

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

**The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic: Shared Values and
Separate Interests**

Bachelor Thesis

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Declaration of Originality

I declare that this bachelor thesis is my own work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and cited in references.

Bratislava, 22 February 2016

Attila Hromada,

Signed: _____

The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic: Shared Values and Separate Interests

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Abstract

The purpose of the study is to contrast the historical and current level of Europeanisation of German political parties with Habermas' model of a European cosmopolitan democracy.

Thus, the subjects of the study are firstly the German political parties and secondly, the model of the Habermasian cosmopolitan democracy. This model was applied on the positions of the political parties in order to find out their degree of Europeanisation. The perceptions of political parties were ascertained through discourse analysis. Data for this study regarding the political parties was collected from primary sources like party materials or secondary sources like books and articles. On the subject of cosmopolitan democracy, the writings of Habermas were used. The interview was conducted with an EU-near organisation asking for privacy regarding the name of the organisation and the interviewee. The interview is embedded into the various sections of the study, according to the applicability of the given questions.

The results provide firstly historical evidence to the recognition of the importance of Europeanisation, starting with the Adenauerian *Westbindung*. But even if today the German parties are considered to be Europhile, there is still a gap between the current state and Habermas' envisioned European cosmopolitan democracy concerning the lack of solidarity, fragmentation of discourses and national interest.

Európska dilema Berlínskej republiky. Zdieľané hodnoty a rozdielne záujmy

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Abstrakt

Úlohou tejto práce je porovnať historickú a súčasnú úroveň „europанизácie“ nemeckých politických strán s Habermasovým modelom európskej kozmopolitnej demokracie.

Predmetom štúdie sú v prvom rade nemecké politické strany, v druhom rade Habermasov model kozmopolitnej demokracie. Tento model bol aplikovaný na vyjadrenia predstaviteľov politických strán s cieľom zistiť ich stupeň europанизácie. Vnímanie politických strán bolo zistené pomocou analýzy diskurzu. Informácie týkajúce sa politických strán boli zozbierané z primárnych zdrojov, ako sú stránickej materiály, alebo sekundárnych zdrojov, ako sú knihy a články. Na tému kozmopolitnej demokracie boli použité aj Habermasove diela. Rozhovor bol vedený so spoločnosťou úzko spätou s Európskou úniou, ktorá požiadala o diskretnosť ako pre organizáciu, tak aj pre respondentu. Obsah rozhovoru je rozložený vo viacerých sekciách štúdie v závislosti od použiteľnosti danej otázky.

V prvom rade, výsledky poskytujú historický dôkaz na rozpoznanie dôležitosti „europанизácie“, ktorú vyzdvihoval už Adenauer vo svojej koncepcii *Westbindung*. Hoci sú nemecké strany považované za eurofilné, stále existujú rozdiely medzi

súčasnou podobou Nemecka a Habermasovou predstavou Európskej kozmopolitnej demokracie z hľadiska nedostatku solidarity, nejednotnom diskurze, a národného záujmu.

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Table of contents

Declaration of Originality	iii
Abstract.....	iv
Abstrakt	v
Acknowledgments	vii
CHAPTER 1	10
1.1. Introduction	10
1.2. What is party Europeanisation?.....	12
1.3. The impact of Europeanisation on the German party system	13
1.3.1. <i>Die Volksparteien</i> (The catch-all parties).....	16
1.3.2. The minor parties.....	17
1.3.3. Far-right parties	19
1. 4. Conclusion.....	19
1. 5. Methodology	20
CHAPTER 2: Historical background of civilising international relations.....	23
2.1. The Dilemma between <i>Westbindung</i> and <i>Ostpolitik</i>	23
2.2. The Reunification and the ‘new <i>Ostpolitik</i> ’	25
2.3. Conclusion.....	27
CHAPTER 3: Crisis in the European Union.....	29
3.1. ‘If the euro fails, Europe fails.’ The common currency in danger.	29
3.2. Germany’s role in the EU integration	31
3.3. <i>Zivilmacht</i>	33
3.4. The European Council.....	34
3.5. Democratic deficit	35
3.6. Lost sovereignty?	36
3.7. The nation-states strike back	38
3.8. Solidarity	39

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

3.9.Responsibility of political parties.....	40
3.10.The future of integration. Bygone European salience or integration at gunpoint?.....	43
3.10.1.The lost importance of integration.....	44
3.10.2.Integration at gunpoint.....	45
CHAPTER 4: Conclusion.....	48
RESUMÉ	51
BIBLIOGRAPHY	54

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Germany is arguably the only nation in Europe that in a self-critical way re-assessed its relations with its European partners, addressing the most sensitive issues as well. In the 20th century, a huge transformation took place in the German political scene, and in a relatively short period of time, without much history of democratic traditions it became one of the world's the most stable democracies, a *Zivilmacht*, that aims at the civilisation of international relations, emphasising the importance of European values. Consequently the country has become a fertile ground for such alternatives about the future of the European integration, which in other countries can be unthinkable due to their highly heroicised national images. The financial crisis nevertheless made such alternative undertakings even more necessary, since the nation-states alone were unable to cope with the issues of a global market, and it is only one example why a higher degree of internationalisation is needed, not to mention human rights or global warming. I see here a special role for Germany since apparently it is one of the few countries that would be willing to transfer power for the aim of such cosmopolitan democracy.

Despite of this favourable perspectives, this study will also show that the party perspectives are less so idealistic as on the surface it seems to be the case. I am arguing that even if the German political parties are exceptionally Europhile compared to other party systems in Europe, there are still a number of constraints which are hindering it to become a party system of a cosmopolitan democracy, such as the lack of solidarity, the fragmentation of national elites and the rebounding national interests.

This study, despite of the fact that it is analysing political parties, first of all is important to all of the citizens for Europe, who are not receiving enough information due to the huge political fragmentation all around Europe. Despite of the fact that there are European elections, the opening of the national discourses did not happen, otherwise we could see joint national campaigning in European elections. The thesis is also written for those citizens who are the victims of the lack of solidarity which has been around more intensively since the outbreak of the crisis and for those who are searching for an alternative to escape this situation outside of the tight grip of the

nation-states. For the political parties, this study has a special purpose, namely to rethink their interest-based strategies into strategies of more long-term perspectives. This study emphasises that such a cosmopolitan democracy is indeed in the interests of the citizens and states of Europe, even if it is accompanied with short-term sacrifices. Therefore it is important that political parties are acknowledging it and if it already happened, inform the citizens about the long-term benefits.

The study is based on discourse analysis and comparative analysis. The discourse analysis was needed in finding out the perspectives of the German parties on various European issues, whereas the comparative analysis is an integrated part of the study with the aim to compare the view of political parties of Europe and Habermas' recommendations on a European cosmopolitan democracy.

In the first chapter I will provide a definition of Europeanisation which serves as a frame of reference for the overarching comparison in the next chapters between the realities of political parties in Germany and what Habermas introduced to be a so called cosmopolitan democracy. In the second chapter I am comparing a similar pacification model of international relations in the German party system, namely the *Westbindung* starting from the times of Adenauer. Finally the core of the study the third chapter deals with the three identified constraints which make parties lagging behind compared what Habermas proposes to be a cosmopolitan democracy, namely the lack of solidarity, fragmentation of discourses and the prevailing national interests.

Surprisingly Habermas' concept of a cosmopolitan democracy is relatively controversial even in the political left, which has a historical role in providing other platforms of political action than the level of nation-states. For instance the leftist-leaning sociologist Wolfgang Streeck rather sees the solutions for Europe's problems in returning to the nation-state's scheme, and the political parties are also unwilling to promote openly such a courageous thesis, now when the popularity of the European Union is so low and outside a small fraction of European Federalists nobody is campaigning in favour of a future treaty change which would enable an even deeper political integration of the European Union.

Hypothesis

German political parties are considered to be pro-European, whereas there are still a number of considerable factors which are hindering the emergence of a European cosmopolitan democracy. The thesis posits that the hindering factors create a gap between the realities of German political parties and a cosmopolitan democracy are posed by

1. the lack of national solidarity towards other European partners
2. the fragmentation of political parties and the isolation of discourses
3. the prevailing of short-term interests of political parties and states, ignoring the long-term benefits of the citizens

1.2. What is party Europeanisation?

As the main part of the work deals with a comparison between the realities of German political parties and the idealistic European cosmopolitanism, the first chapter will provide a frame of reference for this comparison, which is the so called Europeanisation of political parties. Besides defining of the concept of Europeanisation and concluding with a pro-European stance in the German political sphere it will be also discussed how Europeanisation manifests itself among certain German parties.

Europeanisation is understood as a process in which ‘European integration influences the operating arenas, or environments, of national political parties.’ (Ladrech, 2001, p. 394-95) In other words, Europeanisation encompasses the impacts of European topics on the party system of a given country.

Every country has a different reaction to the impacts of Europeanisation: ‘Europeanisation fully acknowledges that the impact of European integration on domestic actors and the extent to which these actors may or may not engage in any adaptation is likely to be non-uniform, within countries, across countries, and over time.’ (Carter, Luther, and Poguntke, 2007, p. 5). Since this a case study of Germany, country-specific factors play an important role concerning the perception of Europe. These factors were enumerated by Külahci as the following: the institutional framework (unilateral vs federal system), the character of the government (single-party or coalition), the effectiveness of the structures scrutinising EU affairs, the

length of EU membership, public opinion on the EU, the existence of euroskeptic parties and the nature of the national discourse on EU-related matters (Külahci, 2012, p. 7).

Inertia in Europeanisation can take place as elites isolate themselves from European processes because they perceive no electoral interest in the Europeanisation of party structures (Mair, 2000, p. 47-8) or because of the '*differences between domestic parties in terms of policy stances of the European Union*' (Mair, 2000, p. 31-7). In other words, such inertia prevails when European issues are not politicised, and thus do not enter mass politics. Consequently, Habermas also warns against such a situation when political issues are not able to reach the public sphere. At that point, he criticises the bureaucratisation of European institutions which results in a European bureaucratic elite making decisions, without the participation of the people (Habermas, 1994, p. 502).

