BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

We Don´t Negotiate with Terrorists! (Except We Do): The shift in tone within US foreign policy towards terrorist groups, and the question of diplomacy

Bachelor Thesis

Bratislava, 2016   **Nikolas Palencsár**

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is the work of my own and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and cited in references.

Bratislava, 22 February 2016

Nikolas Palencsár,

Signature: _____

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Abstract

Keywords: diplomacy, terrorism, US foreign policy, conflict resolution, negotiation, international relations, asymmetry of power, new wars theory

The purpose of this research is to primarily investigate and define the relationship between Islamic terrorist groups and the US, and as a result evaluate whether previous attempts at diplomacy have been successful or not.

As introduction, key problems are proposed and identified. Such issues include the perception of the enemy, inherent cultural incompatibility, the influences of the Soviet-Afghan War, and other factors which combined together have inadvertently portrayed a skewed reality, which has ultimately ushered the War on Terror.

Consequently great emphasis is placed upon the US foreign policy, specifically on its history, its character among the IR schools of thought, and upon its attitude and methods towards terrorism, be it domestic or international. Furthermore the changing nature of warfare is also investigated, as new actors and emerging trends reshape the challenges which the international scene has to undertake. Last but not least the stigma of diplomacy is discussed through recent case studies, in which the US strived to outmaneuver its own policy, by mislabelling terrorists as criminals in order to avoid public backlash.

In conclusion, this research argues that the current change in US foreign policy is greatly beneficial, as it seeks to rectify the misconceptions originating from the War on Terror, consequently enabling diplomacy and thus giving space for a more rational and tactful approach.

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Abstrakt

Zámerom práce je predovšetkým objasniť a zadefinovať vzťah medzi islamskými teroristickými skupinami a USA, a posúdiť úspechy a neúspechy predchádzajúcich pokusov o diplomaciu.

V úvode sú obsiahnuté kľúčové problémy ako vnímanie nepriateľa, kultúrna nezlučiteľnosť či vplyv sovietsko-afgánskej vojny, a ďalšie iné faktory, ktoré formujú skreslenú realitu.

V bakalárskej práci je venovaná osobitá pozornosť aj samotnej histórii zahraničnej politiky USA s dôrazom na jej charakter v rámci myšlienkových škôl operujúcich na úrovni medzinárodných vzťahov, postojov a metódam. V neposlednom rade sa v práci zaoberám aj stigmami diplomacie v USA.

V závere tejto práce poukazujem na účinnosť americkej zahraničnej politiky, ktorá sa snaží napraviť mylné znalosti pochádzajúce zo začiatku "War on Terror". Vďaka tomuto je možná diplomacia, ktorá dáva priestor pre racionálne a taktné prístupy.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, modern societies have been struggling to combat the evolving phenomenon of terrorism. Despite the wide variety of groups within modern terrorism, it is ultimately the Salafi jihadist movement, which has gained prevalence over the last couple of decades. Consequently, as Western societies pursue their righteous crusade against the very entirety of "Terror", such struggle begs the question whether these efforts are not ultimately an exercise in futility.

In the wake of recent events however, it appears that a significant shift is being undertaken by the US foreign policy, which seems to introduce a substantial change of attitude, within the methods of engagement in regard to terrorist organizations. In order to successfully confirm this change in US foreign policy, the paper seeks to argue and explore a multitude of crucial factors and influences.

The first chapter serves as an introduction to how misconceptions regarding terrorism have become embedded within society. From investigating the very definition, to how such groups are portrayed and perceived, the chapter ultimately revises the spread and formulation of new information within modern society. Largely relying upon Deutsch´ model of governmental nerves and Chomsky´s propaganda model, the first chapter seeks to elucidate as to how misinformation can create a vicious circle of retaliation, thus creating unneccesary obstacles for diplomatic engagement in the future.

The second chapter still retains its focus upon the formation of the current status quo, albeit it seeks to investigate from a historical perspective rather than from a theoretical one. As such, a brief introduction is given about the evolution of US foreign policy, whilst eventually focusing on the critical influences of the Cold War. Ultimately attributing the rise of Salafi jihadism to the mishandled conflict of the Soviet-Afghan War, the second chapter ends by bringing forth the classical definition of war and its applicability to the modern times.

The third chapter proceeds with the themes of warfare, as it goes against the previously introduced Clausewitzian concept, and challenges it with Kaldor´s New Wars debate. As a result, a heavy emphasis is placed upon the differences between classic and modern warfare, while also

paying attention to the broadened roster of international actors. Furthermore as the changing nature of the international scene and that of warfare are investigated, the efficacy of diplomacy and negotiation is discussed.

Within the final chapter the main focus is placed upon the Bergdahl case, a recent hostage negotiation which has occured between the US and the Taliban. Despite its conclusive success, the main emphasis rests upon public opinion, which was quick to condemn the deal as immoral and unfair. As a result, the final chapter seeks to explore the political machinations resting behind this trade, while also adressing the public backlash which deemed this negotiation "ahistorical" in regard to previous US foreign policy.

Chapter 1: A Skewed Reality

1.1 - Defining Terrorism

The fundamental issue which surrounds the topic of modern terrorism, is not only the lack of substantial and legitimate source of information, but also an inherent condemnation, which heavily affects any discussion and observation in regard to the subject. The source of this bias seems to stem from a basic flaw within the current perception of the enemy. While today´s definition generally insinuates the common depiction of an inherently evil man hiding within caverns and plotting the downfall of democracy, such portrayal has not always been the trademark signature of terrorism that it has become today.

Going back as far as the early days of the French Revolution, the régime de la terreur was established with the sole purpose to uphold and enforce peace during the time of crisis (Hoffman, 2006, p. 3). Not only did such a goal effectively contradict the modus operandi of today´s terrorists, but consequently it altered the connotations that such terminology confers as well. While the Reign of Terror eventually crumbled under Robespierre´s paranoia and began consuming itself, it still serves as a prime example of the dynamic, rather than constant, nature of terrorism. As a result, the methods, goals and portrayal of terrorist groups vary based on each and every individual case. The Narodnaya Volya refrained from targeting civilians, while the Fenians strived to cause as much havoc as possible (Hoffman, 2006, p. 5-7). The Mujahideen were seen as noble freedom fighters struggling against the Communist oppression, yet Al Qaeda is labelled as warmongers who strive to annihilate the West.

Another influence which stems from the revolutionary era of Europe, is the concept of propaganda by deed. Found within Carlo Pisacane´s *Political Testament,* he proclaims that "ideas spring from actions and not the other way around", while Russian revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin identifies deeds as the most potent form of propaganda (Hoffman 2006; Bakunin 1972, p. 195-196). At its core this credo seeks to instigate action, unfortunately however such broad definition has been largerly misused to justify violence and bloodshed. While today´s understanding often associates such credo with anarchists and modern terrorism, this concept hides non-violent applications as well. A striking example is the concept civil disobedience, thus

following the examples of Martin Luther King Jr, and Mahatma Ghandi, it becomes apparent that such credo is not inherently wicked either.

 Consequently, the concept and implications of terrorism remain ambiguous at best, the primary motivation however remains always the same. Once a particular situation grows unbearable, individuals are to be expected to act by deeds to achieve what they cannot accomplish by words. Thus following Pisacane´s credo, terrorism should only be understood as a mere technique rather than a phenomenon which strives destroy modern society. As such, terrorism is essentially the use of unauthorized violence as a form of intimidation, with the sole objective of achieving political change (Hoffman, 2006, p. 5).

1.2 - Perception and Portrayal

Having clarified the definition of terrorism, the issue of perception still remains. Terrorist groups and individuals are often, albeit mistakenly portrayed as inherently evil (Richardson, 2006). Depicted as intrinsically violent, terrorists are often seen to require no further motivation as they fight due to their very nature, with no apparent cause other than hatred itself (Richardson, 2006). While terrorists are obviously no saints, their vilified portrayal serves no purpose other than inciting public reaction, which may be used as a source of legitimacy for consequent policies. Similar to the US foreign policy, the European Union has been careful not to acknowledge or in any particular way give legitimacy to terrorist groups. In this specific framework of non-negotiation, each and every terrorist organization is essentially disavowed from having any legitimate cause, effectively labelling terrorists as outlaws.

