BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

Vertical Horizons in Retribalized Societies: Case Study of Egypt and Tunisia and the Arab Spring

Bachelor Thesis

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Declaration of Originality

I at this moment declare that this bachelor thesis is my work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All of the used academic and other sources of literature are referenced and listed in the bibliography.

A Word of Thanks

A huge shout out and words of gratitude belong to my thesis advisor, Mgr. Dagmar Kusá, PhD., for all her guidance and words of encouragement. She helped me to see something applicable among all the ideas I came up with. Without her, this bachelor thesis would never have happened. Additionally, I need to thank my mother and sister, who helped me to realize that whatever I set myself that I cannot do is a true challenge that, at the end, can be won. Their wise words fuelled me when I was drained and exhausted, but still, I somehow managed to make it.

Abstrakt

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Táto bakalárska práca sa zaoberá prepojením troch konceptuálnych línií – Marshall McLuhan a retribalizácia (1964), Robert Putnam a sociálny kapitál (1993, 2000) a Gabriel Almond a Sidney Verba (1963) a politická kultúra. Všetky uvedené teoretické rámce sú aplikované na spoločnosti v Egypte a v Tunisku ovplyvnené udalosťami, ktoré sa zaraďujú do série verejných protestov pod názvom "Arabská Jar" so začiatkom v roku 2010. Zámerom tejto práce bolo aplikovať definíciu McLuhanovej retribalizácie na súčasnú spoločnosť v Egypte a Tunisku prihliadajúc na ich charakter sociálneho kapitálu a politickej kultúry. Hlavná hypotéza tejto práce bola, že udalosti Arabskej Jari nestačili na kultúrny a inštitucionálny posun potrebný na vznik a rozšírenie dôvery a kooperácie medzi rôznymi časťami spoločnosti, ktoré sú špecifikom pre detribalizované spoločnosti. Okrem štúdia dostupných dátových, knižných zdrojov a reportov, táto práca viedla svoj vlastný výskum prostredníctvom online distribuovaného dotazníka, ktorý slúžil na sledovanie toho, či výsledky zo svetových databáz sa odrážajú aj na dotazníkoch s menším počtom participantov. Ďalším zámerom bolo zistiť aký druh sociálneho kapitálu je v spoločnostiach identifikovateľný, aby sa dalo určiť či sú retribalizované alebo nie. Otázky boli formulované na základe špecificky vybratých premenných ako jeden z výstupov tejto práce. Druhým výstupom boli samotné výsledky výskumu, ktorého sa zúčastnilo 32 respondentov z Egypta

a Tuniska, prevažne vo veku od osemnásť do štyridsaťpäť rokov. Tie poukázali na to, že Egypťania majú väčší záujem o politické dianie ovplyvnené vysokou mierou korupcie. Zatiaľ čo v Tunisku sa ukázala vyššia miera angažovania sa v dobrovoľných a verejných organizáciách. To ale nespôsobilo nejaké viditeľné zmeny v miere dôvery ani jednej z krajín. Respondenti z oboch krajín vyjadrili skeptické názory so súčasnou situáciou a zdôraznili, že ak zmena nezačne zo strany inštitúcií, tak bola Arabská Jar miernou zbytočnosťou zdôrazňujúc dôležitosť stability krajiny v porovnaní s vybudovaním demokratickej spoločnosti. Práca došla k záveru, že retribalizácia a retribalizované spoločnosti v Egypte a Tunisku sú charakterizované silnými putami v rámci premosťujúceho sociálneho kapitálu a parochiálnymi viac tradičnými politickými kultúrami ako výsledok konkrétnych historických trajektórií. Z tohto dôvodu je McLuhanova definícia retribalizácie a jej efektov na spoločnosť z druhej polovice dvadsiateho storočia dodnes aktuálna a aplikovateľná.

Abstract

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This bachelor thesis deals with the intersection of three conceptual lines – Marshall McLuhan and retribalization (1964), Robert Putnam and social capital (1993, 2000), and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) and political culture. The stated theoretical frameworks are applied to the societies in Egypt and Tunisia influenced by events that fall under a series of public protests under the name "Arab Spring" that began in 2010. The ambition of this paper is to apply the definition of McLuhan's retribalization on the contemporary societies in Egypt and Tunisia considering the nature of social capital and political culture. The central hypothesis was that the events of the Arab Spring did not root a cultural and intuitional shift needed to bridge social networks of trust and cooperation accurate for detribalized societies. Besides analysing available datasets, books and reports, this thesis conducted its own research by means of online distributed survey that served to see whether results from worldwide databases are reflected in questionnaires with a smaller sample of participants. Another purpose of the survey was to weigh what type of social capital is identifiable in the societies in order to address if they are retribalized or not. The

questions were formulated by setting specifically chosen variables as one of the outputs of this thesis. The second outcome were the research results, in which participated 32 respondents from Egypt and Tunisia, mostly from the age of eighteen to forty-five. The results pointed out that Egyptians have more interest in politics, which is influenced by a high degree of corruption. Whereas Tunisia showed a higher level of civic engagement in voluntary and civic organisations. However, this did not cause any visible differences in their share of trust. The respondents expressed scepticism with the current situation and highlighted that if the change does not come from the side of the institutions, the Arab Spring was useless stressing the importance of stability of the country in comparison to having a democracy. The thesis came to a conclusion that retribalization and retribalized societies in Egypt and Tunisia are characterised by strong bonds as part of bonding social capital, parochial and more traditional political cultures as a result of concrete historical trajectories. Out of this reason is Mcluhan's definition of retribalization and its effects on society from the second half of the twentieth century contemporary and applicable.

Introduction

Every day, something new occurs that makes the world different from what it was yesterday and what it will be tomorrow. Each year new approaches and theories are created and published to broaden people's outlooks on their surroundings. It is crucial to dedicate this study to topics and frameworks that can be applied universally in any country of the world. They help us to find connections where they would remain overlooked. Its dynamics and unpredictability characterize the twenty-first-century society. And one of the many ways each of us can become a part of those dynamics is through generating it. Whether it is through mass media or social action is not important, the point how and what effects It brings is. A web of networks that have altered our global society interconnects us all. But why is all important?

The year 2010 is a memorable one, a year in which people in the Arab world began to contest their political regimes to push the officials to change their performance and listen to the demands of their citizens. But this is easier said than done. The incentive must not solely come from the bottom, but also from the top, from the side of the institutions, who must be willing to reform. If a country can do is determined by numerous factors and the purpose of this thesis to elaborate on some of them. The Arab Spring was in many ways unique, but that is not the focal focus of this paper. The questions that keep arising are what influenced the flow of the events the way they did? What underlying factors were in play and how they are theoretically observed? The focus of this bachelor thesis is to connect the nature of societies with their historical trajectories and horizontal societal networks. One way or another, the scholars whose sources this argument will take primary use of are

- Marshall McLuhan (1964) and retribalization,
- Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) and his framework of social capital,
- and lastly Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963/1989) and political culture.

The building definition of the hypothesis will be retribalization since it would always make an interesting attempt to engage in discourse with this concept. The concept will be explained in the first chapter. This paper has chosen two countries for its research, Tunisia, and Egypt out of several reasons, but the most crucial ones were the availability of data and simplicity of finding respondents.

After reviewing the primary literature stated above, the thesis discovered that not enough literature, especially applied to the Arab world, employs the notions of all three authors in a correlative relationship. Out of this reason, this bachelor thesis is going to try something maybe yet undiscovered, which limits the scope of literature and the outlook the author of this thesis can employ. All of the primary sources were initially published in the second half of the twentieth century, which besides being an obstacle could be taken as an advantage for research conducted in the twenty-first century.

The thesis is structured into four chapters. Chapter I start with a literature review of the three most important conceptual lines that are crucial for the understanding of the following hypothesis. Chapter II presents the used methodology this thesis employs, both quantitative and qualitative. Next, chapter three will emphasize the differences between bonding and bridging social capital followed by submitting researching the nature of their variables. The last fourth chapter concerns with political culture, at the beginning distinguishing three of the core types developed by linking the theory to institutional confidence, historical trajectories and the nature of attitude toward a political system. The thesis is ended by final conclusions, bibliography, a résumé and an appendix.

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Abbreviations

AS	Arab Spring
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSI	Civil Society Index Project
GS	Google Survey
ICTs	Information Communication Technologies
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
MENA	Middle East and North Africa region
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PC	Political Culture
PS	Political System
SC	Social Capital
WVS	World Values Survey

Chapter I: Everything Has a Beginning

1.1 Back to The Roots

Marshall Herbert McLuhan conceptualized media in an unconventional fashion. His notions include retribalization, hot and cool media[1] or global village to name at least some among many. The general premise around which all of McLuhan's writings evolve is that any historical shift modifies the overall human nature, from our conduct to feelings and perceptions. This Canadian media theorist provided a powerful framework in which to analyse media and the major historical shifts caused by different inventions in technology and human craftsmanship.