'The Europhile party system is not characterised by an opposition between pro-and anti-Europe mainstream domestic parties; in this setting, the mainstream parties are Europhile.' (Külahci, 2012, p. 5)

In the case of Germany, the party system's responses to Europeanisation, clearly results in a Europhile system. If the party system is described as Europhile, it means that there is a consensus on European integration among all of the mainstream parties. Thus, these parties are all Europhile too. Euroskeptic parties do not necessarily have to be absent, but they do not have much political weight: Külahci describes them having less than 10 percent of the votes but he adds that 'referendums or even European Parliamentary elections may reinforce Eurosceptic parties' (Külahci, 2012, p. 5). Thus, such events are likely to mobilise Euroskeptic voters.

1.3. The impact of Europeanisation on the German party system

After having defined Europeanisation, the aim of the following section is to describe the impacts of the Europeanisation on German political parties, namely, whether Europeanisation changed the German party system significantly. The following description of the historical and current level of the Europeanisation of German parties will be applied in the next chapters to the idealistic concept of European cosmopolitanism.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

In Germany, as in many other European countries, the last decades were spent on the domestication of European politics, trying to involve European issues into the party programme, emphasising that they can be only solved by European cooperation. Nevertheless the impact of the EU remains low on party competition. The low public interest in European affairs is demonstrated in the notoriously low voting turnouts in European parliamentary election, as compared to 'traditional' national elections.

With German unification, economic concerns cropped up and public perception on the EU became less a matter of consensus. Europe was seen for the first time not only as contributor to German welfare and peace, but Germany increasingly saw itself as a partner who contributes to rather than benefits from membership. During the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) German political interests were asserted more intensively. This has continued, though to a lesser extent, with Merkel's 'self-assured modesty' and 'pragmatic multilateralism'. It was a return to normality. In other words, Germany started to behave more like any other normal country because the peculiarities of its geopolitical situation - the division into two countries - ceased to exist (Kundnani, 2014, p. 66).

The German party system has changed significantly since 1980, when it was a two and a half party system with two catch-all parties, the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/ Christian Social Union in Bavaria), SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the liberal FDP (Free Democratic Party). Since then it has developed into a fluid five-or four-party system on the federal level. The other 'newcomer' party was the post-materialist and initially anti-establishment *Die Grünen*, or Greens which was established in 1983. By 1990, this party underwent significant changes and became more pragmatic and set its terms in a more realistic way, hoping to participate in mainstream politics. The establishment nevertheless had little to do with Europeanisation: the party was largely a result of post-materialism, the emergence of new waves of the green and peace movements in Germany (Külahci, 2012, p. 39).

The emergence of the other junior party came shortly afterwards, but due to a different reason, namely German reunification. In 1990, the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), the legal successor of the East German SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) was established -to overcome the party's authoritarian traditions

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

rooted in the one-party state of the GDR. The PDS has merged in 2007 with the newly established WASG (Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice), with a voting base in the Western federal states. The union of the two parties resulted in the establishment of *Die Linke* (The Left).

There are a number of attempts to internationalise the national parties and to europeanise their discourse, such as establishing party institutions like the Friedrich Ebert Foundation close to SPD, which maintains good relations with centre-leftist parties in other European countries. Such networks are aiming to address various issues together, on a European level, and thus more effectively.

Programmatic change is the most visible party response to European integration (D.Hanley, 2002, p. 463-81). It is important to note that even if we have such visible way of pointing out Europeanisation, all in all it has little impact on domestic party strategies. Europe remains far from the everyday issues of citizens, and its integration was not able to generate very controversial issues or heated debates. European policy gradually became more important which can be seen in the party manifestos after the 1980s and 1990s. As EU issues gained more relevance, references to the EU increased in all respective party programmes. These references increased by 60 percent among the three established parties: the CDU, SPD and FDP (Külahci, 2012, p. 41). Even *Die Linke*, which is considered to be the most euroskeptic party in the Bundestag, included the European Union into their programme in order to present a European perspective and bolster their voter basis and credibility.

All in all, Europeanisation did not change the party system of Germany significantly and did not create any significant divisions in the German party system. The biggest takeaway of the German political system since the new millennium is that the number of relevant parties increased, resulting in a fragmented political system. Despite the fact that party Europeanisation also accelerated at that time, this phenomenon is unlikely to be the result of this Europeanisation. In other words, the arrival of *Die Grünen* and *Die Linke* cannot be considered as an impact of EU integration (Külahci, 2012, p. 40).

1.3.1. Die Volksparteien (The catch-all parties)

SPD - Social Democratic Party of Germany

The *Grundkonsens* (general consensus, in this case about the importance of European integration) of the SPD on Europe was disrupted in the beginning of the 1990's due to new developments in the EU which were not necessarily in accordance with the SPD's social-democratic values and their vision of a 'social Europe' (Sloam, 2005). There was an ambiguity in how to perceive Europe because they saw that the Europe of welfare states was endangered by new developments of the EU, such as the Maastricht Treaty.

The social consequences triggered some critical voices, for instance the SPD politician Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul demanded that the 'federal government should end the politics of social cuttings and completely unauthorised coupling of the European Monetary Union with the further cuts in social programmes' (Günsche, 1997). Nevertheless, the debate was won by the pro-Maastricht treaty-wing of the SPD and the party accepted the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 by a large majority, albeit with the reservation that 'only when the economic and stability mechanisms are ensured' (Bundestag, 2012). This compromise also showed the end of the 'programmatic pluralism' in the Europapolitik of the SPD (Külahci, 2012, p. 42). This meant that the SPD became more pro-European while reconciling its values with European developments, such as the relation to the internal market and the single currency.

Some leaders nevertheless preserved their critical stance toward the EU, despite the common party policy on Europe. This elder and more pragmatic approach was outlined by the then-chancellor Schröder: 'Germans should be Europeans because they want to be, not because they feel they have to be.' (Külahci, 2012, p. 42) This social democratic pragmatism was the beginning of a more self-confident German Europapolitik where national interests gained more importance. As the SPD became the senior governing party in 1998, their Europapolitik became more consistent and nuanced compared to their programmatic pluralism at the beginning of the decade.

Many SPD politicians were known for advocating a neutral role for Germany in Europe, a kind of Finlandised state which could benefit from its central position.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

Schröder, for instance, advocated a ‘German Way’ 57, and, surprisingly, the SPD took up more nationalistic rhetoric, for instance when they were arguing for the unification of the German nation when Adenauer integrated Germany into Western Europe.

CDU - Christian Democratic Union of Germany

The CDU has considered itself ‘*Die Europapartei*’ since Konrad Adenauer. Compared to the SPD, from the establishment of European Community, they always had a consistent and steady emphasis on Europe in their party programme. Helmut Kohl, who was the chancellor for a long period, from 1982 until 1998, had a large role in the party’s Europeanisation. Kohl, to avoid future crises, originally wanted not only economic integration, but also a political one.

His other party colleagues published the controversial Schäuble-Lamers paper which advocated a so called core Europe, a more pragmatic suggestion for proceeding with European integration. (Schäuble and Lamers, 1994). Kohl did not agree with the idea of excluding other European states, especially according to their economic performance. Similarly to the SPD, the main criticism towards the European integration within the CDU came from the regional representatives. Criticism from the most prominent level is attributed to Edmund Stoiber (CSU), who criticised, among other things, EU bureaucracy, the perceived superfluous German contributions to the common EU pot, and the lack of supervision of Brussels competences. (Auer and Stroh, 2010). The case of Stoiber shows that one important leader can have a significant influence on the whole party, since the CSU was characterised by soft euroskepticism during Stoiber’s leadership.

1.3.2. The minor parties

FDP - Free Democratic Party

The FDP, as the liberal party, has been a big supporter of market liberalisation in the EU and overall has advocated European integration: ‘The European common market is the heart of the European project. Thereof we need not less, but we need more.’ (Dürr, 2014). The party participated in the Kohl government between 1982 and 1998 and the liberal Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the foreign minister at that time. The FDP had an important role in liberalising the European economy and establishing the Single Market without the political union. In the last few decades, Europeanisation

played an important role within the FDP, considering their important position on foreign policy and the emergence of a liberal and market-oriented European Union (Külahci, 44).

The discourse of the FDP can be compared to the concept of a ‘trading state’, a notion similar to *Zivilmacht*, because both of them are dismissing military power. However, the trading state has no priority to civilise the international relations, but rather to improve the country’s trading capacity. According to Kundnani, both *Zivilmacht* and trading state are aiming at ending of the international anarchy, but a *Zivilmacht* is having much idealistic attitudes towards reaching its aims: ‘for a civilian power, the overriding foreign-policy objective is not simply to improve economic performance or prosperity but to civilise international relations through the development of the international rule of law. In other words, a civilian power aims to make international politics like domestic politics.’ (Kundnani, 26)

Alliance 90/The Green Party

‘Question upon question, but there is a very simple answer: the transition from a union of states to full parliamentarisation as a European Federation, something Robert Schuman demanded 50 years ago. And that means nothing less than a European Parliament and a European government which really do exercise legislative and executive power within the Federation. This Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty.’ (Fischer, 2000)

As the quotation from the famous Humboldt- speech by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer shows above, *Die Grünen* can be considered the most Europeanised party in the German parliament. They started as an activist and anti-establishment party, but it became obvious for them that environmental issues can be solved only in concert with other countries, on an international level. As a matter of fact, Külahci sees the success of *Die Grünen* in the European Interation, which gave bigger platform to the parties, which was significantly deradicalised with the aim of reaching a larger number of voters.

