government and media are still crucial part of society, so the main weapon of populists is their direct and emotional communication toward the audience.

Populists communicate very personally and theatrically in order to pulled the maximum out of the dysfunction of political elites. The populist leader is often charismatic – "meaning that he or she by force of personality" (Ropp, 2014, p. 3) can create a direct relationship with potential voters. The main elements of populist include theatricality, showmanship, impulsiveness, directivity and readiness to act. Populist usually creates a strong emotion in a person as anger and frustration with the current political situation. The authors claim that a populist who is also dissatisfied with current politics will show how badly it affects everyone. People should choose him because he will improve your life situation by his quick reactions to the biggest

problems in the country. Populists' argument is often used from the position of the victims which are they representing (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism, 2018).

Chapter 4: Implication to Slovak Political Culture – History of Slovakia

Political culture of Slovakia is subject – participant political culture. The historical development of Slovakia created mixed political culture due to the fact that Slovakia developed under the domination of other countries such as Austria-Hungary, Czech Republic, or Soviet Union for many centuries. How did Slovakia evolved? Does have Slovakia historical development which prefers stable liberal democracy or authoritarian leader?

Slovak nation was during the 19th century under the rule of Hungary. The Slovak nation was oppressed. The 19th century was a period of stigmatization for Slovakia (Miháliková, 2005). Even today's books describe Slovaks as victims of Hungarianization and nation of passivity. In 1878 was released book Felvidék which characterized Slovak nation as a low and inferior nation (Habaj & Lukačka, 2015). Moreover, He claimed that the Slovaks are reminiscent of subjects and backward people at a first sight. Slovenská Matica was closed and various insults circulated about Slovaks. Nevertheless, the Slovaks withdrew to seclusion and political passivity (Ivantysyn, 1999).

On the contrary, political culture of Hungary flourished. Hungarias had main word at making decisions (Habaj & Lukačka, 2015). Basically, they ruled over the Slovak minority as well. Oppressed Slovak minority did not oppose the Hungarian restrictive laws (Habaj & Lukačka, 2015). This means that Slovakia had subject political culture and was under the rule of authoritarian ruler. Slovak nation could not participate in political decision and if so he had to vote for Hungarian's interests.

The economic development of Slovak nation was very slow. In the 19th century, slavery was abolished and there was a process of slow change from feudalism to capitalism. Nevertheless, the Slovakia was primarily agrarian country to the end of the 20th century. Additionally, this area is symbolized as an era of stigmatization and oppression. The Slovak perceived the government as the main cause of their oppression.

The history describes governing Slovaks as negative people with disgraceful characteristics (Miháliková, 2005). In Slovak society, is sharp refusal of previous political regimes. This creates the myth of them "bad lords" versus us "decent citizens". "Research has confirmed that people continue to see politics rather as ´lords´ mischief´ and an opportunity to ´illegally rob the state at the expense of the working people´ than ´a service to the public" (Miháliková, 2005). The conflict between perception of ´we´ and ´them´, in Slovakia, still shows certain remains of the feudal system, existence of two worlds where politicians belong to the world of distinct politician so called bad lords (Krekovičová, 2005, p. 165).

Political attitudes are to a large extent shaped under the influence of symbolical forms. Slovakia is significantly influenced by its own history. Especially, the history in which have "the Slovaks' limited capacity to exercise genuine autonomy" (Ivantysyn, 1999). The WWI split up the Austria-Hungary, nevertheless Slovak nation was inexperienced to rule its own nation and the First Czechoslovak Republic was formed in 1918. In other words, the Slovak political elite had no experience in the process of the ruling of a nation, and in decision-making for vital areas of national life, because they were formed as a opposition toward other regimes (Miháliková, 2005, p. 8)

History of Slovak political culture of 20th century shows that we were mainly under the rule of dictatorship. The break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1939 changed significantly political situation as well as state. Finally Slovak nation had its own state; however it is not so true. Slovak state was a satellite of Nazis Germany. Therefore, we were not autonomous state as it was presented. The state symbols changed as well, the white-blue-red flag replaces Czechoslovak flag. Additionally, the Czechoslovak anthem, including its Slovak part Nad Tatrou sa blýska was rejected and substituted by the song Hej, Slováci (Miháliková, 2005). The celebrations and satisfaction that accompanied the end of Second World War were not only commemorating victory over Fascism on Slovak territory, it was also about the return of Czechoslovak Republic (Novák, J., 1990, p. 88).

The restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic was impossible and the Communist Party took over the government in the country. Again, the bad communist lords changed the rules of games and abolished Christianity. Even though, that more than two thirds of the population registered as Catholics (Miháliková, 2005). To these days, Slovakia has a tendency of us versus them. The attitudes of Slovaks toward the

Czech territory were very different in the end. Slovakia felt that they did not really benefit from the prosperity or power gained by the multinational state structure (Ivantysyn, 1999). At the end of the day, the communism was other bad regime, who took away rights of its citizens and was full of malevolent politicians. This was another concept of stigmatization of the Slovak "decent citizens".

Slovakia never reconciled with its history and such a state will have problematic relationship toward the distinct elitist politicians and democracy. The state which never admits its own fault as well, will always blaming others such as system, politician, and most importantly, this is the position of victim, which need some messiah to save her. Reconciliation is the tool for peaceful society which admits their mistakes and therefore can move toward respectful relationships with other minorities, religions, and worldviews. Nevertheless, the analysis of Slovak political culture shows that, we did not reconcile with its past, and predicts that our society will incline toward authoritarian male leaders with traditional values such as Christianity and family.