First and foremost, McLuhan's first step to becoming a ground-breaking scholar was the book *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* from 1962. He explains the differences the invention of the printing machine brought to our world, from the increase of literacy to mass production of available sources of education that constituted a unifying factor of the people of the era. In this book, McLuhan (1962) concludes that the society detribalized, but since its contradictory term, retribalization, is focal to this thesis, its definition is not relevant in this section.

Secondly, in his book *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* written in 1964, McLuhan did not concern himself with detribalization, but its opposite process – retribalization, which implies a rebound to old tribal sorts of societal associations. Tribes seem to be characterized by their closeness, exclusiveness, which if attacked by any outside forces could result in external tribal violence. Retribalization is a hypothesis, a claim that McLuhan (1964) voiced that sums up the idea that electronics do not isolate us; at the same time, they make us more egocentric, modifying who we are. His theoretical foundation is sometimes very detailed since he puts great emphasis on the analysis of the historical roots of social communication that started with old tribal societies and explains the trajectory leading to the modern times.

Retribalization marks a civilization of electricity, of being ushered in an era of interlinked human clusters spread around the world (McLuhan, 1964, p. 38), bonded together by the connection provided by new electronic media, and in today's manner, by social media[2].

This process was established thanks to the so-called "global village," which by stimulating a constant flow of information made the world noisier and always awake (McLuhan, 1964, p. 101) in comparison to what it was in the times when people used to fill their free time with reading physical printed books and not the electronic versions many enjoy nowadays. By living in a single space, a single mutual entity going from one side of the world to another, humankind has entered an interconnected and interdependent circle, in which one can easily get lost. McLuhan (1964) claimed that the dawn of electronic media made us identity-less. Out of this reason, we wish to retrieve that what constitutes our "self" back and throughout this advancement, people return to old values that can come with severe consequences like tribal brutality and an increased degree of violence.

Though not all kinds of technologies retribalize, noted McLuhan, only "Nonspecialist technology retribalizes" (1964, p.26), those that are widely accessible to general masses. Tribes are tightly interconnected; the members become a whole. It could be debated about that these kinds of communities tend to stand the test of time due to their high-quality social relations of trust and a deep feeling of accomplishment that makes the collective to stay together even when problems arise. But no human being is faultless, and conflicts could naturally endanger the longevity of any intertribal solidarity.

Nevertheless, to every benefit belongs the chance of a disadvantage. By more electronic technologies penetrating our world, the more we feel the urge to go back

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[1] To find more about Mcluhan's media theories applied to the contemporary world, the following book is recommended: Levinson, P. (2001). *Digital McLuhan: A guide to the information millennium* (Revised ed.). New York: Routledge.

[2] What makes social media social? Recommended to see Fuchs, C., (2014). *Social media: A critical introduction*. London: SAGE.

to basics. Hacking of computers has never been easier, and by being constantly online, answering emails or surfing the Web, the reality has become a modern observatory. Also, retribalization demonstrates "The age of the unconscious and apathy," (McLuhan, 1964, p. 52) that could be purposefully applied to questions regarding interest in public affairs, politics etcetera.

Next, tribalism is derived from oral culture (McLuhan, 1964), from traditions that pass on from one generation to another. We do not have to see something happen if our relatives say it did, we believe them. No universality of the eye, but more stress on spoken word, for example, radio is superior to newspaper or TV at least in retribalized societies it would be. This paper thinks that this is what McLuhan saw in retribalization. Rightfully, global wireless connection and access to communicate have their risks as loss of privacy (McLuhan, 1964, p. 129) and by searching for like-minded people online, the struggle of defining one's identity had received major significance. We express ourselves in fashion, music, accessories etcetera– customizing everything is a global trend.

The definition of retribalization can be summarized into the following points

a) High usage of communication devices in everyday lives,

b) Focus on personalization and personal identity,

c) Prevalence of closed exclusive kinship groups,

b) Higher frequency of inter-communal violence,

c) Lack of privacy due to the high penetration of communication technologies namely electronic technologies and social media,

d) Lower interest in politics and public affairs due to media's effect of creating apathy and unconsciousness on their consumers,

e) Oral sense is stronger than visual senses as caused by the stimulating information flow (E. McLuhan & Zingrone, 1995, pp. 114-116).

1.2 Social Capital

Theories of social capital have become relevant in the past twenty years. Social capital has evaporated into all scientific fields. In defiance of Robert Putnam (1993), who belongs to some of the most famous authors in the field, he is surely not the only one. Social capital became a well-discussed area of discourse and research. Countless authors wrote about what social capital is[3], how it should or could be measured as well naming arguments for the multiple reasons why it is important not to neglect this notion.

Along the lines of social capital, most people would instinctively think of capital as money, but the word itself can possess many adjectives with the aid of which altering its meaning. What resources could one think of besides money? One kind of capital is embodied in the mother nature, the Earth we all inhabit – that is the natural capital. It could be argued that ecologists or members of the Greenpeace movement are advocates of natural capital wanting to invest in it to protect it. Brown[4] (2015) discussed a phenomenon of human capital in her book *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* by saying that our social reality has been translated into one big competitive market adapting economy language to ordinary men and women. Human capital[5] calls on human abilities, talents, and knowledge that, as in commercial capital can be invested for future income[6]. Another way of thinking of assets is to reflect on art, customs, music and literature as cultural wealth. They are bodies, which in sum comprise cultural capital, the type of capital the French theorist

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[3] Francis Fukuyama perceived trust to have a radius, space where trust is built and circulating. Every person has a range of trust that has limits. For more on his views on social capital see Fukuyama, F. (2000 April). *Social capital and civil society* (working paper). IMF Institute.

[4] In her book, Brown (2015) utilizes the following book: Foucault, M. (2009). *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 216-233.

[6] For additional information on human capital see Coleman, J. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital". *The American Journal of Sociology. Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure 94* (1) 95-120.

Pierre Bourdieu (1986) explained. Last, but certainly not the least, the sum of many variables used in social capital research to e.g. measure the level of trust perceptions and values constitute a basis of cognitive, social capital (Uphoff, 2000). After all, Putnam's original works must be briefly introduced. In his books *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (*2000), Putnam wonders and aim to explain why are bowling allies not filled with people and why has the trend of bowling clubs have vanished, linking this shift by using social capital.

In *Making Democracy Work* (1993a), he compares the stocks of social capital in the Northern and Southern Italy by making relations between social capital and the level of civicness[7], which can be understood as the building philosophical stone of democracy. The author deals with numerous recognizable differences between the Italian regions. His general assumption that followed his yearlong research was embodied in the term of social capital, which "Is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would be not attainable in its absence" (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). The term social capital, as Putnam (1993a) indicated, "Refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions"(p. 167). It can be derived that if there isn't general confidence in a tribe, there is not so much of a healthy environment for democracy and social capital to increase making investments in both human and physical capital worth more (Putnam, 1993b, p. 2).

Moreover, Putnam distinguishes between bonding and bridging social capital, which will be explained in a separate chapter. Likewise, in the words of Onyx and Bulen (2000), social capital is "A raw material of civil society" (p. 24) that surely glues the people together, but since it is raw, it needs to be shaped by cultivating the social

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[7] In order to see the state of on civic society as part of annual reports, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is a great source of information about the whole world. If you wish to know more about the countris of the Arab Spring and their state of civicness in 2011, see CIVICUS (2012 April). *State of Civil Society Report 2011.* CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Johanessburg, South Africa: Retrieved from: http://socs.civicus.org.

capital, not letting it lose its value. As Reza Jamali (2015) claimed, that the bigger the capital, the more collaborative and stable the commune becomes.

What is more, social capital has political implications. Woolcock and Naryan´s (2000) remarked that the resources at the level of municipalities could potentially help decision making processes to either succeed or fail. One of the most certain features of social capital is that it can only be generated inside a collective; it is meant for the whole, one person would make no use out of it. On a different note, one can examine a self-assertive social capital as Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005) did when they decided to pay closer attention to elite challenging actions, in other words, examples of collective action in instances of public political action. This approach is to show that there is yet another horizon beyond studies of voluntary organizations' membership.

To conclude, the debate surrounding social capital is very rich and encompasses challenges for the study of political science, sociology history, psychology and many other sciences in years to come. But as long as there is a collective of human beings, social capital will remain relevant.

1.3 What Is Political Culture?

In the book *The Civic Culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (1989, orig. version from 1963[8]), Almond and Verba deal with political culture. It is crucial to note that the original book was published in 1963 by Princeton University Press, nonetheless, this thesis employs the same book, but published by a different publisher in 1989, SAGE. By citing Almond and Verba (1989), political culture combines "Political orientations - attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 12). In other words, this particular kind of culture materializes the spirit of political institutions and citizens, who fall under the influence of their decisions and performance. The desired end Almond and Verba (1989) were aiming for was to cover important cultural and

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[8] The five countries of analysis included United Kingdom, USA, Germany, Italy and Mexico.

psychological compounds. To refine, Almond and Verba (1989) classified three basic types of political culture. This classification revolves around four points - how citizens view the political system as one unit, its inputs (demands) and outputs and how they perceive themselves to be active participants (pp. 14-15). By moving along this matrix, the authors distinguish three types of political culture depending on what orientations with respect are dominant. More about political culture will be explained in its individual chapter.