Another intriguing trend within public discourse is the slowly fading distinction between insurgency and terrorism. While insurgents and terrorists may appear similar in character, their ultimate goal is substantially different. In a straightforward, albeit blunt summary, terrorists are individuals who resort to the use of terrorism as a technique to achieve political change, while insurgents are effectively rebels opposing a specific authority whom they wish to overthrow. Insurgency also hinges upon another factor, which is the classification and acknowledgement of the respective rebel forces as belligerents. Consequently, it is this classification, which effectively muddles the distinction, as both insurgents and terrorists can be seen as those "whom wage war". Despite such differences however, the current perception often lobs various differing movements into the same category. As such, insurgents, revolutionaries, anarchists and freedom fighters alike are often mislabelled as terrorists, only to subsequently be condemned as outlaws by the current framework. Furthermore as such differences hold various meanings for the state and for politicians, on a public level such terms are effectively interchangeable for the word enemy or trouble.

This particularly obfuscated terminology is further propagated by states rejecting the acknowledgement of terrorists as enemy-combatants. The motive behind this is debatable at times. It could be argued that by Schmitt´s definition, once an enemy is acknowledged,

he or she is also respectively given legitimacy and cause (Schmitt 1976). On the other hand however, it could also be viewed as a simple manoeuvre to avoid the restrictions of the Geneva Convention. Nevertheless, this framework of non-negotiation effectively denies the opportunity of diplomacy, consequently establishing a vicious circle as the following:

•   A glaring issue is left unsolved, forcing the affected group to resort to violence;

•   The state reacts with force, consequently labelling a radical minority as criminals thus disavowing their legitimacy;

•   As a result, the insurgents become outsiders, whom may either surrender as criminals, or pursue guerilla warfare, and potentially terrorism as a method of operation;

•   Since the state cannot give in to the demands, the process of vilification begins as a form of rationalization for the subsequent attacks and circumstances;

•   Ultimately, the effects of public discourse become the strongest, as the chain of retaliation effectively binds both parties into a self perpetuating conflict.

These steps eventually lead to a full blown crisis, where terrorism is often seen as the most efficient modus operandi. Coupling this trend with the current trend of disavowal, conflicts are then further propagated as the option of diplomacy is often dismissed as a sign of weakness. As a result, the state is unable to effectively acknowledge the opposing agenda, while yet labelling the conflict as meaningless bloodshed enacted by savages. Consequently, as the terrorist political agenda is officially left unidentified, and the individuals of such group mislabelled, the state is thus bound fighting an unwinnable war, against an undefined enemy, with an illegitimate cause.

1.3 - The Effects of Public Discourse

While misconceptions certainly contribute to a distorted depiction, there is also a subtle layer of political machinations surrounding the issue of perception. Although vocal minorities immediately blame political leadership with the pretenses of willingly misleading the masses, in truth however, it is the very masses that often, yet unfortunately, force the hand of politics. It seems that perception and portrayal are effectively intertwined. It is this fusion that essentially contributes to the formation of public discourse, which consequently becomes the biggest influence that establishes a skewed reality.

Although researchers and political observers often point out the dangers of public discourse, as primarily being aimed towards the masses, such influences also affect politicians, diplomats and specialists as well. While this minute detail is remarkable on its own, another further influence has to be acknowledged, which is none other than the mutual feedback between public and state. Following David Easton´s systems theory, both the public and the state are essentially linked together through a feedback loop which reciprocally affects each party (Easton 1965). While the system is under the influence of the environment (those spheres which are external to the political system within a society), the primary actors are primarily the public and the state (Easton 1965). As such, every input given by the public will effectively shape and ripple the output created by the state, which subsequently affects the public´s demand, thus continuously altering every future input (Easton 1965). As a result, it is plausible to regard every political action as a two-fold reaction, which primarily aims to resolve a specific issue, while also striving to perform in accordance to public demand (Easton 1965). While the extent of the latter behaviour is debateable, nonetheless it serves to prove that political action is effectively fuelled by the very public itself.

Despite the fact that Easton´s systems model provides a rather straightforward explanation as to how the political system may function, it is unable to determine how the status quo is established, while also lacking the necessary depth to investigate the key elements within public discourse and communication. Allowing for a more in-depth analysis, is the complex model of Karl W. Deutsch, whose conceptual model introduced various other elements, next to the feedback loop of David Easton. Taking his model another step further, Deutsch applies it to

foreign policy, which is portrayed as a system of communication (the nerves of government) and introduces distinct new factors such as memory, foreign influence and a variety of subtle "screens" which filter the flow of information (Deutsch 1966). The initial premise of Easton´s model remains intact, as Deutsch´s model follows the looping pattern of a connected output and input. As such, the reciprocal nature between state and population persists. However with the acknowledgement of foreign actors, a subsequently new influence is added, as Deutsch´s model seeks to depict the extent of various external influences (Deutsch 1966). Consequently, the key element of memory is also introduced, as both state and population will be heavily affected by the influences of the past, such as shared culture, conflicts, alliances, tragedies, etc. (Deutsch 1966). However, Deutsch argues for a more intricate concept of memory, as he introduces the division of selective memory, and selective recall (Deutsch 1966). As such, a substantial difference is made between experiencing and documenting the past, from effectively recollecting such events. Last but not least, Deutsch introduces the so called "screens", which filter the flow of information based on:

- **Selective Attention -** The screen which filters both domestic and foreign input, thus altering the process of memory/recall and the internal process of decision-making
- **Acceptable Recall -** The amalgamate of information originating from input, memory/recall and tentavive decisions, which ultimately affect the formulation of policies and thus the final decisions.
- **Repression from Consciousness/State -** The innate repression originating from the State which persistently confronts and inspects information.
- **Acceptable and Feasible Policies -** The final screen which filters the most efficient options available, thus formulating the process of final decisions, and consequently the creation of domestic and foreign outputs.

As a result, thanks to Deutsch´s model, we gain a significant insight to how information and decision-making contribute to the creation of the status quo, which ultimately can be led back to the feedback loop between the state and its inhabitants. Applying this concept to the issue at hand, it becomes evident that once terrorist organizations have become shunned by either government or the masses, the respective group will also be influenced by the other. Since information is inherently encoded as memory, changing previous portrayals and

acknowledgements also become a troublesome feat. Therefore Deutsch´s extended model can be used as an explanation as to how the US foreign policy adapts under the influence of both the state and the masses.

Focusing on the previously mentioned screen of repression, the question of extent arises. Although the repression originating from the state may be minimal, in other cases it may become far more pronounced as the state may actively pursue to influence its inhabitants. Which brings us to Chomsky´s propaganda model, a conceptual model that seeks to investigate systemic biases and the basic functions of propaganda. In contrast to Easton and Deutsch, Chomsky´s propaganda model is quite specific within its scope, as it focuses solely on the acquisition and spread of information while putting heavy emphasis on media ownership, funding, advertising and ultimately the subliminal construction of public consent (Herman & Chomsky 1988). As such, Chomsky´s model serves to illustrate the process by which modern society has come to know about the Salafi jihadist movement. The basic premise of this model seeks to argue that the masses are swayed and controlled through private media (Herman & Chomsky 1988). While major news sources act as de-facto trend setters, subsequent lesser sources will often follow the initial framing, thus aiding and spreading a variety of situation specific agendas (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Another crucial component within Chomsky´s model are the so called "filters", a news source based classification which divides various news in accordance to their methods and purpose. The five filters include: Ownership, Advertising, Sourcing, Flak and Anti-Communism/Fear.