Slovak civic culture is based on traditional values with elements of postmodernist western culture, which has been penetrating to the Czechoslovakia since the 80's of the 20th century (Mistrík, 2006). According to the Almond & Verba, "the civic culture is not a modern culture, but one that combines modernity with tradition" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 5).From the analysis of Slovak political culture, Slovakia is immature nation which did not reconcile with its history and portraits itself as a victim of stronger nation 'them'. The author Erich Mistrík concludes, that Slovakia is "a nation that was not the subject of history, but its object. History with plays with us, we are a toy in the hands of the so-called great history and stronger nations, with our small symbols" (Mistrík, 2006, p. 16). The position of victim is also very common for populist actors. Therefore, we can suggest that Slovak Republic may favor populist actors who blame others for citizens' misfortunes.

Slovak political scene is dominated by traditional politicians, overwhelmingly male, with conservative leanings. The history of independent Slovakia shows that the citizens of Slovakia opt for a strong hand that can lead the nation. This Slovak habit accompanies Slovak politics from the beginning, starting with Vladimír Mečiar, who was the prime minister from 1991 to 1998. He was a populist with the image of a leader who has everything under control. Then we have another politician, Robert Fico, who was the prime minister from 2008 to 2016. According to Milan Kňažko,

Fico is a more refined version of Mečiar, who is more difficult to grasp, harder to read, smarter, more cunning, and much more dangerous and with authoritarian tendencies as his predecessor V. Mečiar (Palata, 2014, p. 2). Nevertheless, this statement is hard to prove, because of insufficient argumentation which is based on opinion. Even though, these two men have been the most significant Slovak prime ministers who lead the country with a strong hand.

It refers to another specific patter of Slovak political culture which proved that Slovaks prefer authoritarian politician. This argument also supports the recent poll, which shows that more than 63 percent of young people is not satisfied with current political situation (NDI, 2018). Additionally, due to our changeable history majority of Slovaks still prefer materialistic values over post materialistic. Another GLOBSEC study reveals that 69 percent of the Slovak citizens would exchange part of their rights for security (Globsec, 2020). There is another significant data which proved that politics of fear works: in GLOBSEC pool, 72 percent of the Slovak respondents believe that migrants are real threat for Slovakia (Globsec, 2020, p. 31). Interestingly, Slovakia and Bulgaria have the most negative attitudes toward migrants and these two countries are ranked as the main believers in conspiracy theories. In Slovakia, 56 percent of Slovak citizens trust in conspiracy theories. This high degree of trust toward unofficial sources is caused by low level of trust in democratic institutions.

The some fraction of Slovaks wants to be ruled with a strong decisive hand. From the GLOBSEC pool, 38 percent of Slovak prefers an authoritarian politician who would rule without parliament or even election. This pool explains the similarities between our most powerful prime ministers. First, Vladimír Mečiar, "was described in the movie of Tereza Nvotová "as a sociopathic autocrat who created a cult of personality around himself and always went hard on his own, no matter what it cost. He transitioned from a VPN (Public against Violence) to a directive nationalist and the head of the HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia). V. Mečiar surrounded himself with people who had not only the Slovak Information Service under their control but also the underworld" (Noskovič, 2017). Second, Robert Fico, is a parallel of Vladimír Mečiar. The Prime Minister's campaign against the president Kiska, who held up a mirror for the government and enjoyed a high degree of popularity, recalls the times when Vladimír Mečiar waged war against the first president Michal Kováč (Balázs, 2018). According to Marrián Balázs, "Robert Fico turned into Mečiar, to that Mečiar, whose performance led psychiatrists to issue a

public statement of Mečiar's resignation" (Balázs, 2018). Paradoxically, both men who had tendencies towards authoritarianism were the most popular and longest-serving prime ministers of Slovakia.

4.1 Trust in Institutions

The trust in institutions is key factor for stable democratic performance. However, the democratic institutions in Slovakia are neither effective nor transparent and are one of the main reasons why Slovaks distrust government. The modern aspect of our society is still functioning democracy and role of institutions. Even though Slovakia inclines toward a strong authority, there are other influences that strengthen the democratization of the country. In Robert Putnam's book *Making Democracy Work* (1993), he explains the relationship between the state and its citizens through studies of institutional efficiency in various Italian districts. Robert Putnam describes institutions as the main game changer in citizen's perception toward a state. The Democratic institutions in Slovakia are not effective and transparent and are one of the main reasons why Slovaks distrust government.

The relationship between the state and institutions is very important. It is important because democratic institutions are essential part of modern democratic state (Putnam, 1993). The effective functioning of institutions means quick responses towards demands of citizens, good transparency of finances, and support of democratic values. The institutions are the mirror of the state's transparency and efficiency. The main reason why Slovaks distrusts the government is the inability of Slovak institutions to fulfil these major tasks. The two main factors which most fully explain the effective functioning of democratic institutions are socioeconomic modernity and civic culture based on solidarity with patterns of civic participation (Putnam, 1993). In other terms, functioning institutions have the ability to directly solve citizens' issues and fulfil the needs of the citizens. Civic participation and social capital are crucial for raise in social trust and horizontal reciprocity. Here, Putnam explains two crucial factors for modern democratic state which are 'trust and horizontal reciprocity' (Putnam, 1993).

The Slovak institutions, mainly the judiciary branch, faced huge corruption scandals recently, having shattered citizens' trust in the state (TASR, 2020). Bribery and corrupt practices vividly weakened trust in old political parties and this distrust of people toward the state cause's rise of populism and popularity of extremist parties

(Ropp S. C., 2014, p. 3). The decline in trust in state representatives proved that trust is an essential factor in successful policy making. Damaged trust after some time leads to the reluctance of citizens to cooperate with the state on reforms, laws. Simply put, citizens will start to revolt against state regulations (OECD, 2013, p 19).