1.4 The Arab Spring Overview

What marks the year 2010 as a milestone for many countries of the MENA region? "It was a year like no other when the whole region shook as ordinary people summoned up the courage to provide a demonstration of "people's power" (Amnesty International, 2012, p. 1). The reason behind these actions from the side of the citizenry are various and reinforcing one another. Derived from this study's survey results, the most respondents claimed the most pressing reason were human rights, democracy, and desire for regime change. According to Human Rights Watch report from 2011, the countries involved in the Arab Spring went into a human rights crisis with state-run imprisonments and repression of freedom. In Egypt, "Security officers "disappeared" those accused of membership in Islamic groups for up to three months and also "went" young political activists for several days" (Human Rights Watch World Report 2011, p. 518). Whereas in Tunisia, "The government frequently uses the threat of terrorism and religious extremism as a pretext to crack down on peaceful dissent" (p. 591).

Apart from human rights issues, Tik Root, an American journalist, said that he thought the most important reason for the Arab Spring was the dissatisfaction with the economy. He added that the social movements that broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, were the first of its kind, people did not know where it all would end (T. Root, Skype conversation, 13.12.2016). Was economy a major problem as well as lack of general liberty?

Amartya Sen (1999) and his concept of Human Development Index (HDI) emphasizes that the principal means of development is the expansion of freedom both in the sphere of economic and social opportunities for healthcare and education. In 2011, Egypt ranked 113th and Tunisia 94th making them medium developed (UNDP Human Development Report, 2011, p. 126). So what triggered the start of people marching in the streets? A streamed video of a burning man (Amnesty International, 2012, p. 1). It can be supposed that this act generated an emotional solidarity and sympathy with the man's despair. After Tunisia, Egypt and countries as Yemen, Morocco, Iraq or Syria, inspired by the revolutionary aspects in Tunisia, avenged against their regimes ("How Tunisia is keeping the Arab Spring ideals", Bennet-Jones, O, 2015). But Egypt and Tunisia are individual cases of the Arab Spring both succeeding in removing their presidents Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, who was pressured into giving up his president status (Miller et al., 2012, p. 79).

By paraphrasing Jamali (2015), this shift opened a space for old and new political parties and candidates to run for the upcoming elections, but in Tunisia, the plurality of individuals is limited (p. 21). These promised to follow the essence of free and fair elections of plurality. The problems seemed to resolve, but that was only a theatre, the transitional governments lacked an internal re-structuralization. More about the institutional and systemic changes that emerged will be a part of subchapter "Institutional Structures and Confidence" (p. 41). Regarding this topic, the GS comes in help to shed light on the perceptions of 32 survey participants about what Jamali (2015) perceived as no heavy machinery conflict, but its softer version (p. 7). The most preferred reason for joining the dissent were human rights, democracy and regime change[9]. In the optional comments to this question, one answer stood out, citing:

"The Tunisian Arab Spring is the biggest mistake of the country; they should call it the Arab Hell"

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[9] Question asked: "What do you perceive was the most crucial of the Arab Spring events"?

(Anonymous male respondent, Tunisia)

1.5 Hypothesis

This paper relates definitions of McLuhan, Putnam and Almond and Verba to two countries of data analysis – Egypt and Tunisia. The reason for doing so is that not enough literature has tried to apply the concepts outside of the American and European borders.

Main Hypothesis: The Arab Spring uprisings did not foster changes in the retribalized societies in Egypt and Tunisia. After reviewing the literature on retribalization, social capital and political culture, the thesis summarizes that the effects on retribalized societies depend on

A1: the prevalence of bridging over bonding social capital,

A2: political culture, namely on the nature of institutional background, and

A3: lastly on affective orientations towards the political system as a result of historical trajectories.

This bachelor thesis aims to inform on the interconnection of political culture in retribalized societies to the dominance of bonding social capital. The research questions are:

Q1: What is the nature of networks in Egypt and Tunisia?

Q2: What is the role of country's institutional background for bridging capital to take root in these countries?

Q3: What orientations foster bridging social capital?

Q4: What joined variables can be studied to combine political culture and social capital in retribalized societies?

Please note that the questions above will not be directly answered to, their answers will be elaborated on in a wider context as part of the chapters of this thesis.

Chapter II: Methodology

This chapter is going to focus on the chosen methodology of this thesis. It includes an overview of qualitative and quantitative techniques.

2.1 Qualitative Methods

This research utilizes an anonymous (no requirement for email addresses) online conducted survey formatted in Google Forms. A combination of empirically based structured, open-ended and statement questions among the targeted sample was managed to gain personal insight. The study was published online in November 2016 and closed down at the beginning of February 2017. For this research, the sample size is n= 32 respondents, for Tunisia, the sample size is n= 15, Egypt's sample size is n= 17. See Figure 5 and Figure 6 in the Appendix to see the gender and age groups' representation. The research emphasizes that conclusions collected only reflect the opinions of a small sample size so do not possess the capacity to make universal generalizations although they are matched to worldwide - acquired datasets to see parallels. For the rest of the paper, this survey will be abbreviated as GS – Google Survey. To find the sample, Internet communication technologies were used. Among social media platforms - Facebook, Twitter, and Email. The first two were used to find respondents from the case study countries, Egypt and Tunisia.

Additionally, one Skype conversation was conducted with an American now based in New York journalist Tik Root, who lived in Egypt and Yemen shortly after AS uprisings broke out. Most of the respondents of the Google survey responded to a public forum with a shared link to the study on the website of InterNations– an Internet-based community that aims to help people, who when traveling abroad to start a new chapter have a hard time finding friends, who could assist them to settle down. Without this platform, the research would never be finalized. The survey consisted of 37 short questions including two choices of filling in optional comments out of which some asked to indicate a point on one to five scale, and others included single choice and multiple-choice questions with the possibility of adding an optional comment.

2.2 Quantitative Methods

This research utilizes survey data from World Values Survey (abbr. WVS), Afrobarometer and Arabbarometer for the countries represented in the Arab Spring. A stronger emphasis is being placed on information obtained from Egypt and Tunisia so to a carry out a comparative analysis to reach a conclusion on their stocks of bonding and bridging social capital and other chosen variables. Statistical data and responses from broader surveys were used to support and disapprove certain arguments with the paper. Also, they contributed in comparing the data from larger samples to my small scale research. The three top datasets used were:

Table 1. Overview of Used Datasets

Name of the database	Area of analysis	Wave/Round	Egypt sample size (n)	Tunisia sample size (n)
World Values Survey	Global	Wave 6 2010/2014	n=1523	n=1205
Afrobarometer	Africa	Round 5 2011/2013 Round 6 2014/2015	n=1190 n=1192	n=1200 n=1 200
Arabbarometer	Middle East, Northern Africa	Round 2 2011 Round 3 2013	n= 1219 n=1195	n=1196 n=1199
Google Survey	Egypt and Tunisia	Round1 2016/Feb. 2017	n= 17	n=15

 Data adapted from *World Values Survey* [Online Data Analysis Database] [Egypt, Tunisia], [Wave 6], [2010-2014].

Afrobarometer Survey Data, [Online Data Analysis Database] [Egypt, Tunisia], [Rounds 5 and 6], [2011-2013 and 2014-2015].

Arabbarometer Survey Data, [Online Data Analysis Database] [Egypt, Tunisia], [Rounds 2 and 3], [2011 and 2013].

Because the databases operate with individual and personal questions, the data results must be held with caution since the answers represent a smaller sample of the participant countries' respondents and cannot correspond to the opinions of whole nations.

Next, a comparative analysis belonging to case study analysis allows observing any phenomena from the perspective of diversity-oriented research. It is not expected that one single variable explains the whole societal context but that the numerous

variables together can give a good explanation of the dissimilarities and perhaps be able to start a discussion on new emerging trends.

As for the last claim, this thesis acknowledges the fact that as human beings, our objectivity is influenced by our subjective perceptions and feelings. Likewise, participants might not be willing to admit and to be completely honest regarding certain topics and questions.

Chapter III: From Bonds to Bridges

This section will primarily focus on Putnam's distinction of social capital that is based on the predominance of human networks and relationships. The two main types Putnam clarified in books from 1993 and 2000, discloses are bonding and bridging social capital. To begin with, this section will start off with recalling what social capital is accompanied by making clear the features Putnam entitles to both types of social capital. All steps are necessary to be able to determine and analyse one of the research questions on the nature of networks in Egypt and Tunisia.