Die Grünen is the party which uses the word ‘Europe’ most frequently in their party programme, partly because the issues they want to solve are more and more connected not only to Germany, but to Europe as a whole. (Grünes Europawahprogramm, 2014).

Whereas the FDP sees Europe as the means to improve free market conditions, the Greens on the other side expect Europe to deal with common European environmental standards and also to counter the democratic deficit in Europe.

Die Linke

Die Linke has the most ambivalent relations towards Europe among the parties which are currently in the Bundestag. The Left party considers the EU's neoliberalism the most problematic component, but nevertheless supports the idea of the European Union. It is interesting that the PDS made the most references to the EU in 2002 (Külahci, p. 41). However, the number of negative references was slightly higher. *Die Linke* appreciates the EU as a platform to create a fairer world, but they do not see the EU as an aim. Rather, they see it as a way which may lead towards that world. They are committed to the European minimum wage, the harmonisation of taxes to end social dumping, the regulation of arms exports, and more direct democracy.

1.3.3. Far-right parties

The far right parties have a fundamentally different approach concerning the European Union than the Volksparteien and the two newcomer parties. Since nationalism has a central role in the programme of these parties, they are reluctant to transfer power from the nation-state to an 'outsider' institution like the European Union. They argue that this process is happening antidemocratically. Their anti-Europeanism at the same time is connected with anti-enlargement and anti-immigration sentiments. They are arguing for the Europe of nations and a federation based on Christian and Western values, which, in their view, has nothing in common with the current EU. Moreover, with the recent economic crisis they also adopted an anti-globalisation and anti-capitalism rhetoric. Hertner and Sloam(2012, p.46) underline that even if they are insignificant parties, one must take into consideration that they are the only openly euroskeptic parties in Germany which they are trying to use to gain more popularity.

1. 4. Conclusion

The German party system provides a unique context for Europeanisation, because there is a consensus among the mainstream parties on the importance of Germany's membership. Europeanisation took place clearly on the programmatic levels of

political parties and there are also attempts to bring European discourses to a higher level.

Nevertheless the growing number of relevant parties had little to do with European issues and in many party discourses can be demonstrated as having only interest-based attachment to Europe, such as the trading state at the FPD and Schröder's 'German Way'. The level of Europeanisation of German parties thus is not yet on the level of reaching a cosmopolitan European democracy because of the self-centredness of perceptions and lack of solidarity.

After having discussed the degree of Europeanisation of German political parties, the following chapter will deal with historical examples, such as when these political players were attempting to civilise international relations towards a higher level of a European cosmopolitan democracy.

1. 5. Methodology

The paper focuses on the perceptions of German political parties in the context of the domestication of international relations.

The hypothesis is being tested first through discourse analysis, namely to determine the degree of Europeanisation among the German political parties, according to Ole Weaver's approach to Discourse Analysis (Weaver, 2004). Discourse analysis includes how specific actors are associated with identified discourses, construct an argument. Accordingly, we cannot merely construct a dominant narrative of political actors, but must also include other, non-mainstream views as well as a critique of dominant narratives.

Consequently, it is important to collect data from all political parties represented in the Bundestag and, moreover, to include in this collection the currently not present FDP which previously had a significant role in the formation of German Europapolitik. Furthermore, the party of the AfD is also incorporated in the research, which has never been in the Bundestag up to this day, but has established an unavoidable role in the political scene.

The analysis of party perception of European integration takes place in the first chapter. This serves an introductory part, functioning as a frame for the later chapters, which enquire into the difference between the parties and Habermas's ideal

cosmopolitan Europe. In order to connect discourse analysis and Habermas's writings, the parties are also classified on how Habermasian elements on European cosmopolitanism can be found in their narratives, in other words how 'Habermasian' could we consider their platforms.

As a frame of reference within the comparative analysis, Europeanisation is defined in the first chapter, including the degree of pro-European attitudes among the German political parties. Party perceptions are compared to Habermas' writings in order to find out how the post-heroic German society and highly Europeanised political system is also fulfilling the requisites of a cosmopolitan democracy, such as how parties are bringing the citizens closer to EU affairs by informing them about the long-term benefits of EU integration.

The comparison emphasises the differences between the realities of the parties and the idealistic stance of a European cosmopolitanism. With the help of comparative analysis, value-based solidarity, the fragmentation of discourses, and the interests of nation-states and parties are identified as deciding factors in assessing the gap between party realities and cosmopolitan democracies.

The comparative analysis is supplemented with a qualitative discourse analysis, namely by characterising and classifying such terms as '*Westbindung*' or 'solidarity'. Discourse analysis is a necessity to observe how the political parties place themselves ideologically, and which concepts can be attached to parties, such as CDU's *Westbindung*.

The main source of data concerning the political parties are primary data, like party programmes or the statements of politicians of the given parties. Secondary sources were additionally used, such as analyses of German political parties in forms of books or articles from newspapers like *Die Zeit*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* or *Die Welt*.

Regarding the discussion of cosmopolitan democracy, it was based largely on primary sources from the works of Habermas. This was complemented with the work of Hans Kundnani-'The Paradox of German Power', borrowing terms like *Westbindung* and *Zivilmacht* in order to embed them into Habermas' concept of cosmopolitan democracy.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

The thesis shows different time periods starting from the Adenauerian Westbindung until the crises of contemporary Europe.

The interview was conducted with an NGO funded by the European Council whose director asked for the privacy of any personal data connected to the organisation. The interview includes solely open questions.

CHAPTER 2: Historical background of civilising international relations

In this chapter, the attitudes of political parties will be analysed from a historical perspective enumerating examples when they attempted to civilise European state relations within the framework of Europeanisation. The attempts for transnationalising the European democracies had started already in the the beginning of the post-war period of the Federal Republic. The next chapter gives historical evidence for increasing Europeanisation, with an observation of the conflicting patterns of European values and separate short-term interests. The following chapter shows a successful attempt to civilise transnational relations through the example of *Westbindung*. It was an example when national interests were not the priority for political elites, but rather the civilisation of international relations and committing the country to European values instead of choosing a more ambiguous *Sonderweg* position.

2.1. The Dilemma between *Westbindung* and *Ostpolitik*

Adenauer and the *Westbindung*

The roots of *Westbindung* (integration with the West) can be traced back to the period after the Second World War when the country found itself in the middle of conflicting interests of the two remaining superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In these insecure times, the leading figure of the CDU and first chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, understood that the prerequisite for German security was Western integration and collective security with its Western allies. Bonn made clear its commitment to the Western bloc already in the early years of the Federal Republic, with a highly disputed decision, especially as perceived by the German left-wing parties. Between the years of 1952 and 1955, the Soviet Union proposed the possibility of a German unification, with the 1945 borders and neutrality. Konrad Adenauer declined the offer and the Bonn Republic became an integral part of NATO in 1955. He made this decision even despite the fact that it would deteriorate the relations with its Eastern European neighbours even more. Adenauer was able to connect European integration with the interests of the citizens of a renascent Germany arguing that it would bring a more promising future for Germany than sovereignty.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

Westbindung, therefore, was completed with both joining the NATO and signing the Treaty of Rome, laying the foundations of a united Europe.

Adenauer faced criticism especially from the SPD because they saw *Westbindung* as a threat to national unity. In the view of social democrats, deteriorating relations with the so-called German Democratic Republic would make the chances of a future reunification very slim, if not impossible. The social democrats thus were trying to use latent German nationalism in order to hinder *Westbindung*. Kurt Schumacher, who influenced the future profile of the SPD, labelled Adenauer as being 'the chancellor of the Allies' for turning his back on the GDR (Thränhardt, 1996, p. 80). Furthermore, Schumacher envisioned a 'social Europe' and was skeptical about whether it would be possible if Germany became too close to the 'conservative, clerical and capitalist' world power, the USA. However, he also deeply detested the Soviet Union, considering the communists to be 'red-painted Nazis' (Kissinger, 2011, p. 146). In a word, the social-democrats were for neutrality from both the West and the East.

Willy Brandt and the *Ostpolitik*

The SPD finally reconciled itself with *Westbindung* in 1959 and since then the term '*Grundkonsens*' was used to describe the relations of German political parties, meaning a consensus on western and European integration. The consensus was nevertheless not as unanimous as it seemed. Egon Bahr, political advisor to Willy Brandt, was convinced that reunification could not be achieved without the Soviet Union. His strategy of rapprochement became known as the *Wandel durch Annäherung*, the slogan of *Ostpolitik*. (Kundnani, p. 82) Kissinger considered the *Ostpolitik* a more nationalistic and independent move from Germany. Moreover, he accused the SPD of double standards, namely that they were accepting the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, but were protesting against colonisation elsewhere in Africa and Asia. (Kissinger, 1979, p. 420)

At first, *Ostpolitik* indeed seemed to be a realistic step, but it also had an aspect which was able to counter the isolation of West Germany through the Hallstein doctrine, according to which any country was deemed as unfriendly if they recognised the GDR. (Kissinger, 1979, p. 440). Thus, *Ostpolitik* could be considered as an act of preventing the isolation of Germany on the international sphere and not a move of

Realpolitik. According to Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, the ‘Prussian red baroness’, a land in the middle of Europe should look not only towards the West but also be more open to its Eastern neighbours. There is already such a strongly positive interrelation between Germany and its European neighbours which is unprecedented in history. On the one hand, it means prosperity and peace in Europe, but this interrelation also means that all of the countries of the old continent are more interrelated and, even with their domestic decisions, they have a strong impact on each other and on Europe as a whole. (Dönhoff, 1992, p. 68-81). Furthermore, the merits of *Ostpolitik* was also a more multiperspectival *Europapolitik* for Germany which enabled reconciliation with its Eastern neighbours.