The more alarming finding is that our culture is benevolent to some degree of corruption. According to Transparency International "Every fifth Slovak household admits that it paid a bribe during the year in contact with public institutions". This survey directly shows the political tradition in Slovakia. The study found that bribes are paid rather by poor than the rich, especially in health care. Middle class pays mainly police and courts. The richest class pay more the tax authorities.

The Slovakia has non-functional institutions. Transparency International survey found that 22 percent of people who do not report corruption do not know where the corruption should be reported. This is really alarming sign of dysfunctional rule of institutions. Additionally, 40 percent of Slovaks are afraid to report corruption due to revenge and another 37 percent believes that reporting will not have impact (Transparency International).

4.2 Role of Trust

A thing such as trust can also lead to the disruption of economic relations in the country and rise of populism. Citizens and employers may see it as risky to reform and innovate their working conditions if they do not trust the state (OECD, 2013, p. 3). Economy and citizens require trust in government which resulted in economic growth and coherence of society in both good and bad times (OECD, 2013, p. 3). Trust in government means that outcomes of political system will generate favoured results for society (Easton, 1965). The trust in democratic government is based on specific support and diffused support (Easton, 1965). Usually, citizens are in opposition towards its government. The governmental specific and diffused support will show the confidence in actions of their government. The specific support means that citizens can associate in political life and demand some change or new reforms. If the demands are fulfilled the support of people will rise. The trust belongs to the diffuse support and is more durable than which deals directly with the governmental performance. The diffuse support means the legitimacy or trust toward the political system (Easton, 1965)

This rising mistrust toward Slovak government escalated with crisis in Slovak political system. The brutal murder of investigative reporter Martin Kuciak and his fiancé led to the biggest riots in the country, since the velvet revolution (Bútorová, Zora; Martin, Bútora, 2019). The reporter was killed in February 2018, mainly for his investigation of corruption and possible links between the mafia and the Slovak government. This murder accumulated frustration from the political situation and people went to the streets. The protests organized a Decent Slovakia initiative (Bútorová, Zora; Martin, Bútora, 2019). According to political analyst Grigorij Meseznikov, the double murder "has reconfigured the entire political scene, as new liberal-democratic parties emerged and immediately gained support (France24, 2020).

The Decent Slovakia initiation caused the resignation of several high-rankings officials such as "untouchable minister of interior" R. Kaliňák as well as resignation of Prime Minister Robert Fico (Bútorová, Zora; Martin, Bútora, 2019). Nevertheless, the Slovak citizens were not yet satisfied; they started to crave for a replacement of SMER - SD and official punishment of the Kuciak's murderers.

If citizens do not trust the state institutions and political incumbents, they look for new alternatives (Ropp S. C., 2014). According to a GLOBSEC 2020 study conducted in Slovakia, "70 percent of respondents do not trust political parties and 76 percent do not trust the judiciary" (TASR, 2020). Mainly due to the killings of investigative reporter and his fiancé and perpetual corruption scandals of ruling party SMER—SD, the party is well known for the clientelism, cronyism and corruption of Slovak courts (Mesežnikov, Grigorij; Kolár, Miroslav; Bútora, Martin ;, 2014).

This is also the reason why 70 percent of Slovaks do not trust in corrupt judiciary system. What are the new alternatives for voters who do not trust in political parties? Citizens who feel stress from the uncertain future, which is mainly associated with the market economy, perceive quite negatively the fact that institutions are not able to "deliver goods" as a rule of law, economic growth, and representation of their interests (Ropp S. C., 2014, p. 6). In this respect, they turn to other solutions to their everyday problems. Usually, people find their new leader in the person of a populist who speaks directly to the people and has a simple solution to even the most complex problems (Ropp S. C., 2014, pp. 3,12). G. Mesežnikov claims that such an alternative is seen in OĽaNo leader. He said "Having vowed to immediately push through anti-corruption measures should he win office, OĽaNO leader Matovic, a 46-year-old MP, appears to have galvanised voter outrage over the murders and the high-level

corruption they exposed" and he continues that "An eccentric self-made millionaire and former media boss, Matovič set up "Ordinary People and Independent Personalities – OĽaNO" a decade ago" (France24, 2020). In such a case, people turn away from the "old model" of political leaders, because it did not represent their needs and therefore people choose the side that has anti-systemic elements (Ropp S. C., 2014, p. 21). This mafia state has to have new leaders," Dasa Hankova, a middle-aged Bratislava shop women adding that OĽaNO leader Igor Matovič would get her vote. "He'll work to end corruption -- it's what matters most now," she said (France24, 2020).The success of OĽaNO is in their anti—cartel movement which offers a great alternative for voters who have lost trust in the old system and their parties (Ropp S. C., 2014, p. 4). All of these factors such as distrust towards institutions, corruption of previous "traditional" political parties, uncertainty, the propensity towards a strong hand government that will solve it for us, supports the popularity of populists and right parties in Slovakia.