3.1 Bonding Social Capital

Robert Putnam (1993[10], 2000[11]) defines bonding social capital as composed and enforced by close interpersonal ties that, as quoted from Putnam (2000), are "Inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups" (p. 20), for example, scouts or Bible groups. Putnam thought of bonding social capital as being a superglue making these networks to last for generations. It could be supposed that such personal, horizontal ties that are fundamentally family oriented develop via the process of socialization and are actively instructed by person's background and encircling mode of culture.

Plus, bonding social capital is hard to measure objectively, since stronger bonds develop in closely aligned relationships, mostly with friends, family or one's neighbours. What goes hand in hand with measuring this type of social capital is that the networks tend to last longer thanks to them being taken care of ever since childhood. One of the recurrently voiced issues of bonding social capital lies within the closeness of each group and its target to keep their doors shut from strangers. Such

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[10] Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy Work: Civic traditions in modern Italy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[11] Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community.* (Reprinted version) New York: Simon and Schuster.

enforcement promotes and prolongs the supremacy of social differences (Putnam, 1993). Since bonding social capital concerns with family-like kin, it can be supposed that it predominantly remains to be situated in more agricultural countryside areas, villages and smaller towns.

3.2 Bridging social capital

Each feature of the previously commented type of social capital can be turned over its head. First and foremost, as the name foretells, what do bridges do? They let us go from one side of e.g. a city to the other. It could be arguing that bonding would keep on the side, not having enough of solid top build the bridge. These networks are more heterogeneous and public oriented. This kind of social capital is present in civil right movements or youth organizations. Putnam (2000) accounts for bridging social capital and that its presence is "Better for external assets and information diffusion" (p. 20). In reality, the fewer people do so, the more advantageous work-related circles one can build. Regardless of the ties being weaker than in bonding social capital, they do not lose competence to foster cooperation throughout various layers of tribes. One more way of establishing bridging networks of trust and collaboration is embodied in people's what this thesis would name an emotional bank and what Tomasello et al. would rename as "group-mindedness" (Tomasello et al., 2012, p. 682). This type of social capital is more likely to be fostered in urban cities.

To combine, there are a couple of things to consider to decide whether a tribe has more bonding over bridging social capital. Firstly, a tribe must be open to stuck out from its status quo and to lean more forward towards negotiations, compromise and advancement. This rearrangement can be resolutely seen in how retribalized societies in countries like the Netherlands, Germany or even Slovakia began to focus more on liberal leaning rights and movements that promote equal opportunities for everyone notwithstanding race, sex, gender or nationality. People will hopefully never resemble mechanic robots; who look identical with only a serial number for differentiation.
 On this account, acceptance of various qualities must be ensured. Hence cultivating this type of capital is very advantageous to communities to build stronger connections

between people of higher and lower social ranks, wealthy and poor, educated and non-educated - the list of contracts can go on and on. Putnam equates this capital with the high level of civicness; in less civic regions, class differences run deeper and could potentially make life more dangerous (1993a, p. 111). If we wish to see how advanced a tribe is in the most poignant way, Ronald Inglehart (1977) recommended looking at the score of social tolerance and openness. This score is the strongest in indicator of postmodern, post-material culture of the post-World War II world, when a generational shift occurred that he named a "Silent Revolution" (Inglehart, 1977, p. 365). The post-war generation's orientation was not strictly set up on obtaining material possessions but on values including human and civil rights, gender equality, trust, and security. To remember at all costs, Putnam (1993b) emphasizes that "Social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it" (p. 10).

To end this distinction on bonding and bridging social capital, this thesis does not intend to narrate a consciousness that bonding SC cannot live in harmonious relationship with bridging SC and vice versa. Quite the opposite, they reinforce each other, bonding social capital is the foundation, the concrete of the bridge a detribalized society has managed to start putting together (Putnam, 2000, p. 21).

3.3 Research on the Web of Networks

After describing and evaluating some of the essential features attributed to both bonding and bridging social capital, as interpreted by Robert Putnam in both his books, one from 1993 and the other from 2000, this paper has put together a list of research variables that will be analysed in this chapter. To save time and space, the section jumps right into the research variables that were conceptualized from and within the primary sources of McLuhan (1964), Putnam (1993, 2000) and Almond and Verba (1989). Please note that these were chosen as to see the connections between the concepts and fixed to this specific analysis. Some steps are left out or added to fit the research more appropriately.

Out of this reason, this thesis research had to choose which independent variables will be observed to determine whether bonding or bridging social capital prevailed, applied to both Tunisia and Egypt. The first variable will analyse:

1) Active Civic Participation - It is pivotal to care dynamic group individuals and not those who are purely rank members. Although note that the bulk of Putnam's most celebrated work, was published long before mass and social media have started to spread by leaps and bounds.

Figure 1: Membership in a voluntary or civic organization

As shown in Figure 1, the sample chosen for this survey is significantly more involved in voluntary or civic organizations. The reason behind it might be that the sample consisted of mostly young students, who are more easy-going and reflective on their future than the elders. However, the interesting point is that Tunisia, the country that has been gradually transitioning and implementing more democratically oriented legal systems and practices is showing that the society could be on its way to more democratized society. This possibility of future development strikes against Egypt, whose membership is lower, but always better than nothing. Additionally, for the question regarding if the respondent has ever done any voluntary activity, the vast majority responded that they did. One participant highlighted that the action is deeply

rooted in the family's traditions. UNICEF, international NGO's, teaching poorer children or donating clothes – these are only some among many. For more of a global outlook, data received from Afrobarometer in two waves, from 2011 – 2015 concluded that participation in voluntary organizations, reaching high 80 and 90 percent, of the respondents not to be members of any association or community group. It could be summarized that this kind of civic participation is not promoted enough or having no inner feeling to be a part of such entities. The second employed social capital variable is trust, more specifically, social trust. Most frequently, the questions on trust are very straight forward.

2) Social trust - The results from the GS reveal that the level of trust is factor dependent. Hence the so many respondents chose the answer that circumstances and objects towards which trust should be oriented. However, Tunisians are more attentive and careful than Egyptians. Set side by side with information from Afrobarometer (Round 6 2014-2015), close to two-thirds of the Tunisian and Egyptian sample stated that one "cannot be too careful" hence being suspicious about others is normal. After examining all datasets from the waves as presented in Table 1, generalized trust is trapped in a downward trend.

Figure 2: On levels of social trust

Q: "Can people be trusted or you cannot be too careful"?

ŠVANDOVÁ: Vertical Horizons in Retribalized Societies

As the results in Figure 3 exhibit, about 50 percent of the respondents from both countries combined claimed to trust only some neighbours on the question "Would you say that you can trust the people in your neighbourhood"? About 50 percent of the respondents from both countries combined claimed to trust only some neighbours. The second most frequent answers were portraying a total lack of trust, with 23 percent of respondents voicing this opinion. In comparison to World Values Survey (2010-2014), inter-neighbourhood trust has been kept in the more beneficial line of having complete trust or being somewhat trusting. It is almost staggeringly different from the responses of the GS, which of course takes into account that the sample in WVS is much larger and therefore more diverse and valuable to make following national generalizations. To support, Jamali (2015) pointed out that "The Egyptian people have experienced a loss of their sense of belonging, while inter-group trust has grown" (p. 22), focusing more on personal identification, just as McLuhan (1964) described in his idea of retribalized societies and loss of individualism.

Figure 3: Trust in neighbourhood

3) Interest in politics - Putnam (2000) recognizes the role of interest in politics as "critical preconditions for more active forms of involvement" (p. 33). This variable includes countless manifestations of political discussions, attending meetings and

referendums. There is a hidden priority in cantering political participation, and the way members of a tribe can change the operations of a political game. This thesis will employ interest in politics from a rationally oriented approach. If we take a cognitive interest in politics and behaviour towards political objects — in the way Almond and Verba (1989) describe it and Putnam (1993) practically measures it. Cognitive orientations embody a "Knowledge of and belief in the political system, its inputs, and outputs" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 14). The questions posed in survey research were purposely chosen to unveil people's cognitive orientations towards the political system. One question arises, how do people most frequently expand informational sources? With McLuhan in mind, one of the many ways might be social media. To support, one of the questions as part of the GS asked the participants what they think is the focal purpose of social media. Jointly, 22 respondents said it was for receiving information about worldwide as well as local events. As expected, the first place belongs to communication followed by receiving information and meeting new people.

To get back to the argument on politics, why should be people interested in politics in the first place? The easiest answers to this question are that they can be very confusing and complicated that average, for rural and less educated citizens more than for urban students and upper-class members. There is a sense of psychological non-devotion that protects the individual from emotional pain[12] and frustration. Asides from the psychological factor, Egypt did not turn off its interest in politics, based on the GS results in the graph above, as well as the World Values Survey data from Wave 6 from 2010-2014.

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[12] For more information on emotional pain that facilitates the rise of public dissatisfaction see Hartling, L. (1996). *Humiliation, real pain: A pathway to violence*. MA: Wellesley College.