2.2. The Reunification and the ‘new *Ostpolitik*’

Helmut Kohl and Reunification

After reunification, contrary to the fears of pro-American idealists that Germany would abandon the Western course and go it alone on a dangerous *Sonderweg* (separate path), Mitterrand and Kohl continued to press on with the deepening of EU integration also as a compromise for approving the German reunification. According to Bahr, *Westbindung* and the European Union solved the German question once and for all: the Berlin Republic no longer constitutes a danger to its neighbours. (Bahr, 1999, p. 41-52)

Some politicians from the left nevertheless argued that the objectives of Germany and the USA were no longer the same- and that was why it was time to loosen *Westbindung* (Kundnani, 2014, p. 66). As Bahr commented on the more and more obvious *Entwestlichung* (de-Westernisation): ‘There are now different interests on either side of the Atlantic and they will remain different. If Germany did not end the dominance of the United States over its foreign and security policy, it would be nothing more than a protectorate’ (E. Bahr, 2003, p. 103). They aimed to create a kind of normality in Germany’s relations towards other nations. According to Bahr, normality was pursuing national interests, but many also saw it as fulfilling the role of membership in an international organisation such as NATO (Kundnani, 2008). The normality meant that Germany wanted to leave behind its foreign policy based on the historical traumas of the Nazis- and now wanted to conduct foreign policy as ‘any other normal state’, without having any negative connotations as to nation-state

interests. My interviewee on the question of the Schlußstrich ('drawing a line under the past and moving on') and normality answered the following:

'I think no country should base its foreign policy on national interest. As a country, you have fundamental values. (...) Maybe the reality is that not all of them share these values. According to these values, people should live free and in dignity, have food and their children should be able to grow up. There should be peace and some kind of rule of law, protection of minorities, women, etc.

All countries have past crimes. Japan has a 'peace constitution', but many people say they should have a real army and not just a so called self-defence force... When it comes to Auschwitz, it is a different agenda, embedded into the UN convention on preventing genocide. The problem with Auschwitz is that it is politically used. Fischer's, (who justified the Kosovo-intervention with saying that Auschwitz also had to be liberated by outside forces, the Allies – the author) and many other Westerners reaction to Kosovo created a model for Putin's reaction on Crimea or South Ossetia or Abkhazia.'

The weakening of Westbindung was explained with the fact that the US and Germany were no longer as important to each other as they were during the Cold War (Kundnani, 2014, p. 56). This weakening manifested itself when Schröder decided to openly oppose the Iraqi war because of public opinion and Bush's weak argumentation. Public opinion indeed generated an 'Entwestlichung' which was connected to the trauma of the Second World War. Thus people insisted on peace basically at all costs (Infratest dimap, 2014).

Gerhard Schröder and the New *Ostpolitik*

In Schröder's time a new *Ostpolitik* was unfolding. Schröder was less concerned with the authoritarian leadership of countries like Russia, China, or Iran. quite on the contrary, he undertook regular visits to some of these countries. His aim was to secure deals with typically state-owned companies in these authoritarian states. Brandt's original *Ostpolitik* had good connotations because it helped to ease relations with communist countries which indirectly contributed to the reunification of the two Germanies. In other words, Willy Brandt was seeking cooperation, rather than confrontation with these countries. The new *Ostpolitik* was profoundly different in

nature. Perhaps the slogan of the new *Ostpolitik* explains it the best, which is a result of paraphrasing the original one from Bahr: From *Wandel durch Annäherung* (Change through rapprochement), it became *Wandel durch Handel* (Change through trade). Schröder argued that economic exchange with these countries will lead to societal change as happened to East Germany thanks to West German credits (Schröder, 2006, p. 141). At any rate, the business oriented realist policy is quite self-evident.

Such issues divide German parties significantly more than the issue of European integration. Germany reprioritised its relations with Russia as the Ukraine crisis broke out and voted for sanctions against Russia, despite sacrificing significant economic ties developed during Schröder's time. Similarly, such division of opinion exists towards the USA as well. There is perfect disagreement for instance on the issue of TTIP, the trade agreement which would be established to dismantle existing barriers between European and American free trade. The issue of TTIP divides parties in the following way: the TTIP is endorsed only by the CDU and FDP; the relatively new 'protest parties', *Die Linke* and *Die Grünen* are against it; and lastly the SPD would accept it with reservations, mainly connected to retaining European standards and more transparency.

2.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, both *Westbindung* and *Ostpolitik* contributed to the domestication of the German Europapolitik and to a more unified Europe. Due mostly to security reasons, Adenauer integrated Germany tightly into the West and he was committed to carrying out this integration even at the expense of his country's growing division. The SPD, driven by its reunificationist and anti-capitalist tendencies, has created *Ostpolitik*, which was a big success in reaching their aims and to avoid the isolation of Germany. After reunification, the *Westbindung* has weakened due to the lack of a security threat, showing that partnerships can get exhausted without a common aim. Egon Bahr, the architect of *Ostpolitik*, demanded normality, meaning to pursue national interest as any other state, even at the expense of loosening *Westbindung*. Germany indeed returned to a new *Ostpolitik*, aiming at special relationships with some non-democratic countries like Russia and China, but at the same time, Germany's European commitment has remained firm.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

This chapter gave a brief history of how the international sphere was domesticated in the Federal Republic through the perspective of German political parties. *Westbindung* serves as an example to understand party positions in the case of a comparison between European cosmopolitanism and the positions of political parties. One could observe here the competing salience between European values and nation-state interest, in many cases intertwining with each other in a given strategy like *Westbindung* or *Ostpolitik*. Nevertheless *Westbindung* made possible such a degree of democratisation of international relations that Germany's democratic development and peace on the European continent were guaranteed.

CHAPTER 3: Crisis in the European Union

Westbindung was the first step in adopting Western values and democracy, and thus, a cosmopolitan democracy. The various crises in the European Union prompted Habermas to advocate a new dimension of the domestication of international relations, more far reaching than *Westbindung* was, namely a cosmopolitan democratisation. Therefore, in order to test Habermas's writings, this chapter will concentrate on the Europe of today, with its various crises.

The third chapter will discuss the prevailing gap between cosmopolitical democracy and the current political scene in Germany. As the previous chapter implies, *Westbindung* was not an easy path to take, which had a lot of opponents among those parties who were thinking more in the framework of nation-states. There are other obstacles of cosmopolitan democracy which are going to be discussed in the following chapter, such as the lack of solidarity, the fragmentation of political elites and the prevailing short-term interests of nation-states. These obstacles emerge because there is already a highly unified community existing in Europe, which is largely lacks the solidarity which is obviously needed among entities with such a high degree of Europeanisation. This solidarity is missing because there is no European citizenry so far due to the lack of political union.

3.1. 'If the euro fails, Europe fails.' The common currency in danger.

Habermas outlined the roots of the euro crisis by pointing out that decisions are made on the national level with no regard to other member states. In order to solve this problem, he supports three essential objectives of Europeanisation:

First, a joint political decision-making is needed on the EU level to coordinate individual states' economic policies. It would prevent some decisions of one member state having negative effects on another's and enable the establishment of a political union, instead of only a monetary one. Second, if the EU budget could levy taxes, it would counter imbalances in the monetary union. Third, euro bonds, the collectivisation of debt would make a united EU financial administration possible and prevent speculations against individual member states.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

Comparing Habermas to the CDU strategy of financial crisis management, we see that the latter was centred on ‘strict regulatory policies concerning government budget’, which contravenes what Habermas promotes about a joint economic government, at least, within the Eurozone. The strategy of the CDU clearly implies a more short-term vision, not really with the aim to correct institutional and political flaws but rather to calm down markets, or even citizens, proving that there is a strategy, even if it is not as daring what Habermas proposes. Such a strategy, according to Habermas, is not only damageful for euro-economies, but can also create a wider gap regarding the discourse and the common understanding among the concerned countries. For widening national discourses he promotes conducting joint transnational campaigns. (Habermas, 2015, p. 101)

Not only the FPD, but also the CDU and SPD in their party programmes are keen to emphasise the concept of ‘trading state’, which can be considered quite contradictory to the value-based German *Zivilmacht* which evolved in the years of the Bonn Republic. The Exportnation still implies a strong despise towards Nazi militarism, since it emphasises trade rather than the military as the dominant tool in foreign policy. On the other side, the ‘trading state’ also contributes to economic egoism, which overtly dominated German political discourse after reunification. The trading state can be considered as economic part of the German normality, which underlines the fact that the reunified Germany should ‘act as a normal state’, following its national interests.

The title of this section, ‘If the euro fails, Europe fails’ is attributed to Merkel, which implies her strong conviction to prevent the break-up of the euro. Even if it sounds an idealistic vision, it can also be translated into a pragmatic decision, namely that the break-up of the euro would be catastrophic for German exporters. Merkel’s other policies in countering the euro crisis also let one assume that the saving of the euro has pragmatic reasons. For instance, the CDU also would avoid the transfer union, which would mean debt mutualisation among the economically weaker and stronger countries of the Eurozone.

Habermas is known as a strong critic of the Merkel-led austerity measures by arguing that fiscal discipline is not the problem, but the asymmetry which triggers it.

According to him, Merkel-type measures did not treat the problem at its roots; they were only short-term solutions. (Habermas, 2015, 128).

The lack of common decisions and institutions imply that the continuing of the euro-crisis is also the result of the lack of Europeanisation. First, the surety on the issue of austerity shows how the CDU sees the euro-crisis in national terms, despite of the fact that they are proud of their post-national and post-heroic statehood. In other words, the austerity policies imply that the main fault for the crisis was in those countries which lacked financial discipline, rather than the whole structure of country economies participating in a poorly constructed euro-mechanism.

3.2. Germany's role in the EU integration

In a liberal international politics, there is no place for hegemonic powers. The political elite of the mainstream parties all agree that thinking in hegemonies is part of an old thinking, which caused a lot of hardships to the old continent. That is why they say that Germany has learned from the mistakes of its tragic past, moreover paid a price for it, and now imagines its role in a unified Europe (the AfD is still an exception here).