> The first and foremost filter of Ownership, seeks to tackle various new sources as fundamental businesses which operate on the basis of profit and loss (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Consequently, as conglomerates overtake various media outlets, they subsequently shape its broadcasts to gain profit for their own agenda (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Furthermore Ownership criticises the possible interconnection between media and politics, as political parties are able to alter the framing of various situations, in order to instill topic specific bias within the public (Herman & Chomsky 1988).

> Consequently, the second filter of Advertising is introduced, which strives to investigate the acquisition of funds for any news outlet (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Such acquisition is often done through advertising, due to which actual news are often dismissed as "fillers"

(Herman & Chomsky 1988). As such, Advertising argues that the actual readers are essentially the products that can be purchased by various agencies through the employment of advertising (Herman & Chomsky 1988).

The filter of Sourcing strays further from the topic of news outlets and funding, instead focusing on the acquisition of information, and the spread of personnel (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Despite best efforts, even the largest media outlets are unable to cover every angle 24/7. Subsequently, the allocation of resources becomes essential as official spokesmen become a part of the media (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Consequently this brings forth the "moral division of labour" which renders journalists less significant, as their investigative role is replaced by simply procuring given information from official authorities (Herman & Chomsky 1988). This phenomenon is predominantly influenced by the lack of resources, as high profile individuals may become offended by relentless questioning, thus diminishing the amount of contacts at the disposal of a news agency (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Despite the undeniable significance of the first three filters, it is ultimately the latter two that may pose the largest threat.

The penultimate filter of Flak tends to refer to negative audience reaction to a media statement, which encourages news sources to avoid certain stories (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Furthermore, the filter of Flak is significantly different from its predecessors, as it strives to manage public information, rather than focusing on market mechanisms (Herman & Chomsky 1988).

It is the fifth and final filter which ultimately affects the issue of terrorism the most, as the filter of Fear is the effective yet subtle manipulation of the masses, achieved through exaggeration, mislabelling and vilified portrayal of an individual or group (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Initially dubbed as anti-communism, the fifth filter has grown dynamic over the time, as various groups and movements have become targeted as the primary dangers to liberty, democracy and freedom of speech (Herman & Chomsky 1988). The innate flexibility of this filter assures that any organization can be discredited, thus proving to be one of the most significant influence within the crisis of modern terrorism.

It is ultimately debatable whether the state initially realizes their conscious negation of the enemy, or if such ignorance is purely coincidental. Either way however, it usually follows that if conflicts are often left unsolved and ignored, the state will retain their dismissive attitude until a violent reaction is undertaken. In the wake of a violent attack however, the state can no longer admit their mistake, consequently forcing the state to retort. It is during these processes, that public discourse becomes the most significant, as the weakened state is expected to show dominance. Consequently, public discourse is then affected by the political perception of the minority, whom at this point are often vilified and persecuted. Coupling evocative speeches with the unfortunate losses suffered by the majority, immediate public backlash is expectable (Brzezinski, 2007). Thus, while initially the state might have only sought to maintain face in front of the public, this time around it is the very public that forces the state to react by demanding retribution against the now persecuted group/minority. In a particular twist however it is not solely the Western world that has come under the influence of public discourse. In accordance to the sociological theory of labelling and deviance, terrorists themselves begin to identify with the given portrayal. As a result, insurgents essentially desensitize themselves by becoming absolute outsiders towards society, only living and breathing for the cause.

1.4 - Social Labelling and Segregation of Deviants

A critical factor within terrorist plots, is often the ensuing reaction which is meant to garner attention and fear alike (Hoffman 2006). Unfortunately as technology enables mankind to remain connected at all times, successful terrorist plots become equal to news headlines. Therefore while the masses may experience fear and anxiety, for terrorist organization such news provide both motivation and challenge. As a result, while terrorists may pick up the fight for a variety of reasons, ultimately however their motivation may persists due to the influence of a society that shuns them.

Developed by Frank Tannenbaum and Howard S. Becker, the theory of labelling argues that deviance is effectively propagated by society itself, as deviants internalize their socially given labels, which only further reinforces their negative behaviour (Becker 1963). The fundamental premise seeks to claim, that whenever an individual is officially mischaracterized or depicted as morally inferior, the subsequent chances of said individual pursuing deviant activities increase. This phenomenon seems to revolve around the behavioural characteristics of the individual, whom as an inherently social being is liable to be influenced by his immediate surroundings. Consequently, when said individual is segregated for a specific activity or belief, the individual is socially encouraged to develop further deviant tendencies, either out of spite or as a process of identification with any particular label (Matza 1969). Furthermore, the issue of punishment becomes of crucial importance, as the acknowledgement of criminals can be viewed as a form of social labelling on its own (Matza 1969).

The predominant problem with any punitive course of action remains within its apparent efficacy and its actual ensuing consequences. While the issue of misportraying terrorists is at hand, in order to achieve greater clarity another example has to be investigated. The perpetual nature of labelling and deviancy seems to imply that both the state and the deviant carry the same respective set of norms and values. Although a prison inmate may oppose or disregard certain norms or values, when released, he will strive to reintegrate within the very same society. Despite the process of integration being significantly harder, as the criminal label stigmatises the individual, the essential will to become a part of the society is still present (Matza 1969). In this sense, while a criminal may endure social stigma, both the state and criminal himself, will acknowledge its position as being part of society to a lesser extent (Matza 1969). However once

an individual becomes labelled as terrorist, there is seldom an option to reintegrate within the current framework of non-negotiation .

Although every terrorist is essentially a deviant by the standard of going against societal norms, the inherent distinction remains within how society acknowledges the said individual. Subsequently, a striking distinction has to be made between the degree of social stigma, which affects either deviants or terrorists. While both categories are generally shunned by the majority of society, the ultimate difference is achieved as the terrorist individual acquires a significant stigma, the likes of which rival the status of the homo sacer. Similar to how the sacred man of the Roman Empire was cast out, individuals labelled as terrorists are effectively forced out of society, dubbed as outsiders whom only characteristics is the innate threat they pose. As criminal behaviour is thought to be enforced by the stigma of a criminal record, the same phenomenon applies to an individual labelled a terrorist. To make matters worse however, such segregation is further pronounced when the issue of terrorism is evoked (Hoffman 1993).

This phenomenon is effectively two-fold, as it distinctly affects a potentially innocent deviant who seeks to oppose authority, and an actual terrorist who has already committed to resorting to terrorism. While a potentially innocent individual might be labelled as a deviant and terrorist, due to his or her opposition towards authority, once such stigma is attributed, the eventual odds of said individual resorting to terrorism exponentially grow. In an example following the Boston Marathon bombing, Mohamed Bada was harassed and threatened with deportation, as police forces suspected him of being a conspirator based on racial profiling (Michaels 2013). Although Bada was eventually found innocent, such circumstances may serve as motivation for distressed individuals to revolt against the government. On the other hand however, if an already committed terrorist is further reinforced through its portrayal by the media, the subsequent internalization of the terrorist identity pushes the individual to mimic the exaggerated savagery of the previously constructed label. As a result, once a terrorist organization begins to identify itself as a group of "outsiders", their methods of operation change, pursuing even deadlier projects, while also broadening their targeted audience as well (Hoffman 1993). This phenomenon can be most easily identified within religious terrorism, in which segregated radicals are prone to target, even those whom share the safe core beliefs, albeit refrain from following the agenda of the socially labelled "outsiders" (Hoffman 1993).

While these factors and influences all contribute to the creation and propagation of the now present preconception of terrorism, the inevitable changes within international relations and the constantly fluctuating nature of politics assure that merely eradicating such misconceptions are only half the struggle.

Chapter 2: Within the Hawk´s Nest

2.1 - The Birth of the American Eagle

Although the primary influences such as definition, portrayal, and public discourse effectively alter the global perception of terrorism, there are other distinct factors which further contribute to the depiction envisioned by the US as whole. While such factors may vary from upbringing, education, and religion, a predominant influence rests within the historical development of the US foreign policy, and consequently it´s character and evolution throughout the ages.