Figure 4: Interest in politics and national affairs

This phenomenon could be caused by also more media exposure and coverage of political happenings. Naturally, this does not require concern state-owned media. Particularly when the countries are fighting for a reformation using collective action and violence, politics become a part of one's life. To add, since Egypt is more corrupted than Tunisia, this paper does believe that the correlation makes citizens more willing to get familiar with how the PS works and what outputs it produces, both negative or positive. Since Tunisia is taking steps to liberalize the country and the state is taking some measures to fulfil the people's demands, it can be disputed that what all citizens need is responsiveness that fosters trust levels in the political systems. Quoting a GS answer:

"Corrupt politics and their control over everything gave me a huge trust issue that most of the people do no good for no reason (everyone has a hidden agenda)"

(Male respondent from Egypt)

6) Civic and political participation is determined by the whole mixture of variables that follow the main arguments of the thesis. Nevertheless, this variable will not be explored for particular reasons. This thesis has already employed that everything links with one another. One of the most common variables to portray civic and political

participation is voter turnouts, but with the Arab Spring, it is much more arduous than writing down the percentage in each round of elections. As a general trend, depending on the country and specific period, the proportion of those, who visit a ballot station alternates. It can be argued that parliamentary elections hold a greater value for citizens as they could choose a person, who is closer to them or even in man's closer social circles and physical vicinity. Data from IDEA[13] (2016) and its "*Voter Turnout Database*" will administer vital information to carry out a comparative analysis of Egypt and Tunisia in pursuance of their electoral participation. The database encompasses numbers of voter turnouts for parliamentary and presidential elections. To know more about the GS respondents' electoral involvement, see Figure 7 in the Appendix.

On the one hand, in Egypt, the numbers of parliamentary voters have been increasing since the late 1970s hitting their first peak in 1987 and then in 2012 after which the percentage declined by almost 40 percent (IDEA, 1987 and 2012). However, the numbers are in a positive correlation with the rapid population boom. The same trend applies to elections that are objected to choose a new president. In Egypt, the first registered presidential elections were carried out fairly recently, only twelve years ago. The turnout was about 23 percent, whereas, in the revolutionary year, it went steeply up to over 50 percent falling by approximately three percent two years after. Additionally, what do the numbers look like in election for people's assemblies or referendum? Usually, the range went from 28 percent to 40 percent spectrum in 2011.

On the other hand, Tunisia is well known for its extremely high turnouts that have been declining after 2004 parliamentary elections, ranging from 91.5 percent in 1999 to three years ago 67 percent in 2014 (IDEA, Voter Turnout Database, 1999 and 2014). The voting age population had almost doubled in size, but the jump is not as high as in Egypt, of course taking a much bigger geographical area to cover than Tunisia has. Voting in Tunisia is not compulsory, which signifies a totally different thinking possessed by the citizens. Regarding Tunisian presidential elections, in 1994 the

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[13] Abbreviation for "International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance."

detected turnout was over 95 percent, yet in 2014 it was approximately 35 percent less (IDEA, 1994 and 2014). These high numbers are usually linked with voters' beliefs in the political process and their desire for a change of government, therefore a possible correlation between a high turnout and anti-incumbency can be argued for, at least in the case of Egypt and Tunisia.

In conclusion, this whole chapter highlights the unimaginable affiliation of collective Arab history, political culture, trust and social capital. No political culture would not exist without any social capital, notwithstanding its stock or type. All factors either encourage or discourage the members of retribalized societies to get involved outside of the warmth of the family house. Sometimes it takes hundreds of years for a political culture to change, but the institutions, stocks of social capital and types of networks must be modified beforehand for the PC to start developing its new appearance.

Chapter IV: All Goes Down to History and Institutions

The primary argument of this chapter is that a shift of retribalized society also depends on political culture, namely the character of institutions, institutional confidence, and pervasiveness of affective orientations towards the state. To start from the very basis, the discussion will start with how the term "political culture" was originally defined and categorized by Almond and Verba in T*he Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* published in originally 1963, but this thesis uses the same book from a different publisher from 1989. Afterward, the initial statement will shift to look at the historical orbits that build and consequently determined the political cultures of the two countries of analysis. Thereupon we can launch to go into more detail in analysing the institutional structures present in Egypt and Tunisia. By the end of the section, the argument will follow what orientations prevail in the mentioned countries' political cultures, ended by giving guiding points of institutional improvements that can be made in the future.

4.1. Basic Types of Political Cultures

The following subsections will take a closer look at Almond and Verba's (1989) three-fold distinction of political cultures followed by exploring the history determined paths that both Tunisia and Egypt underwent that have configured their political cultures, natures of political systems and institutional structures.

4.1.1 Parochial Political Culture

Almond and Verba reported (1989) that the cardinal type of political culture is parochial, emblematic for old tribal and less developed societies (p. 16). All things considered, the word "parochialism" itself can be translated as having a limited outlook that can be a result of strong attachment to for example religion. There is almost a zero-political specialization. If were to talk about a tribal chief, who is empowered with being religious, social and political leader locked in one single body.

Tribal villages and communities have expectations from neither outputs nor inputs side of the system, thus being aware of the existence of the scheme itself. Tunisia and Egypt are strongly religious countries and at the same time religiously united. Since Islam dates way back to the sixths century C.E., it is more than likely to be deeply rooted in the countries. Additionally, the countries´ legal system derives its decisions and conduct from "Shari'ah (Islamic law) as a fundamental source of legislation" (BTI[14] - Egypt Country Report, 2012, p. 6), and the same applies to Tunisia, too.

In contrast, before 2011, the Tunisian president Ben Ali was still in power, the state was developing a more materialistic and Western-oriented resolutions to legal system with European models as a source of inspiration (BTI-Tunisia Country Report, 2012)[15]. It could be disputed that any possible downturn in respect to religious organizations cannot influence one's faith, only the image of the religion and its values. The GS survey did not refute the role of religion in the Egyptian and Tunisian retribalized societies; most participants attend religious services on a weekly basis. It is estimated that in 33 years, the number of Muslims globally will be approximately double the times bigger than the number of Christians ("The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050", Pew Research Center, 2015, p. 7). What this holds for future development is questionable.

Lastly, most of us know that religion is something not worth questioning, or at least impossible either to refute or to confirm. Being religious is something very personal, it can be a great source of confidence and hope that even when the worst things hit us with all their power, there is always something to keep us moving. Religion bonds people together into one huge tribe, since its doctrines are universally accepted by its believers.

4.1.2 Subject Political Culture

If from a historical path a tribe develops at least some degree of political affinity, it is

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[14] Abbreviation for " Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index"

not merely a parochial political culture. The second type of PC is subject political culture, by which citizens' attitudes and feelings are aligned towards the general scheme of the PS, but remaining to give extra caution to the subjects involved within (Almond & Verba, 1989, pp. 17-18).

On an individual level, citizens do not think of themselves as being active participants, and no affiliations to the input side like for example to interest groups or legislative bodies are needed. On the positive side, feelings in connection to output objects such as public policies are a sure thing in subject political culture. Almond and Verba (1989) concluded that this particular kind of PC seems fitted for centralized authoritarian structures that can be intertwined with periods when on the eye democratic principles are applied in state ruling.

In summation, citizens acknowledge the existence of a "Specialized governmental authority" (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 17). Despite Egypt being divided into 29 districts, the decisions go from one central place (BTI- Egypt Country Report, 2012), whereas Tunisia has been eagerly developing its rural areas proving economic development is not to only metropolitan regions (BTI-Tunisia Country Report, 2012). Nonetheless, there is a lack of any other analytical and deliberate affections to the system.

4.1.3 Participant Political Culture

Last but certainly not the least, participant political culture has its essence in the name – to take part in a PS and engage, sounds like a utopia for any democracy preferring fraction of society (Almond & Verba, 1989, p.18). In participant PCs, citizens tend to be more active and committed in comparisons to parochial and subject political cultures. Important to realize is that political cultures have no distinctive limits as noted by Almond and Verba (1989, pp. 19-20). Under those circumstances, participant, subject and parochial (more local) orientations can fuse with one another, every time accustoming to sometimes extreme modifications, conditions and overall development. Shifting away from the political aspects of Almond and Verba (1989), Dessouki (1982) highlighted that the Arab world possesses mass political culture

constituted of "The coexistence of the old and the new" (p. 24), a similar argument as the one proposed by Asante (2002).

To compile the facts, there are three types of political cultures depending on the type of orientations towards the four-fold political system. The details about the nature of political orientations will be unveiled in the section "What You Know Is What You Think" (p. 40).

4.2 Similar Historical Experiences

It might be stated that Egypt and Tunisia are nations with immense cultural heritages as any other lands. They are scarred by having to share a bulk of their history and territory with strangers. Although, this goes for most of the world. But this could be one of the reasons why the citizens are proud of their nationalities. World Values Survey and Afrobarometer data show that in the span of fifteen years, from 1999 to 2014, the respondents were very or quite proud of their nationality and nation. As part of the Google Survey research, eleven respondents said they have a strong personal inclining to their country and land.