On the other side, many actors see a special role for Germany in the process of reforming the EU, even if obviously it should be a process of negotiation with all European partners. For instance the Polish foreign minister said the following: 'I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity' (Economist, 2011), implying that Germany's inward looking and traditionally commercially driven foreign policy makes European integration more difficult. According to this argument, it would be beneficial for all partners if Germany would take the lead in that process, preferably along with France. Almost every state of Europe has experienced an upsurge in populist and euroskeptic parties. The only exception is Germany, which makes it even in this re-nationalised public sphere one of the most committed members of the European integration. Plus, Germany also may have a feeling of responsibility because it has benefited the most from the Eurozone through its increased exports and these export surpluses also contribute to the prevailing imbalances among the member states.

If we are considering the implementation of such *Reformstau*, comparing the party programmes, all parties are for countering the democratic deficit, but only *Die Grünen*

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

(Grüne-Bundestag, 06.02.2016) and the SPD (Kaczmarek, 6.02.2016) are advocating a 'deeper integration' For the CDU, it has seemed to be a taboo topic since the outbreak of the crisis.

Two important factors influence the future of European integration: the attitudes of the parties and public opinion. The political parties reference public opinion when it comes to a deeper reform of the EU. In other words, they are saying that it would be risky to make radical changes in the treaties right now, when public support for the EU is so low, (Peet & La Guardia, 2014, p. 177). On the other hand, Habermas says that political parties do not correctly inform people about the long-term benefits of the integration.

Peet and La Guardia (2014, p.73) apparently does not agree with Habermas. They claim that the political parties themselves are ambivalent about the best solution and the fact that the French and German point of view is different makes a possible solution more cumbersome to implement. More precisely, Germany is less sympathetic to the so-called profligate countries and demands more discipline with the ominous example of the CDU finance minister Schäuble, who proposed in 2010 the suspension of the voting rights of some states who violated Eurozone budget rules. (Die Welt, 27.07.2010). On the other hand France, especially after electing Hollande who is also known as the 'champion of the south, (Peet & La Guardia, 2014, p. 73) is speaking out against Germany's austerity course, urging for more growth oriented policies.

The size of Germany's economy and population puts pressure on German political parties to undertake more responsibility in their Europapolitik. This is an unexpected challenge because Germany is traditionally a strong economic power but it has preferred to cede political decisions to other countries, most typically to the French. By looking at the official slogan of the CDU by saying a 'united Europe means common rules' (CDU website, 2016), we can conclude that mainstream German Europapolitik typically favours norms and rules in problem solving, rather than power politics.

Among the German parties there is a consensus on promoting a common military and foreign policy for the EU which is a rarity throughout Europe, even if they have different aims: the AfD sees a common European foreign policy as the means to

detach from the support of the United States, while the SPD would be motivated by the prospect of stability of the region). There is a consensus because both German and EU foreign policies have the same objectives: they are both new and emerging, trying to find their place in the international scene. The EU, as the biggest economy in the world, is, similar to Germany, an economic giant, but a political and military pygmy. The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 created the post of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, which would enable Europe to play a larger global political role. The young institution of EU foreign ministers had some successes, but all in all many considered it disappointing because the common foreign minister was still overshadowed by the foreign ministers of the EU member states. (Peet and La Guardia, 2014, p. 144). The common action is facing with a number of challenges, such as the difficulties to secure the consent of member countries to a genuine common foreign policy. The main problem is with large members, namely France and the UK, who see themselves as having a global role on their own. Both are nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council and this position makes them very reluctant to follow a European agenda, whilst living in their world of past grandeur.

3.3. *Zivilmacht*

Being a *Zivilmacht* is one of the common traits attributed to both the EU and Germany (Maull, 1990/91). A *Zivilmacht*, similarly to a soft power, emphasises state cooperation in order to achieve its objectives. There is also a shift towards economic ways of solving challenges, rather than a military solution.

‘For West Germany, Europeanisation was not simply instrumental, it reflected a real moral and emotional engagement – but nor was it purely idealistic.’ (Kundnani, p. 31)

Kundnani argues that the concept of *Zivilmacht* did not evolve in Germany because of value-based convictions but simply by necessities and also overtly following its national interests. Developing economically was the only possible way of gaining power, because the Bonn republic was willing to use force only in form of self-defence. The leftover capacity was thus used for improving economy and trade. *Die Linke* criticises *Zivilmacht* in a sense that they find the term connected to the ‘trading state’, which, instead of territorial expansion, expands its trading capacities (the arms

trade being the most notorious example they are criticising). The Europeanisation was also a tool to solve the German question, by encouraging a post-national mentality.

In the previous chapter it was concluded that embedding the country into the Western community helped to dissolve fears about a German dominance. Germany, for the first time of its history, is today surrounded by allies and partners. Kundnani nevertheless no longer describes Germany as a *Zivilmacht*, because of its economic assertiveness within Europe. (Kundnani, 103).

3.4. The European Council

During the crisis a power shift took place among European institutions which involved the comeback of nation-states. Since the establishment of the European Community, the power relations among the EU institutions have always altered. In the early decades, the Commission was exceptionally important, because many new rules, directives had to be proposed and passed. The biggest winner nowadays is the European Council at the expense of the European Commission and European Parliament in the big strategic questions, despite that the European parliament also gained some more power on the legislative field as a reaction in order to counter the prevailing democratic deficit in the EU. The European Council represents the member states' governments and its emerging power on the big strategical decisions is an evident sign that in the crisis national actors are prevailing more than European institutions. This is an inescapable consequence of the recent EU institutional structure, because the national governments are in charge of the resources in order to bail out indebted countries and banks.

The European Council makes no binding decisions, but focuses on political pressure and occasional threats on other states. The national parliaments also need to align themselves with the decisions of the European Council in order to avoid sanctions. This also contributes to the democratic deficit. This undermining of democracy caused an uproar especially in two different camps among the political parties: the defenders of nation-states, e.g. AfD, and those who are against the political intervention in the market such as the FDP.

To the question whether decisions are easier to solve on the national, or transnational level, my interviewee gave a third solution for solving the problems of Europe, which

made me think about the role of the grassroots movements in making a European cosmopolitan society to be a reality:

‘I think you neglect those solutions which are happening on local levels. If you look at the refugee crisis, a lot of people organise themselves on a local level, without any policy. Of course there has to be coordination, and national and European bodies who try to support that but I think that this is the way forward, not a discussion whether a country should agree on its own or should agree as the EU. First let’s see how it works. As we already mentioned before, grassroots movements have a big role here. These movements are happening already, even if they are not seem as political.’

3.5. Democratic deficit

Establishing a European cosmopolitan democracy would centre around the civil sphere, which is today not the perceived reality among citizens. On the contrary, they perceive European institutions as intransparent and distant.

Since European integration began, it was a project pursued by the elites above the heads of the populations. The democratic deficit was already a pressing matter before the crisis, and was exacerbated since then. Compared to Europeanisation of yesterday, the European integration is no longer associated with an economic miracle. In order to overcome the democratic deficit, the EU would need to transfer more democracy to its institutions.

The crisis demanded a new dimension of market regulation, where a cosmopolitan democracy can fulfil the role of a normal state based on mutual trust. Habermas argues for the transnationalisation of democracy by saying that ‘the inclusion of the citizens in supranational decision-making processes is not keeping pace with the legal domestication of the intensified cooperation among the states but we cannot qualify this trend as a civilising process as long as international organisations only exercise their mandates on the basis of international treaties, hence in forms of law, but not yet in accordance with democratically generated law.’ (Habermas, 2015, p 56)

On the other hand, if the transnationalisation of democracy does not take place, the alternative will be a so-called post-democratic executive federalism. Paradoxically, the AfD, and many other populist parties which demand for more democracy in their programmes and warn against more EU-centralism, are actually shifting Europe

towards a post-democratic executive federalism, under the heading of a 'Europe of nations'. In reality, while they want to make the role of the nation-states stronger, they are at the same time promoting the intergovernmental sovereignty of the European Council. With the authorisation of the European Council, more and more intransparent and informal decisions and agreements will be made which have to be accepted by disempowered state parliaments under the weight of political sanctions. In other words, the result is a post-democratic bureaucratic federation. (Habermas, 2011, p. 33)

'Without democratic roots, a technocracy would have neither the power nor the motivation to accord sufficient weight to the demands of the electorate for social justice, status security, public services and collective goods. ' (Habermas, 2015, p. 11)

In this quote Habermas warns against the widening gap between rich and poor citizens and states in the EU. Growing social divisions are hindering legitimacy since disappointed citizens are less enthusiastic about participation in elections. The situation is worsened through the empowerment of the European Council, showing how short-term national interests were prevailing. In other words, the legitimacy of the EU is endangered when the emphasis is on national governments. Thus the EU executive organs are playing against parliaments.(Habermas, 2015, p. 33) The participation of the Council members itself is not completely legitimate, since it was not elected in its European Council-format.

Habermas is critical of the political parties on the issue of the democratic deficit because the parties are not informing the people about their decreased competencies, which corrodes democracy (Habermas, 2012, p.130). But political parties are reluctant to transfer these powers, because they are sticking to their own remaining competencies. Democratisation could help in that the deals would not be followed by national interests, but through representatives elected by a majority.

3.6. Lost sovereignty?

Populist parties like AfD tend to argue against a denser network of international institutions which in their view would result in a 'loss of sovereignty' (AfD website, 23.09.2015). In another article, they are claiming that there is a loss of rule of law due

to the interference of Brussels against the state sovereignty. (AfD website,13.01.2016)

In their view, the Europeanisation of sovereignty (through 'diktat from Brussels') implies a decreasing level of legitimation, and democracy.