Having achieved Pax Americana, the United States is often accepted as a significant actor, if not a global hegemony of the 21st century. Despite this global influence however, the initial premise of the US foreign policy endeavoured to remain as detached from the rest of the globe as possible.

This isolation was promoted by the Monroe doctrine of 1823, which declared any further attempts at colonization from the Old World an act of immediate aggression (US Dept. State 2011). Despite the actual inability to enforce such policy, under the wider aspect of the then reigning Pax Britannica, Britain chose to acknowledge this division of the spheres of influence, which eventually led to the "Special Relationship" coined by Winston Churchill (US Dept. State 2011). This in-depth cooperation would further develop as both the United Kingdom and the United States have managed to achieve a level of interdependence unique among other international actors (US Dept. State 2011). Nonetheless, the United States would remain true to its policy of non-interference until the end of the First World War (US Dept. State 2011).

Following the tragic losses endured during the war, a plan was proposed to assert global peace though a safeguard, a concept which was predominantly based upon Kant´s Perpetual Peace. As such, the first major course of action which was inherently atypical for the reigning US foreign policy, was the proposition for the League of Nations. Although the success of this proposition was largely the merit of Woodrow Wilson, opposition within the Senate has refrained the United States from joining the League of Nations. Despite such outcome however, Wilson envisioned a more assertive United States. As a result, a subtle shift began to occur within the Department of

State as inactivity shifted to engagement thus shaping the isolationist policies into something new (US Dept. State 2011).

Consequently the Department endured an effective renaissance, as new responsibilities and issues began to manifest themselves thus forcing the US foreign policy to quickly adapt itself to the ever changing needs. Although the predominant mentality of non interference still endured within the Senate, the general population was invigorated by the opportunities of the "new diplomacy" as it brought fresh horizons which subsequently generated substantial attraction towards the fields of politics and that of international relations. Despite public demand however, the Department was unable to successfully adapt to Wilson´s vision, and with the ensuing Great Depression, the United States was forced to recover once again under the relative safety of past traditions (US Dept. State 2011).

The first major change in attitude arrived after the end of World War II. As the United States acknowledged the mistakes of their inactivity, such realization has subsequently led to substantial changes within the Department led by State Secretary Stettinius, who has prepared the US to assert themselves as a leading presence. Ultimately however, it was the looming threat of the Cold War which pushed the United States to reaffirm their newly found perspective, as at the end of such conflict, only one superpower could persevere (US Dept. State 2011).

One of the most crucial aspects of the Cold War was not merely the impending doom of nuclear Armageddon, it was the choking fear of Soviet infiltration which has lead the United States to implement the doctrines of President Harry Truman (US Dept. State 2011). Essentially striving to promote Soviet containment, the Truman doctrine has subsequently set out to eliminate any presence of Soviet imperialism, be it through sheer supremacy, or proxy warfare (Brzezinsky 1983). Despite the technological advances of the United States, the notion of US supremacy was always to be assured, as the dangers of Soviet espionage could single-handedly turn the tides of the Cold War (Brzezinsky 1983).

Emerging from the nuclear espionage of World War II, Soviet espionage has kept the Western audiences on their toes at all times (Brzezinsky 1983). Subsequently, as all efforts were deemed necessary to ensure victory during the Cold War, the first and foremost line of security was an anxious and suspicious population (Brzezinsky 1983). Although propaganda has existed in some

form or another throughout the history of mankind, the subsequent fashion in which cold war propaganda was manufactured closely resembled the scope and influence of its present counterpart. Even though propaganda has always strived to deliver a politically loaded message, such influence seldom included the instigation of suspicion towards the individual´s fellow countrymen. Consequently while mass consent was inevitably sought out and acquired, the urgency of constant suspicion and awareness was induced (Brzezinsky 1983). In order to further emphasise the gravity of the situation, the Soviets were subsequently demonized by the media, while both domestic and foreign masses were conditioned against Soviet ideology, way of life, or anything seemingly related (Brzezinsky 1983). It was effectively the influence of the Soviet scare, that has led to the formation Chomsky´s fifth filter, which eventually became adapted to the threat of modern terrorism

On the other hand, however, there was the prevalent presence of proxy warfare, as the Cold War was fought on many foreign battlefields, all stemming from the power struggle of the United States and the Soviet Union. While such conflicts include the War in Vietnam, the Chinese and Greek civil war, the Palestine-Israeli conflict, the Mau Mau uprising and many more, the fundamental importance of proxy warfare lies within its role and influence in regards to the Truman doctrines. Despite the undeniable significance of said doctrines, it was through the aspect of proxy warfare, that the United States has successfully managed to shed its isolation, and become a truly dominant and leading presence in the world.

Last but not least, in 1985 Ronald Reagan gave a speech addressing the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, in which he proclaimed that "America will never make concessions to terrorists" (Reagan 1985). Following Reagan´s statement, the policy of non-negotiation was quickly adapted, which in the future would be coupled with the demonized portrayal of terrorists, thus shaping the US foreign policy´s hostile demeanour towards terrorism.

As a result, it becomes evident that many of the subtle influences which developed contemporary to the Cold War, have successfully rippled throughout the ages, and subsequently led to the development of today´s state of affairs.

2.2 - The Influences of the Cold War

Nevertheless, while the United States has managed to successfully attain its role as an ever-watchful eagle, another prominent event was unfolding, which inadvertently caused today´s extremist blowback that many have led to believe was the primary cause of 9/11.

Although experts could already foresee the imminent downfall of the crumbling Soviet Union, what many couldn´t predict however, was the catalyst that would activate the sequence of the ensuing collapse (Curtis 2004). Once Gorbachev took over the reins of the Soviet Union, it became apparent that the very core of the regime was rotten, as even the high ranking officials acknowledged the flaws of communism. Although Gorbachev still endeavoured in good faith, his attempts at redeeming Communism have ultimately backfired (Curtis 2004). By introducing the economic reforms of "perestroika", further tension was placed upon the already strained political and social relations. Last but not least, once "glasnost" was successfully enacted, the improved transparency allowed the masses to criticize the regime, thus sealing the fate of the Soviet regime (Curtis 2004).Despite the indubitable correlation between Gorbachev´s policies, and the subsequent dissolution of the Iron Curtain, there is another lesser known influence that could potentially be attributed to the Soviet downfall.

Similar to how the Vietnam War proved to be an immense blow against the prestige and presence of the United States, so too did the Soviet Union sweat blood and tears during its campaign in Afghanistan. Under King Mohammed Zahir Shah´s leadership, the Marxist People´s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) grew substantially both in numbers and in influence. Eventually the PDPA splintered into two major factions: the Khalq (Masses), predominantly formed of Pashtun settlers and peasants led by Nur Muhammad Taraki, and Parcham (Flag) whose members were mainly upper middle class with Babrak Karmal on the front (Edwards 2002). Despite Zahir´s efforts of modernising Afghanistan, , his leadership was ultimately overthrown and exiled by his older cousin Mohammad Daoud Khan, whom berated the king on the basis of corruption and shoddy leadership (Edward 2002).

Although Daoud´s government was generally well received, and has enjoyed much more popularity than Zahir´s monarchy, eventual issues would arise as Daoud would try to distance itself from the Soviet Union, thus garnering heat from the PDPA (Edwards 2002). Consequently

as Daoud´s leadership began to wage war an internal war with the PDPA, the anti-Daoud demostrations escalated, as the Afghan army favoured the PDPA agenda, thus overthrowing the government and executing Daoud (Edwards 2002). With Daoud out of the picture, Taraki has been assigned to presidency, thus securing Khalq majority and effectively nullifying Daoud´s endeavours against the Soviet Union.

Following Taraki´s appointment, the very entirety of Khalq was set into motion as Taraki´s government began incrementing social reforms, which not only opposed traditional Afghan values and local customs, but at the same time introduced new policies which limited Parcham presence and influence (Edwards 2002). Khalq leadership eventually materialized itself as a spiritual successor if not double for the Soviet regime as its policies and reforms strictly followed the Soviet agenda. Such sentiment was further propagated as the eventual Khalq-Parcham conflict grew out of hand resulting in systematical executions and purge, resembling that of the Menshevik trials (Edwards 2002).