To sum up, this chapter discussed the Slovak civic culture, which is a mixture of traditional and modern society. Slovaks are losing trust toward the Slovak government. Firstly, Slovak civic culture is a mix of modern democratic regime with traditional ties on the family and Christianity. Slovaks prefer leaders who will lead country with strong hand. The "macho" type of a leader can be found in the figures of the most influential politicians; especially the former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar portrayed this type of politician. Another important politician, Robert Fico, was similar to Vladimír Mečiar in some respects at the end of his career. Both had authoritarian tendencies which for many Slovaks represented something attractive and desirable because it makes them feel that everything in the country is under their control. In the second part, I focused on the importance of a functioning democratic institutions and trust in government. The growing distrust of citizens towards the government and key institutions such as the judiciary, serves as a fertile ground for the growth of populists and extreme political parties with anti-systemic elements. According to Robert Putnam, transparent and efficient democratic institutions play a crucial role in the citizens' perception of government. In Slovakia, the courts are an unreliable institution for 76% of respondents. This is a very dangerous sign for the future of the country with the rule of law and the functioning democracy. Moreover, this crisis has proved the importance of the key value of trust. It is citizens' trust in the state that can prevent the disintegration of old structures, which should be replaced

by more effective populist alternatives. A citizen who loses confidence and trust in state institutions perceives this as the best alternative, and this is one of the reasons why we see an increase in populism in Slovakia.

4.3 Why is populism a threat for a democracy?

Populism contains anti systemic elements because that is its main advantage and the reason why its popularity is growing. Rhetoric of populism is anti-establishment because populism challenges the legitimate authority of the establishment (Inglehart & Norris, 2018). Populist actors highlight the mistakes of current legitimate government and call for drastic solutions (Ropp S. C., 2014). A great example is Donald Trump and his anti-immigration policy. His dream was to create a wall on the border with Mexico. For many Americans, "it is a proof of his authenticity" and determination to do anything to resolve the situation with illegal immigrants from Mexico (Minarechová, 2020).

Another example for which we do not have to go so far is Igor Matovič from Oľano, who visited the villa of former Minister Počiatek in France during the electoral campaign. The theatricality and authenticity strengthened voters' trust in these populist actors (Ropp S. C., 2014, p. 4). The problem is that majority of populists have authoritarian tendencies which in some cases can be seen at a first sight, and sometimes it will appear later (Inglehart & Norris, 2018). Authoritarian tendencies are anti-democratic and anti-liberal; these are the anti –establishment's threats posed by populism.

4.4 Characteristic of Igor Matovič and his Political Party Oľano

Igor Matovič fulfills the definition of a populist politician. The main elements of a populist leader include theatricality, showmanship, impulsiveness, directivity, and readiness to act (Ropp S. C., 2014). Denník N characterized him as a man we cannot underestimate, as he is a master of quick responses to current events (Barborík, 2020). The populist rhetoric is based on direct contact with his audience (Inglehart & Norris, 2018). What is specific about Matovič is that he uses very expressive dialectics, especially in his speeches, public appearances and through a personal Facebook

account or YouTube videos. Igor Matovič admits that it was the video from Cannes which caused the success in the 2020 election (OĽaNO, 2021).

The rhetoric of Igor Matovič was quite calm in cultural questions such as abortion, minority rights. He claimed that people are the ones who have everything in their hands (Kvetko, 2021). The traditional argument about populism is that populist either tolerates multiculturalism and social diversity in society or they advocates 'elitism' – arguing that power should rest in the hands of a single leader or elite (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural Backlash, 2018). Hence OĽaNo movement started as an anti cartel party which has strong attitudes against old traditional politicians as Robert Fico. This attitude is especially presented through the performances of the leader of OĽaNo movement Igor Matovič (MINARECHOVÁ, 2020).

OĽaNo movement is not a traditional political party (Kvetko, 2021). The structure of traditional political party has its statutes with a council where the members of party elect a vice-president and president (Kvetko, 2021). Moreover, traditional party have small official meetings in each district, with their own members and each member has one vote and they have right to vote for their new leadership if is needed.

OĽaNo was created as a response to elite politicians. The structure of OĽaNo party did not exist, he build up his list of candidates arbitrarily. (Kvetko, 2021). His candidates were usually influential and successful people from various fields such as sport, medicine, culture. Additionally, OĽaNo movement is directly ruled by Igor Matovič. He is the one who decides about the board of government and other members of OĽaNo movement. Igor Matovič removed many people from his movement. According to Dennik N, OĽaNO left, "in the first election period (2012 - 2016) of the movement OĽaNo rremained only 10 out of the 16, in the second (2016 - 2020) of 19 only 9. Deputies left the movement almost regularly" (Gdovinová, 2020). The most prominent names are Veronika Remišová or Alojz Hlina (Gdovinová, 2020).

Despite the style of Igor Matovič's performance, he fulfills the conditions of Slovak political culture to become prime minister. Igor Matovič is someone who will defeat the bad lords, is family-based and Catholic. In addition, he prefers traditional values that are important for the Slovak voter. During his campaign strategy, he persuaded majority of voters that he would lead Slovakia with a strong male hand. This also supports the claim of political scientist Jozef Lenč who calls Matovič

"Trump from Trnava" (Lenč, 2020). Jozef Lenč claims that "voter's expectations and election results confirmed the growing inclination of voters to strong men. Their belief that these political "messiahs" would save Slovakia overwhelmed their efforts for programmatic and ideological party politics with the future" (Lenč, 2020). This is the great example of behavior of Igor Matovič who portraits himself as a messiah whose main message before the election was to "remove pigs from the roll" (Matovič, 2020). This name means to remove the old corrupted rule of Smer-SD whose elite members robbed Slovakia of 30 billion in 12 years of their rule (Matovič, 2020).