Egypt, a country with over approximately 94 million inhabitants (CIA World Factbook, 2017) in the middle of the African desert. For Tunisia, because it inhabits the same African land as Egypt does, there are some similarities between their historical experiences. But the area it occupies is more homogenous, of course, that can be accredited to being about one-sixth of Egypt, and the Tunisian population is estimated at over eleven million citizens (CIA World Factbook, 2017). Both countries' historical narratives are marked by being battlefields of the Ottoman Empire (sixteenth until the eighteenth century) as well as the European conquering quests (Dessouki, 1971). All of the Ottoman's colonies were indirectly administered from the Empire's centre of Constantinople (today's Istanbul). Any period of foreign colonialism always leaves an undeniable imprint on the future evolution.

Interestingly, Egypt and Tunisia were originally not an Arab speaking and Islam preaching territories. Everything changed in the seventh century C.E. when

Muhammad's messengers decided to spread the words of Allah into neighbouring countries (Asante, 2002, p. 63).

Furthermore, the time after the fall of the Ottoman Empire left a vacuum for new colonizers namely for the Europeans or even Christian crusaders to take it. Later on during World War I, Egypt became a protectorate of the British Empire (Asante, 2002), while Tunisia remained to be colonized by the French from the nineteenth century (Entelis, 1980).

Institution-wise, both countries used to have royal families, who stepped off from power in the 1950s (Asante, 2002). In the first, Egypt's monarchy was abolished in favour the first republican constitution, and the same applies to Tunisia, where the Royals were dethroned for the same reasons. Egypt has developed a mixed regime incorporating both democratic and civil society practices, yet holds repressive power and total control over the state (Miller et al., 2012, p. 81). Both countries were not directly ruled by the Ottomans, only from a distance and got independent after the colonizing powers were left defeated, which allowed them to establish their first republics with strong centralized authoritarian presidents. "For most of the evaluation period, the system of power relationships and the constitutional and legal arrangements organizing political life in Tunisia were authoritarian forbidding any competitiveness in the political arena (BTI – Tunisia Country Report, 2012, p. 2). Even though the history foretells many ups and downs, the "inherited" institutional systems are authoritarian and concerning the Muslim Holy Prophet.

4.3 What You Know Is What You Think

This paper has already evolved around what political culture is and classified its three focal types Almond and Verba (1989) described. To remind the initial statement of this whole chapter, it argues that a shift of retribalized society, as defined by McLuhan (1964) also depends on the pervasiveness of affective orientations towards the PS. It can be said that certain direction tends to lead to allowing more bonding and some could potentially foster bridging social capital.

To begin with, there are three distinctions of orientations - cognitive, affective and lastly evaluative as classified by Almond and Verba (1989, p. 14). The cognitive orientations refer to knowledge and beliefs about the system, for example, perceiving the country as stable or unimportant and small on the contrary to other nations. All kinds of orientations emanate among other factors from political socialization that begins when children learn to talk, read and orient themselves within the social milieu. The process realizes the role of education, family or media exposure. To which PC would one ascribe the prevalence of cognitive orientations? In the words of Almond and Verba (1989), parochial PC and cognitive orientations are like "bread and butter", they go perfectly together.

By aiming to put the theory above into Putnam's (1993, 2000) context, what social capital could we argue is more correlated with cognitive orientations? It sounds more than plausible to assume that bridging social capital is pointing to cognitive orientations. Forasmuch as the definition is concerned, knowledge about the system, its inputs, and outputs, compels rational and more objective evaluations derived from experiences, observation of the political situation or generally about the political game. Imagine someone asking a teenager why he or she dislikes Slovakia's prime minister Robert Fico. If the answer is simply because the parents always have, the child is not so eager to decide and research ergo bonding social capital is more at action than bridging social capital. The teenager takes the beliefs and knowledge his parents ahem accumulated and holds it as his or her own. In this instance, it is not cognitive but affective orientations, which are at stake. The affective orientations are mere feelings and unexplainable emotions derived from basic information about the PS's performance and actors. This is to say that bonding social capital does not stand in need of external help because it can originate within closely tied social arrangements such as families, co-workers, neighbourhoods and regional organizations.

By the opinion of Almond and Verba (1989), higher rates of affective orientations are in parochial societies, those where bridging SC has a hard time to emerge along the bonding one (p. 20). This thesis research (2016/2017) concluded that most of the

respondents from both countries when asked: "How would you describe your political orientation"? share political orientations from a category associated with democracies such as democratic and liberal political inclination. It can be speculated that the citizens feel alienated on account of not being interested in politics enough, but this argument would require further elaboration.

The last orientations' group are evaluative and are comprehended of one's opinions and judgments, in traditional tribes they can be positively charged otherwise the tribe might break up in great inter-violence (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 21). Because political culture "is the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations," (Almond & Verba, 1989, p.16), the orientations can make up unique mixes that would pose a challenge for scholars for years to come. What shapes the perceptions and expectations held by ordinary men and women is experience and habitual familiarity that the PS works the way it always has.

4.4 Institutional Structures and Confidence

Two parts of the argument number two were already paid attention to, leaving only one final step left. The question is - "What is the role of country's institutional background for bridging capital to take root in these countries"? The premise is that if there is no sufficient institutional support and confidence in their trustworthiness, it is a battle more likely lost than won. After each argument, a section will follow that will elaborate on data that could either support or refute the written statement.

The reasons are:

- Lack of generalized trust toward institutions,

    The institutional background of both Egypt and Tunisia went through series of transformation. Their institutional schemes have many similarities derived from their shared history and political culture. It can be assumed that because the countries' have a long experience with foreign rulers, their legal

system, after claiming independence, could have inherited that legislative essence. As the primary data as part of " CIA Word Factbook" (2017 show, Egypt's and Tunisia's legal systems act upon not purely Islamic religious law. By adopting foreign laws decades ago might shed some light on the reasons why are people so skeptical and distrustful towards the system and some of its constituted parts.

Coming back to the political systems and regimes, taking information from the CIA World Factbook (2017) yet again, Egypt is a presidential republic and Tunisia on the other a parliamentary one. Both countries, having strongly enforced political hierarchies, practically one party states, have almost identical legislative, executive and judiciary branches - an elected president, prime minister and an unicameral government. Here, little attention is needed particualrly when talking about "elected" presidents. Egypt has never had presidential elections, the first ones were five years ago ("Arab Spring 5 years on: Timeline of the major events and uprisings in the Middle East", Smith, 2016). Tunisia has not fared any better in the past decades, Miller et.al (2012) despite having open presidential elections, it is curious how easy Ben Ali beaten the competition winning consecutively (p. 58).

One striking feature that the CIA World Factbook (2017) revealed was that the judges of their Supreme Courts are in Egypt appointed for life, whereas in Tunisia, a new institution checking on the decisions of the judiciaries was put into action. More importantly, do the systems work for the people? Is there a lack of generalized trust towards the institutions?

This research argues that there is a lack of trust and institutional confidence. One way to understand this claim is that the institutions do not perform efficiently. From the 2014 data summarized by the "State Fragility Index", as an output project of the Center for Systemic Peace and the authors Marshall and Cole (2014) from the organization, Tunisia is governed more efficiently than Egypt obtaining its political regime to be a democracy instead of Egypt's

autocracy (Marshall & Cole, 2014). States that were going through such massive wave of public dissent as the one of the Arab Spring get fractured by the situation and the thing that the Arab Spring even accomplished some of its demands is a showcase that the involved countries are very fragile. As Kedourie (1992) remarked, both Egypt and Tunisia have a history of adopting numerous constitutions, although their practical aspect is always the same- the laws are only for a show, the real game is played be the political elites and officials.

It should be taken into consideration that after the AS, the countries did not know what to do or in better words how to do it. From a psychological perspective, it is evident that no one wants to live in rough conditions, not knowing what could happen anytime soon. In the exact words of Miller et al. (2012), some of the major obstacles countries of the Arab Spring have to face to democratize are "Weak party identification; limited experiences with fundamental democratic processes, including voting;" (Miller et al., 2012, p. 59).

Repeatedly, all depends on the happenings of the past, which have altered the present as well as the future. A general assumption could be formulated namely that democracy supports peace more other types of regimes. This is not far from the truth. As the Pew Research Center and their research on public attitudes in 2014 concluded, citizens of both countries preferred stability over democracy, hence in Tunisia people had more faith in the military than in their government. To remember at all costs, Putnam (1993b) emphasizes that "Social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it" (p. 10). As one respondent from Egypt in the age group from 26 to 35 said in the survey, quoting:

" We had our hopes up for a couple of years, and now we are back to where

we were and worse,"

(Anonymous male respondent, Egypt)

- High level of Corruption

At this point, there is no better indicator of lack of institutional confidence than an annual index by Transparency International on the levels of global corruption. If there is a higher degree of corruption, people are less likely to have trust in the state institutions, since as it is believed to be useless to have some. Based on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, put together by Transparency International, Tunisia is currently the 75th most corrupted country, 33 ranks under Egypt out of all 176 countries listed in the "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016" (Transparency International, 2017). Hattar (2017) noted that Tunisia is the new hope by pioneering anti-corruption measures such as Access to Information Law and implemented specific policies to deliberately begin defeating state guided and run bribery.