With Parcham being pushed out and the situation growing unbearable, the population revolted. Centering primarily around the land reforms, the Herat Uprising brought utter chaos as various Pashtun tribes were pitted against each other, while at the same time blaming the Khalq goverment for betraying their own nation for the Soviet Union (Edwards 2002). As a result, President Taraki implored the Soviet Union, specifically Kosygin and Brezhnev for an immediate Soviet intervention. Although the Soviet leadership acknowledged the gravity of the Afghani crisis, Taraki´s pleas were met with reluctance in fear of reaction from the international scene. As Brezhnev stated, such course of action "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours" (Gregory 2008).

Although the Cold war still raged on, following the Sino-American developments both the US and the Soviet Union were finally willing to negotiate. As a result, a détente was formed through various peace talks such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Thus with the intent to uphold such talks and refrain from challenging the wishes of the UN, the Soviet Union shifted from a predominantly confrontational approach to a more composed and evasive attitude (Gregory 2008).

As the situation within Afghanistan further developed, so too did Taraki´s requests grew bolder over time (Gregory 2008). While the initial Soviet assistance only included specialists and advisors, eventually entire detachments and battalions arrived to establish order amidst the revolts. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet presence only added fuel to the fire, thus contributing to another coup led by Taraki´s prime minister Hafizullah Amin, against Taraki himself. Consequently, Amin has managed to put himself in a precarious position, as he not only misinterpreted Soviet directions, but under his leadership Parcham has managed to regain its foothold in Afghanistan (Edwards 2002). As such Amin was classified as an immediate threat by the KGB, which then forced the Soviet leadership to take action in the matter (Gregory 2008).

The ensuing Soviet intervention effectively undermined the détente, while at the same time it horrified the whole entirety of the United Nations. The immediate international and local condemnation put further pressure upon Soviet leadership, which resulted in an increase of violence within the area. Despite the near whole-hearted condemnation from the UN, it was ultimately the Mujahideen who brought the fight to the Soviet 40th Army, as both China and the United States have began to train and support the Afghani warriors (Curtis 2004).

Once Gorbachev officially announced his reforms, the Soviet military command received the orders to withdraw from Afghanistan, despite the ensuing void of power that the Soviets would leave behind. Although Soviet intelligence decided to warn the United States, of the potential threat that the Mujahideen may pose, US leadership dismissed such claims as futile attempts delaying the inevitable, thus enabling the extremist blowback (Gregory 2008, Curtis 2004).

As a result, through the political and economic reforms of Gorbachev, and the significant defeat within Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began to crumble thus ending the Cold War and bringing forth what Adam Curtis dubbed the "phantom victory", a remarkable misconception which could be attributed as the primary catalyst that influenced the rise of Salafi jihadism, and subsequently the War on Terror (Curtis 2004).

2.3 - War Hawks on the Rise - The Precursors of the War on Terror

During President Johnson´s "Great Society", Strauss heavily criticised the character of liberalism, especially that of the Western liberal democracies (Curtis 2004). According to him, liberalism was inherently an extension of nihilism which either manifested itself as violent and brutal, mostly appearing in the form of a totalitarian regime similar to that of Nazi Germany (Strauss 1991). While the other branch was that of an overly lenient egalitarianism which allowed the hedonistic pursuit of the self, being most prominent in Western societies such as the US (Strauss 1964). As the liberal reforms began to fail during the Johnson Administration, the teachings of Leo Strauss became much more influential as his students, the Straussians began to pick up the struggle against the decadence of modern society. Subsequently, through the Straussians, the neoconservative movement was born, which albeit initially influenced by Strauss himself, ultimately diverged as his disciples pushed it beyond sensible boundaries (East 1977). In order to break the hedonistic lullaby of America, the neo-conservatives devised a strategy which strived to re-awaken the masses and reassess the national identity of the now broken and aimless population (Curtis 2004). This process of unification would eventually materialize itself in the form of a dualistic battle, in which the US, the inherent good and symbol of virtue would face off against the evil of an opposing force (Curtis 2004). Subsequently, the neoconservative leadership assumed that through a righteous fight, domestic disputes would be diffused, as the unifying influence of a common enemy would effectively eradicate the hedonistic decadence which has plagued the United States (Curtis 2004).

In a peculiar coincidence however, the very same situation has occurred in Egypt, under the direct influence of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb, who has previously visited America as an exchange student, was horrified by the same hedonistic lifestyle that Strauss has condemned (Curtis 2004). In contrast to Strauss however, Qutb decided to take matters into his own hands, as upon his return to Egypt he began to mobilize the masses against the spreading corruption of Western capitalism (Curtis 2004). Having joined the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb was thrilled once the monarchist government was overthrown by Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, once Nasser made his intentions clear, his government became the new public enemy of the Brotherhood. Although Nasser´s machinations initially included Qutb, once the latter refused his offers, a violent crackdown ensued (Curtis 2004). In a botched attempt of coup d´etat, Qutb was eventually

imprisoned and tortured, which resulted in an experience which forever changed his vision (Curtis 2004). Deeply betrayed by his fellow countrymen, Qutb began to acknowledge even other Muslims as potential targets (Curtis 2004).. It was under this new vision that he wrote his most polemic works, including the manifesto for the political Islam, the Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones). Albeit culturally invaluable, the Milestones has proved to be the fundamental text fueling radical jihadist movements worldwide. Despite Qutb´s eventual release, Nassar´s government prosecuted him shortly thereafter, which ultimately resulted in a mock trial leading to Qutb´s execution (Curtis 2004). Having suffered a martyr´s death, Qutb´s passed his legacy unto his disciples, whom following the last wish of their teacher, cemented the formation of an Islamic vanguard. Guided by Qutb´s milestones, future generations would bring up the fight against the corruption of the Jahiliyyah (Ignorance), one such individual being the prominent figure of Ayman al-Zawahiri.Soon enough, the aspirations of both the Islamic vanguard and that of the neoconservative movements would be fulfilled, as these two distinct yet similar influences would meet in the Afghan-Soviet War (Curtis 2004).

Despite the apparent signs which foreshadowed the imminent Soviet collapse, both US leadership and the Mujahideen misappropriated the Soviet defeat as a victory achieved on their own (Curtis 2004). As a result, the Soviet defeat became a substantial catalyst for both parties, as the Mujahideen began to spread across the region, while the neoconservative leadership reaffirmed their agenda within the United States. Nevertheless, the initial ambitions quickly began to fade, as both parties have managed to run into considerable obstacles along the way. While the neoconservative movement has lost its prevalence largely due to the differing views of President Bush sr., thus diverting their attention to domestic matters, the Mujahideen has splintered into various off-shoot groups, as rebel fighters returned to their native countries to share what they have learned and experienced (Curtis 2004). Regardless of multiple attempts trying to emulate the success of the Mujahideen, following revolts have been met with catastrophic results as now even the estranged Muslim community began to shun the radical jihadists. Following the failures of Egypt and Algeria, Zawahiri sought out to determine the source of their misfortune, which subsequently led him to reassess the efficacy of their cause, Recalling the teachings of his mentor Sayyid Qutb, Zawahiri set out to combat the very source of the corruption whilst being aided by his protégé, Osama Bin Laden (Curtis 2004).

Consequently in the ensuing chaos of 9/11, the newly established presence of the neoconservative movement became palpable, as both the Iraqi, and the War on Terror has sought out to develop a very US specific framing, in which the enemy has become the very embodiment of evil. Little by little, a skewed reality is achieved, in which diplomacy becomes a morally questionable act, thus fuelling the fires of a perpetual war.

2.4 - From Dragons to Snakes

While both the phantom victory and the extremist blowback play an important role as to how the modern Salafi jihadist movement has developed, there´s another particular shift which has subsequently affected the modus operandi of the US foreign policy.