Not only with AfD, there is a more general misunderstanding of identifying popular and state sovereignty as the same. Habermas's aim was to prove that restricting national sovereignty by supranational authorities does not mean that the rights of citizens are curtailed. Therefore, popular sovereignty does not depend on state sovereignty. It is enough if popular sovereignty is present as the relationship of free and equal citizens, the organisation of collective decision-making, and civic solidarity (Habermas, 2012, p 38). Habermas advises that the ultimate decision-making process should not be hierarchised as it is in federal states. Instead, he advocates a so-called double sovereign. The constituting authorities are, on the one hand, the entire citizenry of Europe, and, on the other, the peoples of Europe.

Keeping some sovereignty on the nation-state level would also dispel fears about the disintegration of nation-states, since, in Habermas' view, the nation-state not only embodies the diverse cultures of Europe, but also the guarantor of the rule of law and freedom it has gained from the absolutist rulers since the French revolution. Since member states guarantee further rights and freedoms just as nation-states do, reconfiguring the structures of such a democratic commonwealth would not involve a loss of legitimation either. Dividing sovereignty nevertheless includes the restriction of state sovereignty, which is desirable in the course of the civilising process of the international community which aims at pacifying states through international cooperation.

To conclude, sovereignty is falsely considered one of the biggest sacrifices during the European integration project, making it less attractive in the eyes of the people. Transnationalising state sovereignty can take place without giving up popular sovereignty, namely with two innovations: first, the submission of member states to EU law and also the division of sovereignty between the constituting subjects of the citizen and the peoples of the nation-states. (Habermas, 2011, p. 34) According to Habermas the sharing of sovereignty can be a way to legitimise the European Union. Armin von Bogdandy also advocates such division which would be especially

important for citizens, since the individual would then become 'the subjects of legitimation, who are both citizens of states and the union.' (Bogdandy and Bast, 2009, p. 38)

3.7. The nation-states strike back

For long decades, national consciousness was fostered by schools, historians, press and the military. It became the superior identity, more important than religious or regional affiliation. As poverty, inequality and migration produces fear, people tend to cling to their emotionally burdened nation-states and not to an unknown, distant Europe, even if the problems cannot be solved on national level, but only through collective action.

It was already concluded previously that some political parties in Germany fear that, with the disappearance of nation-states, Western values will also disappear, so they have a well-grounded argument to preserve them. It is notable that they do not fear that other states would endanger their democratic traditions. The suspicion is generated against supranational institutions. This shows that European countries, especially the EU-15 have a largely similar political culture. What is still missing is the lack of political communication on European issues.

Nation-states are the only means through which citizens are able to express their democratic will. It is no wonder that there is an attachment to them: the political identity of the people stems from where actually they perceive, where the politics is 'made'. The problem is that the nation-state is increasingly unable to fulfil the needed governance. This is not yet discussed among the voters of political parties and citizens and many believe that democracy can be implemented only on a national level.

The transnationalisation of democracy is still so contested, that Habermas receives criticism even from the left: the left-wing (Hank, 26. Oktober 2014)sociologist Wolfgang Streeck for instance would prefer to return to the 'defensive nation-state constellation' and retreat back into state sovereignty. Streeck also argues against Habermas's conception of solidarity and claims that there can only be national solidarity, only within nation-state territory. (Habermas, 2015, p 89) He is arguing against the exaggerated Europeanisation, and the removal of the nation-state, referring to the 'fragile social integration of imperfect nation-states like Belgium or Spain.'

According to this narrative, if the removal of nation-state is too complicated for instance in Spain it could be catastrophic in a Greater Europe.

I also enquired about the role of the nation-state from my interviewee and received the following disappointing answer on the future of a cosmopolitan European democracy:

‘I am not sure if we continue on the road of European integration. (...) What is happening is that nation-states are ’fighting back’ and they are able to do that because they run the national elections. In national elections they get to talk about all sorts of unrealistic policies, and in the same time, a large portion of foreign affairs, energetic policy and economic affairs are dealt in Brussels. In that sense integration has peaked and I am not sure if nation-states will allow more integration. Even if there will be some integration, it won’t be sold as integration.’

The implication of the interviewee’s answer was similar to that of Habermas. He also accuses political parties when they are talking about irrelevant things and their discourse is not Europeanised enough in an arena where many things are decided on the European level. In other words they do not have the courage for future integration. I asked directly which the real obstacles for integration are, political parties or public opinion?

‘I think the leadership. If you see that Merkel showed some statemanship during the refugee crisis and you compare it with the attitudes of other European leaders, then the others all are playing to their own base in terms of ‘we will protect our borders’. It’s quite shocking. The real battle is between the European Commission and the countries.’

3.8. Solidarity

The term ‘solidarity’ was a central tenet in the election manifestos of *Die Linke* and *Die Grünen* at the EU elections in 2014. The least frequent use of the term was detected in the FDP’s programme. *Die Linke* discusses a ‘community of solidarity’ and the ‘solidarity of the poor’. At the same time, the CDU’s slogan was ‘solidarity for solidarity.’ The latter catchphrase implies the willingness for solidarity, provided that the ‘beneficiaries of solidarity’ will also exchange something, for instance initiating more reforms. (CDU European elections programme, p. 14)

Habermas would very likely approve the position of *Die Linke* and *Die Grünen*, who regard solidarity as a special component in European integration. The redistribution, such as debt mutualisation, is seen negatively in the short term, but, according to Habermas, it is political solidarity which would contribute to a shared political perspective. (Habermas, 2015, p. 28) Such a degree of the Europeanisation of political perspectives is needed for tackling the crisis, and not the loans which are spent on a state level, causing more tensions among member states.

Previously, we concluded that Germany exemplarily prefers to follow rules and norms in the EU. As Merkel said, a “A good European is not one that seeks an agreement at any price, a good European is rather the one that respects the European treaties and relevant national laws and helps in this way to ensure the stability of the eurozone is not damaged.” (Levine, 7.8. 2015)

Solidarity is nevertheless something distinct from legal obligations, because it cannot be enforced or sanctioned. It is more like ethical obligations. Solidarity also cannot be something connected to the interests of the states, because it has an emphasis on the common good, rather than the legal rights and interests of individual actors. Solidarity is typically among such individuals who share a special relationship and not merely a legal one. Here, Habermas draws a parallel to the EU because, in his view, the increasingly permeable borders of European nation-states is one of the factors which constitute a special relationship among EU members.

Cultural and linguistic differences play some role in influencing solidarity in a society. Habermas (1994, p. 493) gives here the following example: ‘It was above all in Switzerland that a federation developed that was strong enough to balance the ethnic tensions within a multicultural association of citizens’. Therefore the social inequalities between the member states are more important. It is not by chance then, that the European solidarity was challenged in times when the gap of social inequalities became wider than ever, especially between Northern and Southern Europe.

3.9. Responsibility of political parties

There are no widespread political movements connected to EU integration and Habermas draws a parallel to this fact and the ‘victimising’ stance of political parties on EU integration. Political parties define themselves first of all on national levels.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

Thus, there is a hesitation on the part of political elites concerning the transnationalisation of democracy. Habermas gives three main reasons why further EU integration does not have widespread popularity and reasons why it is not addressed and advocated by parties as beneficial for everybody.

First, according to the national-interest argument, Germany 'rediscovered' its nation-state since the reunification and it wishes to return to 'normality', thus following its national interest more. When European integration started, it was clearly in the interest of the Federal Republic, namely against the Soviet threat which the Federal Republic was unable to counter alone. Now the two important factors, the Soviet Union and also Germany as a threat have disappeared.

Second, the 'demoscopic opportunism', or the lack of Europeanisation of national elections means that political parties do not inform voters about European issues because they fear it is an unpopular topic and think that they are more able to gain votes with local issues. Moreover, in many cases, the EU also serves as a scapegoat also among mainstream parties, e.g. its policies on trivial issues, whereas the nation-states are exactly those who authorise the EU about their scope of action. When parties adjust their agenda completely to the public mood, Habermas calls it a post-truth democracy.

Third, media and politics are coalescing and the media is no longer acting to counterbalance the perspectiveless politics. If politics is unable or unwilling to lead an European discourse, then media should take this responsibility. (Habermas, 2011. 131-137)

'If they do not make clear the necessity of changing the treaties because they are afraid of the public opinion, then we are on the way towards a market-compliant postdemocratic executive federation.' (Georg-August-Zinn Preis, 2012)

This delaying Europeanisation is due to the fact that even if mainstream parties are aware of the long-term benefits, they are afraid to point them out to their voters because they fear the potential of the political far-right. In other words, they are not ready to use discourse which deviates from what is publicly accepted and relies too much on opinion polls. Habermas in his speech came to the conclusion that it is no

longer true that individuals make history, because they are only thinking in voting periods and are afraid to adapt risky policies.

The CDU, which was known for being the ‘party of small steps’ also rather disregarded European topics in the election periods, because people associate with the EU in an increasingly in a negative way. This obviously questions whether we can still call the CDU the Europapartei. Daniel Dettling, the policy adviser to the CDU said in one interview that the ‘CDU wants such an EU which, above all, is also useful for us here in Germany’ (Tagesschau, 07.12.2014).

However, not only the political right can be criticised for its short-term policies. The Leftist parties were criticised by Habermas in the following way:

‘The European parties on the Left are set to repeat their historical error of 1914. They too are folding out of fear of a social mainstream susceptible to right-wing populism.’ (Habermas, 2015, p.102)

Historically, the social-democrats and leftist parties more generally were those who broke out from the ‘cages of nation-states’ and established new spheres of policy making. But now, even they are communicating with their voters around national issues and through national political candidates. Habermas encourages a more argumentative political European discourse rather than one based on opinion polls.

On the other hand, there are a couple of exceptions when political parties willingly transferred some tasks to a higher entity, for instance to the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. Nevertheless there were also some opportunistic reasons, because in that way they avoided taking responsibility for unpopular decisions and they rather attributed them to other actors like the Central Bank, in order to keep their voters.