As it could prove very precious, what changes could be done to start a modification of the political culture and the institutional level? This paper accepts that everything in our reality requires time and with elements like political culture or vertical support of cooperation, it requests, even more, time. But in a more logical sense, what else? More stress should be put on education and a balance of authoritarian and democratic ideologies. Less corruption and more responsiveness from the side of the citizenry and equally from the political actors could improve the state of the PS and over a longer time span,

To summarize, this chapter argued for Tunisia and Egypt to have collective Arab history that influences the nature of their political cultures and institutional structures. Traditional values of religion and family kinship as part of bonding social capital are taking first place in retribalized societies that experienced countless period of foreign conquest, fight for their independence and derivatively decades of strong authoritarian leadership. This caused high levels of systematic fraud and misrepresentation in the whole political system that is slower in Tunisia than in Egypt.

Conclusions

This bachelor thesis has conquered the challenge of correlating three distinct theoretical frameworks, something that was not done before in one single writing. The hypothesis was definition oriented, which means that its role was not to refute the theoretical backgrounds. The most crucial point is that for the retribalized bonding societies to become more detribalized with more develop bridging networks of trust and cooperation, then the process must start from the institutions and take a top to bottom approach. Overall, the events of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, which began a wave of reforms have not been influential in altering the retribalized society. All societies are retribalized according to McLuhan since the Electronic Age is a global phenomenon. The question was not whether any retribalized society is changing, but what more what would it take for the retribalized societies to do to modify it. Both countries have parochial political cultures with high religious values derived from the Islamic faith. Despite this point not being thoroughly explored, religion has always been perceived as the core item of traditional values and custom that are also incorporated into legal systems as a decisive source of guidance and decision making.

After examining all the data, the paper came to a couple of conclusions. Bridging social capital was not fostered in the time span of 2010 until 2014. In a state of crisis, people gravitate towards closely interlocked networks for support, a source of trust and companionship. Bridging social capital requires more institutional confidence from the side of the citizenry, which is absent due to a high level of corruption, in Egypt more than in Tunisia. The institutions are still in the learning process, figuring out how to alter the system to prevent another 2017 Arab Spring. After reading through this thesis´ survey responses, most of the participants are very sceptical and apathetic that their countries can begin to leave the traces of authoritarian regimes.

Another factor, social trust, is confined to at first regional trust, only then a large scale national trust can start to develop. Civic participation and NGO´s should try to motivate people to engage, in anything they might believe in actively. The first

argument was proven- bonding social capital is integrated too vigorously, and the institutional structures do not help to widen the societal networks and nets of possible future cooperation. People demobilized too quickly, Egypt seems to have changed nothing, Tunisia at least some parts of its legal system. A wave of episodic social movements[16] is too short lived and additionally, the factors to consider in assessing social movements are very complex. The shift of retribalized societies to become more detribalized needs to stem from both top and bottom, but if the institutions do not participate, it is lost. A cultural and institutional shift needs more to root and spread bridging networks of trust and cooperation characteristic of detribalized societies.

What the future would look like is unlikely to be answered at this point, but this thesis believes that both Egypt and Tunisia have a combination of both bridging and bonding social capital. They have a certain ratio, although it gets overridden by the bonding one, which is not surprising especially after the Arab Spring that effected people´s live courses and the political regime itself. It could be argued that the demonstration in Egypt and Tunisia illustrated what could be the first step to building stronger networks of cooperation and trust. Bridging social capital aids to promote civicness, a virtue that is the ethos of democracy so if the countries involved wish to democratise, they have to start building that bridging social capital with the bonding one as the foundation. Where the future will take the nations of the Arab Spring is a huge question the world is not brave enough to answer. But one thing is known for sure – Tunisia has managed to start its way to being more democratic-like and to obtain a democracy status, while Egypt is, if not even at the worst place than it was before 2010/2011. Whether it will last cannot be accurately stated, even though some countries want to have more liberal ideologies enforced does not mean that they can suddenly become democratic. Everything is in the past, the present and the future.

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[16] For more information about social movements see Cameron, W. B. (1966). *Modern social movements: A sociological outline.* New York: Random House.

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Resumé

Táto téma ma zaujala už keď sa začínala Arabská Jar. Bola som šokovaná tým, ako sa ľudia dokázali tak rýchlo zmobilizovať a preukázať, že sila demonštrácie by nemala byť podceňovaná. No napriek tomu, že sa môže celá séria protestov považovať za úspech, otázky ohľadom toho, aký vplyv mali udalosti na spoločnosť prirodzene ostali ostávali nezodpovedané. Potom, akú rolu zohrali v udalostiach médiá, obzvlášť sociálne médiá, teória Marshalla Mcluhana (1964) ideálnym východiskom pre štúdium v tejto práci. Následne práca uvažovala nad tým, ako sa zmenil charakter sociálneho kapitálu od Roberta Putnama (2000) ktorý je jedným z popredných indikátorov v sociológii, politológii a v iných vedách. Posledným konceptom bola politická kultúra od Almonda a Verby (1989, v originálnom vydaní rok 1963), ktorá predstavuje prepojenie medzi všetky vyššie spomenutými nadhľadmi. Účelom tejto práce je aj poukázať nato, akými spôsobmi sa vyššie uvedení autori dajú prepojiť, obzvlášť pri analýze komplexných javov.

Po krátkom úvode sa práca začína zaoberať vysvetlením základných pojmov, ako s nimi práca bude pracovať. Bolo veľmi kľúčové do podrobna vysvetliť presné definície pojmov na to, aby prác mohla ich charakteristiky prakticky študovať, primárne na základe štatistických dát z World Values Survey, Afrobaroemtra a Arrababrometra. Tie pomohli priblížiť názory ľudí žijúcich v krajinách Arabskej Jari. Metodológia práce bola založená na týchto verejne dostupných databázach. Všetky krajiny sa nedostali do užšieho okruhu výskumu tejto bakalárskej práce a to práva preto, že najväčšia kvantita dát bola pre Egypt a Tunisko. Základnou hypotézou práce je tvrdenie, že udalosti Arabskej nestačili na zmenu retribalizovanej spoločnosti tak, ako retribalizované spoločnosti charakterizoval McLuhan. Práca si stanovila tri hlavné argumenty. K zmene v retribalizovaných spoločnostiach v Tunisku a Egypte nedošlo preto, lebo takáto zmena závisí od charakteru sociálneho kapitálu, od politickej kultúry a miery dôvery v inštitucionálne štruktúry.

V druhej kapitole sa vysvetlila metodológia práce, to jest aké kvantitatívne a kvalitatívne metódy táto práca bude využívať. Okrem vyššie spomenutých databáz bol vytvorený aj vlastný výskum. Dotazník, ktorý bol distribuovaný online, obsahoval otázky na tému sociálneho kapitálu, využitia sociálnych médií a témy Arabskej Jari. Vzorkou bolo 32 respondentov z Tuniska a Egypta, prevažne vo veku 18-35 rokov. Pre bližšie znenie otázok si pozrite "Appendix". Odpovede z dotazníkov poukázali na zistenia zhrnuté v druhej kapitole pod "Research Findings" ako súčasť poslednej časti tretej kapitoly. Vrámci tretej kapitoly sa zobrazili hlavné rozdiely medzi premosťujúcim a zväzujúcim sociálnym kapitálom. Ich základné rozdiely boli zhrnuté do premenných, podľa ktorých sa zistilo, že obidve retribalizované spoločnosti majú nedostatok entít, ktoré by podporovali spojenie a kooperáciu viacerých skupín spoločnosti, tie chudobnejšie ako aj bohatšie. Premenné boli ako jeden z výstupov práce, keďže boli spojením všetkých troch konceptuálnych okruhov.

Štvrtá kapitola sa sústredila na politickú kultúru tak ako je definová Almondom a Verbom (1989). Kapitola v krátkosti predstaví tri typy politickej kultúry, na základe toho, aké politické orientácie prevažujú. Nasledovne sa teória pokúsila skĺbiť poznatky o premosťujúcom a zväzujúcom sociálnom kapitáli ku konkrétnym druhom orientácií. Práca dospela k záveru, že v retribalizovaných spoločnostich prevažujú afektívne orientácie, ktoré nie sú vyslovene založené na záujme o politické dianie, ale sú výsledkom tradícií, rodinného zázemia a procesu socializácie. Možnosť ako tú situáciu zmeniť by bola podpora politickej socializácie zo stany štátu, aby zvýšila dôveru v ich funkciu. Ďalej práca rozpracovala krátky súhrn spoločných historických míľnikov, ktoré sú zdrojom tradičnej politickej kultúry Egypta a Tuniska. No je dôležité pripomenúť, že typy politických orientácií a politických kultúr sú väčšinou zmixované a teda predstavujú veľmi komplexný fenoménom.