Rhetoric of Igor Matovič is clearly a populist one. He usually uses the fight of us versus them (Inglehart & Norris, Cultural Backlash, 2018). His rhetoric consisted of populism, an direct conflict with Fico and Smer–SD, with constant attack of the moral capacity to lead a state. Finally, he was consistently on a front pages of boulevard with controversial allegations against corrupted elite. His position represented the position of victim (Ropp S. C., 2014); he and all Slovak citizens were deceived and robbed by the socialist political party Smer-SD (Matovič, 2020). He directly called civilians as the synonymous with the fight against this evil. About people who are united in a number of Christian fundamentalist communities. Matovič benefited from the frustration of politics, the fear of liberalism and the activism of individuals who see in him a kind of "messiah" of Slovak politics (Lenč, 2020).

4.5 The power of the anti campaign of SMER – SD

The power of anti–campaign has different forms. Usually, "it uses constant criticism, pejorative language or insinuates rumors about politician's very private life" (Martin Haselmayer, 2017, p. 355). The importance to understand the negative campaigns have at least three major contributions. First, parties excessively use negative campaigning in belief they may gain more votes. Second, criticizing government failure, showing corruption or public misuse of state power and providing voters with electoral alternatives through media are key functions of modern democracies, to provide informed voting decisions. Third, this discourse of political parties may lead to polarization and misinformation of society (Martin Haselmayer, 2017).

In Slovakia, the most powerful political party SMER–SD normally led negative campaigns against its opponents. In the 2016 parliament election, they

focused on Igor Matovič as well. Smer-SD attacked Igor Matovič on a suspicion that he had defrauded taxes, exactly in three different stages of his political career, in the years 2010, 2016, 2017 (Čikovský, 2017). Even though, these allegations were refuted by a long investigation, it significantly violated the image of Igor Matovič. However, a 30-page file was circulating in the media, from which it was not a problem to portray Igor Matovič as a man at least suspected of tax evasions in the past. It is clear that it was a politically motivated investigation and although the internal revenue department concluded that Igor Matovič does not owe the state anything, the voters were confused and suspicious about Igor Matovič (Čikovský, 2017). In 2020, this situation was not repeated, Smer-SD did not target Matovič, but Smer SD launched a campaign mainly against the Freedom and Solidarity Party (SaS) and against the coalition Progressive Slovakia-Spolu (PS-SPOLU) (Kvetko, 2021). I contacted Martin Kvetko, marketer of political party Za Ľudí. This anti–campaign is important in general analysis of the successful political marketing. However, it is crucial factor which highly influences the voters' opinion.

The main goal of the anti–campaign is to damage the reputation of the chosen politician (Martin Haselmayer, 2017). The 2020 election was mainly targeted against Andrej Kiska and his newly established party Ps –polu (Kvetko, 2021). Igor Matovič entered this election campaign and was not targeted with so permanent anti campaign such as political party Za Ľudí. Even this, improves the trust of the angry and frustrated voters. Additionally, the 2020 election was mainly against liberalism from the side of coalitional parties such as SMER—SD OR ĽSN, it was the consequence of the systematic promotion of the narrative of liberalism as a threat. In addition, these election questions the liberal democracy as the most suitable political establishment for the Slovak Republic by important public officials (Globsec, 2020, p. 7). Igor Matovič who presented himself as a traditional politician with emphasis on traditional values such as family and Christianity were not harmed by this anti campaign.

4.6 Marketing Campaign

Technologies changed the potential of political marketing. The author Scammel described the political marketing "as a modern media technique and expertise imported from the commercial world into political campaigns" (Scammell, 1995, p. 6). Political rally or bullets can be political marketing but does not have to.

Nevertheless, a survey created in order to find out everything about voters attitudes, belief, opinion which then could be sold to the candidates fulfils the definition of political marketing.

In today's consumer society the consumer is on the top. The stress is on consumer or potential voter, to make him satisfied shifts old political salesmanship like speech, advocacy, and programme to new political marketing (Scammell, 1995). The political marketing's main goal is to find what people prefer or want. The political marketing is rather about the main policy and the main advantages (Kvetko, 2021).

The democratic elections, in specific, are about freedom of choice. Citizen can choose which candidate or party will improve the country or at least represents their interests (Ropp S. C., 2014). Among the important factors of successful political campaign is capital (Denton, Trent, & Friedenberg, 2016). The ability of fund-raising and its organization is key part of successful campaign, especially if you are someone new. An interesting example is Donald Trump who utilized its own funds and raised 5 million (Denton, Trent, & Friedenberg, 2016). This allows Trump to speak his mind.

The OĽaNO movement finances the campaign from funds from the state budget and from donations, receive through transparent account. This allows the main leader Igor Matovič to speak his mind and fulfill his main goal of his political career which was to defeat the mafia (OĽaNo, 2020). According to the authors, the first step toward successful political campaign is capital. This condition fulfills also OĽaNO movement.

The reason why OĽaNO is such a great case study of a sudden rise of populism is that OĽaNO was far away from being a threat for anyone in the elections. In November polls, "Oľano had around 6 percent, it was very unlikely that it would become the winner of 2020 election with the final result of 25 percent" (MINARECHOVÁ, 2020).

The second step toward the successful political campaign is the involvement of voters (Denton, Trent, & Friedenberg, 2016). As Martin Kvetko stated, Igor Matovič was the only one who understood what was at stake in the 2020 elections. He understood the main message. He translated the anti–corruption idea and the mistrust of the people in the institutions into a very strong campaign centered on change and the need to establish the rule of law (Kvetko, 2021). This was his main advantage in the 2020 election. Indeed, Matovič caught the emotions of anger and frustration

among the Slovak citizens. His anti–cartel, anti–corruption and anti–elitist narrative, together with elements of direct democracy (online voting on a political program) or promise of taking away property from those who stole it in politics, were an apt answer to the perceived needs and desires of Slovak citizens.