A deeper integrated Europe is also in the interest of the ‘donor countries’ because it would involve a democratic empowerment of the Europapolitik. But even in mainstream party programmes, the EU is not always seen as a positive project. There are clear criticisms in the party programmes, such as the emphasis on Christian values or a fairer contribution to the EU budget (CDU), more direct democracy, a clearer and common foreign and security policy (SPD) or more integration of the domestic market and economic liberalisation (FDP). Criticism is fine, but what is missing

according to Habermas is that the political parties are not trying to win over their populations to at least participate in the European project. (Habermas,2015,p. 31)

In the first place it is the task of political parties to inform their citizens about the weight of pan-European decisions. Because of the lack of Europeanisation, there is an asymmetry between the democratic participation of the people and the lack of participation as the citizens of the EU. Habermas argues that the more European citizens realise how deep the decisions made on European level are influencing their everyday life, the more interested they will be to claim their rights as the citizens of the EU. (Habermas 2011, p. 31)

To sum up, political parties are not encouraging Europeanisation, because they are afraid it would lead to their weakening. Parties are also reluctant to explain the short-term sacrifices and long-term benefits, in other words providing people with perspectives and arguments. Habermas criticises the lukewarm response of the mainstream parties and he demands they take up a more courageous and inspiring discourse.

The interviewee nevertheless was more optimistic on the educatory functions of parties on European politics:

'I think the political parties are just smart and in Europe there are no initiatives at the moment to try to breathe new life to the European project... In many countries this topic just does not sell at all. There are progressive parties who promote it actively, but it is only one fragment. (...) Why parties are not educating they population? I think they are trying, but maybe it is true that it does become quite complicated and quite difficult to everyone to prove the 'European dream....'

3.10. The future of integration. Bygone European salience or integration at gunpoint?

It is a popular conception of the European Union that it should serve for the rest of the world as a good example concerning the use of soft power, reconciliation, and international cooperation. We see similar views in the German parties as well: in their European election programme we can read a lot about what Europe already achieved, which arouses an impression of complacency from their side (e.g. when the EU received the Nobel Peace prize, it was also cleverly used as political capital in the

case of many parties). On the other side, what really gets more ambiguous is whether they have a concept and an alternative about the future.

When European nations decided to live together peacefully after the Second World War, a domestication of state power began. For some countries, like Germany, peace has a special importance - statistics show that for the all EU countries combined, human rights are the number one values that represent the European Union, whereas for the Federal Republic, peace is in first place. (de.statista.com, 2015)

Nevertheless domestication of state power now demands more than merely the pacification of state relations. The new challenges are, for instance, the regulation of the unfettered markets which permeate state borders. A state coalition is not effective enough. Therefore, a cosmopolitan community of states and citizens is required. Market regulation is not the only argument for the continuation of the Europeanisation process: human rights are also a pressing issue which needs to be institutionalised globally.

3.10.1. The lost importance of integration

Cosmopolitanism and human rights were never as convincing as after the end of the Second World War. After experiencing the consequences of Nazi barbarism, Germany committed itself to a united and peaceful Europe. This Europeanisation happened, first of all, for practical reasons because it was a way to regain trust from the European Community.

Today, public opinion is unfavourable as to the deepening of the integration. Since the last diplomatic wrangling around the Lisbon treaty, a lot of countries are reluctant to push to proceed more with the European project. As we concluded in the previous chapters, parties are using the excuse of negative public opinion to continue their day-to-day tasks and preserve the status quo. Habermas says that the political parties are responsible for a possible inertia in the European integration, but it is also important to point out that Merkel at home also faces restrictions. The biggest protection for German sovereignty for instance is provided by the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Even if Merkel wants 'more Europe' as their official party programme declared , the Basic Law did not allow for instance debt mutualisation.

I attempted to find some historical perspective for why the EU can become less important for Germany - for instance, it is that a lot of people today take peace and democracy self-evident and do not see the surely large contribution of the EU to it, or that Germany already gained back the trust of the international community and now can live in a normality, plus the Soviet threat has also disappeared. The answer was:

‘You should be careful with historical arguments because everything happened within its own context and things are rather complex. The European integration after World War 2 was a transatlantic mechanism for stability as much as it was for American defence purposes, not to mention the national interests of the Europeans. I think it is too easy to say to draw that picture that we were afraid after the war so we created this Europe together. There were also always national interests in the picture.’

3.10.2. Integration at gunpoint

For Habermas, without more Europeanisation, the countries of Europe would not only endanger democracy, but also they would miss the opportunity to regulate their markets, and to show a world a working transnational democracy. A transnational democracy would represent every citizen in his or her dual capacity as a directly participating citizen of a future political union, on the one hand, and as an indirectly participating member of one of the European peoples, on the other. Besides Habermas, many intellectuals throughout Europe agree, that the reform of the Eurozone and changes in the treaties have to be made because the currency union without political union cannot function without complications. Changes in the treaties have to be made so Europe can avoid inertia, which was named as the biggest threat to the European project, according to Slavoj Žižek. The point of view of the Glienicker Group, the group of German economists, journalists and political scientists – is that a stronger dose of federalism, banking union, controlled transfer mechanism, and common unemployment mechanism, common budget is needed for Europe in order to eventually correct its structural problems. (Peet & La Guardia, p 163)

Habermas’ argument is that an integration would not merely be in the interests of the member states, but moreover, the ‘systemic constraints’ of a globalised economy are actually leaving no other choice for the countries but integrating. He calls this constraint the so called ‘integration at gunpoint’. This compulsion would explain why the perceived soft euroskepticism of the CDU later transformed into a pragmatic

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

Europapolitik, with austerity measures and lending to other countries. (Habermas, 2012, p. 129)

Since the member states are already so much interconnected that it would cost too much to disintegrate, and also because of ‘systemic constraints’ as Habermas puts it, the member states have no other choice but integrating. I asked my interviewee whether he agrees with Habermas or not.

‘If you look at the third article of the Treaty on the European Union, it’s about the well-being of the citizens. In a certain level people do realize that the standard of living is guaranteed or at least is being developed through European cooperation, besides the national and local levels. When they say this is what the quality of drinking water should be, and if it is a requirement for countries to fix the quality of their drinking water then I think nobody is holding no-one at gunpoint.’

At the end of the interview I asked the director if it is true that since a further EU integration has so little popularity (and anyhow it has to be democratically undertaken), that perhaps we reached the ‘end of history’ and this is the best Europe we ever had, despite of its periodic crises:

(...) I don’t think that the thesis about the end of history is the final stage. Europe is not only criticised by right-wing populists, but also by left wing. They may have a point when they are criticising the way Europe entrenches capitalism. That there is still a lot to do before it really becomes a people’s project. But I think the argument that we had two World Wars and now it is peace and congratulations, well done Europe is flawed, because peace is not only the absence of war between countries, but there is whole range of concepts such as social peace, poverty and welfare. The last thing we should say that we are done.

(...) I also have to say, that our society is in crisis. Last week I was in France and European values or not, it doesn’t matter, you just see it. You see the segregation, you see that people are afraid, you see security everywhere. And there are not really answers. We have to look beyond the political structures – it is not just our nations

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

who should decide or the EU should decide. It is really is about finding a way to make politics about life again.

To sum up the third chapter, with the help of the case studies above I was able to identify the three factors which are hindering the development of cosmopolitan democracy. In the most cases the lack of solidarity, pursuing national interests and fragmented discourses came hand in hand together, as if they are mutually reassuring each other. For instance the short-sightedness of political parties is both the result of the lack of understanding due to the isolated discourses, but in the same time they are also sometimes recklessly following their interests, with no regard to other countries. It was also concluded that Germany is loosing its *Zivilmacht* character, which was previously very determining for Germany in the years of the Bonn republic. Now Germany became 'normalised' which in the same time means that it no longer finds it controversial to follow its national interests, plus the crisis made it less empathic with the so called 'profligate' countries.

CHAPTER 4: Conclusion

The study discussed the applicability of Habermasian cosmopolitan democracy in the German party system. The way of enquiry was contrasting the perceptions of political parties to an idealistic state of European cosmopolitan democracy. The paper argued that even if Germany is having a pro-European party system, there are still obstacles in the way to achieve a European cosmopolitan democracy. The prevailing gaps between the realities of German parties and the cosmopolitan democracy were distinguished by the hypothesis on three different groups: emerging national interests, the fragmentation of national discourses and the lack of solidarity.

The model of Habermasian cosmopolitan democracy was applied on the political parties of Germany in order to enquire the presence of these hindering differences in the discourse of political parties. Therefore the primary subjects of the study were German political actors, whose discourse was analysed for traces of transnationalising elements. Besides discourse analysis, comparative analysis was also carried out between parties and Habermas' writings in order to determine whether the parties are fulfilling the requisites of cosmopolitan democracies. The model of Habermas thus was applied to the positions of the political parties in order to find out their degree of Europeanisation.

It was concluded in the first chapter that Germany has a pro-European party system and Europeanisation of the party programmes, nevertheless its elections still remained oriented towards the nation-state. The appearance of new parties happened through internal changes, rather than Europeanisation. The second chapter with a historical perspective helped to understand the European unification processes of today. In both cases, namely during the *Westbindung* and today prevailing national interests are playing a role, but in the historical example, Adenauer was able to connect the long-term interests of the German citizens with the *Westbindung*, whereas in today's perspective political leaders are more hesitant to inform their voters about the long-term benefits of integration. I pointed out another parallel in the case of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, which was in the first place about reconciliation and against Germany's isolation, whereas Germany's newfangled orientation towards other non-democratic countries has a deeply economic character.

Hromada: The Europe Dilemma of the Berlin Republic

With this historical background I attempted to show the evolution towards a cosmopolitan democracy: first I started with the Europeanisation of political parties as a frame of reference, then in the second chapter, the *Westbindung*, which was the first instance of domesticating relations between Germany and the Western world, triggering the democratisation of Germany and reconciliation among the peoples of Europe. Then the current economic crisis prompted Habermas to suggest the cosmopolitan democracy as an even higher civilisatory integration of international systems, which has the potential of solving the problems of the crisis-stricken Europe, similarly as the *Westbindung* did for the Bonn Republic. Therefore the main message is that as our world and above all Europe gets more interconnected, the issues are getting more difficult to solve only on nation-state level.