Pre sumarizáciu, Egypt a Tunisko, aspoň v rámci ich povahy sociálneho kapitálu, inštitúcií a názorov zo strany občanov na situácie v krajine, je retribalizovanou spoločnosťou. Nato, aby sa stali viac detribalizovanými, by bolo potrebné začať zo strany inštitúcií a potom smerom dole ovplyvniť aj človeka ako aj celú spoločnosť.

Appendix

1.1 Additional Figures

Figure 5: Gender of Respondents

Gender

Female ▪ Male

31%

69%

Figure 6: Age Structure in Studied Countries

▪ Egypt ▪ Tunisia

Figure 7: On Elections' Participation

Q: Do you actively participate in political elections (including state, regional etc.)?

A bar chart comparing "Yes" (light blue) and "No" (green) responses for Egypt and Tunisia. Egypt: Yes = 11, No = 6. Tunisia: Yes = 10, No = 5. The vertical axis ranges from 0 to 12.

1.2. List of Survey Questions

General Information: Age, gender, country of residence, occupation, marital status

1. How would you describe your political orientation?
   - anarchist
   - democratic
   - conservative
   - social democrat
   - liberal
   - nationalist
   - political Islam
   - socialist
   - other

2. Among the options below, which best describes your current religion?
   - Atheist
   - agnostic
   - Buddhist
   - Baha'i
   - Christian
   - Hindu
   - Jewish
   - Muslim

- Spiritual, but not religious
- No particular religious faith

3. Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful when interacting with people?
   - People can be trusted
   - You cannot be too careful
   - You should be careful and attentive
   - Depends

4. I see myself as part of my [country]
   - Strongly agree
   - Agree
   - Neutral
   - Disagree
   - Strongly disagree

5. Would you say that you can trust the people in your neighbourhood? (When living in Egypt or Tunisia)
   - Trust them a lot
   - Trust some of them
   - Trust them only a little
   - Do not trust them at all
   - Don't know
   - No answer

6. Are you a member or engage in a voluntary or civic organization (check all that apply)?
   - Yes
   - No
   - From time to time

7. Do you trust the members of your community in the place of your residence?
   - Yes
   - No
   - Other (*write in your answer*)

8. Have you attended any public meeting on town or school affairs in the 2 last years?
   - Yes
   - No
   - Other (*write in your answer*)

9. Most people in my surrounding community, neighbourhood/place of living can be trusted (when living in Tunisia or Egypt)
   - Indicate your answer on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being fully agree

10. Do you actively participate in political elections (including state, regional, etc.)?
    - Yes
    - No
    - Other (*write in your answer*)

11. Would you say you can trust the police in your local community/place of residence (when living in Egypt or Tunisia)?
    - Trust them a lot
    - Trust them a bit
    - Do not trust them at all
    - Don't know
    - Other (*write in your answer*)

12. Have you ever done any voluntary activity?
    - Yes
    - No

13. In the last 12 months, I have volunteered
    - Yes
    - No

14. If yes, please sum up your contribution/work into 1 sentence.
    - I have done community service since I was a child; it's very important in my family.
    - Child education
    - UNICEF event organization
    - It's the personality, not the ethnicity I look for while dealing with anyone.
    - Ethnicity have nothing to do with honesty; it's a human behaviour can't be generalized
    - UNICEF, cooking for poorer patients
    - I work for an international NGO,
    - Donating blood
    - Helping in a shelter for homeless people
    - An active member of a Retract Club
    - blood donation campaigns
    - I teach poor people for free
    - delivering food, medicine and monthly salary for people of less fortunate
    - Preservation of intangible cultural heritage
    - Translation and technology work for those, who cannot afford professionals

15. Would you say that people of different ethnicities living in your country or place of residence can be trusted?
    - Indicate your stance on 1 to 5 scale 1 being the most trustful

16. I have a strong personal attachment to my (check all that apply)
    - City

- Region
- Nation
- Neighbourhood
- Religion
- Other (*write in your answer*)

17. Are you interested in politics and national affairs?
- Yes
- No

18. How many times have you attended any public meeting in which there was a discussion of town or school affairs in the past 2-3 years?
- A few times
- 2-4 times
- about once a month on average
- once a month
- never did this
- Other (*write in your answer*)

19. How often do you log into your social media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other accounts?
- Daily
- Every 2-4 days
- Weekly
- A couple of times a month
- I do not have an account on any of these platforms
- Other (*write in your answer*)

20. What does being a member of any community mean to you?
- Being involved in something greater,
- Sharing similar goals and interests,
- Being in contact with friends and like-minded people
- A commitment to a group of people based on their beliefs,
- I think it is my duty, especially when you live in a country where freedoms and human rights are still in danger,
- Loyalty,
- Serving a greater community,
- You contribute, as well as benefit from the contributions of others,
- I must provide the best I possibly can,
- Like being a piece of a puzzle that is needed to complete it,
- Having similar ideas that could be develop into a project,
- Raising standards of knowledge to increase public education,
- Sharing common goals and having willingness to accept responsibilities,

- Having a second family,
- A sense of belonging common interests, we can help each other, socialization
- The need to support and develop it
- A sense of belonging,
- Caring.
- Being committed and connected to people,
- Doing your duties to get your rights (does not happen here), but we must do our duty because God is always watching, our rights are never lost.
- It means being a positive, useful part of this community that makes me believe in the power of my capabilities,
- "Move the train to the next station",
- Belonging, togetherness and shared thinking,

OPTIONAL: How often do you attend religious services?
- Every week
- Almost every week
- Once or twice a month
- A few times a year
- Less often than the answers above
- Never
- Other (*write in your reply)*

21. Would you say you are (happy, very happy, unhappy, don´t know)?
- Very happy
- Happy
- Not very happy
- Not happy at all
- Other (*write in your answer)*

22. In a community, [ ] are the most important factors (check all that apply)
- Cooperation
- Justice
- Trust
- Fellowship
- A pursue accomplishment
- Order
- Reciprocity

23. The focal purpose of social media is/are (check all that apply)
- Communication
- Receiving information
- Meeting new people
- Entertainment

- Building relationships
- Marketing purposes

24. I would like to be more involved in decision-making processes, decisions made by my local council (statement)
- Yes
- No
- Don't know
- 50/50

25. Which social media outlets do you prefer (check all that apply)?
- Facebook
- YouTube
- Instagram
- Twitter
- Other (*write in your answer*)

26. Do you think that social media possess more positive benefits than negative?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- It depends on the situation
- Don't know

27. Social media can transmit an emotional attachment to a community
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Other (*write in your answer*)

28. Social media can be used for the purpose of mobilizing masses
- Yes
- Maybe
- No

29. The Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt would not have gather intensity and emerge without the help of social media
- Agree
- Strongly agree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Neutral

30. Do you perceive your place within the society to have changed before and after the Arab Spring events?
- No

- A little bit
- Yes
- Have no idea
- Other (*write in your answer)*

31. Additional comment:
    - Because we share the same religion, culture and many other rituals, we are, as Muslims, facing the negative halo effects of the other Arab societies as well,
    - Change is relative. After 50 years of education, most people here talk two or three languages with 99 percent of individuals attending school. Also, our school system is too difficult, a big number of students commit suicide. That's why we said to others countries to stop their revolution, we are so sorry for them and their destruction because we will win nothing and they want to just follow us. For us, the Arab Spring is to get a new system organization, no more no less. Maybe one day we will be a developed country, it's hard to free us, but with time all people will trust u,
    - We had our hopes up for a couple of years, and now we are back to where we were, and the worst thing is that they are trying to break us to never rise again.
    - The uprisings in Egypt were conspiracies that were not able to change anything in the society, they actually made the situations worse,

32. Throughout the Arab Spring, I played a role (check all that apply)
    - Reposted video and information online
    - Did not do any of these things
    - Was an active participant
    - Took part in few rallies
    - Attended peaceful demonstrations
    - Signed a petition

33. In present day, one cannot build a community of impact without using the internet and social platforms
    - Strongly agree
    - Agree
    - Strongly disagree
    - Don't' know

34. Social media can be used for the purpose of mobilizing masses aiming to publicly show dissatisfaction
    - Agree
    - Neutral
    - Strongly agree
    - Disagree

35. The primary usage of FB, Twitter, YouTube during the civil movements and events in early 2010/2011 in Egypt and Tunisia was to (check all that apply)
    - Spread information

- Raise global and international awareness

36. Where did you get information on the events in both Tunisia and Egypt? (Check all that apply)
    - Social media
    - Local news
    - Regional newspapers
    - Other

37. What do you perceive was the most crucial of the Arab Spring events? (Check all that apply)
    - Human rights
    - Democracy
    - Regime change
    - Free elections
    - Economic development
    - Other