Effectively being another issue of identifying and understanding terrorism, the US government was hard pressed to adapt to the ever changing circumstances of warfare. Regardless of Soviet espionage, the Cold War was largely defined by a clear perception of the enemy, as the US had little difficulty identifying a clearly distinguishable, albeit colossal threat (Aldrich, Cormac, Goodman n.d.). However, once the Soviet threat has ceased to exist, it didn´t take too long for the Salafi jihadist movement to replace the previous opponent. Although such new enemy was substantially weaker in comparison, what it lacked in sheer strength, it had made up with subtlety and cunning. As such, "having slain the Soviet dragon, the intelligence community now found itself in a jungle full of snakes" (Aldrich, Cormac, Goodman n.d.).

Consequently old definitions and concepts were revised, thus following the US Code, an act of terrorism had to fulfill two preliminary characteristics:

- Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
- Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; (18 U.S.C. § 2331).

While a latter criterion defines whether it´s international or domestic in character:

- Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
- Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. (18 U.S.C. § 2331).

Although these mainly differentiate between the activities of international and domestic terrorism, the US Code also includes "federal crime of terrorism" of which requirements are the following:

- Is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and
- Is a violation of one of several listed statutes, including § 930(c) (relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack on a federal facility with a dangerous weapon); and §

1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the U.S.). (18 U.S.C. § 2332b).

Another substantial document which has affected the work of the US intelligence and foreign policy, was the 2001 USA Patriot Act. While the Titles of the Patriot Act varied from ensuring domestic security, to actively pursuing terrorist leads and investigations. It also served as a legal document to lawfully define terrorist organizations by the following requirements:

- It must be a foreign organization.
- The organization must engage in terrorist activity, or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
- The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States

While the US intelligence has eventually managed to catch up and react accordingly to the changing circumstances, yet the fundamental nature of counter-terrorist operations remains reactionary at best. It seems that while the methods of engagement have effectively changed, the ultimate end-goal has unfortunately remained the same archaic denial of the enemy. As such, while the US intelligence has adapted to successfully engage this new enemy, it has failed to recognize terrorism as a byproduct of segregation, instead acknowledging it as a Schmittian enemy who is to be annihilated. While the initial appearances of counter-terrorism may convey a preventative approach, deep within however its focus lies elsewhere.

2.5 A State of ~~War~~ Emergency

Consequently, the issue of warfare arises, as political vocabulary tends to obfuscate the actual reality of the situation. Officials generally strive to deny the legitimacy of terrorist movements, thus aiming to discredit their opponents and the righteousness of their cause. While this may serve as damage control by framing various conflicts as lesser or as unjust cause, ultimately it creeps closer to actually validating it as war.

From the get go, terrorist attacks are always viewed as individual plots, but never officially recognized as integral operations of an ongoing war. Starting with the classical Clausewitzian understanding of war, we can easily identify such concept as a strictly political phenomenon (Schmitt 1976). Although Clausewitz serves as the main foundation behind the literature of classical warfare, in order to acquire a more recent understanding with the same outlook, the works of Carl Schmitt provide the necessary insights. For Schmitt, war can exist only between two separate entities whose fundamental differences evoke a primal instinct of survival, which ultimately pinnacles in open warfare (Schmitt 1976). As both entities experience the very same existential threat, they dismiss other influences such as appearance, ethics, religion and economy (Schmitt 1976). As a result, based only on their primal urge of survival, they seek perseverance thus becoming equal in the face of extinction. Out of this equality, legitimacy and cause emerges, as both parties acknowledge one another, thus reaffirming the case of war, and war itself (Schmitt 1976). Keeping this concept in mind, it becomes logical for official authorities to deny such claims, by dismissing the idea of a "state/terrorist war" and instead opting to frame the situation as an escalated disturbance. Furthermore, by following Schmitt´s understanding, the idea of the War on Terror is flawed as well, as no struggle can ever be won against an abstract idea (Schmitt 1976). Furthermore, upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that said conflict is no actual war either. Instead, it can be seen as a politically loaded crusade, a campaign of propaganda, which seeks and demands legitimacy from the opposition.

Despite the official consensus dismissing the current conflict as illegitimate, in truth it eerily fulfils Schmitt´s requirements of war. Not only are both parties fundamentally different in their culture and set of values, they respectively seek to deny the identity of one another, thus providing the necessary existential struggle.

Chapter 3: A Question of Diplomacy

3.1 - A Post-Westphalian System

Although Schmitt´s teachings are certainly not without merits, its strong connection to the Westphalian model offers practical, yet limited insights. As such, a completely different outlook is necessary in order to assess the current nature of warfare, thus further evaluating whether a change is required within the US foreign policy to combat terrorism.

An emerging topic, which has gained significant prevalence in the 21st century is the new wars debate. Proposed by Mary Kaldor, the new wars theory seeks to re-define the obsolete concepts of warfare, as she points out the substantial changes that has occurred since the end of the Cold War.

One of the biggest differences in the new wars theory rests within the wide variety of actors it encompasses. While the Westphalian system focuses on the interactions occurring between sovereign states, new wars theory strives to include other non-state actors as well (Kaldor 2012). Placing remarkable emphasis on non-state actors, Kaldor defines this new breed of warfare through the example of guerrilla tactics. While the Clausewitzian breed of conventional warfare included two sovereign states as actors, such standard also includes a variety of non-state actors as well in modern times (Kaldor 2012). Thus a crucial aspect is introduced, as Kaldor points out the ever increasing number of intra-state conflicts. Despite the substantial difference in numbers between inter-state and intra-state conflicts, the situation is far more complicate as the majority of such localized conflicts are often affected by foreign influences (Kaldor 2012). Even though there has been a significant decrease in conflict among sovereign states, the transnational character of regional conflicts effectively nullifies this diminishment. Furthermore, the Clausewitzian "center of gravity" is disproved, as conflict can occur in the strategically least favoured locations as well (Kaldor 2012).

It is this inconsistency, which further promotes the modus operandi of non-state actors as they willingly target civilians in order to achieve political control (Kaldor 2012). While in the past, control was to be maintained through physical presence and dominance, such method is logically dismissed by the limited manpower of non-state actors. Therefore, it is this lack of resources

which largely defines the trends and aspects of non-state actors and as a result the character of new wars (Kaldor 2012).

Using the example of a guerrilla or terrorist group in order to characterize the new wars, the immediate difference rests within the variety of individuals and combatants that such conflict includes. In contrast to government armies and professional soldiers, the new wars also see the inclusion of mercenaries, marginalized minorities and child soldiers as well (Kaldor 2012). Furthermore, as non-state actors often lack self-sufficiency, the lack of funds propagates a predatory behaviour, which further promotes violence through pillage and racketeering and extortion. Although certain groups may lack channels which funnel supplies or donations, nevertheless such non-state actors often resort to more violent methods as a consequence. While reliable military equipment is expensive, cheap and destructive technology is widely available for the taking, albeit with horrifying consequences for the masses. Last but not least, the significant element of identification is discussed, as non-state actors often use the socially given labels as a form of recruitment, employing identity politics in contrast to ideologies. Kaldor subsequently evaluates the state of affairs through the influence of globalization, as no single occurrence is completely remote from other events which transpire across the globe (Kaldor 2012). To essentially summarize the development of warfare, although global conflicts have subsided, localized conflicts have been greater in number, and more brutal in nature. While Kaldor's approach immensely improves the clarity upon which modern terrorism can be examined, the primary obstacle remains within the solidified perspective that conventional warfare has embedded into society.

3.2 - The Stigma of Diplomacy

Bringing up diplomacy as the alternative to war there are a multitude of factors, which have to be resolved, in order to even have a chance at diplomatic success. In a rather simplified and blunt manner, it could be however divided into two significant layers that have to be understood. The first layer could essentially be viewed as past interactions or the current status quo, as a significant amount of opposition emerges from misconceptions and outdated preconceptions that deny peaceful solutions. Subsequently, the second layer revolves strictly around the concept of diplomacy, of how it is viewed, how it is expected to work, and how it actually operates.