Other political parties did not understand this main idea of change and rebellion. For example, a political party like Progresívne Slovensko lost the election due to their focus on their stance against right-wing extremism. They mainly revolved around the topic of extremism, and the counter-rallies against the rightwing People's Party of Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) meetings. Martin Kvetko, as the marketing expert of Za ľudí admits that they did the same mistake as PS–SPOLU because they participated in the anti--campaign against ĽSNS. They organized counter-meetings near meeting in order to show their disagreement with their values. Even though this anti campaign was very successful at the spot and with the core group of these parties' supporters, it hurt them significantly on social media (Kvetko, 2021) and failed to attract a broader voter base. FaceBook portrayed them in completely different light, that they are promoters of rights of Roma people through FaceBook pictures and comments under them called us ultra liberals who strongly favors liberalism (Kvetko, 2021). In the end, political parties such as Za ľudí, PS–SPOLU and the Christian Democratic movement (KDH) lost many potential voters due to the wrong definition of the main need of the 2020 parliament election, misreading the public mood (Kvetko, 2021).

What did Igor Matovič do differently? He said with his populist narrative that every political party should do what they wanted in their campaign and did not fight among each other. This means that even the political parties which were against their values were not their enemy. Their enemies were so called bad lords; corrupted politicians who presented themselves in different light. Additionally, Oľano did not fight against extremism as did other political parties in 2020 election. This was a very interesting move in the eyes of voters of Kotleba – People's Party of Our Slovakia, who did not perceive Oľano as enemy but as another possible option for dissatisfied and angry voters (Kvetko, 2021). In return, OĽaNO created a clear, strong message of fight against corruption which resonated with the people, and perceived as a major problem in society. They focused solely on the fight against corruption, mafia and oligarchs (Minár, 2020). The main reasons behind its power are that no one has the courage and audacity to speak about their corrupt crimes a call for the resignation of concrete officials or even their investigation (Matovič, 2020).

The fourth agenda is to repeat the main agenda from all possible sources (Dalton & Welzel, January 2015). It was mainly the populist rhetoric of Igor Matovič who knew how to stir up the crowd through Facebook. For example, he was announcing that there would be a press conference for three days on Facebook, before the election, however in the end repeat still the same, that we have to revolt against oligarchs (Matovič, 2020). Despite that, the conference had a lot of media popularity (Kvetko, 2021). His team understood the gradually evolving problem of democracies, especially in Slovakia, that democracy in Slovakia is perceived to work only for elites and not for common citizens. Common people see that politicians enjoy visible privileges, have various scandals, many of them are enormously rich and do nothing about it while citizens are bullied for any small crime or transgression (Minár, 2020). Additionally, due to the feeling that these institutions are working only for elites, and that there is lack of rule of law for all citizens, people distrust democratic institutions. For example, corruption scandals like Gorilla, the murder of investigative reporter Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Veronika Kušnírová were left unpunished (Tódová, 2020). His populist rebellion was presented in a simple manner. Thus, even less educated voters could be reached with this simple message.

The OĽaNO movement used various types of communications with people, but their message was simple and clear. The "parosocial interaction is communication with media", which provide their information further to the readers or listenrers (Dalton & Welzel, January 2015, p. 33). The authors claim that the third step toward a success is that the rhetoric must be easy to grasp, simple, and unified. The OĽaNO movement created a catch all marketing campaign due to their main message as an anti cartel party which fights, in particular against clientelism, corruption and exploitation of the state. According to Marting Kvetko this was a very good strategy. M. Kvetko highlights the main difference between success of OĽaNo and the loss of PS-Spolu. "PS–Spolu focused on educated voters and citizens living in the cities. Their template was the success of Matúš Vallo in Bratislava; however, this template did not work for the whole Slovakia. Moreover, they lost their last critical voters when they blocked the parliament. This blockade was a reaction to new proposal of SMER–SD to discuss three government bills in a shortened regime; increase the child allowance, introduce the 13th pension and repeal the law on the highway toll (TASR, 2020). This action shows ambiguous attitudes to the parliament and it evoked a bad emotion in their voters of being irresponsible to rule" (Kvetko, 2021). On the

contrary, Igor Matovič connected all of the people who were angry at the current state of politics. He was a great option for a voter of KDH because he promotes traditional values such as family, Christianity and Slovak traditions. In addition, he was a very interesting option for a young voter because he was informal, humorous, and popular. His topic of fight against corruption was very attractive for people who wanted revolt against the old corrupted regime (Kvetko, 2021). According to Slovak statistics 25.70 percent of OĽaNo voters come from cities, 24.24 percent of voters live on countryside and only 14.11 percent of voters voted for them from abroad. On the contrary, PS–Spolu had a significant gap between the voters from the cities and countryside. In the countryside, a total of 4.52 percent of people voted for PS–Spolu. However, in the cities, an 8.93 percent of people voted for them (ŠÚSR, 2020). Most interesting is the percentage of votes from abroad, where people more often live in cities, a total of 33.30% of people from abroad voted for them (ŠÚSR, 2020). This statistic proves the that PS–Spolu focused mainly on the people living in the cities. OĽaNo's catch-all campaign, without a major gap between the voters from cities and countryside was about the national revolt against the oligarchs, so even the less educated people or people who are not normally interested in politics could be potential voters.