The economic crisis can only be solved through a long term-solution, but the CDU's short term vision was rather about calming down the markets and the citizens. The austerity measures were decided on national level, showing the fragmentation of the discourses of political elites in Europe. The resurgence of nation-states was also observed, which is typical for crisis stricken times, when people are trying to cling to their national identity, rather than a distant European Union. Since then, Germany is loosing its *Zivilmacht* position because its economic interests are getting a bigger salience compared to its commitment of civilising international relations on a higher and higher level. Furthermore, I proved that the AfD was wrong when they were claiming that the transnationalisation of sovereignty eventually infringes the rule of law. I argued with the Habermasian division of sovereignty.

For continuing the work with Habermas's cosmopolitan democracy, it would be interesting to apply it on the political parties of the Visegrád countries. Such alternatives are largely unknown in the Visegrád four, exactly because of the mentioned fragmentation of national political elites, but introducing this discourse would be beneficial for the Visegrád four in countering their rising nationalistic tendencies. I would expect different results as in the case of Germany, since the Federal Republic developed a highly critical and post-heroic society, where a cosmopolitan society is no longer an utopia.

This paper is written firstly for the European citizens because a further Europeanisation has to happen democratically, not in a market-compliant, post-

democratic way. What for the political parties is relevant from this study is the observation of a rather passive, inert and inward-looking and isolated discourse, with an economically- and opinion polls- centred Europapolitik following the rules of the community rather than a value-based solidarity.

Despite of the high interconnectedness of Europe, political parties are still thinking along the lines of national interests. The responsibility of political parties is to make citizens realise the decisions made by the EU which would contribute to the perception that the EU is no longer an elitist project. For solving the problems of Europe, courage is needed to transfer their discourse one level higher. A cosmopolitan democracy would not infringe citizens from their democratic rights, rather it would give them a larger say both as the people of their states and as citizens of the European Union, contributing to a shared perspective for all Europeans. If such a high level of solidarity with its European partners were fostered, Germany would indeed fulfil the ambitious task set out by the German Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker on the unification Day in 1990: 'We hope to serve world peace in a united Europe.'

RESUMÉ

V prvej kapitole opisujem „europanizáciu“, ktorá slúži ako referenčný rámec porovnania reality nemeckých politických strán s idealistickou predstavou európskeho kozmopolitanizmu. Po zadefinovaní „europanizácie“ a zdôraznení špecifických osobitostí Nemecka definujem túto krajinu ako štát s eurofilným straníckym systémom aj napriek malému vplyvu spôsobeného „europanizáciou“, mimo programového obsahu strán.

Druhá kapitola poskytuje historickú prípadovú štúdiu, t. j. ako politické strany videli začiatky procesu zjednotenia Európy. Historická perspektíva pomáha pochopiť dnešné zjednocujúce procesy. V oboch prípadoch prevládajúci národný záujem zohral svoju úlohu, avšak v historickej štúdii Adenauer bol schopný úspešnejšie spojiť dlhodobé záujmy nemeckých občanov prostredníctvom idey *Westbindung* – na rozdiel od súčasných politických lídrov, ktorí viac váhajú informovať svojich voličov o dlhodobých benefitoch integrácie. V tejto kapitole je argument podporujúci zachovanie suverenity vnímaný ako druhoradý.

Majúc prehľad o motívoch, môžeme vyvodiť záver, že *Ostpolitik* nemôže byť kompletne považovaná za mechanizmus len cez prostriedky Realpolitiky, tak ako *Westbindung* nebol taktiež len produktom idealizmu, ale viac menej historická nutnosť. Vyúsťuje to do debaty o „normálnosti“, ktorá sa taktiež objavuje v tretej kapitole, pojednávajúcej o kríze v Európskej únii. Egon Bahr ako prvý navrhol nemiešať skúsenosti z barbarskej nacistickej histórie s politickými problémami, ale nasledovať národné záujmy ako každý normálny štát. Nemecko však čelí traumám z minulosti a stalo sa *Zivilmacht* v rokoch Bonnskej republiky, čo sa zmení, až keď sa Schröder stane kancelárom. V druhej kapitole som poznamenal dôležitý rozdiel medzi novou *Ostpolitikou* za Schrödera a originálnou *Ostpolitikou* Brandtu. Brandtova *Ostpolitik* bola hlavne zameraná na proces zmierenia a proti izolácii Nemecka. Naopak, za Schrödera mala hlboký ekonomický charakter.

Tretia kapitola predstavuje porovnanie nemeckých politických strán a Habermasovej kozmopolitnej demokracie. Tu je hypotéza priamo predstavená testovaním prekážok realizácie kozmopolitnej demokracie, ktorá civilizuje medzinárodné vzťahy na omnoho vyššom stupni. Týmito prekážkami boli nedostatok solidarity, roztrieštenie politických elít a prevládajúci krátkodobý záujem národných štátov. Habermas

navrhol vyšší stupeň integrácie s cieľom prekonať tieto rozdiely. Hneď prvá časť tejto štúdie je o budúcnosti Habermasovej vízie dlhodobého riešenia politickej únie, zatiaľ čo CDU bolo zamerané iba na krátkodobé riešenie problémov, a to upokojovaním trhov a občanov. Tieto opatrenia, rovnako ako úsporné opatrenia, boli vykonané na národnej úrovni, dokazujúce tak roztrieštenosť názorov politických elít v Európe. Na druhej strane, neexistujú žiadne roztrieštené percepcie porovnávajúce Nemecko a Európsku úniu, pokiaľ teda ide o zahraničnú a vojenskú politiku vzhľadom na ich podobné ciele.

V časti týkajúcej sa demokratického deficitu, ktorý ešte viac prehĺbila kríza, som úzko prepojil problém demokracie s nedostatkom solidarity. Solidarita medzi občanmi EÚ sa totiž narušila, pretože občania môžu voliť len v obmedzenej miere k vzdelávacím inštitúciám a stále zostávajúcim elitárskym projektom EÚ.

Ďalej odmietam mylnú predstavu populistickej AfD strany, ktorá vyhlasuje, že EÚ odoberá suverenitu národných štátov a táto strata suverenity znamená, že právny štát a demokracia sú medzi členskými štátmi EÚ porušené. Odmietol som to kvôli Habermasovmu rozdeleniu suverenity, ktoré dokazuje, že štátna suverenita neznamena, že práva občanov sú porušené. Ale aj keď by štátna suverenita neporušila suverenitu občanov, Habermas by ponechal istú časť suverenity aj v jeho ideálnej kozmopolitnej demokracii preto, lebo národné štáty vo väčšine európskych krajín sú stále symbolom slobody, ktorá bola získaná po odstránení univerzalistickej aristokracie. Napriek tomu bude potrebné určité porušenie štátnej suverenity, aby sa upokojilo medzinárodné spoločenstvo, a to na vyššej úrovni.

V ďalšej časti som sa zaoberal návratom národných štátov. V časoch krízy majú občania tendenciu lipnúť na najprirodzenejšej identite, ktorú sú schopní nájsť, a tak sa identifikujú s celým národom. Niet divu, že spojenie s národným štátom je silné, keďže doteraz občania vyjadrovali svoje demokratické túžby hlavne prostredníctvom národných štátov. Problém s národnými štátmi v súčasnej kríze je skutočnosť, že dôležité rozhodnutia sú už na medzinárodnej úrovni. Táto téma je však pre národné strany, ktoré nechcú informovať svojich voličov o znížení zmenšení právomoci, tabu. Habermasov koncept existencie demokracie môže aj mimo národných štátov je prekvapivo kontroverzný. Dokonca aj bežné (obyčajné) strany chcú robiť politiku na národnej úrovni, pretože tvrdia, že solidarita môže existovať len na úrovni národného

štátu. Pre Habermasa je solidarita kľúčovým princípom pre zjednotenie Európy, pretože politická solidarita by prispela k rozšíreniu politických perspektív. Takáto spoločná perspektíva by mohla pomôcť prekonať krízu bez pôžičiek, ktoré nie sú žiadané ani na strane dlžníka, ani na strane veriteľa. Dospelo sa k záveru, že Nemecko už radšej dodržiava pravidlá a normy v EÚ. Solidarita však takáto nie je: podľa Habermasa, solidarita nemôže byť presadzovaná a existuje medzi aktérmi, ktorí majú „špeciálny“ vzťah, nie nevyhnutne právny vzťah. Dodáva, že toto nemá nič spoločné s etnickými alebo jazykovými rozdielmi, skôr ide o prevažujúce spoločenské rozdiely medzi členskými štátmi.

Z oddialenia integrácie EÚ obvinil Habermas nacionalistické predstavy, pri ktorých, v prípade Nemecka, môžeme uvažovať, že sa snažia znovu nadobudnúť normalitu. Druhý dôvod tejto stagnácie je spojený s politickými stranami, a síce preto, lebo politické strany neinformujú občanov o európskych otázkach, pretože sa obávajú, že sú príliš nepopulárne, čo vedie k post-pravdivostnej demokracii, keď dôležitá časť rozhodovania nie je známa. Porovnal som CDU politiku malých krokov týkajúcich sa finančnej krízy, ktoré sú príkladom post-pravdivostnej demokracie, avšak Merkelová preukázala štátnictvo pokiaľ ide o utečeneckú krízu. Na druhej strane, ľavicové strany by mohli byť taktiež kritizované za ignorovanie ich dedičstva národného štátu. Habermas je presvedčený, že ak by si občania uvedomili, aké dôležité rozhodnutia sa robia na úrovni EÚ, mohli by byť viac ochotní podieľať sa na tomto idealistickom európskom kozmopolitizme.

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