Having already discussed the issue of a skewed reality, examined the formation of the current state of affairs, and understood the changing aspects of warfare, comes the issue of diplomacy. While the option of diplomacy is predominantly dismissed due to the preconceived notions that terrorists are inherently evil and psychotic, diplomacy is also rather lackluster in providing substantial proof of its success. A primary concern whenever the option of diplomacy emerges is always the subsequent validity of its results. Why negotiate if the enemy can be neutralized for good? While such dilemma is largely defined by the character of an individual, a subsequent issue with diplomacy is how its still employed in conjunction with the Westphalian system. Evading the issue of public backlash, even if an attempt is made to reach out to guerrilla groups or terrorist organizations, oftentimes diplomacy simply fails as negotiations end without results.

As previously mentioned, a crucial detail rests within how civil wars and uprisings are interpreted by the national authorities and consequently by international powers as well. Oftentimes, revolts are easily dismissed as an issue of social or economic background, and while authorities may initially strive to rectify the situation, they inevitable fail by only throwing resources at the conflict. Surprisingly however, the new war theory questions the previously believed correlation between socio-economic insufficiencies and civil uprisings. In a research led by Paul Collier and Anke Hoffler, a staunch criticism is made in regard to interpreting civil wars, as previous investigations largely defined the historical occurrences based purely on economic well being and social issues (Collier, Hoffler 2004). As Collier and Hoffler argue, similar to how criminal behaviour requires both motivation and opportunity, the same necessities also influence civil uprisings (Collier, Hoffler 2004). Although socio-economic issues are often the trademark of failed states, it is ultimately up to the failed leadership to enable the masses to pursue violent

outlets. While a prevalent argument within the international scene seeks to justify unstable regions through the topic of "bad neighbours" which enable violent spill overs, Stedman points out that the initial sparks are often the result of international pressure (Stedman 1999). Nevertheless, once a situation escalates into armed uprising, it is expected that such situation develops further into neighbouring countries as well. The reason why this phenomenon is important, is as it serves as a proof that the initial framing of the situation is inherently flawed. Despite the advantage of position and resources, authorities fail to understand the root of such conflicts, which are often none other than social marginalization and segregation (Collier, Hoffler 2004). While the haplessness of failed states is understandable, international powers commit the same mistakes of merely throwing resources at the issue and boldly intervening (Stedman 1999).

Consequently a new argument is raised by Stephen Stedman, as he seeks to investigate the motivation and reasoning behind the prevalent actors of a conflict (Stedman 1997). According to Stedman, it is not enough to simply pursue the option of negotiation and diplomacy, the entire situation has to be thoroughly evaluated and understood. As such, Stedman seeks to primarily identify the motivation of each actor, thus assessing the possibility of future cooperation. Furthermore as each individual actor is evaluated based on their objectives and goals, an ensuing classification can determine which course of action may be the most efficient. Following this, Stedman differentiates between the more easily negotiated specific, tangible goals, while also bringing forth the less desirable cases of abstract and ideological objectives as well (Stedman 1997). This division is particularly important towards the current shift in US foreign policy, as it may effectively serve as a foundation upon which future organizations may be evaluated whether to pursue conflict with, or to opt for diplomacy and negotiation.

The significance of human interaction is further emphasised, as not only negative behaviour can worsen the situation, but good intentions as well. A rather unsettling proposal is introduced by Stedman as he remarks the difference between humanitarian relief and humanitarian impulse (Stedman 1999). Although international actors may strive to lessen the suffering in these localized conflicts, oftentimes they only further fuel the conflict through their altruistic endeavours. As such, it becomes evident that even good-willed endeavours can further propagate a violent conflict (Stedman 1999). Consequently diplomacy should not only be viewed as

cooperation and providing assistance in time of need, but something far more intricate. Something which demands understanding and conscious foresight.

3.3 The Asymmetry of Power

A quite delicate topic within negotiations, is the significant influence of the asymmetry power. In essence similar to the separation of power in politics, the asymmetry of power effectively revolves around the dispersion of power among various actors within the process of negotiation. Following the research of Frank Pfetsch and Alice Landau, it becomes apparent that negotiation is not merely about reaching compromise or achieving a fair deal (Pfetsch, Landau 2000). Ultimately based upon party satisfaction only, Pfetsch and Landau argue that both symmetric or asymmetric division can lead to successful negotiations. Consequently, they introduce five forms through which the influence of symmetry and asymmetry manifests itself, thus influencing the outcome of various negotiations (Pfetsch, Landau 2000).

- **Possesional Power:** The first manifestation is the broadest as power can be understood through various dimensions, nevertheless it serves as the first major influence which shapes the course of negotiations
    - **The Hobbesian school of thought** - resources, possessions, potential. As such terms are interchangeable, they can be replaced by political, economic and military indicators
    - **The Lockean school of thought -** power is defined through the relations of political actors, specifically through the influence exerted without actually intervening.
    - **The Deutsch school of thought -** power is intrinsically relative, as it can only be assessed in comparison to other actors.
- **Procedural Equality:** The second manifestation focuses on the variable influence which affect how various parties may seek to achieve equal footing within negotiations.
    - **Coercive power -** serves as a clear indicator of an asymmetric division. Its effectively the "threat power" which actors employ in order to influence the behaviour of their opponents.
    - **Structural power -** revolves around economic potentials. It may appear both within symmetric or asymmetric division

- - **Consensual power -** a more considerate influence which often depicts a fairly symmetric division. While it can employ charisma and persuasion, at the same time it may also include populism and demagoguery.
- **Equidistance:** The third manifestation introduces the possibility of a third actor, which consequently reshapes the previous power balance within both symmetric and asymmetric division
- **Symmetry of Instruments:** The forth manifestation focuses solely on military capabilities, as once the situation devolved into open-conflict, power symmetry becomes a vital issue.
- **Outcomes as a Fair Share:** The fifth manifestation emphasises the importance of attendance and presence, as all negotiating parties should be always included within every act of negotiation. Consequently the scope of negotiation becomes pronounced, as actors are prone to a more amiable behaviour under an extended period, thus lengthy cooperation can enable even previously impossible deals.

Thus ultimately negotiations are not merely revolving around one specific issue, they effectively incorporate previous interactions, cultural differences and various other experiences which may or may not directly affect the eventual outcome. Applying this knowledge to the current US foreign policy, it becomes apparent that negotiations are prone to failure, especially in regard to terrorist organizations as the present framework of non-negotiation is conditioned to neglect the division of power.

Chapter 4: Negotiating with Terrorists

4.1 - The Taliban 5 and the Bergdahl Case

Although the United States has negotiated with questionable groups in the past, the Bergdahl case serves as a unique precedent since the beginning of the War on Terror, as it was the first time in which an American president has officially acknowledged its endeavours towards negotiating with a "terrorist" group.

A significant event which caused a tremendous backlash within the US public opinion was the infamous case of Robert Bergdahl, a United States Army soldier who was released in exchange of five Taliban hardliners dubbed, the Taliban Five. The exchange of the Taliban Five became a hotbed for debates, as public opinion both criticised and praised President Obama´s actions.

The primary source of criticism inherently insinuated the framework of non-negotiation, as many doubted the fairness of the deal. Although public opinion was more distressed by the ethical implications of the uneven exchange, political debates questioned the efficacy of the trade, as Republicans heavily criticised both the exchange and its preliminary handling. The Obama Administration was eventually denounced by the Republican Party (GOP), as it failed to warn the Congress in time, thus further condemning the exchange as illegal (Savage 2015). Although President Obama acknowledged both criticism and even defended the exchange based on claims of executive power, the debate still remained prevalent due to the efforts of the GOP.