Another key aspect of successful political campaign is the perception of unified political party (Denton, Trent, & Friedenberg, 2016, p. 42). The OĽaNO movement shows great coherence and real interest to change the country for better (OĽaNo, 2020). What Martin Kvetko does not consider as a populist move but a very clever one is the structure of the OĽaNo candidate list. Matovič managed to bring people together from several areas–from culture people like Jozef Pročko to athletes, doctors, and pastors. The successful political campaign requires good organization, money, interesting authorities or experts (Denton, Trent, & Friedenberg, 2016, s. 76). Igor Matovič also picked up a leader from each sector through the whole Slovak society. This tactic has a significant strategic impact. He chose trustworthy representatives, who wanted to achieve change, of communities that are large and have authority in their neighborhood. For example, he chose M. Kavecká from the association of nurses, who represented an authority in this field. This strategy achieved that these regional leaders have also attracted many voters. Moreover, the leaders such as K. Hatráková also fought against the corrupt practices in their environment. This tactics served as a final reason why people chose OĽaNo party and that reason was the good and polite citizens would represent your interests in the

politics if he will win (Kvetko, 2021). With this strategy, the emotion of change was more real and believable.

The marketing analysis of his campaign shows that Igor Matovič used primarily social media for his 2020 election campaign. For example, he launched video from Canees, or protests against the oligarchs (OĽaNo, 2020). Igor Matovič used all possible tools for adressing his message to the people. First point was that he had clear message. Second major advantage was that he used each tool to deliver this message to as many people as possible. Barbarík points out that Matovič campaign was successful due to the noise and high visibility in the media. His message, with strong emotion of rebellion, was everywhere. However, it is nothing special compared to the campaigns in the past. "Again, a lot of shouting, the daily churning of nonsensical ideas that stir up the debate, and somehow disappear from the program of the day in a week" (Barborík, 2020). Each election has its own emotion; the 2016 election was captivated by Smer–SD with their politics of fear, which was exaggerated with the threat of Muslim migrants. The parliamentary election of 2020 was dictated by Matovič with his all catching campaign against Smer–SD and its corrupt practices (Minár, 2020). Igor Matovič's brilliant moves were his YouTube videos. He went to Cannes, France, where he "discovered" the villa of the former Minister of Finance and Transport, Počiatka, in a luxurious neighborhood. At this place, he used his theatricality and claimed that this is the property of Slovak Republic (Bílí, 2020).

4.7 Video from Cannes

The analysis of Slovakia 2020 elections proved that in this election the role of online media play essential role. The study of the 2020 parliamentary election conducted by GLOBSEC concluded that:

> "Although social media are already a permanent part of the Slovak elections, in these parliamentary elections, social media played a crucial role. Instagram is slowly gaining popularity, but so far, only a minimum of political candidates use it actively. Contrary, Facebook has become a tool for many campaigns and probably significantly contributed to the change of electoral dynamics when OĽaNO launched a video from France *The Riviera* which had more than 1.62 million views. Also SME–SD video commercials and one SaS video reached more than one million views" (Globsec, 2020).

As described in the previous chapter, the populist rhetoric is built on a direct relationship between the voter and the populist actor. This approach allows populist

politician to approach people individually and directly (Inglehart & Norris, 2018). Voters then feel that this politician is really someone who, if elected, can defend their interests and finally end up corruption of the state elites.

Populist usually creates a strong emotion in a person as anger and frustration with the current political situation (Ropp S. C., 2014). The video from Cannes caused a sensation. The message was that the people should choose Matovič because he will improve their life situation by his quick reactions to the biggest problems in the country. Populist's argument is often used from the position of the victims which they are representing.

Populists usually create a strong emotion such as anger or frustration with the current political situation. Igor Matovič released the video from Cannes in France to show, that he is serious about the fight with mafia in Slovakia. At the beginning of the video, he addressed each citizen of Slovakia who is poor, ill, angry, or somehow discriminated by the current regime (OĽaNo, 2020). The leader of the OĽaNO movement, Igor Matovič claims that this luxurious villa (property of Ján Počiatek) on the French Riviera is bought with money stolen from the Slovak taxpayer. Igor Matovič said that "This is the property of all people in Slovakia," (OĽaNo, 2020). His rhetoric perfectly fits the definition of populist rhetoric due to the fact that it uses rhetoric as an argument used from the position of the victims which the populists claim to represent. Then he added that 11,000 people die in Slovakia each year, simply because they do not receive adequate health care. According to Igor Matovič, it is due to people like Počiatek, who are robbing Slovakia instead of improving health care. In the video, he dramatically called minister of finances Michell, to point out to his privilege manners. Five people took part in this trip Igor Matovič among them , who represented the five million of frustrated Slovak citizens. In the end, Igor Matovič promised to citizens of Slovakia, that the villa of the previous minister of finances Vladimír Počiatek would be confiscated and returned to the people if OĽaNo wins the election (OĽaNo, 2020). This is an outstanding example of a populist promise. He described the situation in Slovakia as the most serious since the beginning of the Slovak Republic, because if mafia and Smer–SD win the election, Slovakia will lose the rule of law and democracy for at least ten years. Therefore, the main message was that people should choose the OĽaNo movement and Igor Matovič because he will destroy the mafia and state robbery. He is the solution for this serious issue (OĽaNo, 2020).

The media campaign helped OĽaNO movement get to the top from the bottom positions. Even though is is already a year after the election, he has not done anything about it yet, the villa is still standing there. Nevertheless, he secured an unbelievable popularity with those videos (Kvetko, 2021). The cause of such big popularity is the brilliant combination of Face–book with the strong emotion of anger and revenge. People could finally visualize those millions of Euros in a real form and place (Kvetko, 2021). Through this visualization, Matovič built up bigger anger and frustration in the citizens toward the previous government.