Despite the prominent detail of Bergdahl being captured while deserting the USA, the predominant issue rests on the fact of negotiating with the Taliban. The foggy definition of terrorism emerges, as the Obama Administration effectively rejected the notion of identifying the Taliban as a terrorist organization, instead classifying it as an "armed insurgency". Nevertheless, such semantics only serve to ensure public relations and legitimacy, as even the Press Secretary of the White House, Josh Earnest has made the mistake of slipping up with the terminology:

"We have not ruled out that there would be some situations in which U.S. service members would still carry out operations in self-defense against the Taliban or other terrorists who are operating in Afghanistan."

As a result, it seems that while diplomacy alone is no easy task, it is inherently the public condemnation, and the ensuing political intrigue which halts the potential alternative that is negotiating with terrorists.

4.2 - Historical Precedents of Negotiating with Terrorists

One of the primary criticisms endured by the Obama Administration was the ahistorical decision to negotiate with terrorists. Although Obama later re-formulated his policy stating that the government alone will not pursue negotiations, but that it will provide assistance to any family, whose relative has been captured by a terrorist organizations (Earnest 2015). While this change is remarkable on its own, the criticism regarding the supposed ahistorical nature of this shift, serves to further elucidate the misconceptions created by the War on Terror, as it ultimately proves to be entirely false.

Although other countries have already negotiated with contemporary terrorists groups: Spain has successfully negotiated with the localized ETA (Basque Country and Freedom), the UK has successfully negotiated peace with the IRA, even former US presidents have willingly opted to negotiate, despite the now shunned behaviour (Cole 2014). One of the earliest records stretch back to 1902, when Teddy Roosevelt, famous for his "talk softly and carry a big stick" line, decided to give amnesty to the Filipino rebel fighters in Aguinaldo (Cole 2014). Furthermore, both Nixon and Ford have endeavoured to negotiate with the Viet Cong who present a clear parallel to the Taliban (Cole 2014). Reagan himself who initially spoke out against such behaviour, has not only negotiated but traded away T.O.W. missiles to Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran. Last but not least George Bush Jr. has also negotiated with Abu Sayyaf for the lives of two American missionaries (Cole 2014, Tomasky 2014).

Consequently, it becomes questionable as to what degree Obama´s decision was "ahistorical" as a wide array of former Presidents have negotiated with terrorists as well. Yet the crucial difference remains within the attitude maintained by the respective Presidential Administration, as the Obama Administration was the first example of openly admitting and officially acknowledging the existence of such a deal. Similar to how Reagan´s speech has defined the adoption of "no concession", the White House has released a report revising the US hostage policy, while Obama has also confirmed these changes during a subsequent press conference. (Earnest, 2015).

As negotiations are not only possible, but successful as well, the alternative that is diplomacy becomes an attractive option. The former Downing Street Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell argues that diplomacy is the only way to defeat terrorism (Powell 2015). Powell claims, that

governments are intrinsically susceptible to change as personnel often change throughout the term, consequently each new government is prone to exhibit the same mistake, which is to dehumanize the terrorist organizations and dismiss their claims (Powell 2015). Despite such tendencies, however, each and every terrorist conflict is inevitably resolved through peace talks (Powell 2015). Furthermore, Powell points out that not only is diplomacy an effective and valid alternative, it is also far more rewarding and beneficial in the long run. In order to further motivate such claim, he points to the precedents of Menachem Begin, Jomo Kenyatta and Archbishop Makarios (Powell 2015). Not only were these individuals labelled as terrorists at one point in their lives, through diplomacy and their efforts, their respective countries have flourished. Begin became famous during his time within Irgun, an undeground Zionist group, which enacted enacted multiple bombings and armed attacks. Kenyatta was imprisoned on the charges of being affiliated with the Mau Mau society during the Mau Mau Uprising in Kenya. Makarios was a leading figure within the enosis of the Greek Cypriots. Ultimately however, each and every one them successfully achieved their goal, as through diplomacy. Begin was elected Prime Minister of Israel, While both Kenyatta and Makarios became the first President of their respective countries.

Nevertheless, a significant obstacle would remain the question, with whom the authorities shall pursue diplomacy with. Although terrorist organizations have been misportrayed and consequently vilified, certain amount of limitations have to be enforced where diplomacy is still possible. Fortunately however, Richardson argues that such problem would inevitably solve itself, as once the option of negotiations become available, a subtle shift in terrorist leadership will occur (Richardson 2006). Consequently, when peace talks become a reality, terrorist organizations often split up into political and military divisions. Ultimately however, once the political group is negotiated with or incorporated within the state, the military group is liable to dissolve or to surrender. Further reinforcing this assumption is the example of Martin McGuiness, a former IRA member whom became a chief negotiator within the Northern Ireland peace processes.

Last but not least, it´s important to keep in mind that while terrorist organizations may often be misportrayed, diplomacy may not be possible nor favourable in every situation. As such, each

and every terrorist organization is to be evaluated, and similar to Stedman´s division, dealt with accordingly.

Conclusion

As a result, I believe that the current shift of US foreign policy in regards to terrorism is none other than an attempt at rectifying the faulty framework of non-negotiation. Although such shift is still carefully formulated to avoid public backlash, it seems to indicate that the Obama administration has successfully managed to acknowledge the intrinsic flaws of denying the possibility to negotiate. As such, I´d argue that the possibility of diplomacy is indeed a clear alternative in many cases, yet while diplomacy is outright rejected for being unethical, unnecessary conflicts will persevere.

In order to successfully combat terrorism, the inherent misconceptions have to be rectified. While it is difficult to combat the influence of labelling, it is imperative for society to strive to limit the exaggerated portrayal, and spread of misinformation. Furthermore, a clear classification or definition is necessary, as the current official standards are unable to successfully identify and sanction terrorist combatants. Consequently through a new set of rules and sanctions, the previously mentioned limit to diplomacy could be defined, which not only would serve to bring further clarity within the process of persecution, but non-state actors themselves would be also made aware with the consequences that their actions entail. While such task is obviously no walk in the park, it is certainly a legitimate endeavour, as the current gray area of ambiguous definitions only complicate and prolong the current judiciary process.

Thus ultimately the question of diplomacy shouldn´t be whether or not, rather how and when.

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Resume

Elementárnym cieľom bakalárskej práce je skúmanie posunu v americkej zahraničnej politike v súvyslosti s postavením diplomacie ako jednou z alternatív voči teroristickým skupinám.

V úvodnej časti prvej kapitoly poukazujem na mylné predstavy o terorizme, ktoré sa dostali do vedomia spoločnosti. Venujem sa v nej samotnej definície terorizmu, jeho chápaniu a vytváraniu nových informácií v modernej spoločnosti.V bakalárskej práci sa v prvom rade opieram o Deutschov model o "vládnych nervoch" a o Chomského model propagandy. Prvá kapitola poukazuje na dezinformáciami vytvorený diabolský kruh, ktorý generuje prekážky v diplomacii.

Druhá kapitola sa venuje formovaniu súčasného status quo najmä z historického hľadiska. Venujem sa v nej stručnému popisu vývoja americkej zahraničnej politiky a v neposlednom rade aj popisu vplyvov Studenej Vojny. V závere druhej kapitoly analyzujem príčiny rozšírenia Salafi-džihádu .Ako jeden z dôvodov považujeme sovietsko-afgánsku vojnu.

V tretej kapitole sa zameriavam na samotné vojny. Sústreďujem sa v nej na Kaldorovú debatu o novej vojne z pohľadu Clausewitzovho konceptu. Pozornosť venujem analýze meniaceho sa charakteru vojny a medzinárodnej scény pričom overujem aj účinnosť diplomacie a proces vyjednávania.

Nosnou témou záverečnej kapitoly je Bergdahlov prípad, t.j. rokovanie o rukojemníkoch medzi USA a Talibanom v roku 2015. Napriek presvedčivému úspechu bola dohoda verejnou mienkou považovaná za nemorálnu a nespravodlivú. V poslednej kapitole sa venujem podrobnému rozboru politických machinácií . Témou záverečnej kapitoly je aj verejná mienka, podľa ktorej toto vyjednávanie považované za „ahistorické" vzhľadom na doterajšiu americkú zahraničnú politiku.