Video from Cannes was a game changer for the OĽaNO movement. The popularity of the video caused rapid rise in preferences of OĽaNO. The video from Cannes was released on January 20, 2020. As you can see from the graph below, this was the point when the preferences of OĽaNO started gradually rise. Igor Mesežnikov claims that this situation changed, "as OĽaNO's support started to raise, people understood there was a chance that by supporting them, they would get a better result and would defeat Smer" (Minarechová, 2020). The green line shows the sudden rise in preferences in January 2020. That was the time when Igor Matovič launched the video from Cannes.

*Figure 1: Change of OĽaNO preferences after the relasement of the video from Cannes: Source- Focus.sk*

Figure 2: Polls of electoral preferences: source-Denník N

Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to show the causes of the sudden rise of populist actors in Slovakia. The conclusion is that short democratic tradition, subject-participant political culture, and preference of authoritarian leaders are the main problem of younger democratic countries. The corruptions, mistrust, rise of cartel - parties, as well as elitism, are the main factors that threaten all democratic countries. The deep crisis caused 12 years of gradual corruption and societal shock from the double killings of an investigative reporter and his fiancée. All these negative causes escalated and created the need for a change. This alternative offers Igor Matovič and his OĽaNO movement an unique chance to succeed in the 2020 election. Nevertheless is important to note that OĽaNo marketing was very effective because people believed in Matovič and his plan of change. According to Martin Kvetko Populism is not a traditional subject because of its anti-systematic elements which polarize society. It means that populism is not stable and has sudden rises and fails. In addition, Igor Matovič's popularity burnt out very quickly. Less than a year has passed since Igor Matovič became the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, and the preferences of his OĽaNO movement fell from 25 percent to 10 percent (Mikušovič, 2020). Martin Kvetko argues that this is not just a Slovak phenomenon. For example, the previous prime minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras suddenly flew to the top but then disappeared quickly. The same is true for Igor Matovič who jumped by 19 percent before the elections, but fell to 10 percent in a few months (Mikušovič, 2020). The future of Slovakia under the rule of Igor Matovič is unpredictable. However, one we can know for sure, it will be very chaotic, full of immaturity and fights due to his lack of inexperience to lead a country (Barborík, 2020).

This study should continue in a further research and compare two countries with sudden rise of populism in order to find out whether there are same or similar causes of rise of populist actors. One thing is certain, Igor Matovič, truly belief that his success in 2020 election created a revolution. When I. Matovič visited French prime minister, he said the 2020 election was revolution from which emerged "second Slovak Republic" (OĽaNO, 2021).

Resumé

Z teoretickej časti autor dospel k záveru, že politická kultúra na Slovensku je skôr tradičná ale má prvky modernosti. Aj preto majú slovenskí voliči tendenciu voliť skôr tradičné strany ako progresívne. Tradičné politické strany sa zameriavajú na úlohu rodiny. Na druhej strane sa progresívne politické strany zameriavajú na rovnosť, partnerstvo osôb rovnakého pohlavia a práva menšín. Teoretická časť opisuje dôvody ktoré zapríčinia úspech populistu. Týmito dôvodmi sú hlavne mix politických kultúr: subjekt kultúry a účastníckej kultúry. nasledujúcej podkapitole som sa zamerala na úlohu inštitúcií a ich význam pre demokratické krajiny. Keď inštitúcie fungujú plnohodnotne a efektívne, minimalizuje sa tak úspech populistických politikov. Nemajú na koho hádzať vinu. Keď však inštitúcie nefungujú, spoločnosť cíti postupné odcudzenie od svojej vlády. Tento zraniteľný vzťah medzi štátom a občanmi otvára obrovský priestor pre populistických alebo extrémnych politikov, ktorí ho využijú ako ich hlavnú zbraň proti aktuálnym politickým špičkám. Mojim hlavným argumentom je že populisti majú omnoho väčšie šance uspieť v časoch krízy. Krízy v podobe straty dôvery v štát. Tým pádom ľudom pripadá štát neefektívny, zbytočný, a treba zmeniť jeho fungovanie. Navyše cítia radu, hnev, frustráciu.

Ľudia potrebovali zmenu a Igor Matovič tak hlasno hovoril o zmene, ktorú si zvolili aj ľudia, ktorí ho nemali radi (MINARECHOVÁ, 2020). Pocity ako hnev a frustráciu vedel I. Matovič briliante použiť a nacieliť na oligarchov. Hlavným dôvodom bola jeho populistická prezentácia problematiky korupcie. Cesta do Francúzska bola zlomovým bodom, ktorým si získal veľkú popularitu a hlavne dôveru ľudí, že môže skutočne zničiť korupciu (Ropp, 2014). Preto existujú dve hlavné príčiny, ktoré pomohli OĽaNo zvíťaziť vo voľbách v roku 2020. Najskôr nespokojnosť voličov s predchádzajúcou politickou vládou Smer-SD sociálna demokracia, ktorá pomohla vzostupu populistického politika, mnoho ľudí ho aj volilo ako menšie zlo, ktoré má šancu poraziť SMER. Po druhé, Igor Matovič ukázal veľkú talent na využívanie médií, a opakovanie jeho hlavný zámeru, ktorým zlepší životy nás všetkých. Zameral sa teda na všetkých ľudí, ktorí chceli zmenu a nahradenie starých nefunkčných skorumpovaných politikov. Tieto dve hlavné príčiny mu pomohli stať sa víťazom volieb v roku 2020.

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